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

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The Times
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE WAR

VOL. VII

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The Times

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE WAR

VOLUME VII



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1918

AUTHORITIES QUOTED

For convenience of reference an explanatory list of the abbreviations used in the margin of this volume, to indicate sources of information, is here appended :—

C.O. . . . *Communiqués Officiels.* These are extracted and translated by permission from a French publication entitled 'Nos Marins et la Guerre,' belonging to the well-known series of 'Pages d'Histoire' (Paris and Nancy, Librairie Militaire Berger-Levrault), and containing, amongst other matter of a less official character, the official communications of the French Ministry of Marine.

U.S.D.C. . . . *United States Diplomatic Corresponaence,* a series of publications issued by the American Department of State, and containing 'Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce.'

D.N.S.B. . . *Dutch North Sea Book,* an official publication of the Netherlands Government, entitled 'Diplomatieke Bescheiden betreffende de Vaart in de Noordzee en het Kanaal in Verband met den Oorlogstoestand' (s' Gravenhage-Algemeene Landsdrukkerij—1915). The correspondence extracted from this publication and cited in the present volume is given, in the original, in English as regards the English despatches, and in French as regards the Dutch. The latter have been translated.

K.D. . . . *Kriegs-Depeschen,* a German serial publication entitled 'Kriegs-Depeschen, nach den amtlichen Berichten des W.T.B. [*i.e.*, the Wolff Telegraphic Bureau] zusammengestellt' (Boll u. Pickardt, Verlagsbuchhandlung, Berlin). This serial is largely, but not entirely, identical with that next to be described, and most of the extracts common to both have been taken from the latter. In all cases they have been translated.

K.V. . . *Kriegsverlauf*, another German serial, entitled 'Der Kriegsverlauf, Sammlung der amtlichen Nachrichten von den Kriegsschauplätzen, Depeschen des Deutschen Grossen Hauptquartiers, des Österreichischen Generalstabes, des Türkischen Hauptquartiers, Meldungen von W.T.B., Urkunden und Berichte' (Carl Heymanns Verlag in Berlin W. 8, Mauerstrasse, 43, 44). It is more copious than *K.D.*, and has, therefore, commonly been used in preference.

L.G. . . *The London Gazette.*

CONTENTS

	PAGE
JANUARY 1915	1
FEBRUARY 1915	163
INDEX	479

JANUARY 1915

LOSS OF H.M.S. *FORMIDABLE*

Admiralty, January 1.

The battleship *Formidable* was sunk this morning in the Channel, whether by mine or submarine is not yet certain. Seventy-one survivors have been picked up by a British light cruiser, and it is possible that others may have been rescued by other vessels. *Times*, Jan. 2, 1915.

LIST OF SURVIVORS

Officers

Lieutenant Henry D. Simonds.
Lieutenant Bernard W. Greathed.
Lieutenant James C. J. Soutter.
Engineer Commander Charles J. M. Wallace.[1]
Assistant Paymaster Sidney W. Saxton.
Assistant Paymaster, R.N.R., Francis H. Wakeford.
Carpenter Sydney McClounan.
Artificer Engineer John Stobart.
Midshipman Eustace J. Guinness.
Midshipman Norman F. Hurd-Wood.
Midshipman Denis E. Pelly.
Midshipman W. Derek Stephens
Midshipman Walter L. Agnew.
Midshipman Trethowan T. Wynne.
(Also the names of sixty-six other survivors, petty officers and seamen.)

[1] Suffering from slight injuries.

A trawler arrived in port last night, and landed about sixty-eight men and two officers of the *Formidable*, who had been picked up early in the day in the Channel. *ibid.*

It is understood that these survivors are in addition to those picked up by a light cruiser, and referred to in the Admiralty statement.

January 3.

FURTHER LIST OF SURVIVORS

Times, Jan. 4, 1915. Mr. Daniel Horrigan, gunner; Mr. George Taylor, boatswain; and 117 more petty officers and seamen.

Berlin, January 3.

K.V., Jan. 3, 1915. On January 1st at three in the morning one of our submarines, as it reports by wireless, torpedoed and sank the English battleship *Formidable* in the English Channel not far from Plymouth. The submarine was pursued by destroyers, but not injured.

BEHNCKE,
Acting Chief of the Admiral Staff.

Times, Jan. 4, 1915. There appears to be little doubt now that of the officers and crew of the battleship *Formidable*, which was sunk in the Channel on the morning of New Year's Day, only 201 have been saved.

The ship went down between 3 and 3.30. There were from 700 to 800 men on board at the time. Of the four boats launched, one, a barge, capsized, and several men were thrown out; the second, also a barge, got away with about 70 men, who were picked up by a light cruiser; the third, a pinnace, also with some 60 men, got ashore at Lyme Regis, and the fourth, a launch, with 70 men, after being in a rough sea for about 11 hours, was rescued about 15 miles off Berry Head by the trawler *Provident*, and brought into Brixham.

Survivors have given graphic accounts of the foundering of the battleship and of their terrible experiences, some of which we give below:

Lyme Regis, January 3.

ibid. From the stories told by the seamen who, after fighting death upon a furious sea for four-and-twenty hours, are now in

safety, it is possible to reconstruct the circumstances in which the *Formidable* is believed to have foundered. The battleship was steering westward in the Channel. At 2 o'clock on Friday morning there was a gale blowing and the sea was running high. The first explosion shook the ship with tremendous violence, and there was not a soul on board who did not know she was doomed. Every man, even in the face of this calamity, remained what he had been up to that moment—a British seaman. The officers' orders were obeyed as if the *Formidable* was at manœuvres. The watertight doors were shut and orders given to clear away the boats. This was done with the utmost difficulty.

The *Formidable*, already listing, began rapidly to settle down, and foundered 45 minutes after a second explosion. Captain Loxley and Commander Ballard were last seen on the bridge of the vessel.

Many of the men who perished faced death with surpassing fortitude. They chatted together and smoked; some, it is said, even sang. The boats, with their cargoes of half-dead, half-frozen seamen, attempted to stand by to pick up any men who might have been able to keep afloat. Even after the *Formidable* had gone down, there remained the faintest of faint hopes that some one more might yet be saved. It was as much as the boats could do to keep afloat themselves.

Lyme Regis, a town of some 4000 inhabitants, is one of the most popular of the smaller resorts on this coast. It is built around the curve of a small bay, and its houses almost line the water's edge, being separated from it only by a few yards of shingle. They form a sort of barrier between the ocean and the inner part of the town. In this barrier there is a narrow break where a small promenade begins, and immediately behind this division in the houses there is a public lamp, which between the walls sends out a pale ray of light to the English Channel. It was this gleam that caught the despairing eyes of some of the *Formidable* survivors on Friday night as their boat fought the last stage of a battle with the tempest. Under the guiding light shone the white foam of breakers, and presently the boat's keel grated on the shingle. The men aboard raised a faint shout. It was heard and answered ashore. A policeman hurried into the

surf, and caught a rope flung from the boat. Help came at once from all quarters, and the boat was pulled ashore. There were 57 men in her, nine of them dead already. One by one the half-frozen sailors were carried ashore and up into private houses, where fires were lighted, and hot drinks and soup made ready. All night the townspeople kept awake seeing to the comfort of the survivors. On Friday night three more of the seamen died. They will be buried in Lyme Cemetery on Monday at 2 P.M. The Mayor and Corporation will be present at the funeral, and a firing party will come from Devonport.

The service of intercession at the parish church to-night was attended by all the *Formidable's* survivors who were landed here and were well enough to be present, special pews being reserved for them.

January 2.

After being in their open cutter for nearly twelve hours, two officers and sixty-eight men from H.M.S. *Formidable* were rescued by the Brixham fishing smack *Provident* (owner and skipper, William Pillar), some fifteen miles from Berry Head. They were bearing W.N.W. when seen.

At the time the *Provident* was running before the gale for shelter to Brixham, but when off the Start had to heave to owing to the force of the wind. She had just previously been struck by heavy seas.

The *Provident* was on the starboard tack, when Jack Clarke, the third hand, noticed an open boat under the smack's lee. He shouted to the captain and the mate (F. Carter) to jump up, saying, 'Here 's a sight under our lee.' They were amazed to see a small open boat drifting amid the mountainous seas, with one oar hoisted as a staff, from which was flying the sailor's scarf. The little cutter was hidden from view for minutes together in troughs of the waves.

Captain Pillar swung the *Provident* clear, and the crew, with almost superhuman efforts, took another reef in the mainsail and set the storm jib. Until that had been done, it would have been disastrous to have attempted a rescue. Meanwhile the cutter drifted towards them, although at times they lost sight of her. Clarke climbed the rigging, and

presently discovered the cutter making heavy weather of it just to leeward.

The captain decided to gybe, a perilous manœuvre in such weather, since the mast was liable to give way. Four times did the gallant smacksmen seek to get a rope to the cutter. Each effort was more difficult than the last; but in the end the *Provident* obtained a good berth on the port tack, and a small warp was thrown and caught by the naval men. When made fast, the warp was coiled around the *Provident's* steam capstan, and with great skill the cutter was hauled to a good berth astern. Then the warp was passed around to the lee side, and the cutter was drawn up under the lee quarter, and her company began to jump on board. This was three hours after the *Provident* had entered upon her mission. But even now there was a danger of losing life as the seas were rising some 30 ft. high at times, and the smacksmen could see the keel of the cutter continuously. The actual work of rescue took thirty minutes to accomplish.

A lad of eighteen had suffered from exposure, and immediate treatment was necessary in order to save his life.

The officer in charge of the cutter, Torpedo Gunner Horrigan, was the last to leave, and he found himself clutching the mizen rigging to get aboard the *Provident*. The rope of the cutter was then chopped. She was well filled with water, having a hole in her hull which had been stuffed with a pair of pants, of which one of the crew divested himself.

One of the men had his fingers jammed between the boat and the smack.

Several of the *Formidable's* survivors were only partly dressed, and some had no trousers. For these accommodation was found in the engine-room, and the others were placed in the cabin and the fish hold.

All were rescued at one o'clock, and a course was then shaped for Brixham.

The needs of the men were attended to on board. All the *Provident's* stock of food was fairly divided, and all the cigarettes and tobacco the men possessed were used. Hot coffee was continuously made. On nearing Brixham the *Provident* fell in with the *Dencade*, which towed her in, and she was berthed at the pier.

Brixham residents brought blankets, clothing, and boots

to the survivors, for a great number had little wearing apparel and no footwear of any sort.

The survivors were soon housed in comfortable quarters. Their plight was simply indescribable. For hours they had been fighting the storm, hoping against hope until the brown-tanned sails of the smack came in sight.

During the height of the storm the seas threatened to engulf them continuously; only men of great stamina and robust constitution could have survived so terrible an ordeal.

The officer in charge commended the gallant seamanship of the Brixham fishermen, extolling it as beyond all praise.

'It blew as hard this morning as it has ever blown,' remarked a weather-beaten fisherman, to which one bluejacket (who had no covering for his feet, and wore a safety belt around his neck) replied, as he shivered in his drenched clothes: 'Here we are again! Undress uniform! Swimming costume!'

The *Provident's* trawl net was lying strewn about the deck with the fish still within its folds. Her four men—Wm. Pillar, F. Carter, J. Clarke, and the cook, Taylor—are proud that they were the means of snatching seventy gallant sailors from a watery grave.

[For the text of this extract we are indebted to the Editor of the *Western Daily Mercury*.]

Brixham, January 2.

Times, Jan. 4, 1915.

The feat of seamanship accomplished by William Pillar, the skipper and owner of the 50-ton smack *Provident*, and his crew of three—William Carter, John Clarke, and Dan Taylor, the little apprentice boy, who acts as cook—in rescuing 70 men of the battleship *Formidable*, after three hours' strenuous and dangerous work, will take a prominent place among the deeds of heroism at sea. On Saturday Skipper Pillar, young in years, was naturally greeted everywhere as a hero, and it was evident that he had been greatly moved by his thrilling experience, but was by no means inclined to magnify his exploit, but to regard it as a mere duty which must be done when it comes in the way of a Brixham fisherman, however great the risks.

One of the survivors has given the following account of his experiences:

I was in my bunk when the explosion took place, and, in my opinion, if it had not been such a stormy night all would have been saved. When the 42 ft. cutter was lowered on the starboard side all the oars but six were unfortunately smashed. The greatest possible difficulty was experienced in keeping clear of the ship, and the oars were used to keep the boat's head to wind. For nearly nine hours the men were rowing incessantly, and they were so exhausted and suffering so much from exposure that they did not care whether they were rescued or not. In moderate weather the cutter would carry 120 men, but with only 70 in her we were fortunate in keeping her afloat, as at times the seas were mountainous, running 30 ft. or more in height. The first explosion did not appear to me to be very severe. The *Formidable* was struck abaft the starboard magazine, but luckily it did not cause the magazine to explode. There being no steam available for the purpose, none of the steam pinnaces could be got afloat—in fact, we were remarkably lucky to get any boats launched at all. The crew did magnificent work in getting the second boat away. The men even rigged out a boat spar. The men in this boat noticed a steamer, but she was evidently too far away to see the distress signals. After the second explosion many of the men jumped overboard, and the battleship listed slowly to the starboard and sank. Captain Loxley and the signaller stuck manfully to their posts to the last, and signals were flashed from the ship as she took the plunge below the waves.

Another member of the crew of the *Formidable* states:

After coming off watch I turned in and was awakened by an explosion. I turned out at once and heard the bugler sounding 'Off action.' After putting on my 'serge' I went up to the quarterdeck, where I found nearly everybody smoking. The captain was a real Briton. He gave his orders as calmly and coolly as if the ship had been in harbour with the anchors down and as if nothing whatever was amiss. The last words I heard him say were—'Steady, men; it's all right. No panic, men. Keep cool and be British. There's tons of life left in the old ship yet.' You cannot say too much in praise of him and Lieutenant Simonds, who worked

splendidly in getting out the boats. The captain's old terrier Bruce was standing on duty at his side on the fore-bridge to the last.

Another seaman said the discipline was splendid, and added: The last I saw of the captain was that he was on the bridge coolly smoking a cigarette. Lieutenant Simonds superintended the getting out of the boats, and as he got the last away I heard the captain say to him, 'You have done very well, Simonds.'

One of the men at the hospital at Brixham, a gun-layer, said:

I was on duty by the side of my gun with everything ready in case of attack, when, about 2.10 A.M., I heard a crash on the starboard side of the ship abreast of No. 1 stokehold. I was on the port side, and I rushed around the deck trying to find out what had taken place. I met Commander Ballard, who asked me to tell everybody on board to keep cool and that the first thing to do was to have out all the boats. I assisted in getting out the launch and pinnace, which was done only after a great struggle, owing to the ship having such a big list to starboard. We loaded the boats up, and there must have been about 90 in the pinnace and between 60 and 70 in the launch. The Commander further said he wanted the big target and all the target gear put overboard and all the woodwork as much as possible for the men to save themselves with. Some of the hands were employed in getting the mess tables over the side. I assisted in getting the big target out, but we had not enough hands to lift it, and I went down to the quarterdeck and got as many hands as possible from there to get the target overboard. This was on the starboard side, and I was going over to the other side of the deck when a second explosion occurred. The shock fetched me over the side of the ship into the water. I floated for some time until I was picked up by the launch, which at this time was well away from the ship, but standing by to get in more men from her. The sea was very rough, and we had to get out of the way of the light cruiser, which was coming to the assistance of the ship, standing by her until she went down.

Lance-Corporal Hurst, R.M.L.I., said he was asleep below at the first alarm, and rushed on deck. The battleship was then heeling over, and after the boats were launched he went

over to the port side to await the order 'Every man for himself,' or anything else that might happen. He continued:

The ship seemed to sink down, and I was shot into the air. I dropped into the water, and as I came up saw something black which evidently was the boat. I clutched it, but had my left hand jammed and went below the waves. I was saved by the piece of string attached to the rudder, which I grasped and was pulled into the boat. We had to pass through such an ordeal in the boat that we had almost given up all hope of being rescued. At last we pulled the oars inboard, rigged up a sea anchor to keep the boat head to sea, sat in the bottom of her and shouted and sang 'It's a long way to Tipperary' to keep our spirits up. We had a narrow shave, for directly after the trawler had brought us all safely aboard the cutter sank beneath the waves.

An able seaman, in the course of his story, said:

After the first explosion all hands were at their posts quickly. It seemed to those who were asleep that it was but a short time since some practical joker had rattled tin cans down the ladder to let us know the New Year had come and since 16 bells had struck to herald 1915, but we all realised very soon that something serious was the matter, for the captain, who was as cool as a cucumber, and the officers ordered the boats to be launched, and every man did his duty nobly. The ship took a terrible list to starboard, and only the boats on that side could be launched, and that with considerable difficulty. Practically the only people saved were those who were in the boats and those who were picked up from the water by them. Among the crew were about 100 youths and boys, as well as over a score of "middies." The boat that I got into was the last over the starboard side, and I had to swim for her. When we got around to the port side there was another explosion. We pulled into our boat as many as we possibly could, but the high seas which threatened every moment to engulf us prevented us doing any more than we did. One young chap who was thrown out of the boat swam to the second, but failed to reach it, and was in the water for half an hour before we picked him up. It is a miracle that any of us are alive to tell the tale, for we had continually to be baling to avoid being swamped.

One of the survivors at Brixham, in the course of a statement, said :

When we began getting the boats out, the starboard cutter capsized and sank, there being four or five men in her. The launch and pinnace were got out by the derrick, and we had great difficulty in getting them out owing to the heavy list. The launch had four or five holes in her through banging about whilst getting her out. She was taken round to the other side of the ship to get in more men, and just as she got alongside the second explosion occurred. Then nearly everybody remaining on the ship jumped overboard, and many were picked up by the boats of a light cruiser. There were no other ships in sight except a liner, but I don't think it was possible for her to have saved any lives. We who were in the launch pulled away from the ship, and the sea began to get rough. The captain and signalman remained on board, where signals were being flashed until she went down, after turning over slowly on the starboard side. This was the first occasion on which the strict Admiralty orders were carried out that, if a disaster happened to one ship, the remaining ships must not stop on the scene to run the risk of also being torpedoed. We pulled away from the ship as far as we could. We had not many oars in the boat at the time, and the weather came on very bad. We put all the oars on one side to keep the boat head to the wind. We could see some lights in the distance, but we had no idea where we were. The sea began to rise to a tremendous height. There was one large hole in the boat, and a man sat on it from the time we started to the time we were rescued. It rained and hailed and blew. We had six oars, but no sails.

We carried on pulling on one side of the boat until daylight and we stopped pulling soon afterwards, about 7 o'clock. Before stopping we rigged a sea anchor to ride by. It consisted of barricoes (barrels) and a heavy piece of timber, and attached to this we had a boat's anchor and cables. We threw these overboard and so rode out the sea. We had to be continually baling out water, the men using for this purpose sea boots and caps. Barrels were also broken in halves and used as balers. The men kept in wonderfully good spirits, despite the poor hopes of being rescued. We were eventually picked up by the trawler about 1.30 P.M., eleven hours

after we had started. Every man in the boat was soaked to the skin."

The King received at Buckingham Palace on Saturday eleven men who had shown gallantry in saving life at sea, and presented them with Board of Trade medals. *Times*, Feb. 8, 1915.

They included the skipper and crew of the trawler *Provident* of Brixham, who rescued 71 survivors of the battleship *Formidable*, sunk in the English Channel on January 1st. His Majesty pinned the silver medal for gallantry on each man's breast, and handed to each a voucher for the monetary award which the Admiralty has bestowed. Captain Pillar received £250; William Carter and John Clarke, second and third hands, £100 each; and Daniel Taylor, apprentice, £50. The King addressed the skipper and his men as follows:

> "'I congratulate you most heartily upon your gallant and heroic conduct. It is indeed a great feat to have saved 71 lives. I realise how difficult your task must have been, because I know myself how arduous it is to gybe a vessel in a heavy gale.'

House of Commons, February 4, 1915.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the fleet of which the *Formidable* was one was cruising without attendant destroyers, and, if so, why; and whether this was the first occasion on which they had so cruised under a new Admiral? *Hansard.*

MR. CHURCHILL: I cannot undertake to discuss the conduct of naval operations during the progress of the war.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, having regard to the fact that merchant vessels of slow speed have been destroyed by submarines, the Admiralty will provide naval defence for convoys in order to minimise the danger?

MR. CHURCHILL: Sir, all these matters receive careful attention in the proper quarters.

House of Commons, February 8, 1915.

Hansard. MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many of the cadets who were at Dartmouth at the outbreak of the war were lost on the *Monmouth* and the *Formidable*?

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA): The answer, I regret to say, is ten and six respectively.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what was the number of Dartmouth cadets sent on board at the commencement of the war and what number has since been lost; and whether the proportion is much greater than in any other class of naval officers?

DR. MACNAMARA: As stated in my right hon. friend's reply to the hon. member on November 16th, the number of Dartmouth cadets embarked at the commencement of the war was 434. Of this number I am sorry to say that forty-one have lost their lives. No statistics have been worked out as to the percentage of officers lost in the various classes, but it is, I am afraid, a fact that the percentage of the cadets embarked from Dartmouth who have lost their lives is greater than in any other class of officer.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS: Will the right hon. gentleman carefully reconsider the question whether the Admiralty will send any more young officers on to the ships?

DR. MACNAMARA: It is impossible to discuss that now. The hon. gentleman can realise why that is so.

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ibid. SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he can give the House any further information concerning the sinking of His Majesty's Ship *Formidable* than was contained in the announcement made public at the time of the event, when it was stated, on the authority of the Admiralty, that it was not certain whether the vessel was struck by a torpedo from a submarine or a mine?

MR. CHURCHILL: As stated by my noble friend Lord Crewe in another place,[1] the definite opinion of the Admiralty is that His Majesty's Ship *Formidable* was sunk by two tor-

[1] [*See below, p. 62.*]

pedoes fired from a submarine. I do not think there is any advantage to be gained by the discussion of this matter at the present time. It is not proposed to hold any formal inquiry nor to bring any person before a court-martial. The Board of Admiralty have considered attentively all the circumstances, and I have no statement to make.

NOTICE TO MARINERS

(No. 1 of the year 1915)

CAUTION WHEN APPROACHING BRITISH PORTS

PART I

CLOSING OF PORTS

Former Notice (No. 1805 of 1914) *hereby cancelled.*

(1) My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, having taken into consideration the fact that it may be necessary to forbid all entrance to certain ports of the Empire, this is to give Notice that on approaching the shores of the United Kingdom, or any of the ports of localities of the British Empire, referred to in Part III. of this Notice, a sharp look-out should be kept for the signals described in the following paragraph, and for the vessels mentioned in paragraph (5), Part II., of this Notice, and the distinguishing and other signals made by them. In the event of such signals being displayed, the port or locality should be approached with great caution, as it may be apprehended that obstructions may exist.

(2) If entrance to a port is prohibited, three *red* vertical lights by night, or three *red* vertical balls by day, will be exhibited in some conspicuous position, in or near to its approach, which signals will also be shown by the vessels indicated in paragraph (5), Part II., of this Notice.

If these signals are displayed, vessels must either proceed to the position marked 'Examination Anchorage' on the Admiralty charts and anchor there, or keep the sea.

(3) At all the ports or localities at home or abroad referred

to in Part III. of this Notice, searchlights are occasionally exhibited for exercise.

Instructions have been given to avoid directing movable searchlights during practice on to vessels under way, but mariners are warned that great care should be taken to keep a sharp look-out for the signals indicated in paragraph (2) above, when searchlights are observed to be working.

PART II

EXAMINATION SERVICE.

(4) In certain circumstances it is also necessary to take special measures to examine vessels desiring to enter the ports or localities at home or abroad, referred to in Part III. of this Notice.

(5) In such case, vessels carrying the distinguishing flags or lights mentioned in paragraph (7) will be charged with the duty of examining ships which desire to enter the ports and of allotting positions in which they shall anchor. If Government vessels, or vessels belonging to the local port authority, are found patrolling in the offing, merchant vessels are advised to communicate with such vessels with a view to obtaining information as to the course on which they should approach the Examination Anchorage. Such communication will not be necessary in cases where the pilot on board has already received this information from the local authorities.

(6) As the institution of the Examination Service at any port will never be publicly advertised, especial care should be taken in approaching the ports, by day or night, to keep a sharp look-out for any vessel carrying the flags or lights mentioned in paragraph (7), and to be ready to 'bring to' at once when hailed by her or warned by the firing of a gun or sound rocket.

In entering by night any of the ports mentioned in Part III., serious delay and risk will be avoided if four efficient all round lamps, two *red* and two *white*, are kept available for use.

(7) By day the distinguishing flags of the Examination Steamer will be a special flag (white and red horizontal surrounded by a blue border) and a blue ensign.

Also, three red vertical balls if the port is closed.



By night the steamer will carry :—

(*a*) Three *red* vertical lights if the port is closed.
(*b*) Three *white* vertical lights if the port is open.

The above lights will be carried in addition to the ordinary navigation lights, and will show an unbroken light around the horizon.

(8) Masters are warned that, before attempting to enter any of these ports when the Examination Service is in force, they must in their own interests strictly obey all instructions given to them by the Examination Steamer. In the absence of any instructions from the Examination Steamer they must proceed to the position marked 'Examination Anchorage' on the Admiralty Charts and anchor there, or keep the sea.

Whilst at anchor in the Examination Anchorage, Masters are warned that they must not lower any boats (except to avoid accident), communicate with the shore, work cables, move the ship, or allow any one to leave the ship, without permission from the Examination Steamer.

(9) In the case of fog, Masters are enjoined to use the utmost care, and the Examination Anchorage itself should be approached with caution.

(10) Merchant vessels when approaching ports are specially cautioned against making use of private signals of any description, either by day or night : the use of them will render a vessel liable to be fired on.

(11) The pilots attached to the ports will be acquainted with the regulations to be followed.

PART III

PORTS OR LOCALITIES REFERRED TO

United Kingdom

Alderney	Guernsey	River Humber
Barrow	Harwich	,, Mersey
Barry	Jersey	,, Tay
Belfast	Lough Swilly	,, Tees
Berehaven	Milford Haven	,, Thames
Clyde	Newhaven	,, Tyne
Cromarty	Plymouth	Scapa Flow
Dover	Portland	Sheerness
Falmouth	Portsmouth	
Firth of Forth	Queenstown	

Canada

Esquimalt	Halifax	Quebec

Mediterranean

Gibraltar Malta

Indian Ocean

Aden	Colombo	Mauritius
Bombay	Karachi	Rangoon
Calcutta	Madras	

China Sea

Hong Kong Singapore

Africa

Durban Simons Bay
Sierra Leone Table Bay

Australia

Adelaide	Melbourne	Sydney
Brisbane	Newcastle	Thursday Island
Fremantle		

Tasmania

Hobart

New Zealand

Auckland Port Lyttelton
Otago Wellington

West Indies

Bermuda Port Royal, Jamaica

PART IV

SWEEPING OPERATIONS

H.M. vessels are constantly engaged in sweeping operations off ports in the United Kingdom.

Whilst so engaged, they work in pairs, connected by a wire hawser, and are consequently hampered to a very considerable extent in their manœuvring powers.

With a view to indicating the nature of the work on which these vessels are engaged, they will show the following signals :

A black ball at the foremast head and a similar ball at the yardarm, or where it can best be seen, on that side on which it is dangerous for vessels to pass.

For the public safety, all other vessels, whether steamers or sailing craft, must keep out of the way of vessels flying this signal, and should especially remember that it is dangerous to *pass between* the vessels of a pair.

(*Notice No.* 1 *of* 1915.)

By Command of their Lordships,

J. F. PARRY, *Hydrographer.*

Hydrographic Department, Admiralty,
London, 1st January 1915.

[The following is the 'Former Notice' which is cancelled by the foregoing. It was accidentally omitted from its proper place in *Naval* 2, and is here inserted for convenience of reference :—

NOTICE TO MARINERS

(No. 1805 of the year 1914)

CAUTION WHEN APPROACHING BRITISH PORTS

PART I

CLOSING OF PORTS

(1) My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, having taken into consideration the fact that local or other circumstances may arise in which it may be necessary, on account of periodical exercises,

manœuvres, or otherwise, to forbid all entrance to certain ports of the Empire, this is to give Notice that on approaching the shores of the United Kingdom, or any of the ports or localities of the British Empire referred to in Part III. of this Notice, a sharp look-out should be kept for the signals described in the following paragraph, and for the vessels mentioned in paragraph (5), Part II., of this Notice, and the distinguishing and other signals made by them. In the event of such signals being displayed, the port or locality should be approached with great caution, as it may be apprehended that obstructions may exist.

(2) If entrance to a port is prohibited, three *red* vertical lights by night, or three *red* vertical balls by day, will be exhibited in some conspicuous position, in or near to its approach, which signals will also be shown by the vessels indicated in paragraph (5), Part II., of this Notice.

If these signals are displayed, vessels must either proceed to the position marked 'Examination Anchorage' on the Admiralty charts and anchor there, or keep the sea.

(3) At all the ports or localities at home or abroad referred to in Part III. of this Notice, searchlights are occasionally exhibited for exercise.

Instructions have been given to avoid directing movable searchlights during practice on to vessels under way, but mariners are warned that great care should be taken to keep a sharp look-out for the signals indicated in paragraph (2) above, where searchlights are observed to be working.

PART II

EXAMINATION SERVICE

(4) Under certain circumstances it may become necessary to take special measures to examine vessels desiring to enter the ports or localities at home or abroad, referred to in Part III. of this Notice.

(5) In such case, vessels carrying the distinguishing flags or lights mentioned in paragraph (7) will be charged with the duty of examining ships which desire to enter the ports and of allotting positions in which they shall anchor. If Government vessels, or vessels belonging to the local port authority, are found patrolling in the offing, merchant vessels are advised to communicate with such vessels with a view to obtaining information as to the course on which they should approach the Examination Anchorage. Such communication will not be necessary in cases where the pilot on board has already received this information from the local authorities.

(6) As the institution of the Examination Service at any port will never be publicly advertised, especial care should be taken in approach-

ing the ports, by day or night, to keep a sharp look-out for any vessel carrying the flags or lights mentioned in paragraph (7), and to be ready to 'bring to' at once when hailed by her or warned by the firing of a gun or sound rocket.

In entering by night any of the ports mentioned in Part III., serious delay and risk will be avoided if four efficient all round lamps, two *red* and two *white*, are kept available for use.

(7) By day the distinguishing flags of the Examination Steamer will be a special flag (white and red horizontal surrounded by a blue border) and a blue ensign.

Also, three red vertical balls if the port is closed.



By night the steamer will carry :—

(*a*) Three *red* vertical lights if the port is closed.

(*b*) Three *white* vertical lights if the port is open.

The above lights will be carried in addition to the ordinary navigation light, and will show an unbroken light around the horizon.

(8) Masters are warned that, before attempting to enter any of these ports when the Examination Service is in force, they must in their own interests strictly obey all instructions given to them by the Examination Steamer. In the absence of any instructions from the Examination Steamer they must proceed to the position marked 'Examination Anchorage' on the Admiralty charts and anchor there, or keep the sea.

Whilst at anchor in the Examination Anchorage, Masters are warned that they must not lower any boats (except to avoid accident), communicate with the shore, work cables, move the ship, or allow any one to leave the ship, without permission from the Examination Steamer.

(9) In case of fog, Masters of vessels are enjoined to use the utmost care, and the Examination Anchorage should be approached with caution.

(10) Merchant vessels when approaching ports are specially cautioned against making use of private signals of any description, either by day or night: the use of them will render a vessel liable to be fired on.

(11) The pilots attached to the ports will be acquainted with the regulations to be followed.

PART III

PORTS OR LOCALITIES REFERRED TO

United Kingdom

Alderney	Firth of Forth	Queenstown
Barrow	Guernsey	River Humber
Barry	Harwich	,, Mersey
Belfast	Jersey	,, Tay
Berehaven	Lough Swilly	,, Tees
Cardiff	Milford Haven	,, Thames
Clyde	Newhaven	,, Tyne
Cromarty	Plymouth	Scapa Flow
Dover	Portland	Sheerness
Falmouth	Portsmouth	

Canada

Esquimalt	Halifax	Quebec

Mediterranean

Gibraltar	Malta

Indian Ocean

Aden	Colombo	Mauritius
Bombay	Karachi	Rangoon
Calcutta	Madras	

China Sea

Hong Kong	Singapore

Africa

Durban	Table Bay
Sierra Leone	Simons Bay

Australia

Adelaide	Melbourne	Sydney
Brisbane	Newcastle	Thursday Island
Fremantle		

Tasmania

Hobart

New Zealand

Auckland	Port Lyttelton
Otago	Wellington

West Indies

Bermuda	Port Royal, Jamaica

PART IV

SWEEPING OPERATIONS

H.M. vessels are constantly engaged in sweeping operations off ports in the United Kingdom.

Whilst so engaged, they work in pairs, connected by a wire hawser, and are consequently hampered to a very considerable extent in their manœuvring powers.

With a view to indicating the nature of the work on which these vessels are engaged, they will show the following signals:

A black ball at the foremast head and a similar ball at the yardarm, or where it can best be seen, on that side on which it is dangerous for vessels to pass.

For the public safety, all other vessels, whether steamers or sailing craft, must keep out of the way of vessels flying this signal, and should especially remember that it is dangerous to *pass between* the vessels of a pair.

By Command of their Lordships,

J. F. PARRY, *Hydrographer.*

Hydrographic Department, Admiralty,
London, 5th December 1914.]

OCCUPATION OF BOUGAINVILLE BY AUSTRALIA

Melbourne.

Reuter's Agency announces that the Australians have occupied Bougainville, the largest of the Solomon Islands, and hoisted the British flag there. *K.V.*, Jan. 2, 1915.

THE *ASKOLD* AT JAFFA

Constantinople.

Headquarters reports that the Russian cruiser *Askold* attempted a landing at Jaffa the day before yesterday. Our coastguards forthwith opened fire on the enemy vessel, which withdrew with the loss of several killed. *K.V.*, Jan. 3, 1915.

OPERATIONS IN THE BLACK SEA

Paris, January 8.

Times, Jan. 9, 1915. It is officially stated that a large Turkish transport was sunk on January 2nd by a mine at the entrance to the Bosphorus. Another transport, convoyed by the Turkish cruiser *Medjidieh*, was sunk on January 5th in the Black Sea between Sinope and Trebizond. The protected Russian cruiser *Pamyat Markuria* and the Russian destroyer *Gnyevnyi* attacked the *Medjidieh*, which, though struck by several shells, succeeded in escaping.—*Reuter.*

Petrograd, January 8.

Times, Jan. 11, 1915. On January 3rd in the Black Sea our cruisers and torpedo boats observed in approaching Sinope a Turkish cruiser of the *Medjidieh* type, followed by a transport. Seeing that they were pursued, the Turkish vessels turned westward in an attempt to escape, but we overtook the transport and sank it. The cruiser got away.

Constantinople, January 5.

K.D. The Turkish General Staff reports as follows: Yesterday there was an encounter in the Black Sea off Sinope between two Turkish cruisers and a Russian squadron composed of seventeen units. Details are lacking. At all events the enemy, in spite of his numerical superiority, was unable to cause any damage to our ships.

Constantinople, January 8.

K.D. The General Staff reports as follows: Contrary to international law, the Russian Fleet to-day bombarded the open town of Sinope, slightly damaging two houses. There was no loss of life. Four barges were sunk. Turkish ships successfully bombarded Russian troops in and north of Makriali, on the Russian coast.

Paris, January 16.

C.O. The Russian Black Sea Fleet has encountered the Turkish cruisers *Breslau* and *Hamidieh* and opened fire upon them

inflicting some damage. The Russian squadron subsequently examined the bays of Sinope, Trebizond, and Platana; it burnt or destroyed a large number of enemy merchant vessels and bombarded the port of Khopa.

DUTCH DIPLOMATIC REPORTS CONCERNING NAVIGATION IN THE NORTH SEA AND THE ENGLISH CHANNEL, IN CONNECTION WITH THE WAR SITUATION.

Fishing in the North Sea off the German Coast

Communication received from the German Ambassador on January 4, 1915

German naval forces have established the fact that *D.N.S.B.* British fishing vessels in the North Sea are flying neutral colours, and particularly the Dutch flag, whilst ostensibly following their avocation of fishing, but obviously in order to be able to supply the British Fleet clandestinely with observations and intelligence. The rewards which have been offered at the same time by the British Government for such services are undoubtedly a special incentive in this respect. Suspicious craft of this nature have repeatedly been encountered, even in the German Bight [Bight of Heligoland].

This state of affairs compels the Imperial Government, in the legitimate defence of the urgent interests of the conduct of naval warfare, to have recourse to suitable measures of a military nature against all fishing vessels of suspicious appearance encountered within the German Bight and the adjacent waters.

The Imperial Government also points out that navigation in the above zone is exposed to great danger, excepting on the waterways defined for the approach to the German estuaries (*see* Notices to Mariners, No. 2770/14 and 3093/14), in spite of the vigilance exercised by the German naval forces. Fishing craft are therefore strongly urged to avoid the above-mentioned danger zones.

The Imperial Government, being anxious to see that Dutch interests should not be injured, considers it of high import-

ance to communicate the above information to the Royal Dutch Government, thus giving it an opportunity of warning local fishing circles accordingly.

Communication from the German Minister on February 9, 1915

D.N.S.B. According to a notice issued by the Naval Admiral Staff, fishing and coasting vessels of foreign nationality are prohibited from proceeding to the navigable waters of the west coast of Schleswig-Holstein, the Elbe, the Weser, the channels of the East Frisian Islands and the eastern Ems, until further notice.

BRITISH ATTACK NEAR MERSINA

K.D., Jan. 8, 1915. The Turkish General Staff reports as follows: On January 5th an English cruiser attempted to land to the west of Mersina. The fire of our coastguards compelled the enemy to withdraw. He left four dead behind.

NOTICE TO MARINERS

(No. 16 of the year 1915)

UNITED KINGDOM

Pilotage Stations established at certain Ports on account of defensive minefields

Former Notice (No. 1781 of 1914) *hereby cancelled.*[1]

[1] [*See Naval* 2, p. 309.] *L.G.*, Jan. 8, 1915. With reference to the extension of the system of mine defence, notice is hereby given that Pilotage is now compulsory at the following ports for all vessels (including fishing vessels) which have a draught of over eight feet, and that it is highly dangerous for any vessel to enter or leave such ports without a pilot. Fishing and other small vessels having a draught of over eight feet are to assemble at the Pilotage stations, and will be conducted into and out of port in groups.

(1) FIRTH OF FORTH.—All incoming vessels must call for a pilot at a station established on the Isle of May.

Outgoing vessels are to discharge their pilots at the same station.

It is dangerous for any vessel to be under way to the westward of the Isle of May without a pilot.

(2) MORAY FIRTH.—All vessels bound to Cromarty or Inverness must call for a pilot at Wick or Burghead.

Outgoing vessels are to discharge their pilots at one or the other of these places.

It is dangerous for any vessel to be under way to the south-westward of a line joining Findhorn and Tarbat Ness without a pilot.

(3) SCAPA FLOW.—All entrances are dangerous.

Examination services have been established in the entrances to Hoxa and Hoy Sounds; vessels wishing to enter must communicate with the Examination Vessel and follow the instructions received from her very carefully.

The only vessels permitted to enter Hoy Sound from the westward are those bound for Stromness: vessels cannot enter Scapa Flow from Stromness.

Note.—RIVER HUMBER.—The Pilot station formerly established seven miles E.S.E. (Mag.), from Spurn Point, has now been withdrawn.

Authority.—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

By Command of their Lordships,

F. J. PARRY, *Hydrographer.*

Hydrographic Department, Admiralty,
London, 5th January 1915.

[The 'Former Notice,' No. 1781 of 1914, cancelled by the above, itself cancelled an earlier Notice, No. 1752 of 1914. As this earlier Notice was accidentally omitted from its proper place in *Naval* 2, it is here inserted for convenience of reference :—

NOTICE TO MARINERS

(No. 1752 of the year 1914)

UNITED KINGDOM

New Pilotage Stations to be established at certain Ports on account of defensive Minefields

In view of the extension of the system of Mine defence, notice is hereby given that on and after the 27th instant, Pilotage will be

L.G., Nov. 20, 1914.

25

compulsory at the following ports, and that it will be highly dangerous for any vessel to enter or leave such ports without a pilot.

(1) RIVER HUMBER.—All incoming vessels must call for a pilot at a station to be established in Lat. 53° 36′ N., long. 0° 30′ E.

Outgoing vessels are to discharge their pilots at the same station.

(2) RIVER TYNE.—All incoming vessels from the northward must call for a pilot off Blyth, and those from the southward off the River Wear.

Outgoing vessels are to discharge their pilots off one or the other of these places.

(3) FIRTH OF FORTH.—All incoming vessels must call for a pilot at a station to be established on the Isle of May.

Outgoing vessels are to discharge their pilots at the same station.

It will be dangerous for any vessel to be under way to the westward of the Isle of May without a pilot.

(4) MORAY FIRTH.—All vessels bound to Cromarty or Inverness must call for a pilot at Wick or Burghead.

Outgoing vessels are to discharge their pilots at one or the other of these places.

It will be dangerous for any vessel to be under way to the southwestward of a line joining Findhorn and Tarbat Ness without a pilot.

(5) SCAPA FLOW.—All entrances are dangerous.

Examination services have been established in the entrances to Hoxa and Hoy Sounds; vessels wishing to enter must communicate with the Examination Vessel and follow the instructions received from her very carefully.

The only vessels permitted to enter Hoy Sound from the westward are those bound for Stromness: vessels cannot enter Scapa Flow from Stromness.

Authority.—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

By Command of their Lordships,

J. F. PARRY, *Hydrographer.*

Hydrographic Department, Admiralty,
London, 16th November 1914.]

THE UNITED STATES AND CONTRABAND—THE *DACIA*

Washington, January 5.

Times, Jan. 6, 1915.

The Government has followed up its warnings to shippers to be careful about smuggling and mixing contraband and non-contraband goods by an arrangement whereby ship-

owners can, if they like, get certificates as to the nature of the cargo carried in their vessels after inspection by the United States Customs authorities. The arrangement is not, of course, a perfect one. Even if, as expected, all ports adopt the scheme, it will be voluntary instead of obligatory, and there may be considerable difficulty in making it obligatory. It is, however, regarded as a long step in the right direction, inasmuch as it will give innocent exporters an opportunity of reducing to a minimum the danger of detention of shipments on the ground that they are suspected of being accompanied by hidden contraband.

It is intimated in connection with the action of the Treasury Department authorising Customs officials to give certificates to vessels that the concession must not be taken to indicate agreement with the British view that there has actually been much smuggling. There seems to be a tendency to believe that British suspicion is exaggerated. Regarding the possibility of making certificates obligatory, it is pointed out that it may at any rate be possible to increase the present inadequate penalties for false manifests.

The improvement in the contraband situation is unfortunately accompanied by indications that there are other commercial difficulties. The question of the purchase by America of interned German vessels is again to the fore. Possibly with a view to bringing forward a test case as to the right of private Americans to acquire such ships, the Government has authorised American citizens to buy a small vessel of the Hamburg-Amerika Line. The vessel, which is called the *Dacia*, is interned at Port Arthur, Texas. The intention of its new owner is reported to be to carry cotton to Bremen.

Great interest is felt here as to whether we shall protest. It is recognised that our general position is that we must have absolute proof of the absolute neutrality of the transfer, and that there must be no suspicion that it has been made to escape the consequences of belligerent ownership.

It is noted that the new owner, though once a member of Congress, rejoices in the name of Breitung, and it is recalled that the last purchase by an American of a German ship—the *Sacramento* of San Francisco—did not turn out satis-

factorily, inasmuch as the *Sacramento* was convicted of carrying supplies to Admiral von Spee's squadron.

The question of the Government purchase of German ships is also acute. By a Parliamentary *coup*, and in the teeth of the bitter opposition of such members as Mr. Root and Mr. Lodge, the President's friends have succeeded in calling up in the Senate the Bill providing for such purchase. The conservatives of both parties are dismayed. It is felt that the Bill is pregnant with diplomatic and economic dangers. It is believed that Great Britain will protest vigorously were it to pass.

Nor is it only a question of the legitimacy of purchase that is felt to be concerned. The Bill, said Mr. Root, 'proposes to put the Government of the United States into foreign trade at a time when that trade necessarily involves frequent and almost constant questions of critical importance and great delicacy and difficulty arising under the law of nations regarding neutral and belligerent rights. It proposes to put the Government of the United States in a position where her good faith will be questioned and where her violation of the law of nations will be asserted if any situations arise such as have been detailed to us within the last few days (by enemies of the British contraband policy). It proposes to create a condition which . . . may raise the question of the United States violating its neutrality and taking sides with one belligerent or another.'

Washington, January 15.

Times, Jan. 16, 1915. The case of the *Dacia* continues to be prominently, but rather confusedly, discussed. The facts at present are as follows: The State Department wishes to treat the business as exceptional. It is argued that it would be unfair to the cotton exporters who put their cargoes in the *Dacia* in ignorance of the situation should the *Dacia* not be allowed to sail. It is suggested that it might be possible to let the *Dacia* sail this once for Rotterdam without prejudice to her subsequent status or to the broad question of the transfer of flag. The cause of the suggestion is the formal intimation, which has already been reported, that Great Britain cannot, as things stand, undertake to recognise the right of the *Dacia* to fly the

American flag while trading with Germany, either direct or through Rotterdam.

There is no question of the validity of the transfer of the *Dacia* to her new owner as far as the payment of money and other details are concerned. At least, her papers are in perfect order. The question is whether, apart from municipal law, Great Britain can acquiesce in steps which would relieve a belligerent country of the consequences of belligerent operations, and, if so, how far she is willing to allow such steps to go. While it is believed that it is possible, and even probable, that we would allow the purchase of German vessels for neutral, and especially for Latin-American, trade, grave doubts are entertained, in view of what we have said, whether it will be possible to prevail upon us to allow a ship like the *Dacia* to trade with Rotterdam, which is, geographically, virtually a German port.

The reply to the American suggestion, which it is understood will be forwarded to London, is awaited with the utmost interest. Should it indicate the possibility of purchasing and employing usefully German vessels, the arrangements which it is reported are on foot in New York for the transfer of some other vessels will be pushed, not that any such convenient answer is deemed likely in impartial quarters. It is expected that Berlin will reserve the right to act if she sees fit in each individual case.

The affair has, of course, considerable political importance, in view of the urgent necessity in the South to export cotton, and the desire to enter the German market as freely as possible, and of the persistent Teutonic efforts to arouse feeling against our maritime policy. In this connection it is hoped that, as the *Dacia* controversy concerns the ship and not the cargo, some way may be found, should the *Dacia* be seized, of forwarding the cotton to its destination, or, at any rate, that it should be immediately bought by Great Britain.

Washington, January 21.

The *Dacia* is still in port. That her sailing is contemplated, however, is proved by the efforts of the owner to get the Government to insure her cargo. Whether the Government will comply with the request and whether, if it did so, the *Times*, Jan. 22, 1915.

insurance would be full or conditional is now being discussed by the appropriate officials.

Washington, January 21.

After a conference with Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Delanoy, of the Federal War Risk Bureau, has decided to issue war insurance for the *Dacia's* cotton. He indicated that no policy would be written covering the ship, although the owners are stated to have sought it. It is understood that the State Department has not advised the *Dacia's* owners to make the voyage, but has simply communicated to them a statement of Great Britain's attitude, leaving it to the owners to take the responsibility.—*Reuter.*

Washington, January 22.

Times, Jan. 25, 1915.

That the *Dacia* will sail is indicated by an announcement that the Treasury Department has now decided to insure its cargo. That it will be seized was reiterated last night by the British Ambassador in the following statement to the Press :

In connection with the transfer of the *Dacia* from the German to the American flag, the British Government, while anxious to avoid causing loss to the shippers of the cargo, have found it impossible to agree that the transfer in the circumstances in which it has been effected is valid in accordance with accepted principles of international law. If, therefore, the *Dacia* should proceed to sea and be captured, the British Government will find themselves obliged to bring the ship, apart from her cargo, before a Prize Court.

It is stated that the cargo of the *Dacia* is to consist solely of cotton owned by American citizens. If it is so, and if the vessel should be captured, the British Government will guarantee the purchase of the cargo at the price which would have been realised by the shippers if the cargo had reached its foreign destination, or, if preferred, they will undertake to forward the cotton to Rotterdam without further expense to the shippers.

Washington, February 1, 1915.

Times, Feb. 2, 1915.

The *Dacia* cleared yesterday from Galveston for Norfolk, where she will coal for Transatlantic voyage. Her seizure is taken for granted here. All *Dacia's* cargo of cotton amounts

to 11,000 bales, and is valued by the owners at £176,000 on the basis of the prices ruling at Bremen.

Washington, February 11, 1915.

The *Dacia* is advertised to clear from Norfolk for Rotterdam to-day. The captain said that he had been promised a bonus if he makes the voyage. *Times*, Feb. 12, 1915.

New York, February 25, 1915.

The *Dacia* is reported by wireless 400 miles west of Land's End.—*Exchange Telegraph Company.* *Times*, Feb. 26, 1915.

Paris, February 27.

The Ministry of Marine announces that the *Dacia* has been stopped by a French cruiser in the Channel and is being brought to Brest. *Times*, Mar. 1, 1915.

Paris, March 23.

The official inquiry into the seizure of the *Dacia* has been concluded. *Times*, Mar. 24, 1915.

The Commission finds that the seizure is valid, and will shortly submit its report to the Minister of Marine, who will at once communicate it to the Prize Court. The latter will be allowed a period of two months in which to give its decision.—*Reuter.*

ALIEN ENEMIES

House of Lords, January 6, 1915.

The EARL OF CRAWFORD: My Lords, I rise to ask His Majesty's Government what was the approximate number of alien enemies resident in this country on December 1 last other than prisoners of war and persons interned in concentration camps, and what was the approximate number of aliens then residing in prohibited areas. *Hansard.*

LORD ST. DAVIDS: My Lords, before the noble Marquess answers the question of the noble Earl opposite, perhaps he will allow me to put my question which stands next, as it also refers to alien enemies. I ask whether the Government can now see their way to announce that they are ready to

repatriate at the cost of this country all alien enemies not of military age and all women and children of alien enemies who may be willing to return to their own countries.

I have been emboldened to put this question on the paper by the fact that at one of the last sittings of the House in the autumn a question of mine[1] in practically similar terms was received rather kindly by the noble Marquess, who thought that there was a little to be said for it, and promised that the Government would consider it. I should like now to ask what the decision of the Government has been on the subject. I might remind the House of the advantages of our offering to pay the expenses of all alien enemies, other than men of military age, who would be willing to go back to their own countries. If all of them accepted the offer it would be an untold benefit; and if only a certain number of them went, it would be an advantage well worth the money, because to that extent, whatever the extent might be, it would lessen the number of very suspicious people that the police and special constables and others are at present obliged to watch all over the country. Even supposing none went, would it not be a good thing that the Government should have made this offer publicly? In the German papers there are statements that we in this country have been treating alien enemies with harshness and unkindness. Well, as an answer to those German newspapers, and in order to impress the minds of people in neutral countries, surely there is nothing better than that we should say that, far from wanting to be harsh to any one, we are prepared not only to let them go without any conditions, but also to pay the expenses back to their own land. Personally, I cannot see any single disadvantage in the Government adopting this course, and I should like to ask what their decision is now that they have considered the matter.

[1] [*See Naval 2, p. 234.*]

VISCOUNT ALLENDALE: My Lords, I hope my noble friend, Lord St. Davids, will excuse me if I say that I do not quite see how this question, though a very interesting one no doubt, arises on the question of the noble Earl, Lord Crawford. I propose to answer Lord Crawford's question, and my noble friend who leads the House will deal with the one put by my noble friend Lord St. Davids. The noble Earl opposite asks for a statement of the figures as at December 1 last, but per-

haps he will allow me to give him the latest available figures and thus bring the matter more up to date.

The EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: Up to what date are the figures? The first of January?

VISCOUNT ALLENDALE: I cannot say exactly the date, but I believe it is up to the first of January—at least it is as near that as possible. The number of male Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians at large in this country is about 27,000; and the number interned or imprisoned about 15,000. The number interned would be greater but for the policy of the War Office, which has resulted in the release of upwards of 2000 in the last few weeks. The number of females is about 18,000.

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: At large or interned?

VISCOUNT ALLENDALE: At large. Since the notice of Lord Crawford's question has been handed in a report has been obtained so far as concerns the areas on the East and South Coasts, and that report gives the total number of male alien enemies in prohibited areas as 695. This figure is worked out as follows: In the prohibited areas from the North of Scotland to Berwick, 59; from Northumberland to the Wash, 437; from the Wash to the Thames, 38; from the Thames to Cornwall, 161. The figures with regard to females are—From the North of Scotland to Berwick, 315; Northumberland to the Wash, 982; from the Wash to the Thames, 214; and from the Thames to Cornwall, 791. This makes a total of 2302 females.

The EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: The noble Viscount is quoting the figures of aliens in prohibited areas?

VISCOUNT ALLENDALE: Yes, this last batch which I am giving.

The EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: Why are they allowed to be there at all?

VISCOUNT ALLENDALE: The chief constables on the spot have, after full inquiry and consultation with the military authorities, discretion to say who shall be allowed to remain. The military authorities have power over and above that, under the Defence of the Realm Act, to order the removal of suspicious persons and those whose presence is considered undesirable. I understand that the persons who have been allowed to remain are those who, after very careful inquiry

by the authorities, are considered to be quite harmless. They have been allowed to remain with the consent of the military authorities.

The EARL OF CRAWFORD: Is it quite certain that the military authorities do not mind these people being there? Certainly there are military authorities in Scotland, at any rate, who are moving heaven and earth to get rid of aliens, as such; yet all down the coast of Scotland there are still aliens. I asked this question six or eight weeks ago,[1] and I find that in the interval of time the number of alien males within prohibited areas has shown very small decrease indeed, and to-day there are actually 3500 alien enemies living within prohibited areas. Again, the prohibited areas which the noble Viscount specified by no means exhaust all the prohibited areas in the country; so that the figure which he has given us is quite incomplete. No mention was made by him of the several prohibited areas in Ireland and on the West Coast.

[1] [*See Naval 2, p. 222.*]

To-day, after five months of war, there are 3500 aliens living within prohibited areas! I consider that women alien enemies, of whom there are 2302, are every bit as dangerous as male alien enemies. The idea that you should leave the women in a prohibited area and exclude the men is farcical. I have heard these figures from the noble Viscount with great disappointment. I had hoped that after an interval of six weeks there would have been some improvement, but there has been a perfectly insignificant change. However, I hope that since the raid on the East Coast the number of aliens in that particular area at any rate has been materially reduced.

The EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: It seems to me that the matter is in extreme confusion. Here you have an Act for the Defence of the Realm which confers certain powers on certain authorities under certain conditions to deal summarily with persons who are suspected of treasonable designs. At the same time you prohibit certain areas, but I have just heard from the noble Viscount opposite that in these prohibited areas there are still a very large number of aliens. Why should you have any alien enemies in a prohibited area at all? What is the object of having a prohibited area if alien enemies are not all cleared out?

The EARL OF MEATH: My Lords, it appears to me that

Parliament has expressed an opinion in one direction, and the officials have altered it in another. Of course, His Majesty's Government have, so long as Parliament permits it, the power to do as they like, but it certainly does appear to me—and I am sure to many of your Lordships—a most extraordinary thing that we should legislate in one direction, and that the legislation should be undone, as it were, in another direction. If we prohibit areas, why are aliens to be permitted to remain there because certain chief constables think those people are harmless? Are we to be governed by the chief constables or by Parliament? Parliament has expressed a wish in one direction; the officials, apparently supported by the Government, think the other way. As a humble member of this House, I protest against alien enemies being allowed to remain in areas which have been prohibited by Parliament.

LORD ST. DAVIDS: There was one point in the answer of the noble Viscount on the front bench which I did not quite understand. I should like to ask whether the figures which he gave of alien enemies in this country and of alien enemies still living in the prohibited areas include naturalised aliens or not.

VISCOUNT ALLENDALE: No, they do not. With regard to what has been said by noble Lords opposite, I can only repeat that my information is that these people have been allowed to remain in certain areas only after very careful consultation between the military authorities and the police and after exhaustive inquiries have been made in regard to them.

LORD MONCREIFF: May I ask how exhaustive these inquiries are, and when they are made? After the raid on the East Coast,[1] very curiously, forty aliens were within the next day expelled from Hartlepool. It seems to me that it took a very long time to find out that they were not desirable people to have there.

[1] [*See Naval 2*, pp. 420-5.]

LORD NUNBURNHOLME: My Lords, I should like to ask the noble Marquess who leads the House to put into force stronger orders under the Defence of the Realm Act. Exactly twenty-four hours before the bombardment of Scarborough a German lady whom the police had placed under observation left the town. That looks rather curious, and as if she knew all about it. I might add that she has never been seen since.

There are on the East Coast of Yorkshire in the prohibited areas a good many naturalised Englishmen and aliens, and many of the people in my county, in the towns on the coast, think that the time has come to clear out all these people *en masse*. We do not see why we should take any risks considering the state of war we are in. Many of these aliens and naturalised Englishmen may have resided in this country for many years, and may be perfectly respectable people, but the general view is that no risks should be taken, and that they should be either deported or interned.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, I think the conduct of the Government in this matter of spies is incomprehensible. Surely the whole point is that which has been made by the noble Lord who has just sat down—Why should we take any risks at all? It is not a question whether this or that naturalised person or alien satisfies the police inquiry; he or she may be a perfectly harmless individual, but we cannot afford to take any risks at all. That is why I say that the conduct of the Government in this matter is incomprehensible. Every time this subject is brought forward we are told that the naval and military authorities are satisfied, but if any of us speak to any of the naval or military authorities who have jurisdiction on the coast, they never by any possible chance express themselves as satisfied. The criticism I would make is this. What we are suffering from is divided authority. Surely this matter of the spy ought to be put in the hands of one single man, and he should be responsible to the whole country for our safety in that respect. So long as the authority is divided—partly civilian, partly naval, and partly military—I do not believe you will ever be able to run home responsibility or make quite sure that the matter is being wisely dealt with. I am no advocate for hounding harmless aliens; personally I would treat them with every consideration; but I do say that on our coasts, and where the Government themselves have established prohibited areas, it is not a question of humanity between us and them, but a question of trusteeship, and we cannot afford to run any risk. That is why I ask the Government to look at this matter from a rather different point of view—to look at it exclusively from the point of view of the safety of our seamen and our coastal defence, and to put the whole and sole responsibility, under the ample powers

which I believe they now possess, in the hands of one man selected by them and thoroughly trusted.

VISCOUNT GALWAY had given notice to call attention to the recent bombardment of towns on the East Coast. The noble Viscount said: As the main point to which I wished to call the attention of your Lordships' House in my question with reference to the present state of the East Coast after the recent bombardment was this matter of aliens residing in prohibited areas, perhaps your Lordships will allow me to say that there is a general feeling of insecurity on the whole of the Yorkshire coast since the bombardment owing to aliens being still left there. It is a matter of common knowledge that signalling has been going on for some months, and also that intelligence has been given to the enemy somehow or other; and there is a fear that His Majesty's Government do not quite realise how strong the feeling of insecurity is. I hold that it is the duty of the Government to see that all doubts about responsibility are removed. Also I must frankly say that a great many people up North have some doubt as to whether His Majesty's Government are really as determined as they might be to enforce their powers against alien enemies in this time of war. Perhaps the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack will not mind my saying that his well-known admiration for Teutonic *kultur* does not tend to reassure them, and they think that such strict steps are not taken against aliens as ought to be taken.

This feeling of insecurity to which I have alluded comes from the different orders given by the Home Secretary, and, if I may say so, his vacillation. There is no doubt about it, that there must be some supreme power behind the military authority or the chief constable when people are arrested one day and released the next. And from what I gather in the newspapers to-day the removal of several aliens from the coast which was supposed to have been done within a week has now been suspended. That looks as if there is interference, either from the Home Office or somewhere else in London, with the local people. I fear the Government wish to have the power to make a scapegoat of some one, on the ground that authority had been given to intern these men, but that they had not been interned. The Government should see to it that no alien is allowed to reside in prohibited areas after

the notice of the prohibited areas had been given. If it is said that such a course would cause these 'poor aliens' inconvenience, I myself hold that the life of one of our gallant sailors is worth more than any amount of inconvenience caused to any alien enemies who ever resided in this country. I hope that your Lordships' House will support the view I take that no question should be thrown on the local or the military authorities. Let an order go forth from the Home Office to say that no alien, whether naturalised or not, shall reside within a certain distance of the coast. It ought to be a general order for the whole of England, and not for particular portions. We should then know where we are, and it would do away with spying. If this were done it would give great satisfaction. As has been said before, these aliens, whether naturalised or not, boldly declare that they do not lose their individual nationality. Under those circumstances I trust that the Government will issue an Order that no further aliens should be allowed to reside on the coast. There were one or two other questions which I was going to put. One was with regard to the compensation to be paid to the people who suffered from the recent bombardment; the other was with regard to the removal of the civil population in case of an invasion. Those points are met by questions which have been put down in the names of Lord Southwark and the Duke of Rutland for to-morrow, and I do not propose to raise them now.

The MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, I think it would be convenient if I said something now upon what has fallen from my noble friend opposite, and with regard to the question of my noble friend behind me (Lord St. Davids), and the points raised by the noble Earls opposite, Lord Crawford and Lord Portsmouth. The noble Earl on the front bench opposite (Lord Selborne) asked that the whole matter should be placed on a different footing—that instead, as is now the case, of the military and naval authorities having the responsibility under the Defence of the Realm Act and utilising for purposes of local inquiry, and where necessary for local action, the police force of the neighbourhood, the whole business should be placed under one man who would be, as I understand, supreme in the matter. But the noble Earl did not point out what the qualification or the nature of that one man

should be. Presumably he would be an official in London. In that case, unless you go on the principle of interning all enemies of all ages and both sexes, which could be done without the appointment of any special official, your single official must act through some local source of information. It would be conceivable, of course, that the whole business should be undertaken by naval or military authorities under what is vaguely called Martial Law—that is to say, that a file of soldiers, or some bluejackets, could march into any one's house and remove the alien therefrom without question. The other alternative, the one which we have adopted, is to use the local police in the different counties as possessing more intimate knowledge of the circumstances, though acting at the instance and under the authority of the military and naval authorities respectively.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: I will tell the noble Marquess exactly what was in my mind. I mean a man like Major-General Baden-Powell—that kind of man. I do not necessarily say him, but he happens to be unemployed at the moment; therefore I mention him. Take such a man. You give him civil, military, and naval advisers on his staff and put the whole of the police, for this single purpose, under his authority, and he is free to move. I would not for a moment suggest that he should remain in London; as a matter of fact, he ought to travel about a great deal. But you should have one single man responsible for this particular task, and all the authorities, civilian, naval, and military, should have instructions to act under him.

The MARQUESS OF CREWE: I confess I am not quite clear as to how a scheme of that kind would work; nor do I feel certain that its results would be altogether more palatable to noble Lords opposite than those which obtain at present. If you are going to inquire into the merits of particular cases at all, if you are not going to make a generally clean sweep of all aliens—I will come to the question of the particular prohibited areas in a moment—some inquiry must be made into particular cases, and it is almost certain that the result would be that in some cases exceptions would be made. On a former occasion when this matter was under discussion here I pointed out a fact which I think has not been alluded to by any subsequent speaker and certainly has not received any

contradiction, and it is rather a curious point. It is this, that even those who are most anxious to see drastic measures taken with regard, as they say, to all aliens, have two or three among their personal acquaintances—it may be an elderly German governess, or an Austrian biologist who has lived all his life in this country——

VISCOUNT GALWAY: Or a Privy Councillor.

The MARQUESS OF CREWE: Or it may be a person of any class or of any politics. You find that everybody knows a certain number of individuals that he himself would except; and, as I pointed out when I was mentioning this matter before, in another place an hon. member who made a very strong speech on the subject mentioned that he knew half a dozen who certainly ought to be excepted because they were beyond any sort of suspicion. And, as I pointed out the other day, if you multiply that small number by the number of those who possess harmless friends, you soon reach the figure of hundreds or thousands on behalf of whom it is desired that an exception should be made.

The noble Viscount who spoke last, Lord Galway, brought a charge against the Home Office that there had been some vacillation in their action, and that whereas it had first been ordained that all aliens should be removed from prohibited areas, that ordinance was afterwards withdrawn in obedience, as the noble Viscount thought, to instructions from London. I am given to understand that this is not quite an accurate account of what occurred. The particular Orders were issued, as all those Orders are, by the military authorities on the North-East Coast. They required that not only all aliens should be removed a certain distance from the coast, but also all persons of foreign origin, even though they were British subjects. The result was a vast deal of local complaint. It must not be supposed—and I think this is a point worth noticing—that the objections to summary action of this kind were appeals *ad misericordiam* from the people themselves. In most cases, I am given to understand, they were appeals from their employers, British subjects such as ourselves, who cannot do without the particular services rendered by these individuals, possibly skilled in certain branches of manufacture or of knowledge; and among those employers you have to include the country, because there are certain processes of the

utmost importance to us all at this moment connected with keeping up various supplies which as matters now stand can only be carried out to the full extent required by the exigencies of the situation by the utilisation of the knowledge of people, in some cases of foreign birth, naturalised in some cases before the war, perhaps for many years, and against whom as individuals no suspicion is entertained by those best qualified to judge.

The EARL OF CRAWFORD: I suppose that does not apply to foreign servants in Government Departments?

The MARQUESS OF CREWE: I should think that that applies to all persons employed in different processes of manufacture—the manufacture of goods for the use of the Government in a great many parts of England and in a great many different departments. In other matters we are always told that we ought to trust the knowledge and experience of the men on the spot, and, if you are not prepared to make an absolutely sweeping removal of everybody, the local police authorities are presumably better acquainted with the past, with the character, and with the probable actions of any one individual included in this category than anybody else can be.

Then, as I was saying, the noble Viscount (Lord Galway) accuses the Government of vacillation. He particularly mentioned the Home Office; but, as a matter of fact, both the promulgation of the general removal and its subsequent withdrawal were the work of the military authorities. The Home Office had no concern with it whatever; and the step was taken on the ground, I fancy, of the sort of hardship that I have mentioned. It was also, I believe, alleged, but I do not know with what foundation, that an Order of that kind was in itself *ultra vires*. I lay no stress on that, because I am not sufficiently acquainted with the arguments that were used. But I can assure noble Lords opposite that, as the result of what they have stated, we shall give further consideration to the definite demand which they have made—namely, that all prohibited areas should be swept clear of all people of alien birth, whatever their position, character, or usefulness. I am unable, however, to say that the result will be such as noble Lords hope, because a great number of considerations are involved. Although we entirely agree with what fell from the noble Viscount, that the safety of any of the defenders of the

country absolutely weighs down all considerations of the convenience of individuals or even of national profit—I would put it as high as that—yet at the same time noble Lords must see, I think, that there are two sides of the question when you come to so sweeping an action as that.

I pass to the question of repatriation of aliens asked by my noble friend behind me (Lord St. Davids). So long ago as October last the various Governments concerned began to discuss the question of the repatriation of all male enemies not of military age and all women and children of aliens who were willing to return to their own country. The result was that when Germany and Austria agreed to extend reciprocal treatment to British subjects in those countries, we agreed to allow the return to Germany and Austria of all women and children and of all male persons either above or below the age of service. The arrangement with Austria was announced on October 10, and that with Germany early in November. Others were also included—ministers of religion, doctors, and, in the case of Austria, invalid people even though of military age. The Germans made a reservation in the case of officers or retired officers; and everybody made a reservation in the case of persons suspected of any form of *espionage* or definitely suspected on any other grounds, but that includes a comparatively small number in all the countries concerned. What has happened is that a very large number have been unwilling to go; and the House, I think, will see that in the absence of compulsion—which has not been suggested by my noble friend, although from something he said I rather gathered he would not altogether object to it—it is clear that just those of whom we should be most glad to be rid, the sinister class of persons mentioned by Lord Crawford, who are presumably well-to-do, are not in the least likely to go even though their ticket was offered them either to Germany or Austria. But, as a matter of fact, a large number have gone. The number of women and of children under 14 who have gone is between 6000 and 7000, and the number of males over 14 is about 2300.

My noble friend suggests that an offer should be made to pay the cost of repatriation. So far as indigent people are concerned, it appears to be scarcely necessary to make any offer of that kind, because the American Embassy has had placed at its disposal funds, both by the Austrian and German

Governments, for the repatriation of indigent subjects of those two countries; and, similarly, we have placed a fund at the disposal of the American Ambassadors for the repatriation of British subjects from Austria and Germany who cannot afford to come home themselves. The American Embassy, between September 1 and the end of December, repatriated 1137 destitute German subjects, and 328 applications for free tickets to Austria-Hungary have been granted—that meaning a larger number than the number of tickets, because it includes tickets issued for whole families. I think my noble friend will perhaps be disposed to agree that in the circumstances a general offer to defray the expenses of those who wish to return would not have a very wide or a very useful effect. As I have tried to point out, it would not have the effect of getting rid of the sort of people mentioned by Lord Crawford, the people who desire to remain here for their own purposes; and the number of those who are not indigent, but would be tempted by the mere cost of the railway ticket to go would, I think, be quite small. Therefore it is not proposed on behalf of the Government to make a general offer of that kind, although so far as the indigents are concerned, there is no reason to suppose that any one who desires to go is prevented by want of means from making the journey.

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, on the subject of resident aliens, it would be clearly undesirable at this hour to continue the debate, and I would only like to make two observations with regard to what has fallen from the noble Marquess the Leader of the House. He spoke about trusting to the view and the authority of the men on the spot, and by the men on the spot he appeared to indicate in the main the police. But unfortunately in many areas there is not complete agreement in the view of the men on the spot. Take the case which was mentioned by the noble Viscount behind me. After the bombardment took place on the East Coast the other day, the police authorities of Sunderland removed a large number of resident aliens from the coastal area to the interior, but the action of the local police, who are the local men to be trusted, according to the noble Marquess, was overruled by the military authorities, and they were brought back. Therefore you do not get that absolute co-ordination of authority which he postulates.

The MARQUESS OF CREWE: The noble Earl understands that the police have to take their instructions from the military or naval authorities.

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Yes. The noble Marquess concluded by saying that he and his colleagues would consider the matter before we meet again. It is perfectly certain that this question will be raised again in this House of Parliament and also in the other. The noble Marquess made an ingenious speech, giving us the plausible reasons that are advanced by people for the particular treatment of their friends in particular places. No such considerations, it appears to us, ought to prevail in view of a great national emergency. I often think, when I hear Ministers make these defences, that they hardly realise the depth and the seriousness of the impression that exists about these matters in the country. You have only to look at what takes place in this House; it is a reflection of that attitude. There are not more than thirty or forty noble Lords in the House at present, but from both sides the strongest possible appeals and protests have been made to His Majesty's Government. That common feeling between the two sides here is reflected outside. It exists everywhere in the country, and whatever may be the decision of His Majesty's Government—the noble Marquess did not hold out to us a very favourable prospect—he may be certain that when Parliament reassembles in February the matter will be raised again here, and it will certainly be raised again in the other House of Parliament; and whether a total removal of aliens from the prohibited areas is possible or not, you may be certain that we shall not rest until we get the matter put upon a much safer and sounder footing than it is at the present time.

The EARL OF CRAWFORD: I will not detain your Lordships many moments, but I should like to say how much I approve of the proposal made by Lord St. Davids. It seems to me a thoroughly sound, common-sense, business-like proposal. I do not think the Leader of the House quite met the noble Lord's point. The noble Marquess said the offer had been made to these people to be sent home. If it has been made, it has never been published. Individuals amongst the people may have told the individual alien, 'Now, if you want to be sent home, the Government will do it'; but that is a

very different thing, and would convey a different impression to the mind of the alien, from a definite statement made in Parliament that the British Government is prepared, as I gather, to send any alien home. At the end of this speech, although at the beginning he said the offer had been made, the noble Marquess said that no general offer should be made. There I differ. The noble Marquess agreed the offer should be made in specific and particular cases, yet he objects to doing it in a collective and public manner. The advantage of doing it in a collective and public manner would be that every alien would know that the offer is open. I doubt whether fifty per cent. have heard yet of the offer. In the second place, an offer made by a great Minister of State would go all over the world. It would show that we had none of those feelings of acerbity, as illustrated by harsh treatment, alleged against us in Germany. Those who did not wish to avail themselves of the offer, as Lord St. Davids had said, would show that they did not object to remaining in this country. Those who did go, I am sure, would be a good riddance. As the noble Earl has said, we shall repeat this question; and I hope that the Government, who appear to be sympathetic, will give the official *status* to their offer which attaches to a statement emanating from a Minister. I do not think there is reciprocity from Germany in this matter. I myself do not mind that. I would get rid of these people who want to go, whatever the measure of reciprocity might be.

The MARQUESS OF CREWE: I cannot tell the noble Earl what the number of English people is who have come from Austria and Germany, but a great number have come, and their expenses have been paid by the Government.

The EARL OF CRAWFORD: A great many aliens who are here will not go back. The noble Marquess himself knows the great, powerful, alien enemy influence there is in this country, and even at the expense of Government funds those men will not go back. It is the ordinary German or Austrian citizens who, if guaranteed a through passage home, would many of them go. If you repatriated the whole of the aliens at large in this country, it would not cost more than one and a half hours of the present cost of the war.

WAR RISKS AND STATE COMPENSATION

House of Lords, January 7, 1915.

Hansard. LORD SOUTHWARK: My Lords, I rise to call attention to the Prime Minister's reply to the letter[1] of Mr. Walter R. Rea, M.P., in relation to the loss of life and destruction of property caused by the bombardment of Scarborough, Hartlepool, and Whitby by the Germans; and to ask for further information. In doing so, I should like to say that, as President of the London Chamber of Commerce, I had the honour two or three weeks ago—that is to say, before the bombardment—of introducing to my right hon. friend the President of the Board of Trade an influential deputation consisting of members of the London Chamber, of the Corporation of London, and others largely interested in the trade and prosperity of London. We urged upon Mr. Runciman that the State should assume entire liability for all losses sustained to property through either aircraft or bombardment. Mr. Runciman, who received us very kindly, said that he could not agree to this, but he invited us to prepare an outline of such scheme of insurance which he promised to consider carefully and sympathetically.

Since then, as you all know, the bombardment has taken place with cruel and disastrous results as to the loss of life and damage to property in the towns I have named. This has been followed by a very kind and sympathetic letter from the Prime Minister to the Member for Scarborough, in which he states that 'The Government have resolved to provide relief from the Imperial funds in respect of damage to persons and property sustained in the recent bombardment.' My special object to-day is to ask His Majesty's Government

[1 The following is the letter above referred to:—

Times, Dec. 24, 1914. Mr. W. R. Rea, M.P. for Scarborough, received yesterday the following letter from the Prime Minister:—

'MY DEAR REA,—In reply to your letter of yesterday I have to say that the Government have resolved to provide relief from the Imperial funds in respect of damages to persons and property sustained in the recent bombardment by the towns of Scarborough, Whitby, and the Hartlepools. The scope and measure of such relief and the machinery for ascertaining and administering it are matters which are receiving careful consideration.

'I need not assure you of my deep personal sympathy with your constituents who have been made the victims of this barbarous outrage.—Yours sincerely, H. H. ASQUITH.']

whether by that letter the country is to understand that His Majesty's Government intend that all future losses sustained through aircraft or bombardment will be fully borne by the State. The matter is one of a serious and important character greatly affecting the commercial stability of the country, and it ought not to be left in even temporary doubt.

As many of your Lordships are aware, the Fire Insurance Companies positively decline to take any further risks. To avoid making any inaccurate statements to the House I have taken steps to secure reliable information. After repeated deliberations the Fire Offices' Committee (which includes all the established tariff companies) decided that the insurance of property against damage from enemy aircraft was outside their province, and could not be covered by the Fire Companies. Insurances to a considerable extent have been effected at Lloyds, but facilities for covering large mercantile risks are non-existent at the present moment. The whole machinery by which commercial and personal property is guaranteed against a common danger has broken down in regard to the risk of loss arising from enemy aircraft or warships. Commerce and property must be protected against all such incidental risks, or trade will be hampered and the sense of security weakened.

I would like to remind your Lordships that amongst other things we have to remember the liabilities of trustees and the questions that arise through mortgages on property. So far as I am concerned, I am dealing to-day only with the question of losses to property. As regards loss of life and damage to persons, that is a more complicated and difficult question and requires very careful consideration. Damage to property arising from war risks cannot be adequately covered. But loss of life and personal damage cases can be, and in the majority of cases are, covered by insurances with the leading life and accident companies and in other ways. It is an entirely different question, and ought not to be mixed up with the property question. I am not going to deal with that now. Personally I urge that there ought not to be any shadow of doubt upon the subject. This is not a personal, but a national question. We know not when or how the next disaster is going to take place. We cannot say whether the property attacked and damaged will be private, public, or mercantile. The other day I heard a large wharfinger say that he wanted

to insure for £700,000. It is a terrible thing to think that such a loss could fall on a company or individual, and that it should be an individual loss.

I look upon all these damages from aircraft or bombardment as a national loss, and we ought all to take our share in meeting the liability. I never felt that there was a question more clear or one that ought to be accepted immediately; and I believe the Government would have the entire approval of the country if, in addition to doing the good work they have done in finance, they would say that they were going to take over this liability for the State. If this liability is taken over by the State it will, of course, cost the State nothing unless the disasters take place. If disasters take place and the State has undertaken to pay the liabilities, there will be no question of premiums, organisations, complications, or expenses of any sort beyond those incurred by the tribunal called upon to deal with the individual claims as they arise after each disaster? If the question of damage by aircraft and bombardment was dealt with by such a tribunal as the Railway Commission with expert assessors, or by the Admiralty Court which deals with compensation questions, I think in that way general satisfaction would be given, and it would be only fair and right.

In speaking to various people I have heard only one or two objections. One was to this effect, 'Oh, I am insured; let others do the same.' That is all very well, but one cannot now insure even if one wishes. Another objection was that what was being advocated would not be acceptable to those who live away from the coast, in the Midlands or elsewhere at a distance. I treat neither of these objections as serious. The man who lives away from the coast, in the Midlands or elsewhere, ought to be very thankful that he is not living in a neighbourhood which he considers dangerous, and I would remind any one who raises the objection that he is living away from the coast that aircraft travel a great distance, and might even be found in these localities which are thought to be safe. But, as I have said, I do not treat the objection seriously. I have a good opinion of my fellow-countrymen, and I cannot believe that any right-minded citizen would desire to shield himself under the excuse that as he is not in danger himself those who are living on the coast and thus in danger should take all the liability themselves. This is such a practical

common sense question that I cannot conceive that His Majesty's Government requires much time to make up its mind upon it. The financial arrangements hitherto made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government in regard to the war have been carried out so satisfactorily that I feel I can appeal to His Majesty's Government to go one step further and adopt what I think would be a wise, fair, and reasonable policy, a policy which would relieve the public mind and do a great deal to maintain the commercial stability of the country. I hope that my noble friend Lord Beauchamp, who is going to reply for the Government, will be able to give a favourable answer to my question.

The LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (EARL BEAUCHAMP): My Lords, I think that in the first place your Lordships would wish an expression of concurrence with the feelings of the country generally of deep sympathy for those afflicted towns which suffered so greatly from the senseless and wanton bombardment from the German ships, deep sympathy with them in the loss which they suffered both of civilian life and of civilian property. But I am afraid that beyond that I am not very likely to receive the approval of my noble friend behind me, because I am unable to tell him that His Majesty's Government have yet been able to publish the exact lines upon which they propose to proceed. The noble Lord himself has studied the subject quite sufficiently to know that it is surrounded with difficulties and also with perplexities; and in those circumstances I do not think it is unreasonable that His Majesty's Government should ask for further time before they make public the exact details of the relief they propose. But I think, in view of some of the expressions which fell from my noble friend behind me, that I should remind your Lordships of the terms of the letter to which he referred. My right hon. friend the Prime Minister said, 'The Government have resolved to provide relief from the Imperial funds in respect of damage to persons and property sustained in the recent bombardment.' I can assure your Lordships that without any undue delay His Majesty's Government will make public the exact details of their proposals.

The EARL OF DURHAM: My Lords, arising out of the noble Earl's speech I should like to point out that the bombardment took place on December 16. From that date until January 4

His Majesty's Government had not sent down any assessors to discover what damage had been done. This is causing very great inconvenience to the poorer population who have suffered by the bombardment. They naturally do not like to repair their houses, which in some cases have been only slightly damaged, because they say 'The Government assessor will come down and find our house in proper repair, and will then say, "We cannot recompense you; we do not know what damage has been done."' In the Hartlepools I know for a fact that employers of labour are very much perturbed at the fact that His Majesty's Government have not sent down any assessors, although the Prime Minister very rightly promised in his letter that compensation would be afforded by His Majesty's Government. This is a letter I have received from the Chief Constable of the County of Durham, under date January 4, 1915: 'I have made inquiry in the two towns and find that no instructions have been received from the Government; but both our borough councils are taking steps on their own account to inquire as to the amount of damage done.' The people in the Hartlepools would be glad to hear that His Majesty's Government will send down assessors, or, if they do not, that they will accept the statements made to them by the local authorities who have been inquiring into the damage done.

THE NAVAL POSITION

House of Lords, January 7, 1915.

Hansard. The EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, I would ask you to observe the form of my notice:

> 'To ask His Majesty's Government whether they will make a statement on recent naval operations and on the present naval position.'

I am obliged to put the notice in that form because there is still no representative of the Admiralty on the front ministerial bench. I must say I think this persistent refusal of His Majesty's Government to appoint a representative of the Admiralty here is gross discourtesy to your Lordships' House and a real public inconvenience. I am sure that the noble Marquess who leads the House will, with his usual courtesy,

endeavour to put the information given to him by the Admiralty into the form most interesting to your Lordships' House. He knows that in asking him to do that we on this side do not for one moment wish to press him to tell us anything that could by any possibility be against the national interest. But for whatever he can say we shall be most grateful. The nation follows the doings of the Fleet with just as great an interest and pride as it follows the doings of the Army; and my noble friend who sits behind me (Lord Curzon) only refrained from alluding to the doings of the Fleet yesterday because he knew that I was going to have an opportunity of speaking for my party to-day.

I do not know how far the noble Marquess will be able to take up the points on which I shall touch in turn, but I should not like to sit down without taking note of some of the occurrences of the past few months for which the Admiralty or the Navy have been responsible. I shall not again go into the question of the naval expedition to Antwerp.[1] The time will come when we shall have to thresh it out to the bottom on the floor of this House. All I will say now is that the more I have learned of that expedition the more sure I am that it ought not to have been entrusted to the Admiralty, and that the Naval Brigade was not the force that ought to have been used.

[1] [*See Naval* 1, pp. 320-8.]

Turning to the battle off the Falkland Islands,[2] there we have every reason to congratulate the Admiralty on the strategical conception which made that victory possible, and the Admiral and his squadron on the manner in which that victory was achieved. The Admiralty acted on one of Nelson's great maxims, that the best thing to do was to annihilate the enemy. I hope all our countrymen understand that so thoroughly was that maxim carried out that it is not going too far to say that Admiral von Spee and his German squadron had no chance whatever, humanly speaking, against Admiral Sturdee and his British squadron, just as Admiral Cradock in his turn had no chance whatever with his squadron against Admiral von Spee and his squadron. The measure of Admiral Sturdee's success off the Falkland Islands is the measure of the blunder that the Admiralty made in furnishing Admiral Cradock with a squadron so wholly incompetent for the task that he was set to carry out

[2] [*See Naval* 2, pp. 406-415.]

in the Pacific. The moment has not yet come to follow that matter out either. We shall have to follow it out in time; but it is almost inconceivable that it should have been the same authority that armed Admiral Sturdee with his squadron and that armed Admiral Cradock with his squadron, both to perform the same task.

I do not know whether the noble Marquess will be able to tell us anything about the loss of the *Bulwark*[1] or the *Formidable*.[2] So far as the public know, the *Bulwark* was lost by an explosion in the magazine. I do not think we have been told whether that explosion was due to an accident or whether it could possibly have been due to what I know has often been the source of anxiety in all navies, and that is the chemical decomposition of powder. So far as we know, the *Formidable* was lost by submarine attack somewhere in the Channel. I do not know whether the noble Marquess will be able to tell us anything about that. I have heard a rumour, to which I do not personally attach any credence, that she was not torpedoed, but that she also was lost by an explosion in her magazine. Personally I do not believe that, but as the rumour exists I mention it in order to give the noble Marquess an opportunity of dealing with it if he is able.

[1] [*See Naval 2*, 307-8.]

[2] [*See* above, pp. 1-13.]

I pass to the raid by our cruisers, submarines, destroyers, and airships on the German harbour of Cuxhaven.[3] I do not ask to be told anything about that raid—either its object or its success or otherwise—which is not entirely in harmony with national interests; but I should not like to sit down without expressing the extraordinary admiration I feel, not only for the individual skill and daring of the men engaged on the water, under the water, and in the air, but also for the professional skill with which all their operations were co-ordinated and made part of one whole.

[3] [*See Naval 2*, pp. 440-5.]

Then I pass to the East Coast raid.[4] Lord Durham has told us to-night that there was no sort of panic. Well, I do not think any of us who knew our countrymen thought that there would be a panic. I hope that the Government will take that lesson to heart and believe that our people are not given to panic, that our people are worthy of being thoroughly trusted, and that it is the worst possible policy to base any tactical or political action on the supposition that our people could be frightened into panic. All they want to know is

[4] [*See Naval 2*, pp. 420-5.]

the whole truth about everything, however unpleasant that truth may be. The more His Majesty's Government take them into their confidence, the more resolute they will be in their support. But I have seen an old heresy awakened from the dead by this raid, and that is that the proper place for Sir John Jellicoe's Fleet is doing a sort of patrolling work up and down our coast. Nothing could be worse policy, or more dangerous, or more suicidal. I do not know where Sir John Jellicoe and his Fleet are, and I do not want to know; but I do know that his only and sole task is to destroy the German Fleet if it ever comes out. It is not his business to try and prevent a raid of this kind.

I want to say something about the possibility of preventing a raid of this kind. Given a German squadron of fast powerful ships which leaves Wilhelmshaven secretly after dark one night and arrives at a spot on our coast chosen by itself, which, as we know, may have no military significance whatever, and arrives at that spot before dawn and leaves with the utmost speed on its return journey within less than an hour after dawn—then I say that it can only be by a fluke if that raiding party be intercepted on its way back; and I hope the British public will understand that. It is no kind of reflection on Sir John Jellicoe, or on the Admiralty, or on any of the Admirals acting under the Admiralty and not under the orders of Sir John Jellicoe, that such a raid as this is possible.

I pass to an incident which occurred much earlier in the history of the war—I mean the escape of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* [1] from the Straits of Messina, with all the political consequences which have ensued. I do not think, so far as we can see, that those political consequences are going to be particularly grievous for the Allies, though I think they may be very fatal for some friends of Germany. Still there is no doubt that that escape was an incident of real naval and political importance. The Admiralty have evidently thought so too, because we have been told in the newspapers that in the first place they held a Court of Inquiry into the conduct of the British Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, Sir Berkeley Milne, and that he was completely exonerated. Subsequently a court-martial was held on Admiral Troubridge, and he in his turn was acquitted with honour by his fellow-officers who sat on that court-martial. Now it is

[1] [*See Naval* 1, pp. 51-4.]

quite clear that the Admiralty would not have ordered the inquiry into Sir Berkeley Milne's conduct in the first place, and the court-martial on Admiral Troubridge in the other, if they did not think that there was something that required explanation, and unless something had happened which in their opinion ought not to have happened. Now we know that the one distinguished officer has been exonerated by the Admiralty itself, and the other completely acquitted by a court-martial. I do not think the Government can leave the question there. I should like to know, even now, something more about it. I am quite sure that the time will come when we shall have to go into that matter even if the Government are not able to help us in going into it now.

That leads me to another point to which I specially wish to draw the noble Marquess's attention, and I confess it is one to which I attach very special importance. I always understood when I was at the Admiralty, and I am told now, that it has been an invariable practice of the Navy that if ever one of His Majesty's ships has been lost, either in peace or in war, a court-martial has been held on the surviving officers of that ship. If the captain survived, the court-martial was on the captain; if the captain was lost the court-martial was on the other officers if there were any survivors, and even on the crew. Now in this war we have lost, among ships of importance, the *Cressy*, the *Aboukir*, the *Hogue*, the *Hawke*, the *Monmouth*, the *Good Hope*, and the *Formidable*. In the case of the *Monmouth* and the *Good Hope* there could be no court-martial because we lost every officer and man; but there have been survivors—I am thankful to say many survivors—in the case of the *Cressy*, the *Hogue*, the *Aboukir*, the *Formidable*, and the *Hawke*. Perhaps the *Formidable* is too recent a case for me to use as an illustration, but not so the *Cressy*, the *Hogue*, and the *Aboukir*. I have seen nothing of any court-martial on the surviving officers or men of those cruisers. Why? Why should a practice which I believe has never been suspended, which has been invariable during two or three centuries—why should that suddenly be suspended in this war? I think the practice was most salutary and most fair to the naval officers and men themselves, most helpful for the maintenance of the high tradition of the Naval Service, most useful to the nation in order that in each case

it might know why one of His Majesty's ships had been lost. Therefore I ask, and shall press hereafter if not now, for an explanation why a court-martial has not been held in these cases. Of course, nothing would satisfy me more than to hear that those courts-martial are going to be held. If they are, I rather regret the delay, but I am very glad of the decision.

I should not like to sit down without briefly reviewing the work of the Fleet since the war began. It is a review which will be very short, though the field it will cover is not less than immense. The doings of the Army are constantly before the public. It is only now and again that the doings of the Navy similarly appear. Yet, my Lords, I believe the death-roll of the Navy is very nearly as high as the death-roll of the Army. Of course, the number of wounded in the Army is enormously greater than the number of wounded in the Navy, but it has been the melancholy, and I believe unforeseen, experience of the Navy in this war that when a ship has been lost the greater proportion of her crew has been lost too. The Navy has kept the people of these islands and of the whole Empire at work and with food in their cupboards. The fact that the war has only partially interrupted the normal life of industry and of the family wherever the British flag flies is due to the work of the Navy. It is due to the Navy that greater movements of troops have taken place under the British flag in connection with this war than I think have ever taken place before in the history of this country or in the history of the world; and, as far as we know, those movements of troops have taken place not only without the loss of a single ship but without the loss of a single life. All that is due to the Navy. It is due to our Fleet also that the only thing the German Navy has been able to do in the way of a raid has been this killing of civilians in the coast towns of Durham and Yorkshire, a feat which never could have had any possibility of any military value whatever. The German object could only have been one of two—either to create a panic in this country, which is a very likely idea on their part, as they clearly know nothing whatever about the character of our people; or they may have thought it necessary to keep up the spirits of their own population by the exhibition of this naval activity. Of that no doubt they

will be the best judges. But if that really was their object, then so far as we are concerned it is a hopeful sign.

Our position as an Opposition, as my noble friend said last night, is a peculiar one; and we cannot lay aside all responsibility, because we represent a very large body of opinion in the country who want to know from time to time why it is that we give such whole-hearted support to the Government. My noble friend answered that question in part last night. I would supplement what he said by saying to our friends that one of the reasons why we support the Government is that we know that the Government are giving the whole of their support to the Board of Admiralty and to Sir John Jellicoe and the officers and men of the Fleet in the performance of the great task that lies before them. Not that we associate ourselves unreservedly with all the doings of the Admiralty. I have already made my reservations in respect of the expedition to Antwerp and the composition of Admiral Cradock's squadron; and I confess that I think that the private war of words which the First Lord delights in carrying on on his own account against the Germans is simply deplorable, and I cannot understand how his colleagues in the Cabinet can tolerate it. I certainly dissociate myself from that altogether. But to the Board of Admiralty as a Board we give our whole-hearted support, and to Lord Fisher in his very special and immense responsibility. Above all, let me say, on behalf of all the party for which I speak, that we have the most supreme and unwavering confidence in Sir John Jellicoe and the officers and men of the Grand Fleet, and not only in those officers and men but in the officers and men of the squadrons or flotillas not under his command, whether in British seas or in foreign waters.

The MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, we cannot, I think, but be glad that the noble Earl opposite, who as a former First Lord of the Admiralty speaks with authority and experience, has been able, even in so thinly an attended House as this, to bring forward the subject of the Navy. One would have hoped that a large number of the noble Earl's supporters would attend to listen to his eloquent statement. The fact that at this moment the subject of the Navy in a debate in Parliament does not arouse precisely the same immediate interest as that of a debate on the Army is due entirely to the

fact which was mentioned by the noble Earl, and on which I will say a word in a moment—that the immediate doings of the Navy have been on a less dramatic scale than those of the Army. I have no doubt that to-morrow, when the noble Viscount opposite brings forward his motion on recruiting for the Army a far larger attendance will adorn the benches opposite than I see at this moment.

The noble Earl repeated the complaint that has been made, that there is no representative of the Admiralty in this House. For more reasons than one I share the regret of the noble Earl. Speaking generally, I think it is desirable that all the important Departments of State should have a representative in your Lordships' House, although, as I believe I pointed out when this question was under discussion before, there have been cases when the party opposite was in power when no representative of the Admiralty has been in this House. I might, perhaps, mention this further point as an excuse on my own behalf for venturing to reply to the noble Earl. Since the institution of the Committee of Imperial Defence, those who regularly sit on it, as I have now for a great number of years, obtain a certain general knowledge both of the Army and of the Navy in their technical aspects which Ministers before the institution of that body who did not fill either of the two actual appointments were not in a position to acquire.

Like the noble Earl, I do not propose in any way to argue the question of the expedition for the support of the besieged city of Antwerp. That is a question which, as he says, may very possibly become the subject of a more detailed discussion on a later date. Nor do I propose on the present occasion to add anything to what has already been said about the action off the coast of Chile, which, as we know, resulted in the lamentable loss of important vessels of His Majesty's Navy. On the last occasion on which any public statement was made about the Navy it was made by my right hon. colleague the First Lord in another place on November 27th,[1] and since that statement the most noteworthy event that has occurred is that to which the noble Earl alluded, among others—namely, the action off the Falkland Islands. The circumstances of that action have been stated with a tolerable degree of freedom, and I need not supplement what was said by

[1] [*See Naval* 2, p. 319.]

the noble Earl, except, of course, to add my congratulations to the Admiral for his brilliant performance. The noble Earl also alluded to the not less brilliant achievement of the Fleet and of the officers and men in various branches of the Naval Service in the raid on Cuxhaven. The more one considers and studies the actual feats of daring and skill which were performed in that raid, the more profound does one's admiration become of the individual officers and men who took part in it.

The result of Admiral Sturdee's victory off the Falkland Islands is that only two German cruisers—the *Dresden* and the *Karlsruhe*—are left to carry out their commerce-destroying raids, and also two armed merchant vessels. Those are the only enemy ships now on the ocean, and, without attempting to boast or to make any too sanguine a forecast, I think it is safe to say that their ultimate end is certain. The difficulties which confront ships of that kind in obtaining supplies, and in particular in coaling, are so marked that it is impossible to suppose, although they may be able to do a certain amount of damage to individual ships in the interval, that they can for long escape the fate of other ships of the same kind that have paid the penalty. It is a point to which notice cannot be drawn too often in connection with what the noble Earl said about the recognition due to the Navy, how complete now is our maritime control over the whole world. I fancy that students of history would be unanimous in saying that there never has been a naval war in which the supremacy of the British Fleet all over the world has been obtained so rapidly and at such small cost as supremacy has been obtained in this instance.

Various events have recently made us think of the war against the United States which began in 1812, the last serious naval war in which this country was engaged. That followed the great series of successes of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th—all those marvellous victories which gave us the command of the sea. But, as the noble Earl very well knows, when it came to 1812 we encountered something of a serious set-back. The Americans produced a class of frigate superior and more powerful than our own; and not only in a series of untoward naval actions, but also in the effect on trade in the country, our Navy for

a considerable period was not predominant. Now, as I say, in an incredibly short space of time we have almost succeeded in obtaining that command, and it is impossible to thank the Navy too heartily for what it has achieved in that respect. At the same time we must not forget, in the first place, to mention the ships of the Australian Navy, nor omit to note the assistance rendered both by French and by Russian cruisers, and also in the Pacific to such an extent by the fine Navy of Japan. Those are points which we certainly must not pass by.

As I was saying, the noble Earl—and I was grateful to him for it—drew attention to the vast silent service which is rendered by the Navy, and which in the press of the observation of other events we may be sometimes apt to forget for a moment, in securing the great flow of trade backwards and forwards and also in securing the sanctity of these shores. And it is important to remember one great naval revolution which the progress of science and invention has brought about—namely, that close naval blockade has now become a thing of the past. In all those great naval wars of the past the Fleet that had the command of the sea could blockade a port, leave its ships at a reasonable distance from that port, and thereby intern the inferior hostile fleet and command the naval situation. The invention of submarines has put a stop to all that. No such thing as a close naval blockade is any longer possible; and we have further to remember the most important fact that a flotilla of submarines cannot be countered by the possession of a superior force of submarines of our own. A squadron of battleships is liable to be defeated and destroyed by a superior squadron; the same with cruisers, and the same even with destroyers. But when you come to submarines the mere fact that you possess a large number yourself does not, in fact, seriously limit the possibilities of danger arising from the hostile flotilla.

I was grateful to the noble Earl, speaking with the authority he does, for making it so clear that the kind of naval raid which was made upon our coast the other day cannot in existing circumstances be rendered impossible by any naval means. He stated that with the utmost clearness and with a conviction for which I was grateful, because it has apparently sometimes been hinted that something might

have been done which would render a raid of that kind impossible. Perhaps I ought to apologise for using the word 'raid,' which has become something of a term of art in our recent discussions. A raid has of late been taken technically to mean a landing of a moderate number, say 10,000, or at the most 15,000, men on these shores; and according to the technical use of the word that term ought not to be applied to a naval bombardment such as that which took place the other day. But, on the other hand, we have heard the phrase used in this connection, and perhaps it is as good as any other. It has to be realised that there are no known methods of making an attack of this kind altogether impossible. If the enemy are prepared to go on making attacks on undefended towns, it is impossible to say for certainty that they may not make them again.

As regards the information which we so freely hear is conveyed to the enemy from our shores, I can only say that if that information included statements that either Scarborough or Whitby was in any sense a defended town, as we have seen stated in some German publications, it was, as we know, of an altogether erroneous character. And perhaps I might say, in passing—and I say this with the most absolute confidence—that I am quite certain that no activities of German spies or any aliens had any bearing whatever upon this naval attack on Whitby, Scarborough, and the Hartlepools; and although I am not able to give my reasons for making that statement, I regard it as a matter of proved certainty. As regards the attack upon those towns reported to be justified in the case of Scarborough—or was it Whitby?—by the existence of a wireless station, all I can say is that that argument would make it justifiable for any of the forces of the Allies who entered Germany to deliver over to the fate of Magdeburg any German watering-places which possess a telegraph office or in which a soldier in uniform could be found. We know that nothing of the kind is likely to happen. Breaches of the conventions and proprieties of warfare by the enemy may be countered in some cases by severe dealing with individuals, but they are not to be countered, and certainly will not be countered by us, by anything in the nature of indiscriminate reprisals. But we can say with certainty, just as we believe it to be the case in the matter of the Belgian

outrages, that such acts will recoil in the long run on the State that perpetrates them.

I should like to add my testimony, and I know I can also add that of the Admiralty, to what has been said of the admiration to be felt for the calmness and courage with which the inhabitants of those bombarded places met the unexpected experience to which they were subject. It so happens that I have the testimony of a friend who visited Hartlepool immediately after the bombardment, who was full of admiration of the complete calmness with which the inhabitants of that town behaved. Before leaving this branch of the subject I desire to say that I heard with peculiar satisfaction the observation which was made by the noble Earl, again speaking with all the authority of his experience, that events such as these ought not to be allowed, and cannot be allowed, to interfere in any way with the main scheme of the naval defence of this country. Any suggestion of pinning the main Fleet to the coast in consequence of attacks or outrages of this kind would be in the highest degree unwise, and perhaps might be almost suicidal. And when the noble Earl says that he does not know where the Grand Fleet is, I can assure him that I am in precisely the same position. It is a question which I never ask, and I am inclined to think that none of my colleagues outside the Admiralty are any wiser than I am.

Perhaps I might say a word upon the steady growth which is taking place in our general naval preponderance. When the First Lord made his statement at the end of November he entered into some detail on this subject, and I have no wish to repeat in any way what he then said. Every month our Fleet in all its branches goes on getting relatively stronger, and that is a process which will steadily continue. It is also, I think, desirable to point out that the manning of the Fleet in all its different branches has been conducted with ease and with success in spite of the formation of the body to which the noble Earl alluded with some deprecation—namely, the Naval Brigade. When war broke out there were a large number of men available in the depots. We were therefore able not merely to make up the reserves of the nucleus crews but to man with first-rate skilled complements the ships which were building for foreign Powers which were

taken over, as the House knows, in a great hurry when war broke out; and all the great forthcoming deliveries of new ships of all kinds, including monitors—a special kind of craft useful for particular purposes of warfare, as the House knows—the manning of all those is completely provided for as far ahead as it is necessary to consider. And in the last resort there remains the Naval Division, which has been used for other purposes, to which the noble Earl alluded, which so far as it is composed of seafaring men can be utilised as another Reserve.

The noble Earl spoke of certain losses which had taken place in the Fleet of late. He alluded, in the first place, to the lamentable explosion on board the *Bulwark*. Although I do not know that it can ever be absolutely proved what the cause of that explosion was, the most generally held opinion is that it was the result of an accident and not a deterioration in the explosives; but I am only there giving a general impression of what I believe to be the best instructed belief. The noble Earl also mentioned the *Formidable*, the loss of which we all so profoundly regret; and he mentioned a rumour which he said was prevalent in some quarters that that battleship had been destroyed not by a torpedo but by an internal explosion. The definite opinion of the Admiralty is that the *Formidable* was sunk by two torpedoes fired from a submarine; and I should like to tell the House that after the ship had been struck the captain signalled to another ship which was in the neighbourhood not to stand by but to keep off because he believed there was a submarine in the neighbourhood. That was a very gallant act, and worthy of the finest traditions of the British Navy; and I am sure it must be a consolation to those whose relatives were lost on that ship to know that they went down like heroes with their last thought for their comrades in the Fleet. We ought not to forget also to pay a tribute to the gallant conduct of those who assisted in the rescue of some of those who happily survived from the *Formidable*, the fishermen who took on board some men from the ship's boats, a work of the greatest difficulty and carried out with the finest gallantry.

Then the noble Earl concluded his speech by touching on a subject of some difficulty, and one upon which I fully admit difference of opinion may easily exist. He inquired as to the

holding of courts of inquiry and courts-martial in cases of the loss of ships. He asked whether, so far as possible, the result of such courts might not be made known to the public, and he also desired that it should be laid down as an invariable rule that in all cases in which a ship was lost a court-martial should necessarily be held.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: I think I put it this way—What is the reason why the invariable rule has been departed from?

The MARQUESS OF CREWE: Precisely; but it comes to the same thing.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: I expressed my own opinion.

The MARQUESS OF CREWE: I am speaking, of course, without special technical knowledge, and I am subject to the contradiction of the noble Earl, or of any other noble Lord who is better informed than I am; but I confess it is a suggestion entirely new to me that during the whole of the naval history of this country, where a ship has been sunk in the course of a naval battle, a court-martial has been always held. I should like to ask the noble Earl—I do not press him for an answer at this moment—whether, if that is so, the holding of the court-martial has been confined to those actually on board the ship that was sunk, or whether it was held on the Admiral commanding the squadron or Fleet, as the case might be, to which the ship that was lost belonged? I am speaking, of course, of a naval action in which the ship is sunk by gunfire, as was the only way of sinking a ship in the past. If that is so, I can only say it is a surprise to me to be told, say in the case of a great victory when one or two ships were lost, that either the captains or admirals of those particular ships were tried by court-martial; and whether that is so or not, I should like to point out that in the case of a ship which is sunk by a submarine, or even I think it may be said of one which is sunk by a mine, a ship of that kind is lost in an operation of warfare and therefore is not *in pari materia* with losses which occur in peace time by a ship being cast away or run aground, or by some mishap of that sort. I certainly had believed, and it appears to me to be a rational distinction, that a difference had been made in the past between the loss of ships by operations of warfare and losses which occurred through accident or mishap for

which the commanding officer of the ship might presumably be to blame.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: I do not think any one thought of holding a court-martial on the captain of a ship sunk in a naval victory such as was Trafalgar; but if there had been a naval reverse, I think a court-martial would have been held on the Admiral. In the case of a single frigate action the captain was held responsible, and that corresponds with the loss of a ship by a submarine or mine now.

The MARQUESS OF CREWE: That, no doubt, is a matter which the Admiralty will take into careful consideration. I am not able to tell the noble Earl precisely in what cases courts-martial have or have not been held, although, as he knows, some courts of inquiry and courts-martial have been held; the noble Earl alluded in particular to the escape of the *Goeben* and the inquiry which took place at which the conduct of two Admirals was inquired into. The *Hawke* was under the command of the Admiral commanding the Grand Fleet. What happened to the *Hawke* was not the result of independent action on the part of her commander; therefore the question as to who ought to be put on his trial would arise, I have no doubt, in each particular case. But, apart from that, there is the further question of what degree of publication ought to take place in cases where courts of inquiry or courts-martial are held. The view which the Admiralty take of that argument of the noble Earl is that during the progress of the war it is not expedient to publish the results of courts of inquiry; and I conceive that they founded their view largely upon this consideration—namely, that in time of war there are all manner of circumstances, some of which are almost certain to be involved in the evidence given for or against the particular officer, which, for reasons of public policy, cannot properly be published.

I feel pretty certain that so far as the particular case of the *Goeben* is concerned, although certain facts connected with the escape of that vessel might be published, it would not be possible in the public interest to publish everything which might come out at the court of inquiry. If that is so it is clearly not fair to the officers, or indeed to the public, that a truncated story should be told; and that, I think, is the main argument which causes the Admiralty to ask noble

Lords and others who desire to be furnished with these details not to press for them during the progress of the war. There obviously can be no object in not publishing anything which in ordinary times would be published—the proceedings of a court of inquiry relating to the loss of a ship—except the fact that some damage may be done to the public interest thereby; and if a rule can be made and maintained that so long as, at any rate, the war at sea lasts there should be no publication of the details of these inquiries I believe that it would prove to be to the public interest, and that no other interests would be prejudiced thereby. It is, of course, open to a particular officer who feels that a complete silence about a case is damaging him to make an appeal to have certain facts published, and I have no doubt that any appeal of that kind would be most carefully considered by the authorities. But the general rule is one which I venture to think it is reasonable should be made and maintained.

As I said when I entered on this subject, it is one on which there is, no doubt, much to be said on both sides. I dare say there is much to be said for the noble Earl's desire to try somebody by court-martial in all cases of loss. On the other hand, I think it might be argued that the effect upon officers —although I do not believe, knowing the spirit and temper of the Navy, that it is an effect which would be in itself formidable—of putting upon trial every man who meets with a mishap would be, except for that wonderfully bold temper of the Navy to which I was alluding, rather to encourage them not to take the kind of risks which are freely taken and ought to be taken in warfare, but which are sometimes taken in peace when they ought not to be taken. That is an argument which I confess I think has some importance. But I have no doubt that the Admiralty will attach every weight to the arguments which have been used by the noble Earl on this subject, and if he desires to develop them to me or to any of the naval authorities privately I shall be very glad, I need not say, to convey them to the proper quarter—namely, to the notice of the Board of Admiralty. Whatever may be said about the representation of the Board of Admiralty in this House, there is one respect in which the Navy always rather suffers in comparison with the Army in this Assembly. There are always a number of noble Lords in

this House who have held high military positions and have seen a great deal of military service. It is only every now and then that we are similarly favoured among the non-official Peers in respect of the Navy. There have been times when there have been eminent Admirals in this House, but a debate of this kind does not now enjoy quite the same advantage which a general military debate does in your Lordships' House. I repeat that I am very glad that the noble Earl has opened up this subject, and I am quite certain that his observations will be appreciated not merely by the House but by the country, and I am glad to have had an opportunity of replying as well as I could to them.

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, there are three observations only that I will make. The first is that it must have been a great strain upon the noble Marquess, although it has been a great pleasure to us, that he should be willing to deliver to us the interesting remarks to which we have just listened about the Navy. But it really is not fair that the noble Marquess, who is the most devoted and self-sacrificing pluralist I have ever known, should be called upon, in the space of two or three afternoons, to represent nearly every Government Department in this House. Willing as he is to do it, and willing as we are to listen to him, I do ask him to see whether he cannot get us a representative of the Admiralty in this House. There was a time, a few years ago, when the Master of the Horse occupied that position. No such discreditable anomaly, I hope, will be repeated. I am certain that among his colleagues, either in the other House or in this, the noble Marquess can find some one to represent the Admiralty here.

My second observation is that with the general spirit of what the noble Marquess said about courts-martial in naval cases we shall all agree; but I think that it would be going too far if he expected us on this side, during the progress of the war, to give an absolute pledge that in no case would we ask for the publication of the result of a court-martial in a case where a ship was lost. Be it remembered that a court-martial on the loss of a ship is a procedure from which the Navy is not averse. Rather is it one to which it is habituated, and any departure therefrom is more likely to be resented than approved of by the Navy.

My third point is about the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*. The noble Marquess did not quite appreciate, perhaps, the point of my noble friend who sits behind me. My noble friend pointed out that the escape of these two ships with its vital and momentous consequences in the progress of the war was evidently regarded by the Admiralty as due to an error on the part of some one or another. Accordingly the conduct of two Admirals was investigated. Both of these Admirals have been acquitted, I believe on the ground that they were merely carrying out the instructions of the Admiralty. The implication therefore is that the blame, if blame there is, rests with the Board of Admiralty itself. That is a conclusion which is very widely drawn, and one of the reasons why my noble friend pressed for information was in order to give the noble Marquess an opportunity of dispelling any doubt. That opportunity he has not taken. But perhaps he may be able to tell us in a sentence if my version of the official procedure is correct—whether the verdict of the court-martial which acquitted Admiral Troubridge has been confirmed or not by the Board of Admiralty?

The MARQUESS OF CREWE: I will inquire as to that. I am not certain.

NAVAL PRIZE FUND

House of Lords, January 7, 1915.

The EARL OF CAMPERDOWN rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether the Treasury had arrived at a decision as to the system of bounty which it was announced on March 17, 1914, was to be substituted for naval prize money. *Hansard.*

The noble Earl said: My Lords, on March 17, 1914, the First Lord of the Admiralty announced that it was the intention of the Admiralty to abolish the system then in force of prize money and to substitute for it a system of bounties. Accordingly an Order in Council was passed abolishing the system then in existence, but the new system was not set up. On August 31st I asked in this House a question[1] on this matter, and Lord Wimborne answered:

[1] [*See* below.]

> 'The old system has been done away with and a new one set up, but the exact form which it will take will be announced in due course.'

Now here we are in January 1915, nearly a year since the change was proposed, and nothing has been done. I am glad to think that the amount which I suppose at some time will have to be divided is considerable. So far as I am aware, however, no announcement has been made by the Admiralty, and we have to be content with the statement that "the exact form will be announced in due course." What we want to know is, when will 'due course' arrive?

EARL BEAUCHAMP: My Lords, the Admiralty have placed before the Treasury a scheme for the establishment of a Naval Prize Fund and for a revised method of distribution in accordance with the decision embodied in the Order of His Majesty in Council of August 28th last.[1] Under this scheme it is proposed to distribute gratuities on a scale generally corresponding to the old system of distribution to the ships' companies, but modified to suit the new conditions of the Naval Service. Up to the present time only a small number of prizes have been finally dealt with by the Court and sold, and it is not possible now to make any statement as to when distribution can be made, or the amount of such distribution. I can assure the noble Earl that this question, which is complex and difficult, is engaging the close attention of the two Departments concerned—that is to say, the Admiralty and the Treasury. But after a close consideration of the question I think that I may say this, that everybody is agreed that periodical distribution, say every three months, is quite impracticable, and that some other method of distribution than that will have to be agreed to.

[1] [*See Naval* 1, p. 114.]

The EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: That answer is not in words the same, but is practically the same as that which I received on August 31st last, when the announcement was already several months due. Certainly the Admiralty and the Treasury seem to me to be proceeding at a very slow rate.

[The following is the question referred to above, together with the answer given thereto:—

House of Lords, August 31, 1914.

Hansard. The EARL OF CAMPERDOWN rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether the Treasury have arrived at a decision as to the grant or bounty which the First Lord of the Admiralty stated when introducing the Naval Estimates was under consideration as a substitute for naval

prize money. The noble Earl said: My Lords, the First Lord of the Admiralty informed the House of Commons that the Government intended to abolish prize money. He stated also that a considerable number of naval officers were in favour of that course, and added that the question of issuing some grant or bounty to sailors during the course of a war was under consideration. That was on March 17, and the matter, I suppose, has been under consideration ever since. Now here we are in a war, and the question of prize money is one which is, I hope, very likely soon to arise. Therefore, I trust that the Treasury have arrived at a decision with regard to this matter. At the present time the question of prize money is governed by the Order in Council of 1900. Prize money up to the present moment has therefore not been abolished, but I understand that an Order in Council dealing with the question is under consideration. I trust that the Order in Council is very soon to be issued, and I venture to hope also that His Majesty's Government have made up their minds as to the system which it is proposed to substitute for the present system of prize money.

LORD WIMBORNE: My Lords, the Admiralty issued a statement through the Press Bureau on August 29 to this effect:—

> 'Parliament was informed earlier in the year that His Majesty's Government had decided that prize money in respect of captures should not be granted. An Order in Council has been passed cancelling the previous Proclamation of September 17, 1900, in respect of captures from the enemy. In lieu of prize money a system of bounties will be established. The exact form that the bounties will take and the manner in which they will be distributed are under consideration, but the intention is that prizes captured during the war should cease to be the perquisite of a limited number of fortunate crews, and that the proceeds of the sales of vessels and cargoes should form a fund out of which the distribution will be made on a basis to be subsequently determined and announced by Proclamation. No alteration will be made in regard to the grant of prize bounties for the capture or destruction of enemy warships as provided for in the Naval Prize Act, 1864, provision for which will be made by Proclamation.'

I have further to say that the Treasury have agreed generally with the Admiralty to substitute the system of prize bounty for that of prize money.

The EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: I was under the impression that the new Order in Council had not been passed. Apparently I was wrong.

LORD WIMBORNE: Yes.

The EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: Is the Order in Council in force?

LORD WIMBORNE: It has been passed.

The EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: Do I understand that prize money

has been abolished, and yet the system which is to be substituted has not yet been determined on? It surely is an extraordinary thing that one system be done away with, and that you should postpone till a future date the decision as to the system to be substituted. I was, as I have said, under the impression that the Order in Council was under consideration, and that when it was issued it would contain a full and complete statement of what was to be substituted for prize money.

LORD WIMBORNE: That matter is still under consideration. The old system has been done away with, and a new one set up, but the exact form which it will take will be announced in due course.

The EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: Ever since March 17 the new system has been under consideration, but it has not been settled yet !]

CLASSIFICATION AND PAY OF NAVAL OFFICERS

At the Court at *Buckingham Palace*, the 7th day of January 1915.

Present—

The KING'S Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

L.G., Jan. 8, 1915.

WHEREAS there was this day read at the Board a Memorial from the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 2nd day of January 1915, in the words following, viz.:—

'Whereas by Section 3 of the Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865, it is enacted, *inter alia*, that all pay, pensions, or other allowances in the nature thereof, payable in respect of services in your Majesty's Naval or Marine Force to a person being or having been an Officer, Seaman, or Marine therein, shall be paid in such manner and subject to such restrictions, conditions, and provisions, as are from time to time directed by Order in Council:

'And Whereas in Article 168 of the Regulations for the Government of your Majesty's Naval Service it is laid down that the Officers of your Majesty's Navy are to be divided into six branches, viz.: Military, Engineer, Medical, Accountant, Naval Instructor, and Artisan:

'And Whereas we are of opinion that it is desirable in the interests of your Majesty's Naval Service that the Officers of the Engineer Branch should now be classified as part of the Military Branch, and further, that certain

alterations should be made in the rates of pay of Engineer Commanders and Engineer Lieutenant-Commanders of your Majesty's Fleet:

'We beg leave humbly to recommend that your Majesty may be graciously pleased, by your Order in Council, to approve of the Regulations set forth in the annexed Schedule, to take effect from the 1st day of January 1915.

'The Lords Commissioners of your Majesty's Treasury have signified their concurrence in these proposals in so far as the pay of the Officers is concerned.

'SCHEDULE.

'1. From the 1st day of January 1915, Officers of His Majesty's Navy will be divided into five Branches, namely, Military, Medical, Accountant, Naval Instructor, and Artisan.

'2. Officers of the existing Engineer Branch, although forming part of the Military Branch, will retain their present titles.

'They will not be eligible to take Command of His Majesty's Ships.

'In all details relating to the duties of the Fleet and to the discipline and interior economy of His Majesty's Ships they will be subject to the authority of any Officer who may be in charge of the Executive duties of the Ship, or acting as Officer of the Watch, or specially detailed for the charge of any other special service or duty, of whatever seniority such Officer may be.

'3. The following revised rates of pay to take effect for Engineer Commanders and Engineer Lieutenant-Commanders as specified:

	Pay per diem. £ s. d.
Engineer Commander and Engineer Lieutenant-Commander after four years from date of promotion to Engineer Lieutenant-Commander	1 0 0
Engineer Commander and Engineer Lieutenant-Commander after six years from date of promotion to Engineer Lieutenant-Commander	1 2 0'

His Majesty, having taken the said Memorial into consideration, was pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed, and the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

PAY ARRANGEMENTS FOR ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE

At the Court at *Buckingham Palace*, the 7th day of January 1915.

Present—

The KING'S Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

L.G., Jan. 8, 1915.

WHEREAS there was this day read at the Board a Memorial from the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 21st day of December 1914, in the words following, viz :—

'Whereas by Section 3 of the Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865, it is enacted, *inter alia*, that all pay, pensions, and other allowances in the nature thereof, payable in respect of services in your Majesty's Naval or Marine Force to a person being or having been an Officer, Seaman, or Marine therein, shall be paid in such manner, and subject to such restrictions, conditions, and provisions, as are from time to time directed by Order in Council :

'And Whereas your Majesty, by your Order in Council bearing date the 16th day of July 1914, was pleased to sanction the revision in certain respects of the provisional arrangements for the emoluments of Officers and others serving in the Naval Wing of the Royal Flying Corps sanctioned by your Order in Council bearing date the 19th day of July 1912':

'And Whereas we are of opinion that these arrangements require additions in certain further respects :

'We beg leave humbly to recommend that your Majesty may be graciously pleased to sanction the following proposals regarding the counting of time for increase of pay, etc., for pension of men entered in the Royal Naval Air Service.

'(1) The active service of all ratings in the Royal Naval

Air Service whether they are lent from the Active List of the Royal Navy, or entered direct under special engagement for a period of service in the Royal Naval Air Service, to be followed by service in the Royal Fleet Reserve (Air Service Section); to count as continuous service for all purposes :

'(2) Men lent from the Active List of the Royal Navy to the Royal Naval Air Service to count their active service in the Royal Naval Air Service for pension and gratuity either in their Naval rating or their Air Service grade, whichever is the more advantageous to them :

'(3) The time served in the Royal Naval Air Service by men lent from the Active List to count, on reverting to the general service, towards increase of pay in the general service rating held during the period :

'(4) Men transferred from the Military Wing, Royal Flying Corps, to the Royal Naval Air Service in no case to receive pensions less than those which equivalent ranks in the Military Wing, Royal Flying Corps, are allowed.

'The Lords Commissioners of your Majesty's Treasury have signified their concurrence in these proposals.'

His Majesty, having taken the said Memorial into consideration, was pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed, and the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

PAY OF RETIRED OFFICERS OF ROYAL INDIAN MARINE

At the Court at *Buckingham Palace*, the 7th day of January 1915.

Present—

The KING'S Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

WHEREAS there was this day read at the Board a Memorial from the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 2nd day of January 1915, in the following words, viz. :— *L.G.*, Jan. 8, 1915.

'Whereas by Section 3 of the Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865, it is enacted, *inter alia*, that all

pay, pensions, or other allowances in the nature thereof, payable in respect of services in your Majesty's Naval or Marine Force to a person being or having been an Officer, Seaman, or Marine therein, shall be paid in such manner, and subject to such restrictions, conditions, and provisions, as are from time to time directed by Order in Council:

'And Whereas we have found it necessary to employ temporarily in your Majesty's Navy certain retired Officers of your Majesty's Indian Marine Force, and certain Officers who resigned from that force:

'We beg leave humbly to recommend that your Majesty may be graciously pleased, by your Order in Council, to sanction the grant to such Officers temporarily employed of pay and allowances from Imperial Funds as follows:—

'*Retired Officers, Royal Indian Marine.*

'Pay and allowances at the Naval rates applicable to their temporary rank in the Royal Navy, to be paid concurrently with their Indian pensions:

'*Other Officers, late Royal Indian Marine.*

'Pay and allowances at the Naval rates applicable to their temporary rank in the Royal Navy, plus 25 per cent. bonus on full pay excluding allowances. Such pay to take effect as from the 1st September 1914.

'The Lords Commissioners of your Majesty's Treasury have signified their concurrence in this proposal.'

His Majesty, having taken the said Memorial into consideration, was pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed, and the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

REVENTLOW ON THE NAVAL SITUATION

Extracts from article 'Germany still Confident; Prepared for a Long War,' by Count Ernest von Reventlow, in the 'New York World,' Sunday, January 10, 1915

Another question of the future is, how long will Russia and France believe Great Britain able to break down the German power of resistance? From the beginning of

the war, Great Britain used every possible means to cut off Germany from the trade of the world, and keep from the German frontier all those wares and goods which the German people need. Through this policy Great Britain intended, and, according to English Government and press, was believed able to starve out Germany and make it impossible for Germans to continue to carry on the war. With this purpose Great Britain trod under foot international rights of the sea and all international customs.

. . . . . .

How the naval war between Germany and Great Britain will develop cannot be prophesied. Particularly in naval warfare do unexpected occurrences suddenly give entirely a different appearance to things. For the rest I believe that the interview with Grand Admiral von Tirpitz[1] recently published in the American Press, points out the way which promises great success for the German cause—the establishment of a blockade of the English coast in certain sections. It would be the first time in history that the coasts of Great Britain were blockaded, but Germany through her submarine power is in a position to carry out such a blockade of the British coasts and harbours, and in fact an effective blockade in the sense of the Declaration of Paris in 1856.

[1] [*See Naval* 2, p. 435.]

Such a blockade would be in line with declarations of international rights, while the enclosing of the North Sea by Great Britain runs counter to international rights, particularly to the rights of neutral Powers.

In all other circumstances we Germans, knowing ourselves, face the future of the conflict with England confidently. It is an English untruth that the German fleet fears a battle with that of England. On the contrary, the German fleet already has twice visited the English coast, and maintains, as before, its base in the German Bight of the North Sea. The great English Fleet, however, has for months quitted the North Sea and keeps itself on the other side of the English Isles, in the Irish Sea or west of the Shetland Islands. Therefore for our Fleet the British Fleet is difficult to find. The English Fleet, however, when it wishes, can always find our Fleet because it does not hide itself. The English Admiralty is anxious to keep its Fleet intact as long as possible.

CAPTURE OF THE *FARN*—CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State

British Embassy,
Washington, January 13, 1915.

U.S.D.C. SIR,—I have the honour to inform you that I learn a ship named the *K. D. 3*, flying the German flag, entered the port of San Juan, Porto Rico, on the 12th instant. The British Consul states that there is evidence to show that this vessel is the former British *Farn* of London, which has been captured by the enemy. Being private property, it is not recognised by international law as lawful prize until it has been taken into a prize court of the captor and adjudicated upon.

I have the honour to request that the United States Government will be so good as to cause this matter to be investigated by the proper authorities, and, if satisfied that the facts are as stated above, to give orders for the detention of this vessel in the interests of a proper observance of neutrality.—I have, &c.,

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State

British Embassy,
Washington, January 17, 1915.

ibid. SIR,—Referring to my notes Nos. 18 and 25 of the 13th and 14th [1] instant, relative to the British ship *Farn* which has been taken into the port of San Juan, Porto Rico, I have the honour to say that His Majesty's Government presume that the United States Government will refuse the request of the German officer, and that instructions will be given to the authorities at San Juan to act in conformity with Article 21 of the Convention signed at The Hague on October 18th, 1907, known as No. 13 [2] of the Instruments signed at the Second Peace Conference.—I have, &c.,

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[2] [*See Naval* 1, p. 428.]

[1] Not printed.

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador

Department of State,
Washington, January 29, 1915.

EXCELLENCY,—I have the honour to acknowledge the *U.S.D.C.*
receipt of your notes of the 13th, 14th, and 17th instant in regard to the steamer *K. D. 3*, which entered the port of San Juan, Porto Rico, in the possession of a German prize crew, and to inform you in reply that, as stated to you informally at the Department, this Government, after a careful investigation of the case, determined to treat the steamer as a tender to a belligerent fleet, and on the 22nd instant instructions were given that the vessel be ordered to leave port within twenty-four hours after notice to that effect, and upon failure to leave, that the vessel, together with the prize officers and crew, be interned, the British officers and crew and the Chinese seamen being released.

The Department is now advised that the vessel, together with the prize officers and crew, was interned on the 25th instant at San Juan.—I have, &c.,

W. J. BRYAN.

The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State

British Embassy,
Washington, February 26, 1915.

SIR,—In your note of the 29th ultimo you were good enough *ibid.*
to inform me of the decision of the United States Government to treat the steamship *Farn*, or *K. D. 3*, which entered the port of San Juan, Porto Rico, in the possession of a German prize crew, as a tender to a belligerent fleet, and that as a result of the instructions given in pursuance of this decision the vessel had been interned.

I understand from the conversations on this question which I have had the honour to have at the Department of State, that the United States Government have been under the impression that the *Farn*, at the time of her original capture by a German cruiser, was employed as an Admiralty collier. I am now informed by my Government that the vessel has not in fact been employed as a collier or otherwise on Admiralty service since the outbreak of war, and that at

the time of her capture she was carrying a commercial cargo to the Plate.

I am further instructed to state that His Majesty's Government consider that, in any case, whatever the previous status of the vessel may have been, it would be necessary, before the vessel could be treated by a neutral Power in whose port she might find herself, as a German fleet auxiliary, instead of as a prize under Article 21 of The Hague Convention, that there should have been a finding of condemnation of her on some other ground by a competent prize court.

His Majesty's Government for these reasons consider that no circumstances have been disclosed in the present case which would justify the treatment of the *Farn* in a manner other than that prescribed in Article 21 of The Hague Convention No. 13 of 1907, and they trust that on further consideration the United States Government will agree in this view and issue the necessary instructions to the authorities concerned for the release of the vessel.—I have, &c.,

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador

Department of State,
Washington, March 13, 1915.

U.S.D.C. EXCELLENCY,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 26th ultimo in relation to the steamship *Farn*, or *K. D. 3*, which has been interned in the port of San Juan, Porto Rico, as a tender to a belligerent fleet. The Department is advised that the *Farn* left Cardiff about September 5th, 1914, for Montevideo, with a clause in her charter to deliver coal to warships if they so desired. Though, as you state, the vessel was not employed as a collier, or otherwise, in the Admiralty service, this fact would not in the opinion of the Department affect her status at the time of internment if she indeed acted as a collier or auxiliary to a belligerent fleet. It is understood that the *Farn* was a British merchant vessel; that she had on board a cargo of Cardiff coal amounting to some 3000 tons; that she was captured by the German cruiser *Karlsruhe* on October 5th; that the cruiser placed a prize crew and officers on board; and that

notwithstanding the known practice of the *Karlsruhe* to sink her enemy prizes, the vessel had been at sea continuously since the date of capture until she put into the port of San Juan on January 12th last for provisions and water. The Department believes that the only reasonable conclusion in the circumstances, is that between October 5th and January 12th the *Farn* was used as a tender to German warships. It appears obvious that a belligerent may use a prize in its service and that the prize thereby becomes stamped with a character dependent upon the nature of the service. It is upon this view of the case that the United States Government concluded to treat the vessel as a tender, which character accords with her presumed service to the German fleet.

Your Excellency states that it would be necessary before the vessel could be treated as a German fleet auxiliary that she should have been condemned by a competent prize court. With this conclusion the Government of the United States is under the necessity of disagreeing. In the opinion of this Government an enemy vessel which has been captured by a belligerent cruiser becomes as between the two governments the property of the captor without the intervention of a prize court. If no prize court is available this Government does not understand that it is the duty of the captor to release his prize, or to refuse to impress her into its service. On the contrary, the captor would be remiss in his duty to his Government and to the efficiency of its belligerent operations if he released an enemy vessel because he could not take her in for adjudication.

As to Article 21 of Hague Convention No. 13 of 1907, cited by your Excellency as prescribing the treatment to be accorded to the *Farn*, it is only necessary to state that as it appears that His Majesty's Government has not ratified this Convention it should not be regarded as of binding effect between Great Britain and the United States.

In this relation I venture to call to your attention that the British Consul at San Juan protested on January 12th against the clearance of the *Farn*, and that your Excellency in your note of January 13th requested that she be detained in the interest of neutrality. It was not until January 17th that your Excellency informed the Department that His

Majesty's Government presumed that the United States would act under Article 21 of Hague Convention No. 13 of 1907 in regard to the release of the vessel. Sufficient time had thus elapsed to allow for communication with British warships and their appearance off the port of San Juan. The result of releasing a German prize loaded with coal at this juncture needs no comment.

In the circumstances the Government of the United States is under the necessity of adhering to its decision to intern until the end of the war the steamship *Farn* as a fleet auxiliary.—I have, etc., For the Secretary of State,

ROBERT LANSING.

The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State

British Embassy,
Washington, March 26, 1915.

U.S.D.C. SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of March 13th in which you are good enough to explain the grounds on which the United States Government is under the necessity of adhering to its decision to intern until the end of the war the steamship *Farn* as a fleet auxiliary.

The tenor of your note was duly telegraphed to His Majesty's Government, who desire me to inform you that it will have their most attentive consideration. They prefer, however, to await the receipt of the full text before replying in detail.

They do not at present understand to whom the United States Government feel themselves bound to hand over the *Farn* at the end of the war, and they would much appreciate it if they could be informed of the decision arrived at in this respect. While they would be very glad if this point could be cleared up, they do not abandon their contention that the *Farn* ought to be released to the British owners without delay.—I have, &c.,

CECIL SPRING-RICE.

NOTICE TO MARINERS

(No. 41 of the year 1915)

ENGLAND, SOUTH COAST

Portland Harbour Approach—Caution with regard to Target Practice

Position.—Portland outer breakwater, lat. 50° 35′ N., long. 2° 25′ W. *L.G.*, Jan. 15, 1915.

Caution.—Mariners are hereby warned that Target practice will take place, without further notice, from ships lying in Portland harbour, and it will therefore be dangerous henceforth for vessels to enter the following area :—

Limits of dangerous area :

(*a*) *On the North.*—By a line drawn in a 97° (S. 67° E. Mag.) direction from the north end of the outer breakwater, until St. Albans head bears 18° (N. 34° E. Mag.).

(*b*) *On the South.*—By a line drawn in a 119° (S. 45° E. Mag.) direction from the south end of the outer breakwater, until St. Albans head bears 18° (N. 34° E. Mag.).

(*c*) *On the East.*—By a line joining the eastern extremities of limits (*a*) and (*b*).

(*d*) *On the West.*—By Portland outer breakwater.

Variation.—16° W.

Charts temporarily affected.—No. 2615, Portland to Christchurch ; No. 2450, Portland to Owers ; No. 2255, Weymouth and Portland ; No. 2675*b*, English Channel, middle sheet.

Publication.—*Channel Pilot*, Part I., 1908, page 150 ; Supplement No. 2, 1914.

Authority.—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

By Command of their Lordships,

J. F. PARRY, *Hydrographer.*

Hydrographic Department, Admiralty,
London, 14*th January* 1915.

SWAKOPMUND OCCUPIED

Pretoria, January 16.

It is officially announced that the Union Forces occupied Swakopmund on Thursday morning.

The British had two killed and one wounded in the operations.—*Reuter.*

INTERNED GERMAN SHIPS

Times, Jan. 14, 1915

It is officially stated that a number of enemy steamships interned in the United Kingdom are being requisitioned by the Admiralty in order that they may be set free for employment in the coasting trade, more especially to meet the need for greater coal supplies in London.

Times, Jan. 22, 1915.

The Admiralty proposes to put the following thirty-four enemy steamers which were detained in United Kingdom ports at the outbreak of war into the East Coast coal trade[1]:—

[1] [See *Naval* 1, pp. 374-9.]

Nyland	*Albert Clement*
Brema	*Marie Leonhardt*
Ostpreussen	*Frieda*
Henry Fürst	*Gemma*
Dryade	*Emma Minlos*
Erna Boldt	*Hanna Larsen*
George Harper	*Ottokar*
Ursus	*Hercules*
Hans Leonhardt	*Horst Martini*
Hans Hemsoth	*Franz Fischer*
Sabbia	*Rhenania*
Levensau	*Wega*
Hornsund	*Prosper*
Providentia	*Denebola*
Serak	*Vianna*
Tergestea	*Hans Jost*
Karpat	*Herbert Fischer*

These steamers are being employed with a view to relieving the situation caused by the short supply of tonnage, the delays in port, and the consequent difficulty of getting coals into London.

FRENCH SUBMARINE SUNK

Paris, January 19.

C.O.

The French submarine *Saphir*, which on the morning of the 15th instant took up patrol duty near the Dardanelles,

has not since rejoined the squadron operating in those waters. The foreign Press states she has been sunk, and Turkish vessels are said to have picked up part of her crew.

Constantinople, January 15.

The Turkish General Staff reports as follows:—The French submarine *Saphir* attempted to approach the entrance to the Dardanelles, but was forthwith sunk by our artillery. A portion of the crew was rescued. *K.V.*, Jan. 15, 1915.

Constantinople, January 17.

Headquarters communicates details concerning the sinking of the French submarine *Saphir*, which, as already announced, was sunk at the entrance of the Dardanelles. The submarine was seeking to approach the entrance of the Dardanelles without showing herself, when she struck a mine and sank. The efforts of our motor-boats to save the survivors of the crew are a noble answer to the inhuman deeds which have been committed by our enemies. *K.D.*

Paris, January 22.

It is officially announced by the United States Embassy in Constantinople that Turkish vessels have picked up and brought to Constantinople ten of the crew of the French submarine *Saphir*, which was sunk by a mine in the Dardanelles. *Times*, Jan. 23, 1915.

THE *CHAR* SUNK

The *Char*, Lieutenant James Melsome, R.N.R., in command, which was sunk after a collision in the Downs on Saturday morning,[1] was one of eight tugs, tenders to the *Harrier*, employed on special examination service. There were at first only six tugs employed on this work in the Downs, but two were lately added, of which one was the *Char*, formerly the North-Eastern Railway Company's steamer *Stranton*, *Times*, Jan. 20, 1915.

[1] [Jan. 16.]

stationed at West Hartlepool. These vessels are commanded by lieutenants in the Royal Naval Reserve, and the work upon which they are employed is most severe, comfortless, and perilous.

NOTICE TO MARINERS

(No. 45 of the year 1915)

ENGLAND, EAST COAST

Yarmouth Roads—Restriction of Navigation

L.G., Jan. 22, 1915.

Position.—Yarmouth roads, lat. 52° 36′ N., long. 1° 45′ E.

Caution.—Mariners are hereby warned that, under the Defence of the Realm Regulations, an order has been made forbidding any vessels, other than open boats, to be under way in Great Yarmouth Roads between one hour after sunset and half an hour before sunrise, until further notice.

Authority.—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

By Command of their Lordships,

J. F. PARRY, *Hydrographer.*

Hydrographic Department, Admiralty,
London, 18*th January* 1915.

ECHOES OF CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS

Times, Jan. 19, 1915.

The officer of H.M.S. *Glasgow* whose narrative of the naval battle off Chile on November 1 last was published in *The Times* of December 11 [1] has now written home the following descriptive account of the naval battle off the Falkland Islands, which took place on December 8. It will be recalled that with the exception of the *Dresden* all the ships comprising Admiral von Spee's squadron were then sunk by the squadron under Rear-Admiral Sturdee :—

[1] [*See below.*]

December 10, 1914.

Lots have happened since I last wrote. On the morning of the 8th, the Germans, under Admiral von Spee, appeared off these (Falkland) Islands, and were reported about 7 A.M. by our look-outs and the volunteers. Couldn't have been better ; saved us a long cold search round Cape Horn and played right into our hands. They came to destroy the wireless station and to coal, expecting to find us in inferior force. We all got up

steam as quickly as possible, and luckily had mostly completed with coal. The *Scharnhorst,* followed by the *Nürnberg,* first approached, but when they got within 20,000 yards we opened fire with 12-inch from inside the harbour, firing over the land, which completely hid us from the enemy, and directed by spotting-officers on the hill. The *Canopus* got one hit at this very long range. Then we hove up anchor and steamed out, *Glasgow* leading as usual. We kept our large cruisers under our smoke as long as possible. About 8.30 A.M. our big cruisers were drawing close, now at about 28 knots, and when within 16,000 yards (that is outside the *Glasgow* range) we had the unique experience of watching a battle royal between the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* and our two big ones.

The Germans were now in line ahead, the *Leipzig, Nürnberg,* and *Dresden* following. It was a wonderful sight. About 10.30 or so the three cruisers altered course to scatter and try to get away (I guess they knew it was all up by now), so we gave chase, the *Kent* and *Cornwall* coming along behind us. About 2 P.M. we closed the *Leipzig* enough to fire our foremost guns, and she turned every now and then to fire a salvo at us. We closed still more until a regular battle went on. The weather was thickish with rain mist. About 5 P.M. we received a wireless from the Flag saying that they had sunk the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau,* at which we all cheered. At this time we had severely damaged the *Leipzig,* when the *Cornwall* came up and joined in, but we had already given her her death-blow. Although shells fell all round us, we were only hit aloft three times, and lost only one man killed, one badly wounded, and several wounded from splinters of shell. The two officers aloft had narrow escape from a shell which passed through the control-top.

We stood close by the *Leipzig* at 9.15 P.M. when she turned over and sank, and we picked up five officers and seven men, one wounded. The *Kent* sank the *Nürnberg,* and the *Bristol* sank two transports, the *Baden* and the *Santa Isabel*; so altogether we almost wiped out the squadron. Ships sunk were the *Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, Nürnberg, Baden,* and *Santa Isabel,* leaving the *Dresden,* which so far escaped. She is fast, but not much of a fighting ship. The others—anyway the two big ones—were the pride of the German Navy and prize firers (crack ships). They fought well. Five were

saved from the *Nürnberg*, none from the *Scharnhorst* (flag), and 150 from the *Gneisenau*. Some 2000 Germans went down. We (the *Glasgow*) lost one man killed, the *Kent* none, the *Cornwall* five, the *Inflexible* one, and the others none—not a scratch. Just shows what we were up against in our battle off Coronel with the poor old *Monmouth* and *Good Hope*.

Our prisoners were convinced (from German sources) that the Germans were in Calais, and that they had taken 1,120,000 Russians! These people also laughed at the idea of the Germans in Germany being scarce of provisions, and said Sweden and Denmark had plenty.

The King sent us a message, 'Heartiest congratulations officers and men on your opportune victory.'

[The following is the letter referred to above, p. 84 :—

9th November 1914.

We are at this moment steaming gaily along at 17 knots. We left the day before yesterday, our *five* men slightly injured by pieces of shells now quite recovered and none the worse. Will now give a *résumé* of our recent moves.

We were joined by the *Good Hope*, with Sir Christopher Cradock in command, and the *Monmouth* (Captain Brandt) off the Brazilian coast. We then cruised south together—*Good Hope, Glasgow, Monmouth*, and the armed liner *Otranto*—down to the cold Terra del Fuego and Straits of Magellan, making swoops down upon wild and unsurveyed bays and places whither we had heard the enemy had gone to coal, etc., but failed to find them there, although we heard their secret and friendly wireless stations talking in code. The land round there is covered with ice and snow, and the many huge glaciers one sees are wonderful to behold.

Well, after passing and repassing Cape Horn, sometimes twice in one day, we were glad to get orders to proceed north on the Pacific coast and to warmer weather. By this time we found that the two armoured enemy's cruisers, *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst*, were probably coming over from the Pacific Islands to join up with the cruisers *Leipzig, Dresden*, and *Nürnberg*, as they had escaped the Australian and China squadrons. We made a rendezvous farther north for our colliers, and went into Coronel and on to Valparaiso to pick up news and receive letters, etc., then back to rendezvous, coaled, and then got orders to go to Coronel alone to send cables, etc. We left Coronel, Chile, on the second occasion about nine o'clock on the morning of November 1, and at about 4 P.M. sighted the enemy in force. We put on speed and ap-

proached them until we made out four cruisers in line ahead, the two big armoured cruisers leading and two three-funnelled cruisers (about our class) following in open order. They immediately gave chase, so we 'hopped it' in the direction of our own ships and the Flag. We advised the Flag by wireless, but the enemy continually used their wireless in order to jam our signals. We first picked up the *Monmouth* and *Otranto* and ran a line ahead, *Glasgow* senior leading.

In an hour or so the *Good Hope* (Cradock's ship) came up, and we wheeled into line behind her, and again approached the enemy, coming round to south when about seven miles off. The sun by this time was getting low on our starboard beam; the enemy were to the east of us, all proceeding south, they having the advantage both in guns and the light; we being silhouetted against the horizon. Their strategical speed being equal to ours, it was impossible to improve the lights before dark. I did not think he would engage until next day. However, we were now gradually closing. About 6.40 P.M. or so the foremost armoured enemy's cruiser opened fire with her 8-inch, and shells shrieked over and short of us, some falling about 500 yards short, giving the impression of excellent shooting. Soon after the *Otranto* began to haul out of line and edge away to the south-west, she not being fitted to fight men-o'-war. We appeared to close a point or two, and at 7 P.M. opened fire. The enemy replied in rapid salvoes, making good and deadly shooting, mostly directed against our Flag, and the *Monmouth*, our next ahead. There was not much doubt as to the result. Shells continued to straddle us, some bursting overhead, throwing pieces of broken shell in all directions. About ten minutes or so after this the poor *Monmouth* sheered off the line to the westward a hundred yards or so, when I saw her being hit heavily. She appeared to heel a bit and shake, her foremast turret (the 6-inch gun shield) in flames. She fell back again into line and out again to the eastward, still firing her 6-inch intermittently.

Shortly after the *Good Hope* was seen to be on fire, also about the fore turret, and seemed to steer or fall away to the eastward or towards the enemy. During this time we kept up a continual fire from our two 6-inch and port battery 4-inch guns in the direction of the foremost light cruisers of the enemy's line, the third and fourth ship, of the lines, but owing to the big sea, our rolling, and the gathering darkness it was impossible to spot the fall of our shells. We could only fire at the flash of their guns, and when our heavy rolling allowed our gunlayers to see the flashes at all. About 7.30 P.M. I was standing near the after 6-inch hand-up when I felt a shell strike us below deck. It seemed to pass out through the other side, but didn't, and I awaited the explosion, expecting the deck planks to rise up; but nothing visibly occurred at the moment. I was second in command of the

starboard battery and, as that was the unengaged side, superintended the supply of ammunition to the port guns, and generally kept an eye for casualties, so was able to use my binoculars to see what could be seen. Hills, a marine, carrying ammunition to P5, was struck behind the ear by a fragment of shell and was temporarily out of action, lying down near S5 hand-up.

The *Good Hope* fell more and more out of line to eastward, burning brightly forward, when suddenly an explosion occurred about her after funnel, blowing up *débris* and flames and sparks some 200 feet high or so, quite distinctly to be heard from our deck. Some of our men thought it was the enemy's flagship, so near had she drifted towards them. Soon after I could see nothing of her, and she never fired her guns again. Our speed during the action must have varied from seven or eight to seventeen knots or so, and when the *Monmouth* dropped back in her distress we had to ease in order not to meet the doses meant for her. The enemy now dropped slowly back, and the armoured cruisers directed their fire in at us; we continued alone to reply when possible, now at about 4500 yards. Everybody was remarkably cool as if at practice. Another shell struck our No. 2 funnel, showing large holes around the casing, and it was this or these shells which wounded three more of our men slightly.

I cannot understand the miracle of our deliverance; none ever will. We were struck at the water-line by in all five shells out of about six hundred directed at us, but strangely not in vulnerable places, our coal saving us on three occasions—as we are not armoured and should not be in battle line against armoured vessels. We only had two guns that would pierce their armour—the *Good Hope's* old two 9.2's, one of which was out of action ten minutes after the start. A shell entered the captain's pantry and continued on, bursting in a passage, the fragments going through the steel wall of the captain's cabin, wrecking it completely. Again no fire resulted.

The *Monmouth*, no longer firing, steamed off to the north-west, and we stood by her signalling. She fell off to north-east, then we asked her if she could steer north-west. She replied, 'I want to get stern to sea, as I am making water badly forward.' We followed close by. Shortly after I was on the flying bridge when I spotted the enemy approaching in line abreast, the ship to the right or southward morsing with an oil lamp to the others. They were then about 6000 yards off or so in the rain, mist, and darkness. I told the captain, who gave me orders to bring them astern, and put on full speed. We drew out of range. The *Monmouth* was silent and hidden by our smoke. About half an hour after we saw flashes of gun-fire and the play of a search-light which lasted a few seconds, then disappeared. We went in a west-north-westerly direction, coming gradually round to south, steering

for Magellan Straits in order to warn our old battleship, the *Canopus*, who was coming up from the southward, to turn and run. She was near two hundred miles away also, and we were some hours getting through to her, because of the continual jamming by the enemy's wireless. It would have been a needless and useless sacrifice of our ship and our 370 odd lives to have remained and engaged the enemy's ships again; some 1600 lives had already gone in the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*. Luckily our engines and boilers were intact, and we were able to push through the heavy seas at 24 knots and get away to give an account of the action, and warn the *Canopus*, who, although she no doubt would have fought gallantly, could hardly hope to successfully fight five ships. We all thanked God for our miraculous escape after a very severe action against great odds.]

The secretary of the Association of Men of Kent and Kentish Men (Mr. Henry Thompson) has received the following letter from Captain J. D. Allen, of H.M.S. *Kent*, describing the action near the Falkland Islands, in which that vessel sank the German cruiser *Nürnberg*:— *Times*, Jan. 19, 1915.

December 12, 1914.

You will have heard by this time that on December 8 H.M.S. *Kent* chased, engaged, and sank the German cruiser *Nürnberg*. It was a single-ship action, as no other ship was in sight at the time. The chase commenced at noon and the action commenced at 5 P.M. After a sharp action, during which the *Kent* was struck by the enemy's shell no less than thirty-six times, the *Nürnberg* sank at 7.26 P.M. I regret to say that four men were killed and twelve wounded. From the time the enemy was sighted until the end of the action the behaviour of the officers and men of the *Kent* was perfectly magnificent. Although under a very heavy fire, they were, one and all, perfectly calm and self-possessed, and, though the enemy fought bravely to the very end, against such men as I have the honour to command, they never could have had a chance.

The *Nürnberg* is a faster ship than the *Kent*, but I appealed to the engineers and stokers to do all in their power to catch her, and finely they responded to my appeal. The *Kent* went faster and faster until she was going 25 knots, more than a knot faster than she had ever been before. The enemy got nearer and nearer until at last she got within range of our guns.

Soon the *Kent's* shell began to fall thick and fast around her, and she was struck many times until she was in flames. The enemy continued firing their guns until the ship was sinking, and as she sank below the surface some brave men on her quarterdeck were waving the German ensign.

No sooner had she sunk than the *Kent's* men displayed the same zeal and activity in endeavouring to save life as they had done in fighting the ship. Boats were hastily repaired and lowered, manned by men eagerly volunteering to help. Unfortunately the sea was rough and the water very cold, so we only succeeded in picking up twelve men, of whom five subsequently died.

The silk ensign and Jack presented to the *Kent* by the ladies of Kent were flying the whole time. They were both torn to ribbons, but I have got them both safe. I carefully collected every bit I could, as they were torn to pieces and some pieces were caught in the rigging. I am afraid they are past repair, but nearly all the pieces intact. They can never be flown again. Will you be so kind as to ask the ladies of Kent what they wish done with them. They can be sewn up, though some pieces are missing. Meanwhile I will keep them here for the present.

Please convey to the Association of Men of Kent and Kentish Men the sincere congratulations of the captain, officers, and men of H.M.S. *Kent* on this memorable occasion. Tell them how proud we are to have had the opportunity of adding yet another honour to the name Kent, and how much we have been encouraged by the interest they have taken in our welfare.

The Association of Men of Kent and Kentish Men has undertaken to provide a new silken ensign and Jack for the county ship. Donations to the fund, which Mr. Alderman Le May has started with a guinea, will be gratefully acknowledged by Mr. Henry Thompson, secretary of the association, 21 and 23 High Street, Rochester.

Times, Jan. 20, 1915.

The action off the Falklands was described in *The Times* yesterday by officers serving in the *Glasgow* and the *Kent*. To-day we print an account of the same action, written by an

officer of the *Inflexible*, which is not only extremely interesting in itself, but has the additional merit of being the first description published of a modern battle cruiser in action by one serving in such a ship. The letter, which is dated December 11, says :—

I am just sending you a short description of the action on the 8th. I suppose you have seen in the papers that it took place near the Falkland Islands.

On Tuesday morning we were in harbour, and had started coaling at about 6.30 A.M. At about 8.30 A.M. five German cruisers were reported approaching the harbour by the shore signal station. These turned out to be the *Scharnhorst* (flagship), *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg*, *Dresden*, and *Leipzig*, the squadron which sank the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* off Valparaiso. Of course we were delighted to see them, as we were wanting very badly to settle up accounts with them over their last exploit.

When they sighted us they immediately turned tail and made off as fast as they could, for, of course, we had a considerably more powerful squadron. Apparently they had not the faintest suspicion that we were in the vicinity, for they had expected to take the Falkland Islands without much opposition and coal there. I believe that half their seamen were in landing rig ready to land when they were approaching. As soon as they were reported we all dropped coaling at once, shoved off the colliers, and made off after them. As we knew we were faster than they were we did not hurry very much to start with, but slowly closed with them, and this gave us time to have dinner comfortably before getting on with the work.

About 12.30 the flagship and ourself, who are considerably faster than the rest of our squadron, increased speed and went on ahead to attack their two big cruisers, the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. At 1 P.M. we opened fire on them at a range of —— yards, the flagship taking on the *Gneisenau* and ourselves the *Scharnhorst*. Their light cruisers immediately spread, but we managed to get at least one shot into the *Leipzig* before they made off, as she was observed to be dropping rapidly astern. We then turned the whole of our attention to the big cruisers and left the rest of our squadron to deal with their light cruisers.

We blazed away at the *Scharnhorst* for three hours, and

finally she sank at about 4 P.M. It was very hard to tell what damage we had done to her as there was a great deal of smoke, and we were, of course, a considerable distance away. We could see that she had three funnels gone and both masts shot away, and must have been more like a sieve than anything else before she finally went down. We had very little damage done to us, as we had an immense superiority in gunfire. Our 12-in. guns were hitting her pretty hard all the time, but as she had only 8.2-in. guns her fire was very ineffective all the time, though I must say remarkably accurate. When she started to go down she went very quickly, and unfortunately we were unable to stop and pick up any of her men as the *Gneisenau* seemed still to have a good deal of kick left in her.

We went to the flagship's assistance, and started in again at the *Gneisenau*. At about 4.45 P.M. she appeared to be sinking and had ceased fire. Her colours had been shot away several times, but she had hoisted them again, and now we thought she had hauled them down. The only visible damage done to her was her foremost funnel shot away, though as we found out afterwards she was badly knocked about. Apparently she had no more colours left, but was still game, for as we were closing she managed to get off one more solitary gun. We had to stand off again, and gave her a few more rounds, and another of our cruisers which had come up let off a few at her. About 5.15 she was observed to be sinking, and we started to close her. She heeled over very slowly till she got to about 70 deg., then she went over with a rush, there was a large cloud of steam, she cocked her stem up in the air and disappeared.

I should think about 300 to 400 of her crew managed to get away from the ship, and were left floating about in the water, hanging on to bits of wreckage, hammocks, and anything they could lay hands on. Their heads bobbing about in the water looked for all the world like a great patch of brown seaweed. As soon as possible we got out what boats we had left to pick them up, and threw lifebuoys and any available bits of wood to them. The flagship and the other cruiser had come up and were doing the same, but a lot of them were drowned as we were short of boats and the sea had started to get choppy. It also was awfully cold in the water, and those we got on board were half-frozen, and you could see many of them in the water letting go of the spars or whatever

they were holding on to as they gradually got numbed. We saw icebergs the next day.

We picked up the commander of the *Gneisenau*, seven officers, and about 50 men, and between the three ships we managed to save about 180. But a lot of them were drowned, and it was an awful sight to see them floating about in the water, shouting out for the boat to come to them and then they would suddenly go down. About 7 P.M. we started off to look for the remainder of their squadron. In the evening one of our light cruisers reported having sunk the *Leipzig*, and another one had sunk two of their colliers. Next morning one of our armoured cruisers reported having sunk the *Nürnberg*. So we really got through a very good day's work, only one of their small cruisers having escaped, and we feel that we have avenged the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* and paid them back with a little interest. Still, one can't help feeling sorry for the poor devils on board; they were very nice fellows, and we have done all we can for them, and I must say they put up a most gallant fight considering the odds against them. Our ships are practically undamaged, and we should have finished the action much sooner if we had gone closer to them, but, of course, our object was to sink them with as little damage to ourselves as possible.

One of the officers saved was telling me that towards the end of the action he could not get along their upper deck, as they practically had none left; nearly every man on the upper deck had been killed, all the guns were out of action, and one turret had been blown bodily overboard by 12-in. lyddite shell. Both their engines were broken up, and they had a fire in the after part of the ship. They would probably have had many more fires, but our shells striking the water near the ship sent up columns of water which kept on putting out the fires. The spouts of water sent up by our shells hitting the water near them went up about half as high again as their mastheads, probably about 300 ft.

The German sailors when they got on board expected to be shot, and were very agreeably surprised when they found they would be looked after decently instead.

Times, Jan. 18, 1915.

Mr. Charles E. Gould, a wireless operator on H.M.S. *Good Hope*—one of five men who formed an observation party which was put ashore on the island of Veshupi, tells in a letter to his mother at Sonning, Berks, how he witnessed the sinking of his vessel. He writes: 'I am safe, with four others. I was picked up from the island of Veshupi in the Pacific by H.M.S. *Canopus*—exhausted, cold, and in rags, but just in the pink of condition. All my comrades have gone; roughly 1500 men perished on that terrible Sunday. It was a rough night. I won't describe the battle now, but the last of the old ship was this: she caught fire, then her magazine blew up and flames rose over 200 ft. in the air. Only our little party of five remain. All our clothes and belongings went down with the ship. The crew of the *Canopus* treated us very kindly. I obtained a pair of canvas trousers, and on my arrival in the Falkland Islands the other day I got a Wild West shirt and some socks.

'Since the war started I have had some terrible hardships. Days and nights with no sleep—out in the open on some mountain or hill as observation party for the squadron—sometimes sleeping (or rather resting) on rushes, bushes or fern leaves, digging a hole in the ground and living like a penguin.

'But I am all right now; I am stationed ashore at a lighthouse in the Falklands.'

ZEPPELIN RAID ON EAST COAST TOWNS

Times, Jan. 20, 1915.

A German airship raid was made on Yarmouth and other towns on the East Coast last night, and afterwards on King's Lynn and the neighbourhood of Sandringham.

As will be seen from the *Court Circular*, the Royal Family returned to Buckingham Palace from Sandringham yesterday.

Three German airships were seen at 1.30 in the afternoon off the Dutch coast. They passed over the island of Terschelling on their way across the North Sea, but whether all reached the English coast is not clear.

Their presence was unsuspected until, after dark about 8.30, bombs were dropped on Yarmouth. Considerable

damage was done, and at least three lives are believed to have been lost.

The bombardment of the town from the air continued for some ten minutes. Several of the missiles did not explode, and one fell through a house in Yarmouth, without injuring the family within.

The authorities promptly extinguished the street lights, and the people seem as far as possible to have kept under cover. This probably made the death-roll lighter than it would otherwise have been.

After the attack on Yarmouth several other towns, Cromer and Sheringham, were visited, and bombs dropped on them, with what result is not yet definitely known.

At King's Lynn, the last town reported to have been visited, the airmen succeeded in killing a boy, who was in bed at the time. Before King's Lynn was reached a bomb was dropped on Heacham, six miles from Sandringham.

Although there were reports that more than one airship was seen, the time table which we publish below is quite compatible with the presence of only one airship, which swept round the Norfolk coast from Yarmouth to King's Lynn.

The following are the approximate times at which the different towns were visited :—

Holland (Terschelling)	1.30 P.M.
Yarmouth	8.20 P.M.
Cromer	8.30 P.M.
Sheringham	8.45 P.M.
Hunstanton	10. 0 P.M.
Heacham	10.30 P.M.
Dersingham	10.40 P.M.
King's Lynn	11. 0 P.M.

Amsterdam, January 20.

An official telegram from Berlin says :—'On the night of January 19th naval airships undertook an attack on some fortified places on the English East Coast. The weather was foggy and rainy. Several bombs were successfully dropped. The airships were shot at, but returned unhurt. (Signed) Deputy Chief of the Admiral Staff, VON BEHNCKE.'—*Reuter.* *Times*, Jan. 21, 1915.

Amsterdam, January 21.

Times, Jan. 22, 1915. The following officially inspired message from Berlin, giving the official version of the Zeppelin raid, is published here:

'Our airships, in order to attack the fortified place of Great Yarmouth, were obliged to fly over other places, from which, it is stated, they were fired at. These attacks were answered by throwing bombs.

'England has no right to be indignant, as her flying machines and ships in broad daylight attacked open towns, such as Freiburg, Dar-es-Salaam, and Swakopmund. Air war is acknowledged to be a means of modern warfare as long as it is carried out within the rules of international law. This has been done by our dirigibles.

'The German nation has been forced by England to fight for her existence, and cannot be forced to forgo legitimate self-defence, and will not do so, relying upon her good right.'

House of Commons, February 8, 1915.

Hansard. MR. INGLEBY asked the Under-Secretary for War if he can state how many Zeppelins raided the East Coast on January 19th; whether the Zeppelins were accompanied by motor-cars; if so, whether he can give the number of such cars; and whether any of them have been identified or any of their occupants arrested?

MR. TENNANT: It is not in the public interest to give the information which may be in possession of the Department regarding the first point. The other points are being further investigated, and I hope to be able to give an answer shortly.

House of Commons, February 9, 1915.

Hansard. In reply to SIR WILLIAM BULL, MR. MCKENNA stated:—

The allegations mentioned in the first part of the question have been carefully investigated by the Norfolk constabulary, who have traced eight cars which were on the roads about the times and places of the Zeppelin's passing. The cars whose movements have been described in letters to *The Times* and *Morning Post* have been identified, and in each case their

movements, though consistent with the stories told in the papers, have been satisfactorily explained. The occupants of the cars were all persons against whom there is no possible ground of suspicion. The figures given in the second part of the question refer to the prohibited areas on the East and South Coasts. The answer to the third and fourth parts of the question is that no orders for the removal of alien enemies from the East Coast have been suspended by or at the instance of the Home Office. As regards the fifth point, no car was stopped at King's Lynn for infringement of regulations—there was no order then in force at King's Lynn prohibiting bright head lights—but after the passing of the Zeppelin several cars were warned to extinguish their lights on account of this danger.

ENGAGEMENT AT SHATT-EL-ARAB.

Constantinople, January 19.

The Turkish General Staff reports as follows: During a night attack on the English lines at Shatt-el-Arab, the enemy was surprised. He lost 100 killed and wounded. A detachment of English cavalry attempted to surprise a detachment of our infantry in the neighbourhood of Korna [Kurna]. The attack, which was well supported by the fire of a gunboat, was repelled with great enemy losses. At the same time the gunboat also was forced to retire. *K.V.*, Jan. 19, 1915.

TURKISH CLAIMS AND ENGLISH CORRECTIONS.

Constantinople.

Headquarters issues following report: *K.V.*,

On January 21st, English forces under cover of three gunboats attempted an offensive against our troops which were near Korna, but were completely defeated and compelled to withdraw with great losses. Our losses were insignificant. Jan. 22, 1915.

Press Bureau, January 26.

With reference to the statement published in the German war news on January 23rd, as coming from Constantinople, *Times* Jan. 27, 1915.

in the following terms: 'On the 21st instant an English force, under cover of three gunboats, took the offensive against our troops near Korna, but they were driven back with heavy loss. Our losses are without importance.' The facts of this engagement, which took place on the 20th, were reported by General Barrett, as follows:

'January 20th.—Reconnaissance was made to-day at 6 A.M. from Mezera, in co-operation with Navy, to ascertain strength and disposition of the enemy's force near Mezera and Korna.

'Our force found his outposts on the sand hills to the south of the Ratta canal, about seven miles to the north of Mezera, and drove them across the canal and advanced into the marshes within six hundred yards of it.

'Severe loss was inflicted on the enemy. We shelled his dhows and camps, and he was driven back in disorder.

'His strength was estimated at about five thousand, together with six guns.

'Casualties on our side were about fifty, and our withdrawal to Mezera camp was not molested.'

The version given by the Turks of this reconnaissance is not unlike the German account of the recent naval action in the North Sea.

RUSSIAN OPERATIONS IN THE BLACK SEA

Petrograd, January 22.

Times, Jan. 23, 1915. An official statement says: 'In the Black Sea we sank on the 19th and 20th instant several Turkish sailing vessels, and in the neighbourhood of Khopa and Riza we set on fire and damaged Turkish barracks and destroyed the lighthouse. We also bombarded the bridge.'

THE *GOEBEN* MINED

Athens, January 21.

Times, Jan. 23, 1915. According to information received from Constantinople, the *Goeben* struck a mine which had drifted into the Bosphorus while returning from a cruise in the Black Sea. She was able to reach Beikos in safety.

Two large transports have been moored in front of the *Goeben* in order to hide the extensive damage to the ship from the public. It seems that she cannot be repaired, as the plant of the local arsenal is not adequate for a ship of her size.

NOTICE TO MARINERS

(No. 53 of the year 1915).

ENGLAND—SOUTH COAST

Portland Harbour Entrances—Anchorage Prohibited

Position.—North ship channel entrance, lat. 50° 35¾′ N., long. 2° 26′ W. *L.G.*, Jan. 22, 1915.

Caution.—Submarine cables are laid across the three entrances to Portland harbour, and vessels are in consequence prohibited from anchoring in their vicinity.

Charts affected.—No. 2268, Portland harbour; No. 2255, Weymouth and Portland.

Publication.—*Channel Pilot*, Part I., 1908, page 153.

Authority.—Admiral Superintendent, H.M. Dockyard, Portsmouth.

By Command of their Lordships,
J. F. PARRY, *Hydrographer.*

Hydrographic Department, Admiralty,
London, 22nd January 1915.

COST OF SHIPPING LOSSES

The cost of the principal losses at sea last year is estimated by the Liverpool Underwriters' Association to have been twice as heavy as the loss in either of the two preceding years. Reckoning only losses amounting to £10,000 and upwards, the total cost is placed at £13,688,954, as compared with £6,736,000 in 1913 and £6,510,000 in 1912. These losses were caused by the destruction of 272 vessels in 1914, 176 in 1913, and 144 in 1912. The cost of the principal losses at sea within the past five years is estimated to have been £38,291,954, caused by the destruction of 899 vessels. *Times*, Jan. 22, 1915.

The number of total losses of vessels of 500 tons and

upwards in 1914 is placed at 323, of which 105 vessels were sunk by warships or mines, the war risk proving the most serious cause of loss during the year. The next most important cause was stranding, which resulted in 100 losses. Fifty-four vessels foundered or were abandoned, 25 were lost by collision, 23 by fires and explosions, and 16 were 'missing.'

Of the 323 vessels totally lost, 141 were foreign steamers and 115 were British steamers; 56 were foreign sailing ships and only 11 were British sailing ships.

DURWARD TORPEDOED BY SUBMARINE

Amsterdam, January 22.

Times, Jan. 23, 1915.

A Dutch steam pilot cutter brought to the Hook of Holland this evening the crew of the British steamer *Durward*, from Leith to Rotterdam.

The *Durward* was torpedoed by the German submarine U 19, 13 miles off the Maas lightship. The crew rowed to the Maas lightship, and from there were taken off by the pilot cutter and landed at the Hook of Holland.

The *Durward* was a steel screw steamer of 1301 tons, built by A. Stephen and Sons, of Glasgow, and owned by G. Gibson and Co., of Leith. She was commanded by Captain Wood, and carried a crew of more than twenty. She left Leith on Tuesday morning with a cargo of general goods.

MR. SECRETARY BRYAN ON NEUTRAL DUTIES

New York, January 24.

Times, Jan. 26, 1915.

The Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, has written to Mr. Stone, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a letter defending the neutrality of the United States in the European War. The letter is as follows:

DEAR MR. STONE,—I have received your letter of the 8th instant referring to the frequent complaints or charges made in one form or another through the Press that this Government has shown partiality to Great Britain, France, or Russia against Germany and Austria during the present war, and stating that you have received numerous letters to the same

effect from sympathisers with the latter Powers. You summarise various grounds for these complaints and ask that you may be furnished with whatever information the Department may have touching these points of complaint in order that you may be informed as to what the true situation is with regard to these matters.

In order that you may have such information as the Department has on the subjects referred to in your letter I will take them up *seriatim*.

I.—Freedom of Communication by Submarine Cables versus Censored Communication by Wireless

The reason that wireless messages and cable messages require different treatment by a neutral Government is as follows:—Communications by wireless cannot be interrupted by a belligerent. With a submarine cable it is otherwise. The possibility of cutting a cable exists, and if a belligerent possesses naval superiority a cable is cut, as was the German cable near the Azores by one of Germany's enemies, and as was the British cable near Fanning Island by a German naval force. Since a cable is subject to a hostile attack the responsibility falls upon a belligerent and not upon a neutral to prevent cable communication.

A more important reason, however, at least from the point of view of a neutral Government, is that messages sent out from a wireless station in neutral territory may be received by belligerent warships on the high seas. If these messages, whether plain or in cipher, direct movements of warships or convey to them information as to the location of an enemy's public or private vessels the neutral territory becomes a base of naval operations, to permit which would be essentially unneutral. As a wireless message can be received by all stations and vessels within a given radius, every message in cipher, whatever its intended destination, must be censored. Otherwise military information may be sent to warships off the coast of a neutral country. It is manifest that a submarine cable is incapable of becoming a means of direct communication with a warship on the high seas; hence its use cannot as a rule make a neutral territory a base for the direction of naval operations.

II.—Censorship of Mails and in Some Cases Repeated Destruction of American Letters on Neutral Vessels

As to the censorship of mails, Germany as well as Great Britain has pursued this course with regard to private letters falling into their hands. The unquestioned right to adopt a measure of this sort makes objections to it inadvisable. It has been asserted that American mails on board Dutch steamers have been repeatedly destroyed. No evidence to this effect has been filed with the Government, and therefore no representations have been made. Until such a case is presented in concrete form this Government would not be justified in presenting this matter to the offending belligerent. Complaints came to the Department that mails on board neutral steamers have been opened and detained, but there seem to be but few cases where a mail from neutral countries has not been finally delivered. When a mail is sent to belligerent countries open, and is of a neutral and private character, it has not been molested, so far as the Department is advised.

III.—Searching of American Vessels for German and Austrian Subjects on the High Seas and in the Territorial Waters of a Belligerent

So far as this Government has been informed no American vessels on the high seas, with two exceptions, have been detained or searched by belligerent warships for German and Austrian subjects.

One of the exceptions to which reference is made is now the subject of rigid investigation and a vigorous representation has been made to the offending Government. The other exception, where certain German passengers were made to sign a promise not to take part in the war, has been brought to the attention of the offending Government with a declaration that such procedure, if true, is an unwarranted exercise of jurisdiction over American vessels in which this Government will not acquiesce. An American private vessel entering voluntarily the territorial waters of a belligerent becomes subject to its municipal laws, as do persons on board the vessel. There appeared in certain publications an assertion that failure to protest in these cases is an abandonment of a

principle for which the United States went to war in 1812. If the failure to protest were true—which it is not—the principle involved is entirely different from the one appealed to against a justifiable (unjustifiable?) impressment of Americans in the British Navy in time of peace.

IV.—Submission without Protest to British Violations of Rules Regarding Absolute and Conditional Contraband as laid down in The Hague Conventions, the Declaration of London; and International Law

There is no Hague Convention which deals with absolute or conditional contraband, and as the Declaration of London is not in force, the rules of international law only apply. As to articles to be regarded as contraband, there is no general agreement between nations. It is the practice of a century, either in time of peace or after the outbreak of war, for a nation to declare articles which it will consider as absolute or conditional contraband. It is true that a neutral Government is seriously affected by this declaration, as the rights of its subjects or citizens may be impaired. But the rights and the interests of belligerents and neutrals are opposed in respect to contraband articles and trade, and there is no tribunal to which questions of difference may be readily submitted.

The record of the United States in the past is not free from criticism. When neutral, this Government has stood for a restricted list of absolute and conditional contraband. As a belligerent, we have contended for a liberal list, according to our conception of the necessities of the case. The United States has made earnest representations to Great Britain in regard to the seizure and detention by the British authorities of all American ships or cargoes *bona fide* destined to neutral ports, on the ground that such seizures and detentions were contrary to the existing rules of international law. It will be recalled, however, that the American Courts have established various rules bearing on these matters. The rule of 'continuous voyage' has been not only asserted by American tribunals, but extended by them. They have exercised the right to determine from circumstances whether the ostensible was the real destination. They have held that the shipment of articles of contraband to a neutral port 'to order,' from

which, as a matter of fact, cargoes have been shipped to an enemy, is corroborative evidence that the cargo was really destined to an enemy instead of to a neutral port of delivery.

It is thus seen that some of the doctrines which appear to bear harshly upon neutrals at the present time are analogous to, or outgrowths from, policies adopted by the United States of America when it was belligerent. The Government, therefore, cannot consistently protest against the application of rules which it has followed in the past unless they have not been practised as heretofore.

V.—Acquiescence without Protest to the Inclusion of Copper and other Articles in the British List of Absolute Contraband

The United States of America has now under consideration the question of the right of a belligerent to include 'copper unwrought' in its list of absolute contraband instead of in its list of conditional contraband. As the Government of the United States of America has in the past placed 'all articles from which ammunition was manufactured' in its contraband list and had declared copper to be among such materials, it necessarily finds some embarrassment in dealing with the subject. Moreover, there is no instance of the United States of America acquiescing in Great Britain's seizure of a copper shipment. In every case in which it has been done vigorous representations have been made to the British Government, and representatives of the United States of America have pressed for the release of shipments.

VI.—Submission with Protest to Interference with American Trade to Neutral Countries in Conditional and Absolute Contraband

The fact that the commerce of the United States is interrupted by Great Britain is consequent upon the superiority of her Navy on the high seas. History shows that whenever a country has possessed that superiority our trade has been interrupted and that few articles essential to the prosecution of war have been allowed to reach its enemy from this country. The Department's recent Note to the British Government, which has been made public, in regard to the detentions and

seizures of American vessels and cargoes, is a complete answer to this complaint.

Certain other complaints appear to be aimed at the loss of profit in trade, which must include, at least in part, trade in contraband with Germany, while other complaints demand the prohibition of trade in contraband, which appears to refer to trade with the Allies.

VII.—Submission without Protest to Interruption of Trade in Conditional Contraband consigned to Private Persons in Germany and Austria, thereby supporting the Policy of Great Britain to cut off all Supplies from Germany and Austria

As no American vessel, so far as is known, has attempted to carry conditional contraband to Germany or Austria-Hungary, no ground of complaint has arisen out of the seizure or condemnation by Great Britain of an American vessel with a belligerent destination. Until a case arises, and the Government has taken action upon it, criticism is premature and unwarranted.

The United States, in its Note of December 28th to the British Government, strongly contended for the principle of freedom of trade in articles of conditional contraband not destined to belligerent forces.

VIII.—Submission to the British in their Interference with Trade in Petroleum, Rubber, Leather, and Wool

Petrol and other petroleum products have been proclaimed by Great Britain as contraband of war. In view of the absolute necessity of such products to the use of submarines, aeroplanes, and motors the United States Government has not yet reached the conclusion that they are improperly included in the list of contraband. Military operations to-day are largely a question of motive power through mechanical devices. It is, therefore, difficult to argue successfully against the inclusion of petroleum among articles of contraband. As to the detention of cargoes of petroleum going to neutral countries, this Government has thus far successfully obtained the release in every case of detention or seizure which have been brought to its attention.

Great Britain and France have placed rubber on the

absolute contraband list, and leather on the conditional list. Rubber is extensively used in the manufacture and operation of motors, and, like petrol, is regarded as essential to motor power to-day. Leather is even more widely used in cavalry and infantry equipment. It is understood that both rubber and leather, together with wool, have been embargoed by most of the belligerent countries.

It will be recalled that the United States has in the past exercised the right of embargo upon exports of any commodity which might aid an enemy's cause.

IX.—The United States has not interfered with the Sale to Great Britain and her Allies of Arms, Horses, Uniforms, and other Munitions of War, although such Sales prolong the Conflict

There is no power in the Executive to prevent the sale of ammunition to belligerents. The duty of a neutral to restrict trade in munitions of war has never been imposed by international law or by municipal statute. It has never been the policy of this Government to prevent the shipment of arms or ammunition into belligerent territory except in the case of neighbouring American Republics, and then only when civil strife prevailed. Even to this extent the belligerents in the present conflict, when they are neutrals, have never, so far as records disclose, limited the sale of munitions of war. It is only necessary to point to the enormous quantities of arms and ammunition furnished by manufacturers in Germany to belligerents in the Russo-Japanese War and in the recent Balkan Wars to establish the general recognition of the propriety of this trade by a neutral nation.

It may be added that on December 15th the German Ambassador, by direction of his Government, presented a copy of a Memorandum of the Imperial German Government which, among other things, set forth the attitude of that Government towards traffic in contraband of war by citizens of neutral countries. The Imperial Government stated that

> 'under the general principles of international law no exception can be taken to neutral States letting war material go to Germany's enemies from or through neutral territory';

and that

> 'adversaries of Germany in the present war are, in the opinion of the Imperial Government, authorised to draw on the United States contraband of war, and especially arms, worth billions of marks.'

These principles,' as the Ambassador stated, have been accepted by the United States Government in a statement issued by the Department of State on October 15th last entitled, 'Neutrality and trade in contraband.' Acting in conformity with the propositions there set forth, the United States has itself taken no part in contraband traffic, and has, so far as possible, lent its influence towards equal treatment for all belligerents in the matter of purchasing arms and ammunition of private persons in the United States.

X.—The United States has not suppressed the Sale of Dum-dum Bullets to Great Britain

On December 5th last the German Ambassador addressed a Note to the Department, stating that the British Government had ordered from the Winchester Repeating Arms Company 20,000 shot guns, model 1897, and 50,000,000 buckshot cartridges for use in such guns. The Department replied that it saw published the statement of the Winchester Company, the correctness of which Germany has confirmed to the Department by telegraph. In this statement the company categorically denies it has received an order for such guns and cartridges from, or made any sales of such material to, the British Government, or to any other Government engaged in the present war. The Ambassador further called attention to 'information, the accuracy of which is not to be doubted,' that 8,000,000 cartridges filled with mushroom bullets had been delivered since October by the Union Metallic Cartridge Company for the armament of the British Army. In its reply, the Department referred to a letter of December 10th, 1914, of the Remington Arms—Union Metallic Company of New York to the Ambassador, called forth by certain newspaper reports of statements alleged to have been made by the Ambassador in regard to sales by that company of soft-nosed bullets. From this letter, a copy of which was sent to the Department by the company, it appears that, instead of 8,000,000 cartridges having been sold, only a little

over 117,000 were manufactured and 109,000 were sold. The letter further asserts that these cartridges were made to supply a demand for better sporting cartridges with soft-nosed bullets than have been manufactured heretofore, and that such cartridges cannot be used in the military rifles of any foreign Power. The company adds that its statements can be substantiated, and that it is ready to give the Ambassador any evidence he may require on these points.

The Department further stated that it was also in receipt from the company of a complete detailed list of persons to whom these cartridges were sold, and that from this list it appeared that cartridges were sold to a firm in lots of 20 to 2,000, and in one lot each of 3,000, 4,000, and 5,000. Of these only 960 cartridges went to British North America and 100 to British East Africa. The Department added that if the Ambassador could furnish evidence that this or any other company was manufacturing and selling for the use of the contending armies cartridges whose use would contravene The Hague Conventions the Department would be glad to be furnished with this evidence; and that the President would, in case any American company could be shown to be engaged in this traffic, use his influence to prevent, so far as possible, sales of such ammunition to Powers engaged in the European War, without regard to whether it was the duty of this Government upon legal or conventional grounds to take such action. The substance of both the Ambassador's Note and the Department's reply have appeared in the Press.

The Department has received no other complaints of alleged sales of dum-dum bullets by American citizens to belligerent Governments.

XI.—British Warships are permitted to be off American Ports and intercept Neutral Vessels

The complaint is unjustified from the fact that representations were made to the British Government that the presence of war vessels in the vicinity of New York harbour was offensive to this Government, and a similar complaint was made to the Japanese Government as to one of its cruisers in the vicinity of the port of Honolulu. In both cases the warships were withdrawn. It will be recalled that in 1863 the Department took the position that captures made by

vessels, after hovering about neutral ports, would not be regarded as valid. In the Franco-Prussian War President Grant issued a Proclamation of warning against such practices. The same policy has been maintained in the present war, and all the recent proclamations of neutrality by the President state that such practice of belligerent warships is 'unfriendly and offensive.'

XII.—Great Britain and her Allies are allowed without Protest to disregard American Citizenship Papers and Passports

American citizenship papers have been disregarded in comparatively few instances by Great Britain, but the same is true of all belligerents. Bearers of American passports have been arrested in all countries at war. In every case of apparent illegal arrest the United States Government has entered vigorous protests, with a request of release. The Department does not know of any cases, except one or two which are still under investigation, in which naturalised Germans have not been released upon representations of this Government.

There have, however, come to the Department's notice authentic cases in which American passports have been fraudulently obtained and used by certain German subjects. The Department of Justice has recently apprehended at least four persons of German nationality who, it is alleged, obtained American passports under the pretence of being American citizens, and for the purpose of returning to Germany without molestation by her enemies during the voyage.

There are indications that a systematic plan had been devised to obtain American passports through fraud for the purpose of securing a safe passage for German officers and reservists desiring to return to Germany. Such fraudulent use of passports by Germans themselves can have no other effect than to cast suspicion upon American passports in general. New regulations, however, requiring, among other things, the attaching of photographs of the bearer to his passport under the seal of the Department of State and the vigilance of the Department of Justice, will doubtless prevent further misuse of American passports.

XIII.—Change of Policy in Regard to Loans to Belligerents

War loans in this country were disapproved because they were inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality. There is a clearly defined difference between a war loan and the purchase of arms and ammunition. The policy of disapproving of war loans affects all Governments alike, so that the disapproval is not an unneutral act. The case is entirely different in the matter of arms and ammunition, because the prohibition of export not only might not, but in this case would not, operate equally upon the nations at war. Then, too, the reason given for the disapproval of war loans is the sale of arms and ammunition.

The taking of money out of the United States during such a war as this might seriously embarrass the Government in case it needed to borrow money, and might also seriously impair this nation's ability to assist neutral nations which, although not participants in this war, are compelled to bear a heavy burden on account of the war. And, again, a war loan, if offered for popular subscription in the United States, would be taken up chiefly by those who are in sympathy with the belligerent seeking the loan. The result would be that great numbers of the American people might become more earnest partisans, having a material interest in the success of the belligerent whose bonds they hold. These purchasers would not be confined to a few, but would be spread generally throughout the country, so that people would be divided into groups of partisans, a state of things which would result in intense bitterness and might cause an undesirable, if not a serious, situation.

On the other hand, contracts for, and sales of, contraband are mere matters of trade. The manufacturer, unless particularly sentimental, would sell to one belligerent as readily as he would to another. No general spirit of partisanship is aroused—no sympathies excited. The whole transaction is merely a matter of business.

This Government has not been advised that any general loans have been made by foreign Governments in this country since the President expressed his wish that loans of this character should not be made.

XIV.—Submission to the Arrest of Native-born Americans on Neutral Vessels and in British Ports and their Imprisonment

The general charge as to the arrest of American-born citizens on board neutral vessels and in British ports, the ignoring of their passports, and their confinement in gaols, requires evidence to support it. That there have been cases of injustice of this sort is unquestionably true, but Americans in Germany have suffered in this way as Americans have in Great Britain. This Government has considered that the majority of these cases resulted from over-zealousness on the part of subordinate officials in both countries. Every case which has been brought to the attention of the Department of State has been properly investigated, and, if the facts warranted, a demand for release has been made.

XV.—Indifference to the Confinement of Non-Combatants in Detention Camps in England and France

As to the detention of non-combatants confined in concentration camps, all belligerents, with, perhaps, the exceptions of Serbia and Russia, have made similar complaints, and those for whom this Government is acting have asked for investigations, which representatives of this Government have made impartially. Their reports have shown that the treatment of prisoners is generally as good as possible under the conditions in all countries, and that there is no more reason to say that they are mistreated in one country than in another country, or that this Government has manifested indifference in the matter.

As this Department's efforts at investigation seemed to develop bitterness between the countries, the Department, on November 20th, sent a circular of instruction to its representatives not to undertake further investigations in concentration camps. But at the special request of the German Government that Mr. Jackson, the former American Minister at Bukarest, now attached to the American Embassy in Berlin, should make an investigation of prison camps in England in addition to the investigations already made, the Department has consented to dispatch Mr. Jackson on this special mission.

XVI.—Failure to Prevent Transhipment of British Troops and War Materials across the Territory of the United States

The Department has had no specific case of the passage of convoys or troops across its territory brought to its notice. There have been rumours to this effect, but no actual facts have been presented. The transhipment of reservists of all the belligerents who have requested the privilege has been permitted on condition that they travel as individuals and not as organised, uniformed, or armed bodies. The German Embassy has advised the Department that it would not be likely to avail itself of the privilege, but Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, did so. Only one case raising the question of the transit of war material owned by a belligerent across United States territory has come to the notice of the Department. This was a request on the part of the Canadian Government for permission to ship equipment across Alaska to the sea. The request was refused.

XVII.—Treatment and Final Internment of the German s.s. Geier and Collier Locksun at Honolulu

The *Geier* entered Honolulu on October 15th in an unseaworthy condition. The commanding officer reported the necessity of extensive repairs which would require an indefinite period for completion. The vessel was allowed the generous period of three weeks to November 7th to make repairs and leave port; or, failing to do so, be interned. A longer period would have been contrary to international practice, which does not permit a vessel to remain for a long time in a neutral port for the purpose of repairing generally a run-down condition due to long service. Soon after the German cruiser arrived at Honolulu a Japanese cruiser appeared off the port, and the commander of the *Geier* chose to intern the vessel rather than depart from the harbour. Shortly after the *Geier* entered the port of Honolulu the steamer *Locksun* arrived. It was found that this vessel had delivered coal to the *Geier* en route, and had accompanied her towards Hawaii. As she had thus constituted herself a tender or a collier to the *Geier* she was accorded the same treatment and interned on November 7th.

XVIII.—Unfairness to Germany in Rules relative to the Coaling of Warships in the Panama Canal Zone

By proclamation of November 13th, 1914, certain special restrictions were placed on the coaling of warships or their tenders of colliers in the Canal zone. These regulations were framed through collaboration with the State, Navy, and War Departments, and without the slightest reference to favouritism to belligerents. Before these regulations were proclaimed war vessels could procure coal of the Panama Railway in the zone ports, but no belligerent vessels are known to have done so. Under the proclamation fuel may be taken on by belligerent warships only with the consent of the Canal authorities, and in such amounts as will enable them to reach the nearest accessible neutral port, and the amount so taken on shall be deducted from the amount procurable in United States ports within three months thereafter. Now it is charged that the United States has shown partiality because Great Britain and not Germany happens to have colonies in the near vicinity where British ships may coal, while Germany has no such coaling facilities. Thus it is intimated that the United States should balance the inequalities of geographical position by a refusal to allow any warships of belligerents to coal in the Canal until the war is over. As no German warship has sought to obtain coal in the Canal zone the charge of discrimination rests upon the possibility which, during several months of warfare, has failed to materialise.

XIX.—Failure to Protest against Modifications of the Declaration of London by the British Government

The German Foreign Office presented to our diplomats in Berlin a memorandum, dated October 10th, calling attention to violations and changes in the Declaration of London by the British Government, and inquiring the attitude of the United States towards such action on the part of the Allies. The substance of the memorandum was forthwith telegraphed to the Department on October 22nd, and was replied to shortly thereafter to the effect that the United States had withdrawn its suggestion, made early in the war, that for the sake of uniformity the Declaration of London should be adopted as a temporary code of naval warfare during the

present war owing to the unwillingness of belligerents to accept the Declaration without changes and modifications; and that thenceforth the United States would insist that the rights of the United States and her citizens in the war should be governed by the existing rules of international law. As this Government is not interested in the adoption of the Declaration of London by belligerents, modifications by belligerents in that code of naval warfare are of no concern to it except as they adversely affect the rights of the United States and its citizens as defined by international law. In so far as those rights have been infringed the Department has made every effort to obtain redress for the losses sustained.

XX.—General Unfriendly Attitude of the Government toward Germany and Austria

If any American citizens, partisans of Germany and Austria-Hungary, feel that this Administration is acting in any way injurious to the cause of those countries, this feeling results from the fact that on the high seas the German and Austro-Hungarian naval power is thus far inferior to the British. It is the business of belligerent operations on the high seas, not the duty of a neutral, to prevent contraband from reaching the enemy. Those in this country who sympathise with Germany and Austria-Hungary appear to assume that some obligation rests upon this Government, in the performance of its neutral duty, to prevent all trade in contraband and thus to equalise the difference due to the relative naval strength of the belligerents. No such obligation exists. It would be an unneutral act of partiality on the part of this Government to adopt such a policy, if the Executive had the power to do so. If Germany and Austria-Hungary cannot import contraband from this country it is not because of that fact the duty of the United States to close its markets to the Allies. The markets of this country are open upon equal terms to all the world, to every nation, belligerent or neutral.

The foregoing categorical replies to specific complaints is a sufficient answer to the charge of unfriendliness to Germany and Austria-Hungary.

I am, my dear Senator, very sincerely yours,

(Signed) W. J. BRYAN.

BRITISH NAVAL RAID ON ALEXANDRETTA

Cairo, January 28.

The following *communiqué* has been issued here:

'On January 24th and 25th small parties landed in Alexandretta Bay, north and south of the town, and cut six telegraph wires. No serious resistance was offered and there were no casualties.' *Times*, Jan. 29, 1915.

The following appears in the German war news issued from Berlin under date January 28th:—'Turkish Headquarters reports the vain attempt of the British cruiser *Doris* to land troops near Alexandretta.' *ibid.*

ACTION OFF THE DOGGER BANK

Admiralty, January 24.

Early this morning a British patrolling squadron of battle cruisers and light cruisers under Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, with a Destroyer Flotilla under Commodore Tyrwhitt, sighted four German battle cruisers, several light cruisers, and a number of destroyers steering westward, and apparently making for the English coast. The enemy made for home at high speed. *Times*, Jan. 25, 1915.

They were at once pursued, and at about 9.30 A.M. action was joined between the battle cruisers *Lion*, *Tiger*, *Princess Royal*, *New Zealand*, and *Indomitable* on the one hand, and *Derfflinger*, *Seydlitz*, *Moltke*, and *Blücher* on the other.

A well-contested running fight ensued. Shortly after one o'clock *Blücher*, which had previously fallen out of the line, capsized and sank. Admiral Beatty reports that two other German battle cruisers were seriously damaged. They were, however, able to continue their flight and reached an area where dangers from German submarines and mines prevented further pursuit.

No British ships have been lost, and our casualties in personnel as at present reported are slight, *Lion*, which led the line, having only eleven wounded and no killed.

One hundred and twenty-three survivors have been rescued from *Blücher's* crew of 885, and it is possible that others have been saved by some of our destroyers.

No reports of any destroyer or light cruiser fighting have yet been received at the Admiralty, though some has apparently taken place.

Their Lordships have expressed their satisfaction to Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty.

Amsterdam, January 25.

Times, Jan. 26, 1915. An official telegram from Berlin gives the German version of the naval battle in the North Sea. It says:

'During an advance in the North Sea by the armoured cruisers *Seydlitz*, *Derfflinger*, *Moltke*, and *Blücher*, which were accompanied by four small cruisers and two flotillas of torpedo-boats, the squadron became engaged with British forces composed of five battle cruisers, several small cruisers, and twenty-six destroyers.

'The enemy broke off the engagement after a fight of three hours' duration seventy miles west-north-west of Heligoland, and retreated.

'According to the information available one British battle cruiser, and on our side the armoured cruiser *Blücher*, were sunk. All the other German vessels have returned to port.

'VON BEHNCKE.'

Amsterdam, January 28.

Times, Jan. 29, 1915. A *Reuter* telegram from Berlin gives the following:

Rear-Admiral Hipper, with small scouting cruisers, met the British squadron 120 miles west of Heligoland. The number and classes of the British ships were superior to the German. The Admiral turned south-east to find support nearer to the coast, or to have favourable sun and wind conditions. The British ships ran nearly parallel to the German force, a distance of about 20 kilometres. The battle opened at a range of 15 kilometres. The British concentrated their fire on the last German ship, *Blücher*, having the advantage of greater speed. The *Blücher's* engines were soon damaged, and she was obliged to fall back, but still kept on firing. The two attacking British destroyers were sunk by the *Blücher's* fire. A third destroyer was probably sunk by a German submarine. The *Blücher* was torpedoed by another destroyer, and blew up at 12.37 P.M. Seventy sea miles from Heligoland the British squadron turned, fearing German

reinforcements or the minefields, or perhaps owing to the condition of its own ships. The leading ship, the *Lion*, and the second, the *Tiger*, were burning. Amidst the smoke a British battleship went near a German torpedo-boat which had remained on the spot. The torpedo-boat torpedoed the battleship, which soon sank. This fact is confirmed by the observation of a German airship to the battle cruiser *Moltke*. The German light forces did not participate. The German losses were the *Blücher* sunk. Two hundred men were rescued by a British torpedo-boat. One battle cruiser and one small cruiser were hit, and had some dead. The torpedo-boats returned undamaged. The damage to the *Lion* is apparently serious, as she was towed by the *Indomitable*. The name of the British battleship which sank is unknown.

Further detailed reports have come to hand concerning the sea fight which took place on Sunday between the hours of about 9 A.M. and 12.30 noon, and they not only confirm the first German reports to the fullest extent, but they also add complementary details to the same effect. It is important that this fact should be stated beforehand, as to-day the statement is repeated by the English that no English ship was lost. Admittedly, however, the 'official' report does not emanate from the English Admiralty, but it was rather sent out to the world under the auspices of Reuter's Agency. As against the English denial, we adhere to the statement that a British battle cruiser was sunk during the fight off Heligoland. This is beyond a doubt. The sinking was observed by a Zeppelin cruiser which was hovering over the battle area, and further by our armoured cruiser *Moltke* as well as by the torpedo-boat which was able to fire two torpedoes at the already heavily damaged British warship. *K.D.*, Jan. 1914.

As already known four large cruisers, several light cruisers and two torpedo-boat flotillas took part in the fight on the German side. The German ships were steaming on a westerly course west-north-west from Heligoland. They were presumably steaming in the normal formation of single line ahead, *i.e.* with the four large cruisers leading, followed by the light cruisers, the torpedo-boats being close to the large cruisers.

The English force came from the direction of the English coast. What objects the English forces had in view are naturally not known here. It is possible that they were merely performing patrol duty. The enemy was sighted 120 nautical miles west-north-west of Heligoland. Our force then changed its course to a south-easterly one. This manœuvre had obviously for its object to draw the enemy nearer to the German coast, where possibly Heligoland might take a hand, or where perhaps German submarines or German minefields might prove effective.

Considerations of wind and light conditions, which are well known to have their importance on the course of sea actions, may not have been without their influence on the decision of the German Admiral. Both opponents moving in a south-easterly direction, the German line found itself brought nearer to the English. The fight developed in a south-easterly direction and approached to within 70 English miles of Heligoland. When both fighting forces were about 20 kilometres distant from each other the English Admiral opened fire. The commander of the German forces, Admiral Hipper, had hoisted his flag on the *Seydlitz* at the head of the line. The *Blücher* occupied the last position among the large cruisers.

With reference to the *Blücher*, her speed must be reckoned at 25 knots at most, whilst the English ships could raise their speed to 28 knots, which, as a matter of course, gave them the advantage. In spite of this superiority the English did not attempt to get nearer to the German ships, but tried to obtain hits at a distance of close on 20 kilometres. Later on the distance was reduced to about 15 kilometres. The *Blücher* was subjected to heavy fire by the English. Soon after the commencement of the action a heavy shot damaged her machinery, causing her to list over, but she continued the action. The other German ships could not come to her help as they had to continue the fight. Her ability to manœuvre being naturally greatly impaired, English torpedo-boats were able to approach the *Blücher* and complete her destruction with torpedoes. At 12.37 a violent explosion was heard, after which the *Blücher* sank.

It has been firmly established that the fight with the *Blücher* cost the English two torpedo-boat destroyers which

were destroyed by her. For the reasons already stated our forces were unable to take part in the rescue work. The survivors of the *Blücher*, which was the ship furthest advanced in the direction of England, were picked up by English light forces. The number of those rescued has reached 200.

In the meanwhile the fight had proceeded and was then broken off by the English Admiral. As to the cause of this decision, it is left to conjecture as far as the German side is concerned. Heligoland cannot have had any immediate bearing on the point, as it was still 70 nautical miles away.

Whether his approach towards the German coast made him feel uncomfortable, whether he had anxious thoughts with regard to German submarines, or whether the falling out of one of his battle cruisers decided him, we are unable to establish. The last indicated reason is the most probable one. The fact remains that a battle cruiser was left behind and, surrounded with steam and smoke clouds, got close to a German torpedo-boat which hit her twice with torpedoes. Her destruction, as already pointed out, is established with absolute certainty. By comparing this loss to that of the *Blücher* the English loss in this respect alone is considerably greater, as a modern battle cruiser is concerned on the English side.

In addition to this, serious damage was observed on the English ships, such as the falling over of masts and funnels. Even English reports admit freely that the *Lion* was hit below the waterline and, some of the compartments filling, she had to be taken in tow by the *Indomitable*. Judging by the circumstance reported in the English accounts that ten men were killed and ten wounded on the *Lion*, it follows that other German shots must have pierced the armour and therefore have caused considerable damage.

It was further observed from the German side that a great fire and damage to machinery was caused by hits in another English battle cruiser. To the above must be added the loss of the torpedo-boat destroyers. Besides the craft of this description already mentioned as having been sunk by shots from the *Blücher*, a destroyer was annihilated by a German submarine. A fourth destroyer (*Meteor*) suffered such serious damage that she had to be taken in tow. The light cruisers did not take part in the fight on either side.

Apart from the *Blücher* our ships did not suffer vitally. One of our cruisers was quite undamaged. In another there was slight material damage as well as the loss of a few lives caused by a direct hit. A third cruiser showed unimportant damage by shell-fire and two killed. Not one of the German torpedo-boats was sunk or damaged; neither is there any loss of life to deplore.

The above is the truth concerning the fight off Heligoland, which the English Press has exaggerated into a great victory. We undoubtedly deplore with sorrow the loss of the *Blücher* and of several hundreds of brave German seamen. They died a hero's death and met it with courage and calm devotion to duty. We can, however, look back with satisfaction upon the issue of this fight which certainly did not terminate unfavourably for Germany.

[From the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.*]

Berlin, February 3, 1915.

Main Headquarters reports as follows:

Times, Feb. 4, 1915. 'Commenting on the gradual admissions in official reports of damage done to British cruisers, the German papers point out that it now becomes known the *Lion*, the *Tiger*, the *Princess Royal*, and the *New Zealand* are more or less damaged.'

(*Official.*)

Berlin, February 5.

Times, Feb. 6, 1915. The credit for the destruction of the British battle cruiser on January 24th is due to destroyer 'V 5,' Commander-Lieutenant von Uchorn, who launched torpedoes from a range of five miles, thus showing the exceptional qualities of the German torpedoes in range and good explosive powers. The Admiralty officers regard the destruction of the cruiser as an established fact beyond all possible doubt, because of the corroborative testimony of a large number of officers and men, who identify the cruiser with considerable certainty as the *Tiger*.—*German Wireless.*

Admiralty, January 26.

All the British ships and destroyers engaged in Sunday's action have returned safely to port. *Times*, Jan. 27, 1915.

The *Lion*, which had some of her forward compartments flooded by a shell below the waterline, was taken in tow by the *Indomitable*. The destroyer *Meteor*, which was also disabled, was taken in tow by the destroyer *Liberty*. Both vessels were guarded by strong escorts of destroyers. The repairs to both vessels can speedily be effected.

The total number of casualties among officers and men reported to the Admiralty is :

Lion.—Seventeen men wounded.

Tiger.—One officer and nine men killed and three officers and eight men wounded.

Meteor.—Four men killed and one man wounded.

It is not believed that any other casualties have occurred, but if so they will immediately be published.

As soon as Sir David Beatty's report is received a fuller account will be given.

Admiralty, March 3, 1915.

The following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., commanding the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, reporting the action in the North Sea on Sunday, January 24th, 1915: *Times*, March 3, 1915.

H.M.S. Princess Royal, February 2, 1915.

SIR,—I have the honour to report that at daybreak on January 24th, 1915, the following vessels were patrolling in company.

The battle cruisers *Lion*, Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O., flying my flag ; *Princess Royal*, Captain Osmond de B. Brock, Aide-de-Camp ; *Tiger*, Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O. ; *New Zealand*, Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Aide-de-Camp, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O. ; and *Indomitable*, Captain Francis W. Kennedy.

The light cruisers *Southampton*, flying the broad pendant of Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O. ; *Nottingham*, Captain Charles B. Miller ; *Birmingham*, Captain Arthur

A. M. Duff; and *Lowestoft*, Captain Theobald W. B. Kennedy, were disposed on my port beam.

Commodore (T) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in *Arethusa*, *Aurora*, Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson, *Undaunted*, Captain Francis G. St. John, M.V.O., *Arethusa* and the Destroyer Flotillas were ahead.

At 7.25 A.M. the flash of guns was observed S.S.E. Shortly afterwards a report reached me from *Aurora* that she was engaged with enemy's ships. I immediately altered course to S.S.E., increased to 22 knots, and ordered the light cruisers and flotillas to chase S.S.E. to get in touch and report movements of enemy.

This order was acted upon with great promptitude, indeed my wishes had already been forestalled by the respective senior officers, and reports almost immediately followed from *Southampton*, *Arethusa*, and *Aurora*, as to the position and composition of the enemy, which consisted of 3 battle cruisers and *Blücher*, 6 light cruisers, and a number of destroyers, steering N.W. The enemy had altered course to S.E. From now onwards the light cruisers maintained touch with the enemy, and kept me fully informed as to their movements.

The battle cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the southward. The wind at the time was N.E., light, with extreme visibility. At 7.30 A.M. the enemy were sighted on the port bow steaming fast, steering approximately S.E. distant 14 miles.

Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our position on the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to S.E. parallel to them, and settled down to a long stern chase, gradually increasing our speed until we reached 28·5 knots. Great credit is due to the engineer staffs of *New Zealand* and *Indomitable*—these ships greatly exceeded their normal speed.

At 8.52 A.M., as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear ship, the battle cruisers manœuvred to keep on a line of bearing so that guns would bear, and *Lion* fired a single shot, which fell short. The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with light cruisers ahead and a large number of destroyers on their starboard beam.

Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and

at 9.9 A.M. *Lion* made her first hit on the *Blücher*, No. 4 in the line. The *Tiger* opened fire at 9.20 A.M. on the rear ship, the *Lion* shifted to No. 3 in the line, at 18,000 yards, this ship being hit by several salvoes. The enemy returned our fire at 9.14 A.M. *Princess Royal*, on coming into range, opened fire on *Blücher*, the range of the leading ship being 17,500 yards, at 9.35 A.M. *New Zealand* was within range of *Blücher*, which had dropped somewhat astern, and opened fire on her. *Princess Royal* shifted to the third ship in the line, inflicting considerable damage on her.

Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a position broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul our range with their smoke; but the enemy's destroyers threatening attack, the *Meteor* and M Division passed ahead of us, Captain the Hon. H. Meade, D.S.O., handling this Division with conspicuous ability.

About 9.45 A.M. the situation was as follows:—*Blücher*, the fourth in their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely from gun-fire; their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire. *Lion* was engaging No. 1, *Princess Royal* No. 3, *New Zealand* No. 4, while the *Tiger*, who was second in our line, fired first at their No. 1, and when interfered with by smoke, at their No. 4.

The enemy's destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now appeared to have altered course to the northward to increase their distance, and certainly the rear ships hauled out on the port quarter of their leader, thereby increasing their distance from our line. The battle cruisers, therefore, were ordered to form a line of bearing N.N.W., and proceed at their utmost speed.

Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack. *Lion* and *Tiger* opened fire on them, and caused them to retire and resume their original course.

The light cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port quarter of the enemy's line, enabling them to observe and keep touch, or attack any vessel that might fall out of the line.

At 10.48 A.M., the *Blücher*, which had dropped considerably astern of enemy's line, hauled out to port, steering north with a heavy list, on fire, and apparently in a defeated con-

dition. I consequently ordered *Indomitable* to attack enemy breaking northward.

At 10.54 A.M. submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and I personally observed the wash of a periscope two points on our starboard bow. I immediately turned to port.

At 11.3 A.M. an injury to the *Lion* being reported as incapable of immediate repair, I directed *Lion* to shape course N.W. At 11.20 A.M. I called the *Attack* alongside, shifting my flag to her at about 11.35 A.M. I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the Squadron, and met them at noon retiring N.N.W.

I boarded and hoisted my flag in *Princess Royal* at about 12.20 P.M., when Captain Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since the *Lion* fell out of the line, namely, that *Blücher* had been sunk and that the enemy battle cruisers had continued their course to the eastward in a considerably damaged condition. He also informed me that a Zeppelin and a seaplane had endeavoured to drop bombs on the vessels which went to the rescue of the survivors of *Blücher*.

The good seamanship of Lieut.-Commander Cyril Callaghan, H.M.S. *Attack*, in placing his vessel alongside the *Lion* and subsequently the *Princess Royal*, enabled the transfer of flag to be made in the shortest possible time.

At 2 P.M. I closed *Lion* and received a report that the starboard engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3.38 P.M. I ordered *Indomitable* to take her in tow, which was accomplished by 5 P.M.

The greatest credit is due to the Captains of *Indomitable* and *Lion* for the seamanlike manner in which the *Lion* was taken in tow under difficult circumstances.

The excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation was a conspicuous feature.

I attach an appendix giving the names of various officers and men who specially distinguished themselves.

Where all did well it is difficult to single out officers and men for special mention, and as *Lion* and *Tiger* were the only ships hit by the enemy, the majority of these I mention belong to those ships.—I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) DAVID BEATTY,
Vice-Admiral.

Officers

Commander Charles A. Fountaine, H.M.S. *Lion.*
Lieutenant-Commander Evan C. Bunbury, H.M.S. *Lion.*
Lieutenant Frederick T. Peters, H.M.S. *Meteor.*
Lieutenant Charles M. R. Schwerdt, H.M.S. *Lion.*
Engineer-Commander Donald P. Green, H.M.S. *Lion.*
Engineer-Commander James L. Sands, H.M.S. *Southampton.*
Engineer-Commander Thomas H. Turner, H.M.S. *New Zealand.*
Engineer-Lieutenant-Commander George Preece, H.M.S. *Lion.*
Engineer-Lieutenant Albert Knothe, H.M.S. *Indomitable.*
Surgeon Probationer James A. Stirling, R.N.V.R., H.M.S. *Meteor.*
Mr. Joseph H. Burton, Gunner (T), H.M.S. *Lion.*
Chief Carpenter Frederick E. Dailey, H.M.S. *Lion.*

Petty Officers and Men

Petty Officer John William Kennett, O.N. 186788, H.M.S. *Lion.*
Able Seaman Henry Davis, O.N. 184526, H.M.S. *Tiger.*
Able Seaman Hubert F. Griffin, O.N.J. 14160, H.M.S. *Princess Royal.*
Able Seaman Peter Stanley Livingstone, O.N. 234328, H.M.S. *Lion.*
Able Seaman Herbert Robison, O.N. 209112, H.M.S. *Tiger.*
Able Seaman George Henry Le Seilleur, O.N. 156802, H.M.S. *Lion.*
Boy 1st Class, Francis G. H. Bamford, O.N.J. 25598, H.M.S. *Tiger.*
Chief Engine-Room Artificer 1st Class, Evan Richard Hughes, O.N. 268999, H.M.S. *Indomitable.*
Chief Engine-Room Artificer 2nd Class, William Beaty Dand, O.N. 270648, H.M.S. *New Zealand.*
Boy 1st Class, Julius F. Rogers, O.N.J. 28329, H.M.S. *Tiger.*
Chief Engine-Room Artificer W. Gillespie, O.N. 270080, H.M.S. *Meteor.*

Mechanician Alexander James Cannon, O.N. 175440, H.M.S. *Lion.*

Mechanician Edward Charles Ephgrave, O.N. 288231, H.M.S. *Lion.*

Chief Stoker Patrick Callaghan, O.N. 278953, H.M.S. *Lion.*

Chief Stoker Alfred William Ferris, O.N. 175824, H.M.S. *Lion.*

Chief Stoker John Ernest James Portsmouth, O.N. 174232, H.M.S. *New Zealand.*

Chief Stoker William James, O.N. 153220 (R.F.R. Dev. A 3422), H.M.S. *Indomitable.*

Chief Stoker James Keating, R.F.R., O.N. 165732, H.M.S. *Meteor.*

Stoker Petty Officer Michael Flood, R.F.R., O.N. 153418, H.M.S. *Meteor.*

Stoker Petty Officer Thomas William Hardy, O.N. 292542, H.M.S. *Indomitable.*

Stoker Petty Officer Albert John Sims, O.N. 276502, H.M.S. *New Zealand.*

Stoker Petty Officer Samuel Westaway, R.F.R., O.N. 300938, H.M.S. *Meteor.*

Acting Leading Stoker John Blackburn, O.N.K. 4844, H.M.S. *Tiger.*

Stoker 1st Class, Alan H. Bennet, O.N.K. 10700, H.M.S. *Tiger.*

Stoker 2nd Class, Harold Turner, O.N.K. 22720, H.M.S. *Tiger.*

Leading Carpenter's Crew, Emmanuel Omega Bradley, O.N. 346621, H.M.S. *Lion.*

Leading Carpenter's Crew, Elisha Currie, O.N. 344851, H.M.S. *Lion.*

Sick Berth Attendant Charles S. Hutchinson, O.N.M. 3882, H.M.S. *Tiger.*

Chief Writer Samuel G. White, O.N. 340597, H.M.S. *Tiger.*

Third Writer Herbert C. Green, O.N.M. 8266, H.M.S. *Tiger.*

Officers' Steward 3rd Class, Fred W. Kearley, O.N.L. 2716, H.M.S. *Tiger.*

The First Lord of the Admiralty has received the following telegram from Field-Marshal Sir John French : *Times*, Jan. 26, 1915.

'I and the Army in France hope you and our naval comrades will accept our warmest congratulations on the victory of the British Fleet in the North Sea.

'Will you kindly convey to Admiral Beatty, Commodore Tyrwhitt, and their officers and men our admiration and warmest good wishes ?'

AIR RAIDS ON BELGIAN COAST

Admiralty, January 24.

On Friday, the 22nd, twelve or thirteen German aeroplanes appeared over Dunkirk at 11.30 A.M. and dropped bombs. *Times*, Jan. 25, 1915.

No particular damage was done, except that a shed in the docks was set on fire. One of the bombs fell just outside the United States Consulate, breaking all the windows and smashing the furniture.

Belgian, French, and British naval and military airmen engaged the German aeroplanes, one of which was brought down by a British military machine just over the Belgian frontier. The German aeroplane, pilot, and passenger were captured.

During the day visits were paid to Zeebrugge by Squadron Commander Richard B. Davies and Flight Lieutenant Richard Peirse. Twenty-seven bombs were dropped on two submarines and on the guns on the mole.

It is believed that one submarine was damaged considerably, and that many casualties were caused amongst the guns' crews.

In making a reconnoitring flight before this attack Squadron Commander Davies was on one occasion surrounded by seven German aeroplanes, but managed to elude them. He was slightly wounded in the thigh on his way to Zeebrugge, but continued his flight, accomplished his mission, and is now progressing satisfactorily.

THE *KARLSRUHE*

The German war news contains the statement that it is reported from Leipzig that the *Karlsruhe* has sunk eleven merchant ships during the last fortnight. *Times*, Jan. 25, 1915.

LOSS OF THE *VIKNOR*

Press Bureau, January 25.

Times, Jan. 26, 1915. The Secretary of the Admiralty regrets to announce that the armed merchant vessel His Majesty's Ship *Viknor*, which has been missing for some days, must now be accepted as lost with all officers and men.

The cause of her loss is uncertain, but as some bodies and wreckage have been washed ashore on the North Coast of Ireland it is presumed that during the recent bad weather she either foundered or, being carried out of her course, struck a mine in the seas where the Germans are known to have laid them.

House of Commons, February 4, 1915.

Hansard. LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the bodies of four men belonging to the Royal Navy who served in the armed merchant cruiser *Viknor*, wrecked off the coast of Ireland, have been buried in a pauper's grave at Larne at the expense of the ratepayers; whether these men's lives were lost in the service of the country; and, if so, whether he will take steps to ensure that proper respect is in future paid to the remains of men of the Royal Navy killed during the present war?

DR. MACNAMARA: It would appear that, owing to a regrettable misunderstanding, arrangements were not made by any local naval authorities for the funeral of certain men whose bodies were washed ashore from His Majesty's Ship *Viknor*, and that the burials were undertaken by the Poor Law guardians. This fact was communicated to me by the hon. and gallant Member for Antrim (East) on the 1st instant, and immediate instructions were issued that in the case of the recovery of any further bodies arrangements for the funeral should be made in accordance with the King's Regulations. Further, the guardians were at once informed that the cost of the burials which had already taken place would be refunded on application to the Admiralty.

House of Commons, February 10, 1915.

Hansard. LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked whether His Majesty's Ship *Viknor* was surveyed after she was armed; whether

the Government were quite satisfied that she was absolutely seaworthy; and whether there will be any inquiry with regard to her loss?

MR. CHURCHILL: The hull and machinery of the ship were thoroughly surveyed while she was being fitted out and armed, and on completion her stability was tested. The Admiralty officers responsible were quite satisfied that the ship was in all respects seaworthy. As there are no survivors no formal inquiry can be held.

House of Commons, February 17, 1915.

LORD C. BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is aware that there are ten survivors of His Majesty's Ship *Viknor* who were nineteen days in that ship and left her as a prize crew on January 18th; and whether the Board of Admiralty will reconsider their decision not to have an inquiry into the loss of the ship? *Hansard.*

DR. MACNAMARA: I do not think that the members of the crew referred to can, strictly speaking, be termed survivors. In any case they are not in a position to throw any light on the circumstances in which this vessel was lost, not having been on board her at the time.

LORD C. BERESFORD: There is great doubt about the seaworthiness of this ship. Is the right hon. gentleman aware that one sub-lieutenant, one signalman, four seamen, and three Marines, a total of nine, only left the ship a short time before, and they are all capable of giving evidence as to the seaworthiness of the ship? The question is so serious that I ask the right hon. gentleman if he will reconsider the matter?

DR. MACNAMARA: I cannot. On the question of seaworthiness I cannot add anything to the reply of the First Lord.

SUBMARINE ATTACKS *GAZELLE* IN THE BALTIC

We learn from a trustworthy source that on January 24th the small cruiser *Gazelle* was attacked by an enemy submarine in the neighbourhood of the island of Rügen and injured *K.D.*, Jan. 27, 1915.

by a torpedo. Her injuries were slight. The cruiser has returned to a Baltic port. There was no loss of life.

ZEPPELIN DESTROYED OFF LIBAU

Times, Jan. 27, 1915.

The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement:

The Naval General Staff, Petrograd, communicate the following:

'On Monday morning a Zeppelin appeared above Libau and had time to drop nine bombs on the undefended part of the town. After being fired at by the forts the Zeppelin fell into the water.

'Small craft were sent out and destroyed the Zeppelin and took the crew prisoners.'

THE *BRESLAU* AGAIN

Petrograd, January 30.

Times, Feb. 1, 1915.

The following *communiqué* was issued to-day at Great Headquarters:

In the Black Sea on Wednesday, January 27th, our Fleet came upon the Turkish cruisers *Medjidieh* and *Breslau*, near Samsun, and pursued them until nightfall.

On Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday our torpedo-boats sank several Turkish sailing vessels.

On Thursday one of our torpedo-boats made a daring raid on Trebizond, where, after cannonading the enemy's troops, who took to flight, it bombarded and damaged the barracks and stores.

At Rize, close by, the torpedo-boat silenced two of the enemy's batteries, sank several sailing vessels, and damaged the barracks.—*Reuter.*

GERMAN GOVERNMENT TAKES CONTROL OF CORN AND FLOUR

Times, Jan. 27, 1915.

It is officially announced from Berlin that the Federal Council has decided to seize all the stocks of corn and flour in Germany by February 1st, and that all business transactions in flour are forbidden from the morning of January 26th.

'*Owners of corn,*' the announcement runs, '*are bound to report their stocks, whereupon confiscation at fixed prices will follow.*'

SINKING OF THE *WILLIAM P. FRYE* AND OTHER VESSELS

Washington, March 11.

Once again the American public is aroused and the American Government embarrassed by Prussian ineptitude and lawlessness. The German auxiliary cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* has arrived in Newport News. Had she come with clean hands the country would have applauded the daring and skill with which for seven months she conducted her commerce-destroying raids from China to the West Atlantic. As it is, the admiration expressed is more than qualified by annoyance and indignation that she should have dared to sink an American vessel which she is generally believed to have had no right to sink. *Times*, March 12, 1915.

Her victim, the *William P. Frye*, was a steel sailing vessel of some 3500 tons. She left Seattle on November 1st for Queenstown with a cargo of 5200 tons of wheat, valued at just under £60,000. So far as can be gathered, the ultimate destination of the wheat was Liverpool.

That the *Eitel Friedrich* will be interned is believed to be highly probable. The captain says she will need six weeks for boiler and machinery repairs, and even if given so long it is expected that he will prefer to rest upon his laurels than to risk certain fate before the guns of British cruisers.

The *Frye's* captain, H. H. Kiehne, tells the following story :—

On January 27th he was approached by the *Eltel Friedrich* in the South Atlantic. Having made the requisite inquiries, the German captain told him that he deemed his cargo contraband, and proposed to destroy it. Kiehne protested, but German officers and men came on board and began to jettison the grain. The *Eitel Friedrich* then disappeared after another ship, and when she reappeared, to use Kiehne's words, 'evidently the grain was not being thrown overboard fast enough to suit the German skipper, for he sent half a hundred men aboard soon afterward, and the work went on for hours without interruption. However, it was slow at

the best, and I was informed the next morning that my ship would be sent to the bottom, which was done in the manner described. It was originally the intention of the German captain to leave enough cargo in the hold in the ship for ballast. That part of the grain was to be rendered useless by salt water. As soon as I was informed that my ship was to be sent to the bottom I and my wife, with our two boys and the crew, made for the German cruiser in our boats. We were taken on board and shown every courtesy throughout the remainder of the voyage.'

Nor does the public yet know the full extent of the mistreatment by the *Eitel Friedrich* of American property. The first ship she destroyed was American in all but flag, and would have flown the American flag had she finished her voyage. She was the *Charcas*, a British-chartered vessel belonging to the William R. Grace Company of New York, the transfer of which under the proposed new law had been arranged for before her loss was known. The *Charcas* was destroyed off the South American coast on December 5th.

The next victim was the French collier *Jean*, with 3000 tons of coal for British war vessels. The *Jean* was towed to Easter Island, where she was sunk. The British vessel *Kildalton* was caught and destroyed on the way. The crews of these ships were left on Easter Island. The list of the vessels sunk and of the crews taken into the *Eitel Friedrich* after leaving Easter Island was given to the Collector of Customs at Newport News as follows:

Isabel Browne (Russian), sailing ship; Axmar Eriksson, master; crew, 13; owner, Tronberg, Finland; sunk January 27th.

Pierre Loti (French), sailing ship; Transchant, master; crew, 24; owner, Société Nouvelle d'Armement, Nantes; sunk January 27th; 2196 tons.

William P. Frye (American), sailing ship; H. H. Kiehne, master; crew, 31; 3374 tons.

Jacobsen (French), sailing ship; V. Lerou, master; crew, 23; owner, Société des Voiliers Dunkerquois; sunk January 28th; 2195 tons.

Invercoe (British), sailing ship; W. J. King, master; crew, 23; owner, Inver Line, Aberdeen, Scotland; sunk February 12th; 1421 tons.

Mary Ada Short (British), steamship; A. E. Cobbing, master; crew, 28; owner, James Westoll, of Sunderland, England; sunk February 18th; 3605 tons.

Floride (French), steamer; Monssion, master; crew, 78; passengers, 86; owner, Compagnie Générale Transatlantique; sunk February 19th; 6629 tons.

Willerby (British), steamer; U. Wedgwood, master; crew, 27; owners, Ropner and Co., West Hartlepool; sunk February 20th; 3630 tons.

Santiago, March 3.

The steamer *Skerries*, arrived at Coronel, reports that the British barque *Kildalton* and the French barque *Jean*, were sunk by the German auxiliary cruiser, *Eitel Friedrich* at the end of December. The crews were left at Easter Island at the beginning of January. *Times*, March 4, 1915.

The *Kildalton* was bound from Liverpool to Callao; and the *Jean* from Port Talbot to Antofagasta. A reinsurance rate of 10 per cent. on the *Kildalton*, and of 15 per cent. on the *Jean* was quoted on January 29.

Panama, March 13.

After spending two months on Easter Island, the Chilean possession in the Southern Pacific, most of the crews of the barque *Kildalton*, of Glasgow, and the *Jean*, of Havre—two of the victims of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*—were landed at Panama on March 12 by the Norwegian ship *Nordic*. They sailed for England four days later. *Times*, March 30, 1915.

The sailors, 25 of whom were of British nationality, and 24 Frenchmen, were put ashore at Easter Island on December 31. The inhabitants consisted of about one hundred Malays, an Englishman, the agent of the Easter Island Trading Company, and his wife, and Mrs. Ruttlidge, of the British Museum, who is studying the prehistoric statues and inscribed tablets for which the island is celebrated.

When the *Nordic* called at the island on February 28, all the marooned sailors were taken off, except the captain of the *Jean* and seven sailors, who elected to remain. One of the seven, a Frenchman, married a Kanaka woman, and is now

a leader of the tribe. A member of the *Kildalton* crew, David Campbell, died on the island on February 8.

Washington, March 12.

Times, March 13, 1915.

The chorus of Press comments on the sinking of the *William P. Frye* bears out the educational value of the incident. Nearly every newspaper shares the belief semi-officially registered in Washington that Berlin is bound promptly to apologise and promise amends for an act which even the German-American Press cannot defend. It is pointed out that otherwise the whole of Germany's case about our cutting off of her foodstuffs falls to the ground. As the *New York Times* says, 'Any attempt to justify the sinking of the *Frye* would at once invalidate all protests against the seizure of the *Wilhelmina*.' [1]

[1] [*See* p. 192.]

Not that the cases of the *Wilhelmina* and the *Frye* are deemed parallel, save in Anglophobe quarters. While American opinion is not altogether inclined to admit our right to seize the *Wilhelmina's* cargo, it is noted in all quarters that the sinking of the *Frye* is a far more flagrant and more unbearable infringement of neutral rights than the detention of the *Wilhelmina*.

In another way too, the *Eitel Friedrich* is rightly or wrongly felt to have prejudiced the German case in the war-zone business. The cruiser is reported to have used German, French, and British flags. The *Washington Times* writes :—

'A German warship may use any flag it chooses, but if a British ship uses the American flag that renders all ships under the American flag liable to be sunk with their crews, passengers, and all on board. This doctrine cannot last long.'

Nor is it only because of the damage to the Teutonic case that the blunder of the *Eitel Friedrich's* captain is so convenient a prelude to the publication of our Orders in Council. Teutonic war methods are again under suspicion. What right, it is asked, had the *Eitel Friedrich* to continue her commerce-destroying career laden with non-combatant enemies, to say nothing of neutral Americans, when at any time she might have run into a hostile cruiser? It is felt that the business lends an evil point to the stories of the use of non-combatants as shields for advancing troops in Belgium and France.

Though, according to some accounts, the captain is anxious to make a dash through the British cruisers which the newspapers say are waiting for him, the *Eitel Friedrich* has gone to dry dock, and the general impression continues that she will eventually be interned.

According to the *Staatszeitung*, the German-Americans are proposing to use the international parcels post for sending supplies to Germany. The announcement is accompanied by letters from Mr. Bartholdt and the president of the German-American National Alliance. Mr. Bartholdt gives the opinion that interference by the Allies with the parcels post service would be a *casus belli*. The president of the German-American Alliance naïvely says:—'For reasons of policy, everything should be avoided that might awaken apprehension that this is a matter of agitation or propaganda to counteract the effect of the policy of starvation instituted by England and her Allies.'

Newport News, March 12.

After a preliminary survey by the dockyard officials, Captain Thierichsen has written to the authorities estimating that it will take about three weeks to complete the repairs to the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. *ibid.*

Newport News, March 12.

When the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* docked yesterday evening the crews of the sunken British, French, and Russian ships disembarked. The Englishmen marched towards the tramway singing 'Tipperary.' *ibid.*

Captain Wedgewood, of the steamer *Willerby*, one of the British vessels sunk, said that the cruiser was almost upon the *Willerby* before he discovered her. The German signalled the steamer to stop, but the steamer kept on, whereupon the cruiser swerved astern, and Captain Wedgewood quickly ordered his engines astern, hoping to ram the German vessel. The *Eitel Friedrich* escaped by a few yards.—*Reuter*.

Washington, March 14.

Opinion grows that Berlin will seek to forestall an American protest for the sinking of the *William P. Frye* by an apology *Times*, March 15, 1915.

and a promise of amends. Count Bernstorff has announced that the whole business was a mistake. The captain of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, it seems, was under the impression that the rules of the Declaration of London were in force, and that as Queenstown is a fortified port he was justified in regarding as contraband the *Frye's* cargo of grain. In view of Germany's general attitude over the Declaration of London and of our contraband policy, Count Bernstorff may be congratulated on a notable addition to the diplomatic laurels he has gained since the outbreak of the war.

There is considerable suspicion about the interned liners at Newport. It is believed that the Administration has discovered more than it cares to admit about the plans of Captain Boy-Ed, the German Naval Attaché, and his colleagues for the disappearance of the faster vessels without clearance papers and for their conversion into commerce-destroyers.

Washington, March 22.

Times, March 23, 1915. Remonstrances to Germany with reference to the sinking of the *William P. Frye* by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* are being prepared by the State Department, and will shortly be transmitted to Germany.

It is stated officially at the White House that a Note to Great Britain, containing representations with regard to some features of the Order in Council, is being drafted and will be despatched to London in a few days. The basis of the representation has not been made known.—*Reuter.*

Washington, March 31.

Times, April 2, 1915. It has been established to the satisfaction of the United States that the wheat cargo on board the American ship, *William P. Frye*, was not American-owned when she was sunk by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. The American Note which will shortly be forwarded to Germany will therefore only ask for payment of the hull.—*Reuter.*

Washington, April 5.

Times, April 6, 1915. The text of the American Note to Germany regarding the sinking of the *William P. Frye* by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* has now been published.

It is of the briefest character, and is confined chiefly to a recital of the legal aspects of the sinking of the ship. It suggests as reparation the satisfaction of the entire claim for £45,610, with interest as from January 28, the date of the sinking of the vessel.

The items of the claim are as follows:—Value of ship, £30,000; actual freight as per freight list, £7950; travelling and other expenses of the ship's captain and others in connection with the making of affidavits, etc., £100; personal effects of captain, £60; damages due to deprivation of use of ship, £7500.—*Reuter.*

Washington, April 9.

The bad impression produced by the recent German diplomatic treatment of the United States is heightened by the publication of the German reply to the American request for an indemnity for the sinking of the *William P. Frye.* While Germany recognises the right of the United States to an indemnity, it does not do so on the ground of international law and equity, but on account of a clause in certain old treaties, which provides for reimbursement for loss of even contraband goods destroyed, as the cargo of the *William P. Frye* was destroyed. The treaties are not mentioned in the American Note, and the cynical refusal to admit the justice of legal arguments by which the demand is supported is deemed to augur badly for the future. *Times,* April 10, 1915.

New York, April 9.

The German reply to the American Note demanding compensation for the loss of the *William P. Frye* was handed to Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador in Berlin, within twenty-four hours of the receipt of the Note. In the matter of speed this despatch of business breaks all diplomatic 'records.' *ibid.*

[In completion of the story of the *William P. Frye,* the diplomatic correspondence on the subject is here appended, although it more properly belongs to the International Law Division of this history:—

The Secretary of State to Ambassador Gerard

(TELEGRAM)

Department of State,
Washington, March 31, 1915.

U.S.D.C. You are instructed to present the following note to the German Foreign Office:

Under instructions from my Government I have the honour to present a claim for $228,059.54, with interest from January 28th, 1915, against the German Government on behalf of the owners and captain of the American sailing vessel *William P. Frye*, for damages suffered by them on account of the destruction of that vessel on the high seas by the German armed cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, on January 28th, 1915.

The facts upon which this claim arises and by reason of which the German Government is held responsible by the Government of the United States for the attendant loss and damages are briefly as follows:

The *William P. Frye*, a steel sailing vessel of 3374 tons gross tonnage, owned by American citizens and sailing under the United States flag and register, cleared from Seattle, Wash., November 4th, 1914, under charter to M. H. Houser, of Portland, Oreg., bound for Queenstown, Falmouth, or Plymouth for orders, with a cargo consisting solely of 186,950 bushels of wheat owned by the aforesaid Houser and consigned 'unto order or to its assigns,' all of which appears from the ship's papers which were taken from the vessel at the time of her destruction by the commander of the German cruiser.

On January 27, 1915, the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* encountered the *Frye* on the high seas, compelled her to stop, and sent on board an armed boarding party, who took possession. After an examination of the ship's papers the commander of the cruiser directed that the cargo be thrown overboard, but subsequently decided to destroy the vessel, and on the following morning, by his order, the *Frye* was sunk.

The claim of the owners and captain consists of the following items:

Value of ship, equipment, and outfit . . .	$150,000.00
Actual freight as per freight list, 5034 1000/2240 tons at 32–6—£8180, 19s. 6d. at $4.86 . . .	39,759.54
Travelling and other expenses of Captain Kiehne and Arthur Sewall and Co., agents of ship, in connection with making affidavits, preparing and filing claim .	500.00
Personal effects of Captain H. H. Kiehne . .	300.00
Damages covering loss due to deprivation of use of ship	37,500.00
Total	$228,059.54

By direction of my Government, I have the honour to request that full reparation be made by the German Government for the destruction of the *William P. Frye* by the German cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*.

BRYAN.

Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State

American Embassy,
Berlin, April 5, 1915.

The following is translation of the reply of the Foreign Office to my Note of April 3rd : *U.S.D.C.*

German Foreign Office,
Berlin, April 5, 1915.

The undersigned has the honour to make reply to the Note of his Excellency, Mr. James W. Gerard, Ambassador, the United States America, dated the 3rd instant, Foreign Office No. 2892, relative to claims for damages for the sinking of the American merchant vessel, *William P. Frye*, by the German auxiliary cruiser, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*.

According to the reports which have reached the German Government the commander of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* stopped the *William P. Frye* on the high seas January 27th, 1915, and searched her. He found on board a cargo of wheat consigned to Queenstown, Falmouth, or Plymouth to order. After he had first tried to remove the cargo from the *William P. Frye* he took the ship's papers and her crew on board and sank ship.

It results from these facts that the German commander acted quite in accordance with the principles of international law as laid down in the Declaration of London and the German prize ordinance. The ports of Queenstown, Falmouth, and Plymouth, whither the ship visited was bound, are strongly fortified English coast places, which, moreover, serve as bases for the British naval forces. The cargo of wheat being food or foodstuffs, was conditional contraband within the meaning of Article 24, No. 1, of the Declaration of London, and Article 23, No. 1, of the German prize ordinance, and was therefore to be considered as destined for the armed forces of the enemy, pursuant to Articles 33 and 34 of the Declaration of London and Articles 32 and 33 of the German prize ordinance, and to be treated as contraband pending proof of the contrary. This proof was certainly not capable of being adduced at the time of the visiting of the vessel, since the cargo papers read to order. This, however, furnished the conditions under which, pursuant to Article 49 of the Declaration of London and Article 113 of the German prize ordinance the sinking of the ship was permissible, since it was not possible for the auxiliary cruiser to take the prize into a German port without involving danger to its own security or the success of its operations. The duties devolving upon the cruiser before de-

struction of the ship, pursuant to Article 50 of the Declaration of London and Article 116 of the German prize ordinance, were fulfilled by the cruiser in that it took on board all the persons found on the sailing vessel, as well as the ship's papers.

The legality of the measures taken by the German commander is furthermore subject to examination by the German prize court pursuant to Article 51 of the Declaration of London and Section 1, No. 2, of the German Code of Prize Procedure. These prize proceedings will be instituted before the prize court at Hamburg as soon as the ship's papers are received, and will comprise the settlement of questions whether the destruction of the cargo and the ship was necessary within the meaning of the Article 49 of the Declaration of London; whether the property sunk was liable to capture; and whether, or to what extent, indemnity is to be awarded the owners. In the trial the owners of ship and cargo would be at liberty, pursuant to Article 34, Paragraph 3, of the Declaration of London, to adduce proof that the cargo of wheat had an innocent destination and did not, therefore, have the character of contraband. If such proof is not adduced, the German Government would not be liable for any compensation whatever, according to the general principles of international law.

However, the legal situation is somewhat different in the light of the special stipulations applicable to the relations between Germany and the United States, since Article 13 of the Prussian-American treaty of friendship and commerce of July 11, 1799, taken in connection with Article 12 of Prussian-American treaty of commerce and navigation of May 1st, 1828, provides that contraband belonging to the subjects or citizens of either party cannot be confiscated by the other in any case, but only detained or used in consideration of payment of the full value of the same. On the ground of this treaty stipulation, which is as a matter of course binding on the German prize court, the American owners of ship and cargo would receive compensation even if the court should declare the cargo of wheat to be contraband. Nevertheless, the approaching prize proceedings are not rendered superfluous, since the competent prize court must examine into the legality of the capture and destruction, and also pronounce upon the standing of the claimants and the amount of indemnity.

The undersigned begs to suggest that the Ambassador bring the above to the knowledge of his Government and avail himself, &c.

(Signed) JAGOW.

April 1915.

GERARD.

The Secretary of State to Ambassador Gerard

Department of State,
Washington, April 28, 1915.

You are instructed to present the following note to the German Foreign Office : *U.S.D.C.*

In reply to your Excellency's Note of the 5th instant, which the Government of the United States understands admits the liability of the Imperial German Government for the damages resulting from the sinking of the American sailing vessel, *William P. Frye*, by the German auxiliary cruiser, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, on January 28th last, I have the honour to say, by direction of my Government, that while the promptness with which the Imperial German Government has admitted its liability is highly appreciated, my Government feels that it would be inappropriate in the circumstances of this case, and would involve unnecessary delay, to adopt the suggestion in your note that the legality of the capture and destruction, the standing of the claimants, and the amount of indemnity should be submitted to a prize court.

Unquestionably the destruction of this vessel was a violation of the obligations imposed upon the Imperial German Government under existing treaty stipulations between the United States and Prussia, and the United States Government, by virtue of its treaty rights, has presented to the Imperial German Government a claim for indemnity on account of the resulting damages suffered by American citizens. The liability of the Imperial German Government and the standing of the claimants as American citizens, and the amount of indemnity are all questions which lend themselves to diplomatic negotiation between the two Governments, and happily the question of liability has already been settled in that way. The status of the claimants and the amount of the indemnity are the only questions remaining to be settled, and it is appropriate that they should be dealt with in the same way.

The Government of the United States fully understands that, as stated in your Excellency's Note, the German Government is liable under treaty provisions above mentioned for the damages arising from the destruction of the cargo as well as from the destruction of the vessel. But it will be observed that the claim under discussion does not include damages for the destruction of the cargo, and the question of the value of the cargo therefore is not involved in the present discussion.

The Government of the United States recognises that the German Government will wish to be satisfied as to the American ownership of the vessel, and the amount of the damages sustained in consequence of her destruction.

These matters are readily ascertainable, and if the German Government desires any further evidence in substantiation of the claim on these points in addition to that furnished by the ship's papers, which are already in the possession of the German Government, any additional evidence found necessary will be produced. In that case, however, inasmuch as any evidence which the German Government may wish to have produced is more accessible, and can more conveniently be examined in the United States than elsewhere, on account of the presence there of the owners and captain of the *William P. Frye* and their documentary records, and other possible witnesses, the Government of the United States ventures to suggest the advisability of transferring the negotiations for the settlement of these points to the Imperial German embassy at Washington.

In view of the admission of liability by reason of specific treaty stipulations, it has become unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the meaning and effect of the Declaration of London, which is given some prominence in your Excellency's Note of April 5th, further than to say that, as the German Government has already been advised, the Government of the United States does not regard the Declaration of London as in force. BRYAN.]

THE FRENCH MINISTER OF MARINE IN LONDON.

Times, Jan. 29, 1915.

The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement:

'The French Minister of Marine, M. Victor Augagneur, dined on Wednesday night with the First Lord at Admiralty House. Among the other guests were the French Ambassador, the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Crewe, Lord Kitchener, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Balfour, Sir Ian Hamilton, Colonel Seely, Capitaine de Vaisseau Salaün, the French Naval Attaché, the Secretary of the Admiralty, and the Chief of the Admiralty War Staff.

Earlier in the day M. Augagneur visited Portsmouth and was entertained at luncheon by the Commander-in-Chief.

Mr. Churchill received the following telegram yesterday morning:

'Avant de quitter la Grande Bretagne je vous adresse l'expression de ma reconnaissance personnelle pour l'accueil qui m'a été fait. Dans notre entrevue se sont manifestés à nouveau l'accord complet et la confiance réciproque des

marines françaises et britanniques sur toutes les mesures qui nous conduiront à la victoire finale.

'AUGAGNEUR.'

Mr. Churchill has replied as follows:

'M. AUGAGNEUR, Ministre Marine, Paris.

'It was a great pleasure to my colleagues and myself to make your personal acquaintance and to find ourselves in complete accord with the French Admiralty on all questions of policy.'

With regard to the purposes and results of the Minister's mission Reuter's Agency is authorised to make the following official declaration:

M. Augagneur, the French Minister of Marine, arrived in London on Tuesday morning.

The same day he was received by the King. He has had a series of conferences with the First Lord of the Admiralty with reference to the disposition and the employment of the naval forces of the two allied Powers.

These conferences showed the conformity of views of the two statesmen and the close solidarity of the two Governments.

During his visit M. Augagneur saw the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Kitchener, Lord Crewe, and Mr. Balfour.

The Minister also visited Portsmouth and inspected the arsenal and dockyard.

GERMAN TORPEDO-BOAT SUNK BY RUSSIAN SUBMARINE.

Paris, February 3.

An official telegram from Petrograd announces that on January 29 a Russian submarine sank a German torpedo-boat off Cape Moen, Denmark. *Times*, Feb. 4, 1915.

STATEMENT BY FRENCH MINISTRY OF MARINE.

Paris, January 31.

The Ministry of Marine to-day issued the following Note: *Times*, Feb. 1, 1915.

Up to the present, by a sort of self-respect, German seamen have generally not sunk Allied merchant ships until they have taken off the crews or authorised them to escape. Almost the only departure from this rule with which they have had to reproach themselves has been the criminal

attack off Boulogne upon the French liner *Amiral Ganteaume*,[1] full of Belgian women and children. That vessel, torpedoed by a German submarine, fortunately succeeded in reaching the coast with the assistance of friendly ships, which rescued most of the passengers.

[1] [*See Naval* 1, pp. 344-5.]

To-day the German Navy has decided to violate international law systematically and deliberately. The officers have received orders to respect nothing in future, and to place themselves outside the pale of humanity. Thus, on January 30th, German submarines torpedoed without previous notice two British merchant ships in the vicinity of Havre. The whole world will rise in horror at such an act of war, which is unworthy of a civilised nation.

In the first instance the British steamer *Tokomaru* was sunk at ten o'clock in the morning of January 30th, seven miles west-north-west of Cape Antifer by a German submarine. Her crew were saved by French torpedo-boats. The British steamer *Icaria* was also torpedoed by a German submarine on the same day at one o'clock fifteen miles west of Cape Antifer. She did not sink, but was towed into Havre escorted by French torpedo craft.

In the Irish Sea the British ships *Linda Blanche* and *Ben Cruachan* were torpedoed by German submarines.—*Reuter.*

GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITY

Amsterdam, January 31.

K.D., Feb. 1, 1915.

It is reported from Fleetwood that the German submarine 'U 21' has sunk the steamer *Ben Cruachan* of North Shields. The crew of the steamer, numbering 21, was given ten minutes time to get into the boats; it was picked up by a fishing trawler and landed at Fleetwood. The *Ben Cruachan* was a coasting steamer.

Reuter's Agency reports from London; Yesterday at 12.30 noon the 'U 21' caught the steamer *Linda Blanche* bound from Manchester to Belfast in the neighbourhood of Liverpool; the crew of this steamer composed of ten men was landed in boats. In the evening a steamer entering Liverpool reported having seen 'U 21' sinking yet a third British cargo steamer.

The Secretary of the Admiralty publishes the following reports by the masters of the British merchant ships *Tokomaru* and *Ikaria*, showing how they were torpedoed by German submarines, together with a memorandum on the loss of the British ship *Oriole*, probably from the same cause : *Times*, Feb. 9, 1915.

I, Mathew Robertson, master of the s.s. *Ikaria*, of Liverpool, official number 113368, declare as follows :

I left Santos, via Rio Janeiro, Bahia, Pernambuco, and Madeira on December 21st, 1914, with a cargo of general merchandise, bound for Havre and London. All went well until January 31st, 1915. When about 25 miles northwest of Havre, 12.30 on that day, I was on the bridge with the chief and the second officer, when we saw the wake of a torpedo coming towards the ship at about 30 ft. from the ship. The ship was stopped at the time for the purpose of getting a pilot, as two tugboats were coming up with flags at the fore. About a second after we saw the wake of the torpedo, we were struck in the forepart of the ship on the port side. An explosion occurred and a volume of water mixed with cargo, cement, and parts of the torpedo arose about 60 ft. and fell on the deck. The ship immediately began to sink by the head. The crew were ordered to launch the boats to leave the ship. The crew and I then boarded the tug which was lying close to us and waited for the ship to sink. About an hour afterwards, as she stopped sinking by the head, part of the crew with myself, some of the officers, and the engineers went on board. A tow-rope was attached to the ship from the tugboat, and she was taken in tow. Meanwhile a part of the crew on board started to get steam in the main engines. As the ship would not steer, a second tug was called to assist in steering. She was ultimately towed to Havre, where she arrived about 9.30.

Dated this 1st of February, 1915.

M. ROBERTSON.

Declared before me, James Walsh, British Vice-Consul, Havre.

I, Francis Greene, master of the British steamer *Tokomaru*, of Southampton, official No. 99624, declare as follows :—

I left the port of Wellington, New Zealand, on December

9th, 1914, and touched at Montevideo January 2nd, 1915, and Teneriffe on January 22nd, 1915.

About 9 A.M., when seven miles from Havre Lightship, we were steaming slow on our way to Havre when we were struck by a torpedo on the port side. We knew it was a torpedo from a submarine because we could see the periscope. The ship began to settle down by the head and took a heavy list to port and seas came over her. Immediately she took a list I got the crew into the boats. My room was full of water, and I could not save any of the ship's papers. As soon as the forecastle's head was submerged we rowed away from the ship. We were taken aboard by a French mine-sweeper, *Saint Pierre.* We stood by until the ship sank, which she did at 10.30 A.M. The crew, numbering 57 and myself, were saved; all effects were lost.

Dated this 30th day of January, 1915.

F. GREENE.

Declared before me, James Walsh, British Vice-Consul, Havre.

The British steamship *Oriole,* of the General Steam Navigation Company, which left London on January 29th, was due at Havre the following day. She has not arrived, nor is there any news of her whereabouts except that two life-buoys marked s.s. *Oriole* were picked up near Rye last Saturday. There is grave reason to fear that she may have fallen a victim to the German submarine which torpedoed the *Tokomaru* and *Ikaria.* She carried a mercantile crew of 21 hands all told.

PROMOTIONS, APPOINTMENTS, HONOURS, AND REWARDS

Admiralty, January 1, 1915.

L.G., Jan. 1, 1915.

The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following appointments to the Distinguished Service Order and for the Award of the Distinguished Service Cross in respect of the undermentioned Officers:

To be Companions of the Distinguished Service Order.

Major Arthur Harwood French, Royal Marine Light Infantry, Royal Marine Brigade, Royal Naval Division.

Engineer Lieutenant-Commander Edward Hickman Tucker Meeson, His Majesty's Ship *Laurel.*

Lieutenant-Commander Edmund Laurence Braithwaite Lockyer, His Majesty's Ship *Carmania.*

Squadron Commander Edward Featherstone Briggs, Royal Naval Air Service.

Flight Commander John Tremayne Babington, Royal Naval Air Service.

Flight Lieutenant Sidney Vincent Sippe, Royal Naval Air Service.

To receive the Distinguished Service Cross.

Lieutenant George Lionel Davidson, late His Majesty's Ship *Loyal.*

Lieutenant Gerald Gordon Grant, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, Royal Naval Division.

Sub-Lieutenant Charles Oscar Frittriof Modin, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, Royal Naval Division.

Lieutenant David James Gowney, Royal Marine Light Infantry, Royal Marine Brigade, Royal Naval Division.

Lieutenant Harold Owen Joyce, late His Majesty's Ship *Vestal.*

Lieutenant Douglas Reid Kinnier, Royal Naval Reserve, s.s. *Ortega.*

The following awards have also been made :—

To receive the Distinguished Service Medal.

For the operations round Antwerp from the 3rd to the 9th October :—

NAVAL BRIGADE

Chief Petty Officer Bernard Henry Ellis, No. 748, B Co., R.N.V.R., London.

Chief Petty Officer Payne, D Co.

Petty Officer William Wallace, O.N., Dev. 211130.

Stoker Petty Officer William Stephen Cole, O.N., Ch. 100113.

Leading Seaman (Acting) Henry Lowe, R.N.R., Dev., No. B, 2542.

Ordinary Seaman George Ripley, new army recruit, C Co. (now R.N.V.R.), K.W./755.

Ordinary Seaman T. Machen, new army recruit, C Co. (now R.N.V.R.).

Royal Marine Brigade

R.F.R. Ch. 661. Sergeant-Major (Acting) James Thomas Gallieford, R.M.L.I.

R.F.R. Ch. 426. Quartermaster-Sergeant George James Kenny, R.M.L.I.

R.F.R. Ch. 631. Sergeant Gideon Harry Bruce, R.M.L.I.

Ch. 18717. Lance-Corporal Thomas Charles Franks, R.M.L.I.

Ply. 7685. Lance-Corporal Walter John Cook, R.M.L.I.

R.F.R. Ch. 194. Private George Henry Hall, R.M.L.I.

R.F.R. Ch. 1585. Private Charles Joseph Fleet, R.M.L.I.

Ch. 18446. Private Stuart Lang, R.M.L.I.

Senior Reserve Attendant Edmund Walch, Royal Naval Auxiliary Sick Berth Reserve, O.N., M. 9522.

For the operations off the Belgian Coast from the 17th October to the 9th November :—

Falcon. Petty Officer Robert Chappell, O.N., 207788 (since died of wounds received in action).

Falcon. Petty Officer Frederick William Georgeson Motteram, O.N., 183216.

Brilliant. Leading Seaman John Thomas Knott, O.N., J. 1186.

Falcon. Able Seaman Ernest Dimmock, O.N., 204549.

Mersey. Boy, 1st Class, Herbert Edward Sturman, O.N., J. 24887.

For service in the Dardanelles in Submarine 'B 11' on the 13th December :—

Petty Officer William Charles Milsom, O.N., 182452.

Petty Officer Thomas Henry Davey, O.N., 215464.

Chief Engine-Room Artificer, 2nd Class, John Harding, O.N., 270410.

Engine-Room Artificer, 1st Class, Anthony Douglas, O.N., 270773.
Stoker Petty Officer Patrick M'Kenna, O.N., 284570.
Leading Seaman Alfred Edmund Perry, O.N., 234667.
Leading Seaman Wilfrid Charles Mortimer, O.N., 219476.
Able Seaman Norman Lester Rae, O.N., 232229.
Able Seaman George Read, O.N., 231010.
Able Seaman Edward Buckle, O.N., 237869.
Able Seaman Tom Blake, O.N., J. 1383.
Signalman Frederick George Foote, O.N., J. 1862.
Acting Leading Stoker John Henry Sowden, O.N., 308448.
Stoker, 1st Class, Stephen James Lovelady, O.N., K. 2240.

Central Chancery of the Orders of Knighthood

Lord Chamberlain's Office, January 1, 1915.

The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following appointments to the Most Honourable Order of the Bath:

To be Ordinary Members of the Military Division of the Third Class, or Companions, of the said Most Honourable Order:

Captain Noel Grant, R.N. (H.M.S. *Carmania*).
Captain John Collings Taswell Glossop, R.N. (H.M.A.S. *Sydney*).
Commander James Barr, R.N.R. (H.M.S. *Carmania*).

To be Ordinary Members of the Civil Division of the Third Class, or Companions, of the said Most Honourable Order:

Captain Richard Webb, R.N.
Fleet Paymaster Charles John Ehrhardt Rotter, R.N.

Chancery of the Royal Victorian Order

St. James's Palace, 1st January 1915.

The King has been graciously pleased to make the following promotions in, and appointments to, the Royal Victorian Order:— *L.G.*, Jan. 1, 1915.

To be Member of the Fifth Class.

(Dated 1st October 1914.) Carpenter Lieutenant John William Sheldrake, Royal Navy. On promotion from His Majesty's yacht *Victoria and Albert.*

War Office, 17th February 1915.

L.G., Feb. 17, 1915. The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, British Forces in the Field :—

14th January 1915.

My Lord,—In accordance with the last paragraph of my Despatch of the 20th November 1914, I have the honour to bring to notice names of those whom I recommend for gallant and distinguished service in the field.—I have the honour to be, your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

J. D. P. French, *Field-Marshal,*
Commanding-in-Chief, The British Army
in the Field.

Royal Navy

Rear-Admiral the Honourable H. L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.
Wing Commander C. R. Samson, D.S.O.
Squadron Commander R. B. Davies.
Flight Lieutenant C. H. Collett, D.S.O.
Flight Lieutenant R. E. C. Peirse.
Acting Commander A. S. Littlejohns.
Lieutenant E. S. Wise.
Lieutenant D. C. G. Shoppee.
Captain J. P. De Montmorency.
Rear-Admiral E. G. Shortland, Royal Navy (retired).
Captain Sir M. MacGregor, Bart., Royal Navy (retired).
Captain C. W. G. Crawford, Royal Navy (retired).
Paymaster-in-Chief C. Alton, C.B., Royal Navy (retired).
Fleet Paymaster V. H. T. Weekes, Royal Navy.
Fleet Paymaster F. H. Gerty, Royal Navy (retired).

Royal Naval Reserve

Admiralty, 2nd January 1915.

The following is substituted for the notice which appeared in the *London Gazette* of the 22nd December 1914[1]:—

In accordance with the provisions of His late Majesty's Order in Council of the 8th December, 1903, Rear-Admiral Cresswell John Eyres has been placed on the Retired List, at his own request, in order to take up an appointment as Captain in the Royal Naval Reserve. Dated 18th December 1914.

The King has been graciously pleased to confer the Royal Naval Reserve Officers' Decoration upon the following Officer: *L.G.*, Jan. 15, 1915.

Lieutenant Clarence Edward Henry Aylen.

Royal Marines

Rear-Admiral Reginald Hugh Spencer Bacon, C.V.O., D.S.O., Retired, is granted a temporary Commission in the Royal Marines as Colonel Second Commandant. Dated January 16th, 1915. *L.G.*, Jan. 22, 1915.

Royal Naval Reserve

Admiralty, January 23, 1915.

In accordance with the provisions of His Majesty's Order in Council of December 16th, 1912, temporary Commissions in the Royal Naval Reserve have been issued as follows: *L.G.*, Jan. 26, 1915.

Captains.

Sir James Edward Clifford Goodrich, K.C.V.O. (Admiral, retired).

William Blake Fisher, C.B. (Admiral, retired).

[1] [The notice referred to is as follows:—

Admiralty, 19*th December* 1914.

Royal Naval Reserve.

In accordance with the provisions of His Majesty's Order in Council of 16th December 1912, a temporary Commission in the Royal Naval Reserve has been issued as follows:—

CAPTAIN

Cresswell J. Eyres (Rear Admiral, retired).]

ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION

L.G., Jan. 29, 1915.

Colonel Second Commandant Alfred Edmund Marchant, C.B., A.D.C., Royal Marine Light Infantry, is granted the temporary rank of Brigadier-General from the 5th to the 9th October, 1914, inclusive, whilst in command of the Third (Royal Marine) Brigade.

ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION

Admiralty, February 2, 1915.

L.G., Feb. 5, 1915.

Captain Leslie Orme Wilson, D.S.O., M.P., Royal Marine Light Infantry, Retired, serving with the Berkshire Royal Horse Artillery (Territorial Force), to command the *Hawke* Battalion of the First Brigade, and to be temporary Lieutenant-Colonel in the Royal Marines. Dated January 26th, 1915.

ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE

Admiralty, 30th January 1915.

L.G., Feb. 2, 1915.

In accordance with the provisions of His Majesty's Order in Council of 16th December 1912, temporary commissions in the Royal Naval Reserve have been issued as follows :—

Captains.

John Denison (Admiral, retired).
Frederick Owen Pike (Vice-Admiral, retired).

DETENTIONS OR CAPTURES OF ENEMY SHIPS OR CARGOES

VESSELS DETAINED OR CAPTURED AT SEA BY HIS MAJESTY'S ARMED FORCES

L.G., Jan. 15, 1915.

(In continuation of previous notification published in the *London Gazette* of January 5th, 1915.[1])

[1] [*See Naval* 2, p. 459.]

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name and Tonnage.	Nationality.	Where Detained.
Josephina (1,295) . .	Netherland . .	Falkland Islands.
Viganella (841) . . .	German . . .	Plymouth.

Ships whose Cargoes, or Part of them, have been Detained

(In continuation of previous notification published in the *London Gazette* of January 5th, 1915.[1])

L.G., Jan. 15, 1915.

[1] [*See Naval* 2, p. 460.]

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
Albistan	British	London.
Dannebrog	Danish	Falmouth.
Ellen	Norwegian	Newport.
Lincairn	British	Liverpool.
Maronian	British	Liverpool.
Martha	Danish	Hull.
Orissa	British	Liverpool.
Sicilian	British	London.
Woolston	British	Liverpool.

Foreign Office,
January 14, 1915.

Vessels Detained or Captured at Sea by His Majesty's Armed Forces

(In continuation of previous notification published in the *London Gazette* of January 15th, 1915.)

L.G., Jan. 29, 1915.

LIST OF SAILING VESSELS.

Name and Tonnage.	Nationality.	Where Detained.
Hamidieh (40)	Turkish	Famagusta.
Kassi Kerim (32)	Turkish	Famagusta.
Maria (36)	Turkish	Famagusta.
Maria (30)	Turkish	Famagusta.
Saida (82)	Turkish	Famagusta.
Saileh (34)	Turkish	Famagusta.
Seideh (44)	Turkish	Famagusta.
Seideh (27)	Turkish	Famagusta.
Seleſka (8)	Turkish	Akanthou.

SHIPS WHOSE CARGOES, OR PART OF THEM, HAVE BEEN DETAINED

L.G., Jan. 29, 1915.

(In continuation of previous notification published in the *London Gazette* of January 15th, 1915.)

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name of Vessel.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
Alrina	Netherland	Falmouth.
Ardgarroch	British	Liverpool.
Bonovento	Norwegian	Falmouth.
Den of Ruthven	British	London.
Linaria	British	London.
Manhattan	British	London.
Marengo	British	Hull.
Marie Susanne	British	Gloucester.
Mergansen	British	Liverpool.
Mombassa	British	London.
Terek	British	London.

Foreign Office,
January 28, 1915.

ADMIRALTY MONTHLY ORDERS

Admiralty, S.W., February 1, 1915.

64.—*Enemy Vessels, Mines and Submarines—Rewards for Information, etc., as to*

In order to encourage fishermen and others to bring in immediate reports of enemy vessels and mines and to assist in the destruction of hostile Submarines, the Admiralty offer the following rewards to Trawlers, Drifters, and other vessels. Rewards (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) are applicable to Trawlers and Drifters in the service of the Admiralty; the remainder are not applicable to them:

Scale of Rewards.

	Amount not to exceed a Maximum of
(1) For the capture or destruction of an Enemy Submarine or other war vessel by the crew of a Trawler or Drifter . . .	1,000*l.*
(2) When the capture or destruction of an Enemy Submarine or other war vessel is caused through the agency of a Trawler or Drifter	1,000*l.*
(3) For the proved destruction of an Enemy mine in certain areas limited by the Admiralty .	5*l.*
In special cases	10*l.*
(4) For information which directly leads to the actual capture or destruction of an Enemy war vessel down to and including a Minelayer or Submarine	1,000*l.*
(5) For information which leads to the Enemy war vessel, Minelayer, or Submarine being sighted and chased, the information being proved to be accurate although the Vessel was not destroyed	200*l.*
(6) For information of the movements of Enemy war vessels, or other vessels engaged in mine-laying or other hostile or suspicious action, the information being proved to be accurate and valuable and delivered at the earliest possible moment	1*l.* for each mile travelled off the course in order to report quickly.
Also in special cases where the reporting vessel has not travelled off course	10*l.*
(7) For the first information of the existence of Enemy Mines, proved to be accurate and valuable and delivered at the earliest possible moment	10*s.* per mile for each mile travelled off the course in order to report quickly, in addition to 3*l.* to the Skipper.
Also in special cases where the reporting vessel has not travelled off course	5*l.*
(8) When Drifters, by direction of Naval Authorities, are sent to set their nets in a certain area which it is desired to clear of Enemy Mines, and the nets are damaged or destroyed by such mines, the reward is the amount of the proved value of the nets, in addition to the reward under (3) for mines exploded .	
(9) For the first report of a Mine washed up on shore, in cases where the Mine is actually recovered	1*l.*

II.—The areas, referred to in paragraph (3), are those in which navigation is permitted under the Admiralty Orders as published from time to time; those in paragraph (8) may be designated by Naval Authorities as circumstances require, the Admiralty being informed whenever such local Notices are issued or withdrawn.

III.—Rewards under paragraph I., clauses (3), (6), (7) and (9), may be paid direct by Commanders-in-Chief and Senior Naval Officers; those under (1), (2), (4), (5) and (8) are to be submitted to the Admiralty.

The Admiralty or Senior Naval Officer will determine at their discretion the amount of the reward, its distribution between the Master and Crew, and share to be paid to each vessel if information is brought by more than one. The claims of Owners to share in the distribution are to be considered in each case according to circumstances, and the amount apportioned accordingly.

IV.—Vessels observing Enemy War vessels or vessels engaged in mine-laying or other hostile or suspicious action should *at once* proceed towards the nearest British Warship or Port and report *immediately*.

Reports should be made to Naval Officers, Coastguards, Customs Officers, or Fishery Officers.

Where circumstances permit, reports should be made in writing, giving the following particulars of the Vessel sighted —name, nationality, description, course and speed, date and time, position; but in *no circumstances* should the making of the report be delayed.

V.—On all occasions when reports are made by fishing craft which render them eligible for a reward under the regulations mentioned, the Officer to whom the report is made should take all possible means to satisfy himself of the accuracy of the Skipper's statements. Special attention should be paid to any evidence as to the Skipper having sacrificed fishing in order to report.

The times of his leaving port, commencing and ceasing to fish, returning to port, the time when he would normally have returned to port in the ordinary course of his fishing, and the amount of his catch, should all be carefully noted whenever circumstances permit.

VI.—Senior Naval Officers are to make the terms of this Notice known as widely as possible among those concerned. A supply printed in poster form, and omitting portions which do not concern the public, will be forwarded to them as soon as possible.

65.—*Panama Canal—Rules for Use by Belligerent Vessels*

The following " Rules and Regulations governing the use of the Panama Canal by Vessels of Belligerents and the maintenance of neutrality by the United States in the Canal Zone," which are contained in a Proclamation by the President of the United States, dated November 13th, 1914, are to be observed by H.M. Ships and Fleet Auxiliaries :

Rule 1.—A vessel of war, for the purposes of these rules, is defined as follows : a public armed vessel, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the Government, whose name appears on the list of officers of the military fleet, and the crew of which are under regular naval discipline, which vessel is qualified by its armament and the character of its personnel to take offensive action against the public or private ships of the enemy.

Rule 2.—In order to maintain both the neutrality of the Canal and that of the United States owning and operating it as a Government enterprise, the same treatment, except as hereinafter noted, as that given to vessels of war of the belligerents shall be given to every vessel, belligerent or neutral, whether armed or not, that does not fall under the definition of Rule 1, which vessel is employed by a belligerent Power as a transport or fleet auxiliary or in any other way for the direct purpose of prosecuting or aiding hostilities, whether by land or sea ; but such treatment shall not be given to a vessel fitted up and used exclusively as a hospital ship.

Rule 3.—A vessel of war of a belligerent, or a vessel falling under Rule 2 which is commanded by an officer of the military fleet, shall only be permitted to pass through the Canal after her commanding officer has given written assurance to the authorities of the Panama Canal that the Rules and Regulations will be faithfully observed.

The authorities of the Panama Canal shall take such steps as may be requisite to insure the observance of the Rules and Regulations by vessels falling under Rule 2 which are not commanded by an officer of the military fleet.

Rule 4.—Vessels of war of a belligerent and vessels falling under Rule 2 shall not revictual nor take any stores in the Canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels through the Canal shall be effected with the least possible delay in accordance with the Canal Regulations in force, and with only such intermission as may result from the necessities of the service.

Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same Rules as vessels of war of the belligerents.

Rule 5.—No vessel of war of a belligerent or vessel falling under Rule 2 shall receive fuel or lubricants while within the territorial waters of the Canal Zone, except on the written authorisation of the Canal Authorities, specifying the amount of fuel and lubricants which may be received.

Rule 6.—Before issuing any authorisation for the receipt of fuel and lubricants by any vessel of war of a belligerent or vessel falling under Rule 2, the Canal Authorities shall obtain a written declaration, duly signed by the officer commanding such vessel, stating the amount of fuel and lubricants already on board.

Rule 7.—Supplies will not be furnished by the Government of the United States, either directly or indirectly through the intervention of a corporation, or otherwise, to vessels of war of a belligerent or vessels falling under Rule 2. If furnished by private contractors, or if taken from vessels under the control of a belligerent, fuel and lubricants may be taken on board vessels of war of a belligerent or vessels falling under Rule 2 only upon permission of the Canal Authorities, and then only in such amounts as will enable them, with the fuel and lubricants already on board, to reach the nearest accessible port, not an enemy port, at which they can obtain supplies necessary for the continuation of the voyage. The amounts of fuel and lubricants so received will be deducted from the amounts otherwise allowed in the ports under the jurisdiction of the United States during any time within a period of three months thereafter. Provisions furnished by contractors may be supplied only upon permission of the Canal Authorities, and

then only in amount sufficient to bring up their supplies to the peace standard.

Rule 8.—No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike materials in the Canal, except in case of necessity due to accidental hindrance of the transit. In such cases the Canal Authorities shall be the judge of the necessity, and the transit shall be resumed with all possible despatch.

Rule 9.—Vessels of war of a belligerent and vessels falling under Rule 2 shall not remain in the territorial waters of the Canal Zone under the jurisdiction of the United States longer than twenty-four hours at any one time, except in case of distress; and in such case, shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of a vessel of an opposing belligerent.

The twenty-four hours of this rule shall be construed to be twenty-four hours in addition to the time necessarily occupied in passing through the Canal.

Rule 10.—In the exercise of the exclusive right of the United States to provide for the regulation and management of the Canal, and in order to ensure that the Canal shall be kept free and open on terms of entire equality to vessels of commerce and of war, there shall not be, except by special arrangement, at any one time a greater number of vessels of war of any one nation, including those of the Allies of a belligerent nation, than three in either terminal port and its adjacent terminal waters, or than three in transit through the Canal; nor shall the total number of such vessels, at any one time, exceed six in all the territorial waters of the Canal Zone under the jurisdiction of the United States.

Rule 11.—When vessels of war or vessels falling under Rule 2, belonging to or employed by opposing belligerents, are present simultaneously in the waters of the Canal Zone, a period of not less than twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of the vessel belonging to or employed by one belligerent and the departure of the vessel belonging to or employed by his adversary.

The order of departure is determined by order of arrival, unless the vessel which arrived first is so circumstanced that an extension of her stay is permissible.

A vessel of war of a belligerent or vessel falling under Rule 2 may not leave the waters of the Canal Zone until twenty-four hours after the departure of a private vessel flying the flag of the adversary.

Rule 12.—A vessel of war of a belligerent or vessel falling under Rule 2 which has left the waters of the Canal Zone, whether she has passed through the Canal or not, shall, if she returns within a period of one week after her departure, lose all privileges of precedence in departure from the Canal Zone, or in passage through the Canal, over vessels flying the flag of her adversaries which may enter those waters after her return and before the expiration of one week subsequent to her previous departure. In any such case the time of departure of a vessel which has so returned shall be fixed by the Canal Authorities, who may in so doing consider the wishes of the commander of a public vessel or of the master of a private vessel of the adversary of the returned vessel, which adversary's vessel is then present within the waters of the Canal Zone.

Rule 13.—The repair facilities and docks belonging to the United States and administered by the Canal Authorities shall not be used by a vessel of war of a belligerent, or vessels falling under Rule 2, except when necessary in case of actual distress, and then only upon the order of the Canal Authorities, and only to the degree necessary to render the vessel seaworthy. Any work authorised shall be done with the least possible delay.

Rule 14.—The radio installation of any vessel of a belligerent Power, public or private, or of any vessel falling under Rule 2, shall be used only in connection with Canal business to the exclusion of all other business while within the waters of the Canal Zone, including the waters of Colon and Panama Harbours.

Rule 15.—Aircraft of a belligerent Power, public or private, are forbidden to descend or arise within the jurisdiction of the United States at the Canal Zone, or to pass through the air spaces above the lands and waters within said jurisdiction.

Rule 16.—For the purpose of these rules the Canal Zone includes the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbours adjacent to the said cities.

84.—*Ratings serving Abroad—Method of Payment*

In view of the difficulty of arranging for the regular payment of Naval ratings serving in France and Belgium it has been decided that every man on proceeding for service abroad is to be supplied with a Sailor's Pocket Book, in order that advances of pay may be obtained as required from any Accountant Officer who may be available. Each book should give the man's full name, rating, official number, depot or ship where borne for pay, and the net rate of advance which may be paid, after allowing for allotment, insurance and any other charges. The state of the account at the time of despatch should also be indicated. The men's accounts should remain open on the books of their ship or depot, and be adjusted quarterly by making the necessary charges for allotments, etc., and for such advances of pay as are reported to have been made.

When an advance of pay is required by the men of a detachment the Officer in Command will requisition the necessary money from the nearest Accountant Officer, after satisfying himself that the state of the men's accounts will permit of the sums asked for being allowed, and will give his receipt for the total amount. The advance made to each man, together with the date of payment, must be entered in his Pocket Book when the payment takes place, and at the same time the men's receipts must be obtained on Acquittance Rolls, such as are used in the Army for this purpose. These should be handed to the Accountant Officer as the Paying Officer's discharge for the sum received. Extracts therefrom will finally be despatched by the Accountant Officer to the men's ships or depots to be charged in their detailed accounts, and in order to facilitate their prompt despatch the ship or depot (as shown in the Pocket Book) should invariably be stated thereon.

In cases where the Officer in Command of a detachment renders an account to the Admiralty he will himself make advances as required and forward the necessary information to the men's ships, the Pocket Books being noted in the manner indicated.

Supplies of the Pocket Book and Acquittance Rolls are available at the West India Docks, and should at once be

requisitioned for issue of future drafts. Where time permits it is desirable also that the system should be explained to the Officers and Men, who are not at present acquainted with this method of payment.

Steps should also be taken to write up Pocket Books for all ratings already serving on the Continent, and the present state of the account should be shown in each case. They should then be despatched to the Officers in Command of the various detachments, together with a supply of Acquittance Rolls and a copy of this Order.

FEBRUARY 1915

NOTICE OF THE GERMAN ADMIRAL STAFF CONCERNING NAVIGATION ON THE FRENCH COAST

The *Reichs-und-Staatsanzeiger* publishes the following official notice: *K.D.*

Berlin, February 1, 1915.

NOTICE.

England is about to transport numerous troops and large quantities of war supplies to France. All military means at our disposal will be employed against these transports. Peaceful shipping is strongly warned against approaching the northern and western coasts of France, where it might be mistaken for vessels engaged in warlike operations and thus become exposed to grave danger. Merchant vessels proceeding to the North Sea are recommended to use the route round Scotland.

The Chief of the Admiral Staff,

V. POHL.

GERMAN SUBMARINE ATTACKED BY H.M.S. *VANDUARA*

Admiralty, March 12.

H.M.S. *Vanduara* (auxiliary armed vessel) engaged a German submarine in the Irish Sea on the 1st February. *Times*, March 13, 1915.

The German Government allege that she did not show her colours before firing. The Commanding Officer of the *Vanduara*, however, reported at the time, 'I was flying no colours, but hoisted white ensign before opening fire.'

As fire was opened at about 3000 yards, and the yacht

altered course to bring her bows on to the submarine, which submerged when she was still 2000 yards away, it is clear that there could have been no justification for any positive statement on the part of the officer of the submarine.

MR. CHURCHILL ON THE ALLIED FLEETS

Times, Feb. 3, 1915.

The *Matin* publishes the following interview which its special correspondent in London has had with the First Lord of the Admiralty :—

The aim of my interview may be summed up in the following question which I asked Mr. Churchill : 'What has been the combined effort of the British and French Fleets ?' The First Lord replied : 'The action of the Navy is necessarily slow. The pressure exercised on the adversary never ceases. While the Germans remain under cover, they have a great advantage over us. Take, for example, their submarines, of which they never cease to speak. We have more than they, but how can we send ours against theirs ? Submarines do not fight each other. Any single submarine of theirs which leaves harbour can naturally do more work than ten British submarines, which cannot find a single German ship to attack. It is easy to lose, either by submarine attacks or by mines, a battleship which has cost millions, not to speak of the lives on board. It is, therefore, necessary to act with prudence when, unlike the Germans, one is not hiding in port, but continually exposed on the high seas.

'Let us recapitulate the work of our Navy since the opening of hostilities. Do you know how many German warships are still at large ? Two cruisers, the *Karlsruhe* and the *Dresden*, and two auxiliary cruisers, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* and the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. This is the first time that Great Britain can say in war that the seas are free. When we were fighting with you we never achieved an equal result. Even after Trafalgar things were not the same. Thanks to the freedom of the seas, the whole of Asia is open to us and our Allies. The same can be said of Australia and Africa. That is to say, four-fifths of the world.

'With regard to America, even if we suppose that in South America the Germans have relations and friendships, any help sent from that quarter cannot reach them. As for

the United States, it is possible that public opinion hesitated at the outset. But now Americans know.

'We will know how to take all precautions compatible with the rights of belligerents and the respect of neutral Powers. Our grip on Germany will not cease until she has been crushed, for even if you, France, and our ally, Russia, decided to end the struggle—which is inconceivable—we will continue to fight alone until the end.'

I have been told by our Naval officers that on all occasions when our forces have acted together with the English we have been treated with great gallantry. We have always been given a place of honour in which it was possible for us to distinguish ourselves. I told the First Lord how much we appreciated this in France. He replied:

'Napoleon said "Malta or war." At the beginning of this campaign I spoke to the chiefs of your Navy, and when we had made all necessary arrangements, I said to them: "Malta will be your base. You can consider Malta to be a second Toulon."'

Speaking about the situation on the front, Mr. Churchill concluded:

'All our officers who have been in contact with your Army are unanimous in their opinion. We have an unlimited admiration for the effort made by France and by her Army. You can repeat this to your compatriots.'

THE *ASTURIAS* ATTACKED

Paris, February 2.

An official note issued by the French Ministry of Marine states that at 5 P.M. yesterday, at a point fifteen miles north-north-west of Havre, a German submarine fired a torpedo at the British hospital ship *Asturias*, but missed her. *Times*, Feb. 3, 1915.

This action violates the provisions of The Hague Convention of November 18, 1907.

House of Commons, February 3, 1915.

LORD ROBERT CECIL: Can the Under-Secretary of State for War give us any information about the attempt on the *Hansard.*

Asturias, the hospital ship; is he aware that the ship is so painted as to make it absolutely impossible that any mistake as to its character could have occurred; and do the Government propose to make any representations to the neutral nations on the subject of this gross violation of international law?

MR. TENNANT: I have received by courtesy of the noble Lord, notice of this question and I have made inquiries at the War Office, but we have no official information there. I have put myself in communication with the Admiralty, and I understand that a telegram has been received at the Admiralty. Perhaps the noble Lord will address his question to the Admiralty.

LORD ROBERT CECIL: Then perhaps I may be allowed to put the question to the representative of the Admiralty?

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA): Perhaps the noble Lord will raise the matter on the Motion for the Adjournment.

LORD ROBERT CECIL: I will.

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA): We received a message advising us that a submarine, with conning towers showing, fired a torpedo at the *Asturias* at five o'clock in the afternoon of the first. Happily, it missed her. She was painted white, with a green band, and red crosses, which were illuminated. I understand she was notified as a hospital ship to the belligerents by the War Office, in accordance with the Convention signed at The Hague on 18th October 1907.[1] Among those Conventions was a Convention for 'the adaptation of the principles of the Geneva Convention to maritime war.' Those who concluded it were 'animated alike by the desire to diminish, as far as depends on them, the inevitable evils of war; and wishing with this object to adapt to maritime war the principles of the Geneva Convention of the 6th July 1906, have resolved to conclude a Convention for the purpose of revising the Convention of the 29th July, 1899, relative to this question, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say—' Then follow the names of the plenipotentiaries, 'who, after having deposited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions.' I should like to read

[1] [*See Naval* 1, pp. 414-21.]

the first article. It is interesting to note that in the list of names of those who are so animated the first name I read is 'His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia.' Article 1 reads as follows:—'Military hospital ships, that is to say, ships constructed or adapted by States for the particular and sole purpose of aiding the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked, the names of which have been communicated to the belligerent Powers at the commencement or during the course of hostilities, and in any case before they are employed, shall be respected and may not be captured while hostilities last. Such ships, moreover, are not on the same footing as warships as regards their stay in a neutral port.' With regard to the point as to representation made by the noble Lord [Lord R. Cecil] I will of course notify his suggestion to the Foreign Office. But this much is certain, that the civilised world will need no representation of ours to enhance its sense of horror at this wanton outrage.

The Secretary of the Admiralty issues the following statements made by the master and officers of the hospital ship *Asturias*:— *Times*, Feb. 13, 1915.

Captain's Statement, Hospital Ship 'Asturias,' Havre, February 2, 1915

At 4.15 P.M. on the 1st February, with the P.M.O., I inspected ship, finishing at 5 P.M. Going towards the bridge from the main saloon, Mr. Fletcher, cadet, reported to me torpedo just fired at us passing astern. I at once went on the bridge, and upon the Second Officer confirming the statement that he observed the wash of a submarine two points on the starboard beam, I at once starboarded 3½ points, sending down to the engine-room instructions to give the ship all steam possible. After that until passing the lightship I made a zigzag course.

Seeing a French destroyer on my port quarter, also one on my port bow, I sent a wireless message that a torpedo had been fired at me and missed; there was also a fishing boat in the vicinity of the French destroyer on my port quarter.

Apart from the testimony of my officers, a number of people on board not only saw the course of the torpedo, but also observed the submarine following in our wake. It was a very light and clear evening, and at 5.15 broad daylight, and in no possibility could the character of the ship be mistaken.

CHARLES LAW, *Master.*

Statement of Mr. Thomson, Second Officer, Hospital Ship 'Asturias,' Havre, February 2, 1915

At 5 P.M. on the 1st February, whilst in charge of the bridge, the ship being N.N.W., fifteen miles from Havre lightship, I observed a smooth in the water about two points abaft the starboard beam 500 yards away; about 150 feet from this smooth I distinctly observed the track of a torpedo, which passed us close under our stern.

On observing the torpedo I immediately called the attention of Cadet Mr. Fletcher, who was on watch with me, and instructed him to inform the Commander, who arrived immediately and starboarded 3½ points, at the same time ordering all steam. I was then relieved by the Chief Officer.

A. N. THOMSON, *Second Officer.*

Statement of Mr. Fraser, Third Officer, Hospital Ship 'Asturias'

A few minutes after 5 P.M., on hearing that a torpedo had been fired at the ship, I took my glasses and went aft and could distinctly see the wash of the periscope of a submarine following astern until about 5.30, when he appeared to sheer off to starboard. Two French destroyers were active on each quarter following us into shoal water. There were a number of R.A.M.C. officers with me, who also saw the submarine.

J. W. FRASER, *Third Officer.*

Statement of Mr. Fletcher, Cadet, Hospital Ship 'Asturias,' February 2, 1915

Whilst on watch with the second officer on February 1 at 5 P.M. we had just sighted Cape La Hève twenty-one miles off, and I was laying off a bearing in the wheel-house, the

Second Officer called to me: 'Come at once, a torpedo has been fired at us.' I observed a smooth on the water about two points abaft the starboard beam, and a track of a torpedo about thirty yards from it travelling towards the ship, and I could distinctly see the track passing astern. I at once went to the captain to report, whom I met coming towards the bridge, and reported same.

E. I. FLETCHER, *Cadet.*

Statement of Mr. Youlten, Cadet, Hospital Ship 'Asturias,' Havre, February 2, 1915

Hearing that a torpedo had been fired at us I ran on deck and saw a periscope of a submarine on the starboard quarter. I then went aft and could distinctly see the wash of a periscope in our own wash slightly on the starboard quarter. At 5.25 I lost sight of it; we were increasing our distance all the time. I had no glasses with me.

BASIL A. H. YOULTEN, *Cadet.*

Washington, March 7.

The German Embassy publishes a remarkable admission of the attack on the hospital ship *Asturias* off Havre, evidently received in a cablegram from Berlin. It runs as follows :— *Times*, March 8. 1915.

'The Government is sorry to admit that the *Asturias* was attacked on February 1, at 5 P.M. Looming up in the twilight, carrying the lights prescribed for ordinary steamers, the *Asturias* was taken for a transport carrying troops. The distinctive marks showing the character of the ship not being illuminated, they were only recognised after a shot had been fired. Fortunately the torpedo failed to explode, and the moment the ship was recognised as a hospital ship every attempt at further attack was immediately given up.

The following correspondence has passed between Lord Robert Cecil, M.P., on behalf of the British Red Cross and St. John's Ambulance, and Dr. T. J. Macnamara, M.P., Secretary *Times*, Apr. 9. 1915.

to the Admiralty, with reference to the attempt on the part of a German submarine to torpedo the hospital ship *Asturias* in the Channel on February 1 :—

March 23, 1915.

DEAR MACNAMARA,—On February 5 the British Red Cross Society protested to the International Comité of the Red Cross at Geneva against the attempt to torpedo the *Asturias*. I send you a copy of the protest, which was signed by Lord Lansdowne, the Hon. Arthur Stanley, and myself.

You will remember that something was said about the matter in Parliament, and later on there was a report in the newspapers that the German Government had made some communication to the American Embassy at Washington, admitting and regretting the incident, and giving a very inadequate excuse that the *Asturias* was not recognised as a hospital ship.

We have now received a letter from the International Comité (copy of which I enclose), asking in what form the excuses have been offered by Germany, and whether she admits that the attempted torpedoing of the ship was a violation of The Hague Convention.

Before replying to it, this Society would be very glad to be quite sure that the facts as originally understood are in all respects accurate. We should also like to know whether the Americans have had official expression of regret by the German Government.—Yours very truly, ROBERT CECIL.

DEAR LORD ROBERT,—In reply to your letter of the 23rd inst., I send you copies of the Official Debates for February 3 (columns 89-91) and March 10 (columns 1,363 and 1,364). These I think give the references to the matter in Parliament.

I am not aware as to whether there has been any official expression of regret from the German Government, but you will remember that in the newspapers of March 8 a statement appeared as having been issued by the German Embassy at Washington, as follows :— [For text see previous page.]

As regards the statement that the *Asturias* was 'carrying the lights prescribed for ordinary steamers,' the testimony of the captain is that it was broad daylight ; that no lights were therefore showing ; that in no possibility could the character

of the ship be mistaken; and that Cap la Hève was visible twenty-one miles away.

As I told you on February 3 the vessel was painted white with a green band and red crosses. She was also at the time flying the Red Cross flag. You will no doubt remember that I spoke of the Red Crosses on her sides as being illuminated. They were not, I find, actually illuminated at that moment, because as I have already stated it was broad daylight. The Red Crosses have always been illuminated and reported at the same time as the mast head lights and side lights.—Very faithfully yours, T. J. MACNAMARA.

TURKISH ACCOUNT OF A SKIRMISH NEAR KURNA

Constantinople.—General Headquarters reports :—

In the region of Kurna a small party surprised two enemy battalions entrenched behind barbed wire during the night of January 30, and inflicted considerable losses on them. On the following day the enemy attempted to land in the neighbourhood under cover of gunboats, but was thrown back, leaving behind numerous killed, among whom were a captain and a non-commissioned officer. *K.V.*, Feb. 2, 1915.

ALLEGED SECRET ORDER OF THE ADMIRALTY RELATING TO THE HOISTING OF NEUTRAL COLOURS

Berlin.—According to a trustworthy source the following secret order of the English Admiralty has become known: *K.V.*, Feb. 2, 1915.

Owing to the appearance of German submarines in the English and Irish Channels all English merchant ships are at once to hoist neutral flags and to cover all distinctive marks such as port mark, name, etc. House flags are not to be carried. This order is to be kept secret.

Foreign Office, February 7.

Times, Feb. 8, 1915.

The use of the neutral flag is, with certain limitations, well established in practice as a *ruse de guerre*.

The only effect in the case of a merchantman of wearing a flag other than her national flag is to compel the enemy to follow the ordinary obligations of naval warfare, and to satisfy himself as to the nationality of the vessel and of the character of her cargo by examination before capturing her and taking her into a Prize Court for adjudication.

The British Government has always considered the use of British colours by a foreign vessel legitimate for the purpose of escaping capture. Such a practice not only involves no breach of international law, but is specifically recognised by the law of this country.

In the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, it is enacted (Sec. 69 (1)) as follows :—

'If a person uses the British flag and assumes the British national character on board a ship owned in whole or in part by any persons not qualified to own a British ship, for the purpose of making the ship appear to be a British ship, the ship shall be subject to forfeiture under this Act, *unless the assumption has been made for the purpose of escaping capture by an enemy or by a foreign ship of war in the exercise of some belligerent right.* And in the instructions to British Consuls, 1914, it is stated 'a ship is liable to capture if British character is improperly assumed except for the purpose of escaping capture.' As we have in practice not objected to foreign merchant vessels using the British merchant flag as a ruse for the purpose of evading capture at sea at the hands of a belligerent, so we should maintain that in the converse case a British merchant vessel committed no breach of international law in assuming neutral colours for a similar purpose, if she thought fit to do so.

By the rules of international law, the customs of war and the dictates of humanity, it is obligatory upon a belligerent to ascertain the character of a merchant vessel and of her cargo before capture. Germany has no right to disregard this obligation. To destroy ship, non-combatant crew, and cargo, as Germany has announced her intention of doing, is nothing less than an act of piracy on the high seas.

London, February 8, 1915.

A Reuter telegram announces that passengers in the *Lusitania*, which reached Liverpool early yesterday morning, declare that, as the ship was approaching the Irish coast, a wireless telegram reached her from the Admiralty to the effect that she should hoist the American flag. Accordingly the ship sailed under American colours to Liverpool. *K.V.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 10, 1915.

AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, *London*:

The Department has been advised of the Declaration of the German Admiralty on February fourth, indicating that the British Government had on January thirty-first explicitly authorised the use of neutral flags on British merchant vessels presumably for the purpose of avoiding recognition by German naval forces. The Department's attention has also been directed to reports in the press that the captain of the *Lusitania*, acting upon orders or information received from the British authorities, raised the American flag as his vessel approached the British coasts, in order to escape anticipated attacks by German submarines. To-day's press reports also contain an alleged official statement of the Foreign Office defending the use of the flag of a neutral country by a belligerent vessel in order to escape capture or attack by an enemy. *U.S.D.C.*

Assuming that the foregoing reports are true the Government of the United States, reserving for future consideration the legality and propriety of the deceptive use of the flag of a neutral power in any case for the purpose of avoiding capture, desires very respectfully to point out to His Britannic Majesty's Government the serious consequences which may result to American vessels and American citizens if this practice is continued.

The occasional use of the flag of a neutral or an enemy under the stress of immediate pursuit and to deceive an approaching enemy, which appears by the press reports to be represented as the precedent and justification used to support this action, seems to this Government a very different

thing from an explicit sanction by a belligerent government for its merchant ships generally to fly the flag of a neutral power within certain portions of the high seas which are presumed to be frequented with hostile warships. The formal declaration of such a policy of general misuse of a neutral's flag jeopardises the vessels of the neutral visiting those waters in a peculiar degree by raising the presumption that they are of belligerent nationality regardless of the flag which they may carry.

In view of the announced purpose of the German Admiralty to engage in active naval operations in certain delimited sea areas adjacent to the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland, the Government of the United States would view with anxious solicitude any general use of the flag of the United States by British vessels traversing those waters. A policy such as the one which His Majesty's Government is said to intend to adopt, would, if the declaration of the German Admiralty is put in force, it seems clear, afford no protection to British vessels, while it would be a serious and constant menace to the lives and vessels of American citizens.

The Government of the United States, therefore, trusts that His Majesty's Government will do all in their power to restrain vessels of British nationality from the deceptive use of the flag of the United States in the sea area defined in the German declaration, since such practice would greatly endanger the vessels of a friendly power navigating those waters and would even seem to impose upon the Government of Great Britain a measure of responsibility for the loss of American lives and vessels in case of an attack by a German naval force.

Please present a note to Sir Edward Grey in the sense of the foregoing and impress him with the grave concern which this Government feels in the circumstances in regard to the safety of American vessels and lives in the war zone declared by the German Admiralty.

You may add that this Government is making earnest representations to the German Government in regard to the danger to American vessels and citizens if the declaration of the German Admiralty is put into effect.

BRYAN.

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
London, February 19, 1915.

Sir Edward Grey has just handed me the following memorandum since your telegram to him was given to the press in Washington. I consented to his proposal to give this memorandum out for publication in Saturday morning newspapers. 'The memorandum communicated on the 11th February calls attention in courteous and friendly terms to the action of the captain of the British S.S. *Lusitania* in raising the flag of the United States of America when approaching British waters, and says that the Government of the United States feel a certain anxiety in considering the possibility of any general use of the flag of the United States by British vessels traversing those waters since the effect of such a policy might be to bring about a menace to the lives and vessels of United States citizens. *U.S.D.C.*

'It was understood that the German Government had announced their intention of sinking British merchant vessels at sight by torpedoes without giving any opportunity of making any provision for saving the lives of non-combatant crews and passengers. It was in consequence of this threat that the *Lusitania* raised the United States flag on her inward voyage and on her subsequent outward voyage. A request was made by the United States passengers who were embarking on board her that the United States flag should be hoisted presumably to ensure their safety. Meanwhile the memorandum from your Excellency had been received. His Majesty's Government did not give any advice to the company as to how to meet this request, and it is understood that the *Lusitania* left Liverpool under the British flag.

'It seems unnecessary to say more as regards the *Lusitania* in particular in regard to the use of foreign flags by merchant vessels. The British Merchant Shipping Act makes it clear that the use of the British flag by foreign merchant vessels is permitted in time of war for the purpose of escaping capture. It is believed that in the case of some other nations there is a similar recognition of the same practice with regard to their flags and that none have forbidden it. It would

therefore be unreasonable to expect His Majesty's Government to pass legislation forbidding the use of foreign flags by British merchant vessels to avoid capture by the enemy. Now that the German Government have announced their intention to sink merchant vessels at sight with their non-combatant crews, cargoes and papers, a proceeding hitherto regarded by the opinion of the world not as war, but as piracy, it is felt that the United States Government could not fairly ask the British Government to order British merchant vessels to forgo the means—always hitherto permitted—of escaping not only capture but the much worse fate of sinking and destruction. Great Britain has always when neutral accorded to the vessels of other States at war, liberty to use the British flag as a means of protection against capture, and instances are on record when United States vessels availed themselves of this facility during the American Civil War. It would be contrary to fair expectation if now when the conditions are reversed, the United States and neutral nations were to grudge to British ships liberty to take similar action. The British Government have no intention of advising their merchant shipping to use foreign flags as general practice or to resort to them otherwise than for escaping capture or destruction.

'The obligation upon a belligerent warship to ascertain definitely for itself the nationality and character of a merchant vessel before capturing it, and *a fortiori* before sinking and destroying it, has been universally recognised. If that obligation is fulfilled, hoisting a neutral flag on board a British vessel cannot possibly endanger neutral shipping, and the British Government hold that if loss to neutrals is caused by disregard of this obligation it is upon the enemy vessel disregarding it and upon the Government giving orders that it should be disregarded that the sole responsibility for injury to neutrals ought to rest.'

AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, *London.*

PAY, PENSIONS, AND ALLOWANCES TO VARIOUS CLASSES OF NAVAL OFFICERS

At the Court at *Buckingham Palace*, the 3rd day of February 1915. *L.G.*, Feb. 9, 1915.

Present—

The KING'S Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

WHEREAS there was this day read at the Board a Memorial from the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 29th day of January 1915, in the words following, viz. :—

'Whereas by Section 3 of the Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865, it is enacted, *inter alia*, that all pay, pensions, or other allowances in the nature thereof, payable in respect of services in your Majesty's Naval or Marine Force to a person being or having been an Officer, Seaman, or Marine therein, shall be paid in such manner, and subject to such restrictions, conditions, and provisions, as are from time to time directed by Order in Council :

'And Whereas by Orders in Council dated the 8th March 1895, and the 5th March 1910, provision is made for the payment to Officers called into active service from the Reserved or Retired Lists in time of war or emergency of the pay and emoluments of their corresponding Ranks on the Active List, together with a bonus of twenty-five per cent. for every pound of the full pay earned by them, exclusive of allowances :

'And Whereas this arrangement is found to be inequitable in cases where an Officer's retired pay exceeds the full pay of his corresponding Rank on the Active List :

'We beg leave humbly to recommend that your Majesty may be graciously pleased, by your Order in Council, to authorise the continued payment of retired pay to Officers on the Reserved or Retired Lists called into active service in time of war or emergency, including the present hostilities, in cases where such retired pay exceeds the full pay of their corresponding Ranks on the

Active List, together with a bonus of twenty-five per cent. for every pound of retired pay received by them during the period of re-employment, exclusive of allowances.

'The Lords Commissioners of your Majesty's Treasury have signified their concurrence in this proposal.'

His Majesty, having taken the said Memorial into consideration, was pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed. And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

L.G., Feb. 9, 1915.

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'And Whereas we consider it desirable that improvements should be made in the scales of pay, and in the conditions governing half pay, applicable to certain ranks of Officers of your Majesty's Navy and Royal Marines :

'We beg leave humbly to recommend that your Majesty may be graciously pleased, by your Order in Council, to sanction the proposals set forth in the annexed Schedule, with effect as from the 1st January 1915.

'The Lords Commissioners of your Majesty's Treasury have signified their concurrence in these proposals.

'SCHEDULE.

'REVISED RATES OF PAY FOR CERTAIN RANKS.

'Officers, Royal Navy.

	Present.	Proposed.
	A day.	A day.
	s. *d.*	*s.* *d.*
'Lieutenant, R.N., on promotion . . .	10 0	11 0
,, ,, after 4 years	11 0	12 0
'Sub-Lieutenant	5 0	7 6
'Assistant Paymaster on promotion . . .	5 0	7 6
,, ,, after 2 years . .	7 0	7 6

'NOTE.—The above rates of pay to apply to Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants, R.N.R. and R.N.V.R., and to Assistant Paymasters, R.N.V.R., except Assistant Paymasters, R.N.V.R. serving in the Royal Naval Division who receive 10s. a day under Order in Council of 17th December 1914.

'Royal Marine Officers entered prior to 1st January 1912.

	Present.	Proposed.
	A day.	A day.
	s. *d.*	*s.* *d.*
'Lieutenant, R.M.A. or R.M.L.I., after 3 yrs. R.M.A.	7 5	8 6
R.M.L.I.	7 0	8 6
,, ,, ,, after 6 yrs., both	9 0	10 0

'NOTE.—Afloat pay in both cases to be the same as shore pay.

	Present.	Proposed.
	A day.	A day.
	s. *d.*	*s.* *d.*
'Captain, R.M.A. or R.M.L.I., under 1 yr., R.M.A.	12 1	12 6.
R.M.L.I.	11 7	12 6
,, ,, ,, after 1 yr., R.M.A.	12 7	12 6
R.M.L.I.	12 1	12 6

'NOTE.—Afloat pay to be 12s. 6d. a day under 1 year, and 13s. a day over 1 year, as at present. Captains now in receipt of the rate of 12s. 7d. a day to retain it.

'*Royal Marine Officers entered after 1st January 1912.*

	Present.	Proposed.
	A day.	A day.
	s. *d.*	*s.* *d.*
'Probationary 2nd Lieutenants, after 2 years .	6 0	7 6
'Lieutenants, R.M., on promotion . . .	10 0	11 0
'Captains, R.M., on promotion . . .	12 0	12 6

'*Quartermasters, R.M.*

	Present.		Proposed.	
	R.M.A.	R.M.L.I.	R.M.A.	R.M.L.I.
	A day.	A day.	A day.	A day.
	s. *d.*	*s.* *d.*	*s.* *d.*	*s.* *d.*
'Quartermasters, R.M., on appointment	9 6	9 0	10 6	10 0
after 5 years .	11 0	10 6	12 0	11 6
,, 10 ,, .	12 6	12 0	13 6	13 0
,, 15 ,, .	14 0	13 6	15 0	14 6
,, 20 ,, .	15 6	15 0	16 6	16 0

'*Half Pay.*

'Half pay for less than a month to be abolished for all Officers below the rank or relative rank of Captain, Royal Navy, except in case of prolonged sickness, for misconduct, or at an Officer's own request. This concession to apply also, under similar conditions, to Officers on the Retired, Reserved and Emergency Lists when re-employed.'

His Majesty, having taken the said Memorial into consideration, was pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed. And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

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WHEREAS there was this day read at the Board a Memorial from the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 29th day of January 1915, in the words following, viz. :—

'Whereas by Section 3 of the Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865, it is enacted, *inter alia*, that all pay, pensions, or other allowances in the nature thereof, payable in respect of services in your Majesty's Naval or Marine Force to a person being or having been an Officer, Seaman, or Marine therein, shall be paid in such manner, and subject to such restrictions, conditions, and provisions, as are from time to time directed by Order in Council :

'And Whereas the highest rate of pay for Lieutenant-Commanders entered as Lieutenants or Sub-Lieutenants on the Supplementary List of your Majesty's Navy under Orders in Council bearing dates the 29th June 1895, and 9th August 1898, is 14s. a day (in addition to Messing Allowance of 2s. a day), being the highest rate in force for Lieutenants, Royal Navy, at the time of the above-mentioned Orders in Council :

'And Whereas the highest rate of pay for Lieutenant-Commanders is now 16s. a day, this rate being payable after 6 years' seniority as Lieutenant-Commander :

'We beg leave humbly to recommend that your Majesty may be graciously pleased, by your Order in Council, to sanction the payment of full pay at the rate of 16s. a day (in addition to Messing Allowance of 2s. a day) to Lieutenant-Commanders of 6 years' seniority entered on the Supplementary List under the above-mentioned Orders in Council, to take effect from the 1st January 1915.

'The Lords Commissioners of your Majesty's Treasury have signified their concurrence in this proposal.'

His Majesty, having taken the said Memorial into consideration, was pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed. And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

L.G., Feb. 9, 1915.

At the Court at *Buckingham Palace*, the 3rd day of February 1915.

Present—

The KING'S Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

WHEREAS there was this day read at the Board a Memorial from the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 27th day of January 1915, in the words following, viz. :—

'Whereas by Section 3 of the Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865, it is enacted, *inter alia*, that all pay, pensions, or other allowances in the nature thereof, payable in respect of services in your Majesty's Naval or Marine Force to a person being or having been an Officer, Seaman, or Marine therein, shall be paid in such manner, and subject to such restrictions, conditions, and provisions as are from time to time directed by Order in Council :

'And Whereas we consider it desirable that the Officer appointed for Wireless Telegraphy duties at Gibraltar should receive an allowance of 1s. a day for travelling expenses :

'We beg leave humbly to recommend that your Majesty may be graciously pleased, by your Order in Council, to sanction the grant of this allowance, with effect as from the 4th August 1914.

'The Lords Commissioners of your Majesty's Treasury have signified their concurrence in this proposal.'

His Majesty, having taken the said Memorial into consideration, was pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed. And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

At the Court at *Buckingham Palace*, the 3rd day of February 1915. *L.G.*, Feb. 9, 1915.

Present—

The KING'S Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

WHEREAS there was this day read at the Board a Memorial from the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 25th day of January 1915, in the words following, viz. :—

'Whereas by Section 3 of the Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865, it is enacted, *inter alia*, that all pay, pensions, or other allowances in the nature thereof, payable in respect of services in your Majesty's Naval or Marine Force to a person being or having been an Officer, Seaman, or Marine therein, shall be paid in such manner, and subject to such restrictions, conditions, and provisions, as are from time to time directed by Order in Council :

'And Whereas by your Majesty's Orders in Council, dated the 19th day of July 1912, and the 21st day of January 1914, provision is made for the payment of a Uniform Allowance of £50 to Acting Mates and Acting Mates (E) respectively, on passing a qualifying examination, and being confirmed :

'And Whereas the existing state of hostilities has rendered it necessary to employ Acting Mates and Acting Mates (E) as Mates and Mates (E) respectively without completing the usual course of training, and being confirmed in rank :

'And Whereas we are of opinion that in these circumstances the usual Uniform Allowance granted on confirmation should nevertheless be paid :

'We beg leave humbly to recommend that your Majesty may be graciously pleased, by your Order in Council, to sanction the payment, during the period of hostilities, of the usual Uniform Allowance of £50 to Acting Mates and Acting Mates (E) employed in the performance of duty as Mates and Mates (E) respectively prior to confirmation.

'The Lords Commissioners of your Majesty's Treasury have signified their concurrence in this proposal.'

His Majesty, having taken the said Memorial into consideration, was pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed. And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

ADMIRALTY COURTS-MARTIAL

House of Lords, February 3, 1915.

Hansard. The EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, I beg to ask the noble Marquess the question standing in my name on the paper—namely, whether a court-martial has been held, or whether it is intended to hold a court-martial, in the case of any of His Majesty's ships that have been lost during the present war, and, if so, which?

The MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, the question which the noble Earl has placed on the paper is one which the Admiralty tell me they consider to be of great importance, and they have not been able to-day to collect all the *data* which would enable them to reply to it. The noble Earl's question is simple in itself, but there are questions of policy involved with reference to which it is desirable that the Admiralty should be fully informed as to the various precedents in the past. I have just heard from them that they expect to be in a position to answer the question to-morrow if the noble Earl would like to put it down for that day. There is, I see, a somewhat important subject for discussion to-morrow—the Second Reading of the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act (1914) Amendment Bill, standing in the name of Lord Parmoor. Therefore the noble Earl would perhaps prefer to put his motion down for Tuesday in next week. But if he decides to place it on the paper for to-morrow, I have no reason to suppose that the discussion of Lord Parmoor's Bill will keep us far into the night.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: I do not propose to initiate any debate either in asking the question or on receiving the noble Marquess's answer, and therefore I will put the question down for to-morrow.

House of Lords, February 4, 1915.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, I rise to ask the Lord Privy Seal whether a court-martial has been held, or whether it is intended to hold a court-martial, in the case of any of His Majesty's ships that have been lost during the present war, and, if so, which? *Hansard.*

The LORD PRIVY SEAL and SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (The MARQUESS OF CREWE): My Lords, in reply to the question of the noble Earl I have to inform him that only one court-martial has so far been held in the case of the loss of one of His Majesty's ships—that is, the case of the auxiliary cruiser the *Oceanic*, which ran aground early in September on the coast of Scotland. As regards the intention of holding a court-martial in the case of any other ship, I am afraid I am not in a position to answer that question either in the negative or in the affirmative. The Admiralty are not able to give the noble Earl the information which he desires. I understand that on this occasion the noble Earl does not desire to do what so often happens in the case of questions in our House—namely, to make this the foundation for further discussion.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: Not to-day.

The MARQUESS OF CREWE: I gather that he proposes to do so on some future occasion. It may, therefore, be of some help both to him and to us if I say one or two words upon the general position taken up by the Admiralty. The noble Earl was quite right on a former occasion [1] in stating that the holding of a court-martial in the case of the loss of a ship has been in the past, although not an invariable, yet a general custom in the Navy. It represents, as I understand, rather a custom than a statutory obligation; and it is a custom which, as one looks through the history of the past two hundred years, has somewhat tended to diminish in observance, although its observance has remained general—that is to say, there were very few cases in the eighteenth century when courts-martial were not held, and there were rather more in the course of the nineteenth century in which it was not thought necessary to hold a court-martial. The Admiralty take the view that the conditions of warfare have changed in many respects so fundamentally that more occa-

[1] [*See* P. 54.]

sions may now arise in which it is not necessary to hold a court-martial than was the case previously. Obviously we cannot look into the minds of our predecessors, and what the view of the Board of Admiralty a hundred years ago would have been in the case of a ship sunk by a mine or by a torpedo from a submarine, it is of course entirely impossible to conjecture. The Admiralty regard those changed conditions as in some degree justifying a change of practice. They also in this present war lay emphasis on the fact that the holding of courts-martial during its continuance would in a great number of cases involve the attendance of a number of officers, some of them very prominent, who are importantly engaged elsewhere; and that is a factor which, as the noble Earl will realise, has become more salient in naval warfare as conducted at present than could have been the case in the past.

The general view which the Admiralty take—and this may be of some assistance to the noble Earl in initiating a future discussion—is that, where there is any question of a failure on the part of an officer to obey orders, to act with due sense of responsibility, or to take proper precautions, or in cases in which misbehaviour on the part of a crew or any portion of it is alleged to have led to disaster, it is advisable that a court-martial should be held; but in cases where those considerations do not in any degree arise, speaking generally the Admiralty hold that a court-martial may not be necessary. It is important to remember, however, that there are a number of cases, in their opinion, in which Courts of Inquiry, as distinct from courts-martial, may be held with a view to elucidating the cause, very often the material cause, of particular disasters. And in stating their view that courts-martial may not in every case be necessary, the Admiralty desire to emphasise the difference between those courts and Courts of Inquiry. I do not think that this afternoon there would be any advantage in my pursuing the subject further. Therefore I will leave it there, taking it from the noble Earl that he desires to deal with the subject at some later date.

SUEZ CANAL NOT CLOSED

The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement: *Times*, Feb. 3, 1915.

With reference to reports which have appeared in the Continental Press to the effect that the Suez Canal had been closed, the Suez Canal Company has issued a statement which denies this, saying that the Canal is open to traffic as usual, subject to precautions to ensure the safety of vessels in transit.

TURKISH ATTACK ON SUEZ CANAL

Cairo, February 4, 1915.

An official *communiqué* summarises the events from Tuesday night [February 2] until midnight last night as follows:— *Times*, Feb. 5, 1915.

Toussoum post was attacked at 3 A.M. by the enemy's infantry, and at the same time a determined attempt was made under cover of heavy maxim fire to cross the Canal by means of pontoons and rafts. At daybreak the enemy were seen advancing. Their artillery fired on Toussoum and Serapeum, and was answered by our artillery and the fire from our ships. After a certain amount of fighting, including an advance from Serapeum, the enemy retired at 3.30 P.M.

During the action eight officers and 282 men were made prisoners, and a large number of dead were left lying in front of our position.

H.M.S. *Hardinge* was twice hit by shells, and ten men wounded. Our other losses were two officers and 13 men killed and 58 wounded, of which one officer and two men killed and one wounded belonged to the Egyptian Field Artillery, which gave valuable assistance.

At the Ismailia ferry at daylight the enemy were found entrenching 700 or 800 yards from our posts. Two battalions fired on us with rifles. During the day there was intermittent fire, but no infantry attack, and no casualties on our side.

At El Kantara our outposts were attacked between 5 and 6 A.M. The enemy were driven off, leaving 21 killed and 25 wounded, and 36 unwounded prisoners were left on our hands.

Later there was a partial attack from the south, but the

enemy were checked 1200 yards from our position, and eight more of their dead were found.

Our casualties were one officer slightly wounded, four Indians killed, and 24 wounded.

The total strength of the enemy's forces engaged seems to have numbered at least 12,000 men, with six batteries, but the invasion of Egypt has merely taken the form of Turkish prisoners being brought to Cairo.

The conduct of the troops, British, Indian, and Egyptian, was excellent.

K.D. *Constantinople, February* 6.—The Great General Staff reports :—

Our advanced guards have arrived in the regions east of the Suez Canal, and have driven back the English outposts towards the Canal. Actions which are still proceeding took place at the same time in the neighbourhood of Ismailia and Kantara.

(*Turkish Official*)

Constantinople, February 9.

The Ottoman army charged to deliver Egypt, by the grace of the Most High, approached the Suez Canal and the four British men-of-war which were there. It sank one, burned the other, damaged the third, and obliged the fourth to take to flight. A fifth British man-of-war anchored in a fright in the Suez Canal.—*Reuter.*

K.D. *Constantinople, February* 9.—Headquarters reported yesterday as follows :—

The advanced guard of our army operating against Egypt has carried out a successful reconnoitring march through the desert, driven back the advanced posts of the English towards the Canal, and even crossed the Suez Canal with a few companies of infantry between Toussoum and Serapeum. In spite of the fire of the English cruisers and armoured trains, our troops kept the enemy busily occupied during the whole of the day, and took a full survey of his means of defence. An English cruiser was seriously damaged by our gun fire. Our advanced guard will

maintain contact with the enemy and provide an intelligence service on the eastern bank of the Canal until our main force can advance to the attack.

A part of our fleet has bombarded Yalta with good effect, and in another place sunk a Russian ship.

In the course of the attempted attack on the Suez Canal by the Turkish Army on February 3, the two French warships *Requin* and *D'Entrecasteaux* successfully contributed to the defence of the Canal. The coast defence vessel *Requin* silenced the big Turkish guns and the cruiser *D'Entrecasteaux* dispersed an important group of the enemy. Neither vessel suffered any damage. *C.O.*, Feb. 15, 1915.

NOTICE TO MARINERS

(No. 84 of the year 1915)

ENGLAND—EAST COAST

River Humber—Pilotage

Mariners are hereby warned that, under the Defence of the Realm Regulations, 1914, the following instructions, respecting Pilotage of the River Humber, are now in force :— *L.G.*, Feb. 4, 1915.

Until further notice, the Outer Pilot Station of the Humber Pilotage District will be in the neighbourhood of the Bull Light-vessel.

All vessels, irrespective of draught, size and nationality, bound to or from any place above Grimsby must be conducted by licensed Pilots over the whole or any part of the waters between Hull and the Outer Pilot Station.

In the cases of British vessels employed in the Coasting Trade of the United Kingdom, of British fishing vessels, and of British vessels of less than six feet draught of water, if bound between Grimsby and the sea, pilotage by licensed pilots will not be insisted upon.

When the Humber is closed to navigation, inward bound vessels must anchor in the neighbourhood of the Outer Pilot

Station, and wait there until navigation is reopened, and pilots, when necessary, are available.

Authority.—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

By Command of their Lordships,

J. F. PARRY, *Hydrographer.*

Hydrographic Department, Admiralty,
London, 4th February 1915.

DUTCH RIGHTS IN RHINE WATERS

House of Commons, February 4, 1915.

Hansard. MR. BIGLAND asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether he has information showing that prior to the outbreak of the war the Dutch Government had ceded to the German Government the Dutch rights in the waters of the Rhine; and, if so, whether he will state the view of the British Government as to the effect of this treaty on the position of Holland as a neutral in the present war?

SIR E. GREY: The free navigation of the Rhine has been secured by three treaties: by Annex 16 of the Act of the Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815; by the Treaty of March 31, 1831, between Baden, Bavaria, France, Hesse, Nassau, the Netherlands, and Prussia; and by the Treaty of October 17, 1868, between France, Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, the Netherlands, and Prussia. These conventions are published in the *State Papers*. His Majesty's Government are aware of no other agreement affecting the rights of the riverain Powers.

MIDSHIPMEN ON ACTIVE SERVICE

ibid. SIR WILLIAM BULL asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, having regard to the fact that midshipmen in war-time work just as hard as any other members of the ship's company, and having regard to the reduction in the peoples' income at the present time and to the concessions of free kit granted to military cadets by the War Office, he will consider the possibility of the State provision of the compulsory minimum of £50 a year pocket-money which is at present demanded from and paid by the parents of midshipmen on active service?

DR. MACNAMARA: I regret that I do not see my way to recommending a general remission of the private allowance payable on behalf of midshipmen, but where real necessity exists the Board of Admiralty is prepared to give favourable consideration to applications for whole or partial relief.

COAST PATROL

MR. CATHCART WASON asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he can state the number of trawlers or steam drifters employed by the Admiralty in patrolling our coasts; and whether, in view of the recent destruction of inoffensive merchantmen, he will consider the expediency of enlisting the services of a large number of such ships for the better protection of our commerce and for the destruction of submarines and aircraft? *ibid.*

DR. MACNAMARA: As regards the first part of the question, it is not in the public interest to give the information desired. As regards the second part, the Admiralty have always before them the importance of providing all possible protection for our commerce, and of taking all legitimate means of destroying hostile submarines and aircraft, and they adopt every measure which appears useful towards these ends.

NAVAL OPERATIONS

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the Fleet of which the *Formidable* was one was cruising without attendant destroyers, and, if so, why; and whether this was the first occasion on which they had so cruised under a new admiral? *ibid.*

MR. CHURCHILL: I cannot undertake to discuss the conduct of naval operations during the progress of the war.

NAVAL DEFENCE FOR CONVOYS

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, having regard to the fact that merchant vessels of slow speed have been destroyed by submarines, the Admiralty will provide naval defence for convoys in order to minimise the danger? *ibid.*

MR. CHURCHILL: Sir, all these matters receive careful attention in the proper quarters.

THE *WILHELMINA'S* CARGO

Washington, February 4.

Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, acting on instructions from his Government, has suggested to the State Department that an American Consul should supervise the distribution of foodstuffs on the steamer *Wilhelmina* so as to ensure that they go to German civilians alone.—*Reuter.*

Times, Feb. 5, 1915.

The following statement is issued by the Foreign Office :—

The new German decree[1] makes it evident that all grain and flour is to pass under the control of the German Government, and must, therefore, when imported be regarded as virtually consigned to the German Government or to authorities under their control.

[1] [*See* p. 130.]

This creates a novel situation, and it is probable that if the destination and cargo of the *Wilhelmina* are as supposed, the cargo will, if the vessel is intercepted, be submitted to a Prize Court in order that the new situation created by the German decree may be examined and a decision reached upon it after full consideration.

There is no question of taking any proceedings against the vessel, and the owners of the vessel will be indemnified for any delay caused to it, and the shippers of the cargo compensated for any loss caused to them by the action of the British authorities.

There is no truth whatever in the statement made in the Press that it has been decided that other such consignments will be seized, together with the vessels, without compensation to neutrals, for no decision has yet been taken to depart from previously existing rules or practice.

The apparent intention, however, of the German Government to sink merchant ships by submarine without bringing them into port or providing accommodation for their crews, and regardless of loss of civilian lives, and the attempt to effect this even against a hospital ship, has raised very seriously the question whether Great Britain should adopt in retaliation more stringent measures against German trade. It is recognised that when any such decision to this effect is

reached, due care must be taken not to inflict loss upon neutral ships which have sailed before any warning has been given or the decision announced.

A telegram from our correspondent at Falmouth states that the cargo of the *Wilhelmina* has been seized, and will be brought before a Prize Court. *Times*, Feb. 12, 1915

It is stated the vessel has received orders for a port in the Bristol Channel. It is not known when she will sail.

The *Wilhelmina* is an American vessel on a voyage from New York to Hamburg with a cargo of food shipped by an American firm, and consigned to an American citizen in Germany. The shippers stated that the food was intended for civilians in Germany, and not for military purposes. After the vessel had cleared from New York the German Government promulgated a decree by which flour and corn were taken under official control.

Washington, February 11.

The State Department has decided that the *Wilhelmina* case must be allowed to go to the Prize Court, because of the contention raised that the German decree appropriating the grain supply justifies the seizure. The owners of the cargo, and perhaps the *Wilhelmina's* owners also, will be represented by counsel. The American Ambassador will be instructed to watch the progress of the case.—*Reuter.*

House of Commons, February 15, 1915.

SIR JOHN LONSDALE asked if any decision has been arrived at with regard to the cargo of the steamship *Wilhelmina*? *Hansard.*

MR. PRIMROSE: After considering the special circumstances of this cargo and its destination, it was settled to submit the cargo to the decision of the Prize Court, and there is no question of taking proceedings against the vessel itself. There is a report in the Press of possible negotiations for the sale of the cargo to the International Commission for relief of distress in Belgium, and if this is confirmed the decision come to would be reconsidered.

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO THE CASE OF THE *WILHELMINA*

The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page

(Telegram.) *Department of State,*
Washington, February 15, 1915.

U.S.D.C. The Department notes that you have been informed by the British Government that the American steamer *Wilhelmina* has been sent to Prize Court, but is not yet unloaded. The Government of the United States, of course, has no intention of interfering with the proper course of judicial procedure in the British prize courts, but deems it proper to bring to the attention of the British Government information which has been received in relation to the character and destination of the cargo and to point out certain considerations prompting the supposition that the seizure may not be justified.

This Government is informed that the W. L. Green Commission Company, an American corporation organised in 1891, which in the past has made extensive shipments of goods to Germany, is the sole owner of the cargo, which consists entirely of foodstuffs consigned to the W. L. Green Commission Company, Hamburg, and that the Company's manager, now in Europe, has instructions to sell the cargo solely to the civilian population of Hamburg. A copy of the ship's manifest has been submitted to this Government, accompanied by a sworn statement from the Company's manager, in which he represents that he was instructed to proceed to Germany to dispose of the cargo to private purchasers in that country, and not to any belligerent Government nor armed forces of such Government, nor to any agent of a belligerent Government or of its armed forces.

According to well-established practice among nations, admitted, as this Government understands, by the Government of Great Britain, the articles of which the *Wilhelmina's* cargo is said to consist are subject to seizure as contraband only in case they are destined for the use of a belligerent government or its armed forces. The Government of the United States understands that the British authorities consider

the seizure of the cargo justified on the ground that a recent order of the Federal Council of Germany, promulgated after the vessel sailed, required the delivery of imported articles to the German Government. The owners of the cargo have represented to this Government that such a position is untenable. They point out that, by a provision of the order in question as originally announced, the regulations in relation to the seizure of food products are made inapplicable to such products imported after January thirty-one, nineteen fifteen. They further represent that the only articles shipped on the *Wilhelmina* which are embraced within the terms of these regulations are wheat and bran, which constitute about fifteen per centum of the cargo as compared with eighty-five per centum consisting of meats, vegetables, and fruits. The owners also assert that the regulations contemplate the disposition of foodstuffs to individuals through municipalities; that municipalities are not agents of the Government, and that the purpose of the regulations is to conserve the supply of food products and to prevent speculation and inflation of prices to non-combatants.

The German Government has addressed a formal communication to the Government of the United States in relation to the effect of the decree issued by the German Federal Council, and this Government deems it pertinent to call to the attention of the British Government a material portion of this communication, which is as follows:—

'1. The Federal Council's decision concerning the seizure of food products, which England alleges to be the cause of food products shipped to Germany being treated as contraband, bears exclusively on wheat, rye, both unmixed and mixed with other products, and also wheat, rye, oats, and barley flour.

'2. The Federal Council makes an express exception in section forty-five of the order. Section forty-five provides as follows: The stipulations of this regulation do not apply to grain or flour imported from abroad after January thirty-one.

'3. Conjunctively with that saving clause the Federal Council's order contains a provision under which imported cereals and flours would be sold exclusively to the municipalities or certain specially designated organisations by the

importers. Although that provision had for its object simply to throw imported grain and flours into such channels as supply the private consumption of civilians and, in consequence of that provision, the intent and purpose of the Federal Council's order, which was to protect the civilian population from speculators and engrossers, were fully met, it was nevertheless rescinded so as to leave no room for doubt.

'4. My Government is amenable to any proposition looking to control by a special American organisation under the supervision of the American Consular officers, and, if necessary, will itself make a proposition in that direction.

'5. The German Government further calls attention to the fact that municipalities do not form part of or belong to the Government but are self-administrative bodies, which are elected by the inhabitants of the Commune in accordance with fixed rules, and therefore exclusively represent the private part of the population and act as it directs. Although those principles are generally known and obtain in the United States as well as in England itself, the German Government desired to point out the fact so as to avoid any further unnecessary delay.

'6. Hence it is absolutely assured that imported food products will be consumed by the civilian population in Germany exclusively.'

It will be observed that it is stated in this communication, which appears to confirm the contentions of the cargo owners, that a part of the order of the German Federal Council relating to imported food products has now been rescinded.

This Government has received another communication from the German Government giving formal assurance to the Government of the United States that all goods imported into Germany from the United States directly or indirectly, which belong to the class of relative contraband, such as foodstuffs, will not be used by the German army or navy or by Government authorities, but will be left to the free consumption of the German civilian population, excluding all Government purveyors.

If the British authorities have not in their possession evidence, other than that presented to this Government as to the character and destination of the cargo of the *Wilhelmina*, sufficient to warrant the seizure of this cargo, the Government

of the United States hopes that the British Government will release the vessel together with her cargo and allow her to proceed to her port of destination.

Please communicate with the British Government in the sense of the foregoing.

BRYAN.

Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State

(Telegram.) *American Embassy,*
London, February 19, 1915.

Sir Edward Grey has just handed me the following memorandum. Since your telegram to him was given to the Press in Washington, I consented to his proposal to give this memorandum out for publication in Saturday morning's newspapers: *U.S.D.C.*

MEMORANDUM

The communication made by the United States Ambassador in his note to Sir Edward Grey of the sixteenth instant has been carefully considered, and the following observations are offered in reply:—

'2. At the time when His Majesty's Government gave directions for the seizure of the cargo of the steamship *Wilhelmina* as contraband they had before them the text of the decree made by the German Federal Council on the twenty-fifth January, under Article forty-five of which all grain and flour imported into Germany after the thirty-first January was declared deliverable only to certain organisations under direct government control or to municipal authorities. The vessel was bound for Hamburg, one of the free cities of the German Empire, the government of which is vested in the municipality. This was one of the reasons actuating His Majesty's Government in deciding to bring the cargo of the *Wilhelmina* before the Prize Court.

'3. Information has only now reached them that by a subsequent decree, dated the sixth February, the above provision in Article forty-five of the previous decree was repealed, it would appear for the express purpose of rendering difficult the anticipated proceedings against the *Wilhelmina*. The repeal was not known to His Majesty's Government at the time of detention of the cargo, or indeed until now.

'4. How far the ostensible exception of imported supplies from the general Government monopoly of all grain and flour set up by the German Government may affect the question of the contraband nature of the shipment seized is a matter which will most suitably be investigated by the Prize Court.

'5. It is, however, necessary to state that the German decree is not the only ground on which the submission of the cargo of the *Wilhelmina* to a Prize Court is justified. The German Government have in public announcements claimed to treat practically every town or port on the English east coast as a fortified place and base of operations. On the strength of this contention they have subjected to bombardment the open towns of Yarmouth, Scarborough, and Whitby, among others. On the same ground, a number of neutral vessels sailing for English ports on the east coast with cargoes of goods on the German list of conditional-contraband have been seized by German cruisers and brought before the German Prize Court. Again, the Dutch vessel *Maria*, having sailed from California with a cargo of grain consigned to Dublin and Belfast, was sunk in September last by the German cruiser *Karlsruhe*. This could only have been justified if, among other things, the cargo could have been proved to be destined for the British Government or armed forces and if a presumption to this effect had been established owing to Dublin or Belfast being considered a fortified place or a base for the armed forces.

'6. The German Government can not have it both ways. If they consider themselves justified in destroying by bombardment the lives and property of peaceful civil inhabitants of English open towns and watering places, and in seizing and sinking ships and cargoes of conditional contraband on the way thither, on the ground that they were consigned to a fortified place or base, *a fortiori* His Majesty's Government must be at liberty to treat Hamburg, which is in part protected by the fortifications at the mouth of the Elbe, as a fortified town, and a base of operations and supply for the purposes of Article thirty-four of the Declaration of London. If the owners of the cargo of the *Wilhelmina* desire to question the validity in international law of the action taken by order of His Majesty's Government, they will have every opportunity of establishing their case in due course before the

Prize Court, and His Majesty's Government would, in this connection, recall the attention of the United States Government to the considerations put forward in Sir Edward Grey's note to Mr. Page of the tenth instant as to the propriety of awaiting the result of Prize Court proceedings before diplomatic action is initiated. It will be remembered that they have from the outset given a definite assurance that the owners of the *Wilhelmina*, as well as the owners of her cargo, if found to be contraband would be equitably indemnified.

'7. There is one further observation to which His Majesty's Government think it right, and appropriate in the present connection, to give expression. They have not, so far, declared foodstuffs to be absolute contraband. They have not interfered with any neutral vessels on account of their carrying foodstuffs, except on the basis of such foodstuffs being liable to capture if destined for the enemy forces or governments. In so acting they have been guided by the general principle, of late universally upheld by civilised nations, and observed in practice, that the civil populations of countries at war are not to be exposed to the treatment rightly reserved for combatants. This distinction has to all intents and purposes been swept away by the novel doctrines proclaimed and acted upon by the German Government.

'8. It is unnecessary here to dwell upon the treatment that has been meted out to the civil population of Belgium, and those parts of France which are in German occupation. When Germany, long before any mines had been laid by British authorities, proceeded to sow mines upon the high seas, and, by this means, sunk a considerable number not only of British but also of neutral merchantmen with their unoffending crews, it was, so His Majesty's Government held, open to them to take retaliatory measures, even if such measures were of a kind to involve pressure of the civil population—not indeed of neutral states—but of their enemies. They refrained from doing so.

'9. When, subsequently, English towns and defenceless British subjects, including women and children, were deliberately and systematically fired upon and killed by ships flying the flag of the Imperial German Navy, when quiet country towns and villages, void of defences, and possessing no military or naval importance, were bombarded by German

airships, His Majesty's Government still abstained from drawing the logical consequences from this form of attack on defenceless citizens. Further steps in the same direction are now announced, and in fact have already been taken, by Germany. British merchant vessels have been torpedoed at sight without any attempt being made to give warning to the crew, or any opportunity being given to save their lives, a torpedo has been fired against a British hospital ship in daylight, and similar treatment is threatened to all British merchant vessels in future as well as to any neutral ships that may happen to be found in the neighbourhood of the British Isles.

'10. Faced with this situation, His Majesty's Government consider it would be altogether unreasonable that Great Britain and her allies should be expected to remain indefinitely bound, to their grave detriment, by rules and principles of which they recognise the justice if impartially observed as between belligerents, but which are at the present moment openly set at defiance by their enemy.

'11. If, therefore, His Majesty's Government should hereafter feel constrained to declare foodstuffs absolute contraband, or to take other measures for interfering with German trade, by way of reprisals, they confidently expect that such action will not be challenged on the part of neutral states by appeals to laws and usages of war whose validity rests on their forming an integral part of that system of international doctrine which as a whole their enemy frankly boasts the liberty and intention to disregard, so long as such neutral states cannot compel the German Government to abandon methods of warfare which have not in recent history been regarded as having the sanction of either law or humanity.'

PAGE.

Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State

(Telegram.) *American Embassy,*
London, April 8, 1915.

U.S.D.C. The Prime Minister has just handed me the following, which I have communicated to Hayes and Brooking, who strongly recommend its acceptance by their principals:

'His Majesty's Government share the desire of the

United States Government for an immediate settlement of the case of the *Wilhelmina*. This American ship laden with foodstuffs left New York for Hamburg on January 22nd. She called at Falmouth of her own accord on February 9th, and her cargo was detained as prize on February 11th. The writ instituting Prize Court proceedings was issued on February 27th, and claimed that the cargo should be condemned as contraband of war. No proceedings were taken or even threatened against the ship herself, and in the ordinary course the cargo would have been unloaded when seized, so that the ship would be free to leave. The owners of the cargo, however, have throughout objected to the discharge of the cargo, and it is because of this objection that the ship is still at Falmouth with the cargo on board.

'His Majesty's Government have formally undertaken that even should the condemnation of the cargo as contraband be secured in the Prize Court they would none the less compensate the owners for any loss sustained in consequence of the ship having been stopped and proceedings taken against the cargo.

'It was understood at the time that the proceedings in the Prize Court would be in the nature of a test case, the decision in which would govern the treatment of any subsequent shipments of food supplies to Germany in similar circumstances. Since then the situation has, however, materially changed by the issue of the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, and the measures taken thereunder which prevent further supplies being sent from America to Germany, whether contraband or not.

'In these circumstances there is no longer any object in continuing the judicial proceedings in the case of the *Wilhelmina*; for it can no longer serve as a test case, and it is really agreed that the owners of the cargo, even if proved to have no claim, are to be treated as if their claim was good. Nothing therefore remains but to settle the claim on proper and just conditions, and this would, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be secured most expeditiously and with the least inconvenience to all parties by an agreement between the Crown and the claimants for the disposal of the whole matter. His Majesty's Government accordingly propose that such an agreement be arrived at on the following terms:

"His Majesty's Government having undertaken to compensate the claimants by paying for the cargo seized on the basis of the loss of the profit the claimants would have made if the ship had proceeded in due course to Hamburg, and by indemnifying them for the delay caused to the ship so far as this delay has been due to the action of the British authorities, all proceedings in the Prize Court shall be stayed, on the understanding that His Majesty's Government buy the cargo from the claimants on the above terms. The cargo shall be discharged and delivered to the proper officer of the Crown forthwith. The sum to be paid shall be assessed by a single referee nominated jointly by the Ambassador of the United States of America and His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who shall certify the total amount after making such inquiries as he may think fit, but without formal hearing or arbitration." His Majesty's Government would be grateful if the United States Ambassador would inform the claimants of the above proposal at his early convenience and obtain their acceptance. PAGE.'

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CONGESTION IN BRITISH PORTS

Times, Feb. 5, 1915.

The President of the Board of Trade has appointed an Advisory Committee, consisting of members nominated by the authorities of some of the principal docks in Great Britain, to consider and recommend the adoption by the various dock authorities concerned, either separately or in co-operation, of such measures as appear best calculated to remove or diminish the congestion in the docks and to deal with the traffic of the ports in the public interest in the most expeditious and advantageous manner possible.

The names of the members of the Committee are as follows:—

Lord Inchcape, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E. (Chairman).

Lord Devonport, Mr. J. G. Broodbank, and Mr. H. T. Moore (London).

Sir Helenus R. Robertson and Mr. Alfred Chandler (Liverpool).

Sir H. A. Walker (Southampton).
Sir Sam. Fay (Immingham).
Mr. E. C. Geddes (Hull).
Mr. W. J. Noble (Newcastle-upon-Tyne).
Mr. P. J. Pringle (Leith).
Mr. J. Hannay Thompson (Dundee).
Mr. D. Shields (Glasgow).
Mr. Ernest Latimer (Manchester).
Mr. C. S. Denniss (Cardiff), and
Mr. D. Ross Johnson (Bristol).

Sir Frederick G. Dumayne will act as Secretary of the Committee.

Any communications on the subject should be addressed to the Secretary of the Committee at the Board of Trade, Whitehall Gardens.

GERMANY DECLARES BRITISH WATERS A MILITARY AREA

Berlin, February 4.

1. The waters round Great Britain and Ireland, including the entire English Channel, are hereby declared a military area. From February 18 every hostile merchant ship found in these waters will be destroyed, even if it is not always possible to avoid thereby the dangers which threaten the crews and passengers. *Times*, Feb. 5, 1915.

2. Neutral ships also incur danger in the military area because, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the British Government on January 31 and the accidents of naval warfare, it cannot always be avoided that attacks intended to be made on enemy ships may also involve neutral ships.

3. Traffic northwards around the Shetland Islands, in the east part of the North Sea, and a strip of at least thirty sea miles in breadth along the coast of Holland is not endangered.

VON POHL, *Chief of the Admiral Staff.*

DECLARATION OF GERMAN GOVERNMENT ON ENGLAND'S VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Since the beginning of the present war Great Britain has carried on a mercantile warfare against Germany in a way that *Times*, Feb. 9, 1915.

defies all the principles of international law. It is true that the British Government has announced in a number of decrees the London Declaration concerning naval warfare to be binding to its naval forces, but in reality she has renounced the Declaration in its most important particulars, although her own delegates at the London Conference on naval warfare had recognised its conclusions to be valid as international law. The British have put a number of articles in the list of contraband which are not, or at most are only indirectly, useful for military purposes, and therefore, according to the London Declaration as well as according to the universally recognised rules of international law may not be designated as contraband. She has further actually abolished the distinction between absolute and relative contraband, inasmuch as she has subjected to capture all articles of relative contraband intended for Germany without any reference to the harbour in which they are to be unloaded or to the hostile or peaceful use to which they are to be put. She does not even hesitate to violate the Paris Declaration, as her naval forces have seized on neutral ships German property that was not contraband. In violation of her own decrees concerning the London Declaration she has further, through her naval forces, taken from neutral ships numerous Germans liable to military service, and she has made of them prisoners of war. Finally she has declared the entire North Sea to be an area of war, and if she had not made impossible the passage of neutral shipping through the sea between Scotland and Norway, she has rendered it so difficult and dangerous that she has to [word missing] a blockade of neutral coasts and neutral ports, in violation of all international laws.

All these measures have the obvious purpose, through the illegal paralysation of legitimate neutral measures, not only to strike at the German military strength, but also at the economic life of Germany, and finally, through starvation, doom the entire population of Germany to destruction. The neutral Powers have generally acquiesced in the steps taken by the British Government. Especially, they have not succeeded in inducing the British Government to restore the German individuals and property seized in violation of international law. In certain directions they have also aided the British measures which are irreconcilable with the freedom of

the sea in that they have, obviously under the pressure of England, hindered by export and transit embargoes the transit of wares for peaceful purposes in Germany. The German Government has in vain called the attention of neutral Powers to the fact that it must face the question of whether it can any longer persevere in its hitherto strict observance of the rules of the London Declaration if Great Britain were to continue its course and the neutral Powers to continue to acquiesce in these violations of neutrality to the detriment of Germany. For her violations of international law Great Britain pleads the vital interests which the British Empire has at stake, and the neutral Powers seem to satisfy themselves with theoretical protests. Therefore, in fact, they accept the vital interests of belligerents as sufficient excuse for every method of warfare.

Germany must now appeal to the same vital interests. To its regret it therefore sees itself forced to military measures aimed at England in retaliation against the English procedure. Just as England has designated the area between Scotland and Norway as an area of war, so Germany now declares all the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the entire English Channel, as an area of war, thus proceeding against the shipping of the enemy. For this purpose, beginning from February 18, 1915, it will endeavour to destroy every enemy merchant ship that is found in this area of war without its always being possible to avert the peril that this threatens persons and cargoes. Neutrals are therefore warned against further entrusting crews and passengers and wares to such ships. Their attention is also called to the fact that it is advisable for their ships to avoid entering this area, for even though the German naval forces have instructions to avoid violence to neutral ships in so far as they are recognisable, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the British Government and the contingencies of naval warfare their becoming victims of an attack directed against enemy ships cannot always be averted. At the same time it is especially noted that shipping north of the Shetland Islands, in the eastern area of the North Sea, and in a strip of at least thirty sea miles in width along the Netherland coasts, is not in peril.

The German Government gives such early notice of these

measures that, hostile as well as neutral ships may have time to adopt their plans accordingly. Germany expects that the neutral Powers will show no less consideration for the vital interests of Germany than for those of England, and will aid in keeping their citizens and the property of the latter from this area. This is the more to be expected as it must be to the interests of the neutral Powers to see this destructive war end as soon as possible.

BERLIN, *February* 4, 1915.

OPERATIONS IN EAST AFRICA

K.D., April 19, 1915.

Among detailed events of the war should be mentioned the following: At Wanga there was an affair of outposts during which Rifleman Bossart was badly wounded. The detachment at Fort Schirati won a success on January 17th. The enemy losses consisted of four Europeans, two Askaris dead, and nine Europeans and an unknown number of Askaris wounded. Eight mules, many cartridges and much baggage were captured. On January 22nd the English cruiser *Astræa* fired twenty-one rounds at the customs-house on Kwale Island, and on February 1st, 27 rounds at Kiwindje without hitting anything. On February 6th, an English cruiser bombarded Kisiwani. Early on February 6th, the steamer *Adjutant*, captured formerly by the English, was, during a reconnoitring cruise at the mouth of the Rufiji, unmanageable and driven ashore after a sharp action. The crew, one officer, 21 men, and two natives, were made prisoners. On board the *Adjutant* one man was killed and one badly wounded; on the German side there were no casualties, in spite of a heavy bombardment by the *Hyacinth*. According to private intelligence, four 10.2 centimetre and two 4.7 centimetre guns with ammunition fell into our hands. The *Hyacinth* was also hit, and retired at full speed. North of Kifumbiro, an English detachment, 40 men strong, was surprised by the Boch (Bock?) detachment. The enemy fled after a short resistance, leaving 17 dead, including five Indians. There were no losses on the German side. After destroying the Schirati buildings, the English evacuated the Boma, Schirati, which they had strongly fortified, on February 3rd, and went to Waringu. Schirati has again been occupied by our troops.

BLACK SEA OPERATIONS

(*Official*)

Petrograd, February 7.

In the Black Sea our destroyers bombarded Khopa. The cruiser *Breslau* arrived on Saturday at Batum, and fired twenty shots without result at our destroyers, which were manœuvring there, but they were harmless. After two shots had been fired by the fortress the *Breslau* made off. *Times*, Feb. 8, 1915.

GERMANY'S WARNING TO NEUTRAL SHIPS

Amsterdam, February 13.

Communiqué by German Legation at The Hague :— *Times*, Feb. 15, 1915.

Since Germany, following the British example, declared as a war zone from February 18th English and Irish waters, Great Britain has declared as war ports all British ports, and has herself justified the use of neutral flags on merchant vessels. Moreover, according to reports from a trustworthy source, a great number of British merchantmen have been armed in order to destroy the German submarines by shells or to sink them by ramming them. Thus these ships lose their character of merchant ships, and become war vessels.

Germany is again obliged, therefore urgently to warn all neutral ships not to enter English coast waters after February 18th, as from this date the German Admiralty will prosecute the war with all means against British war ports and the British armed merchant fleet. Neutral ships which are then still within the war zone run the same risks as if they pursued a course through the middle of sea battles between Germany and Great Britain, the place and date of which cannot be made known, and for these risks Germany cannot take the responsibility.

The route around Scotland owing to the depth of the waters cannot be endangered by mines. There as well as in the waters of the North Sea, with the exception of British waters and German bays, neutral shipping will not be endangered by the measures of the German Admiralty.

DECLARATION OF LONDON

House of Commons, February 8, 1915.

Hansard. LORD C. BERESFORD asked the Prime Minister whether the Government have made any modification or changes in the Declaration of London from its original form; if so, will he state what these changes are; whether the Declaration of London, with or without its modifications, has the authority of international law; whether any nations have accepted its terms as a new code of naval warfare; if so, will he state the names of these nations; and whether the British are using the Declaration of London or certain clauses of it as a temporary code during the present war?

[1] [*See Naval* 1, p. 92.] [2] [*See Naval* 1, p. 352.]

MR. PRIMROSE: By Order in Council of 20th August,[1] and 29th October, 1914,[2] which have been published, certain modifications were announced subject to which His Majesty's Government were prepared to adopt the Declaration of London during the present hostilities. The Declaration has not been ratified, and has therefore not the same authority as a universally ratified code of law. In view of recent German announcements of an intention to disregard the laws and customs of the sea, further modifications in British practice may be necessitated.

RETIRED NAVAL OFFICERS

ibid. LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether retired military officers called up for service during the war receive their full pension in addition to the pay of their rank; whether retired naval officers called up for service during the war receive only 25 per cent. of their retired pay in addition to the pay of their rank; and, if so, whether the Board of Admiralty will issue instructions for retired officers of the Navy to be treated in the same manner as retired military officers when called up for service during the war?

DR. MACNAMARA: The answer to the first part of the question is, I understand, in the affirmative. As regards the second part, the general rule is that retired naval officers called out for service during war receive the full pay and

allowances of their rank on the retired list together with a bonus of 25 per cent. calculated on their full pay without allowances, their retired pay being suspended. Owing to the practice in the naval service regarding the grant of a step in rank on the retired list, which in the majority of cases confers a considerable financial benefit on re-employment, it is not proposed to alter existing regulations.

INTERNED STEAMERS

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many enemies' interned steamers have been put or are being put into the coasting trade; and whether the Admiralty is exacting the highest rates prevailing in the market for these boats? *ibid.*

DR. MACNAMARA: Thirty vessels are being used in the coasting trade out of thirty-six. The remainder are either unseaworthy or being employed for other purposes. The freight at which they are chartered is the current freight of the day for the voyage. The result of the action of the Admiralty has been to reduce the freights from the Tyne, for instance, from 13s. 6d. to 11s.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the Admiralty is letting enemies' interned steamers to shipowners and demanding from them considerably higher rate of pay than the Admiralty is itself paying the same shipowners for the use of their boats which have been commandeered; and whether the rates which have been charged for the interned ships are being accumulated for the benefit of the alien enemy when the war is over?

DR. MACNAMARA: The Admiralty is not letting the enemies' interned ships to shipowners, but is running them for Government account. The freights earned are paid into the Exchequer. The ultimate disposal of the fund so raised is not yet decided upon, but it will not go to the enemy owners of the vessels.

WARRANT ENGINEERS' PROMOTION

MR. BARNES asked the grounds on which promotion is refused to warrant engineers, Royal Naval Reserve, in view of the number of commissions now being given to engineers *ibid.*

who are not in the Reserve; and whether these warrant engineers may apply for temporary commissions in the Navy or Merchant Service?

DR. MACNAMARA: The rank of warrant engineer was created in 1903 for the purpose of providing a permanent reserve of warrant officers for the Engineer branch of the Royal Navy. In this capacity they are a valuable reserve, as they supply the want most felt in the engineering department when a sudden expansion of the Fleet becomes necessary. Temporary commissions in the Royal Naval Reserve have, as a rule, only been granted to engineers taken up with their vessels for service in the Fleet, and these officers do not serve in regular ships of war. These appointments are in no way permanent, and terminate when the ship in which the officers are serving pays off.

PRIZE MONEY (ABOLITION)

House of Commons, February 8, 1915.

Hansard. SIR CLEMENT KINLOCH-COOKE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he could now make a statement regarding the new scheme of poundage promised by the Government as a consequence of the abolition of prize money?

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the question of prize money for the Navy still remains in abeyance; whether the Fleet have received any benefit up to date for the large amount of enemy's shipping (nearly 100,000 tons) which has been accounted for; and, if not, whether he will make some communication to the House on this question?

DR. MACNAMARA: I will, if I may, answer this question and No. 43 standing in the name of the noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth together. The question of prize money has been receiving close consideration since the outbreak of hostilities, and certain conclusions as to the basis of distribution have been taken by the Board of Admiralty. But the hon. member will recognise that under modern conditions the subject is more complicated than it has been in the past. I need scarcely assure the hon. member that the whole matter continues to receive the closest attention of the Government. The question of making periodic advances to the Fleet has

been discussed from time to time, but there are very great difficulties in the way, and I am afraid that I can hold out no hope that such *ad interim* distributions will be possible.

LORD C. BERESFORD: Will there be no distribution of prize money until the war is over?

DR. MACNAMARA: I think that may be so. There are great difficulties in the way. I would like to consult my advisers on the matter.

NAVAL TRANSPORT SERVICE

MR. CATHCART WASON asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will consider whether the time has arrived when the captains and officers of merchantmen employed on transport service should have temporary Royal Naval Reserve commissions conferred on them, not only for the purpose of defence, but also to enable them to deal effectively with insubordination among the crew, especially considering the percentage of aliens among them? *ibid.*

DR. MACNAMARA: The question has already been fully considered by the Admiralty, but I am advised that the grant of commissions would not effect the object in view.

MR. CATHCART WASON: If the right hon. gentleman is unable to accept the suggestion in question, will he give the officers referred to a badge to show that they are employed in His Majesty's service?

DR. MACNAMARA: I will consider that, but as the crews are not under the Naval Discipline Act, my hon. friend will realise that it would not attain the object which he suggests on the paper.

ADMIRALTY SWIMMING COLLAR

MR. FALLE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he is aware that the German sailor is provided with an efficient life-saving waistcoat; if he is aware that our men are only provided with a kind of dog-collar, calculated only to assist in drowning any man using it; if he will make proper provision in this direction for our men, and whether he can say if any expert opinion, other than that of the manufacturer, as to the use and suitability of these collars was obtained before purchase by the Admiralty? *ibid.*

DR. MACNAMARA: Certain statements have appeared in the Press in regard to the life-saving appliances in use in the German Navy. His Majesty's ships are normally provided with life-saving appliances sufficient to provide for the full complement of the ship. The Admiralty swimming collar was introduced as the most ready means of providing a personal equipment to be always worn or carried on the person which, while not encumbering the wearer in the performance of his duty, would give effective aid to a swimmer. As such, the evidence goes to show that it has answered its purpose, and been the means of saving many lives. I may remark that the collar was not introduced as the design of one manufacturer, but after consultation with representatives of leading firms, some of whom were experts in life-saving appliances. It was considered to be the best form of appliance that could be supplied quickly in the large numbers required. Since the introduction of the collar, the Admiralty have continued to devote constant consideration to the subject, with the result that it is hoped to issue improved appliances immediately.

MR. FALLE: Can the right hon. gentleman give me the approximate cost of these collars?

DR. MACNAMARA: I cannot off-hand, but I will tell the hon. gentleman if he likes to know.

CASUALTIES ON MERCHANT SHIPS (COMPENSATION)

House of Commons, February 9, 1915.

Hansard. MR. STEWART asked the President of the Board of Trade whether he can now make any announcement as regards compensation being granted in the case of those captains and officers of merchant ships killed or injured through the operations of the war; and whether, if such compensation is to be granted, it will be made retrospective as from the beginning of the war?

The PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE (MR. RUNCIMAN): A scheme has been prepared by the Board of Trade and the War Risks Associations for the payment of compensation in the case of all persons employed on merchant ships insured under the War Risks Insurance Scheme who

are killed or injured through warlike operations and who are not already covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. This scheme, which I hope will be completed and put in operation very shortly, will date back to the beginning of the war.

MR. PETO: Will the scheme include compensation for loss of kit owing to the ship being sunk by submarine or otherwise?

MR. RUNCIMAN: I do not think it is intended to cover loss of kit.

INCREASE IN THE NAVY PERSONNEL

A Supplementary Estimate for men in the Navy was issued as a Parliamentary White Paper last night. The number of additional men asked for is 32,000. *Times*, Feb. 9, 1915.

This number represents the probable excess beyond the numbers already noted for the year 1914-15 :—

	All Ranks.	
Original Estimate	151,000	
Supplementary Estimate, August 5, 1914[1] . .	67,000	[1] [*See Naval* 1, p. 62]
Supplementary Estimate now presented . .	32,000	
Revised total	250,000	

BLACK SEA OPERATIONS

(*Official*)

Petrograd, February 9.

Yesterday at 7 A.M., while our fleet was at sea, the coast-guards between Sebastopol and Yalta sighted the German cruiser *Breslau*, which drew in to Yalta at about eight o'clock, fired several shots on the town, and then steamed away. The German shells damaged four shops and the Hôtel de Russie, but no persons were killed or wounded. *Times*, Feb. 10, 1915.

As a reply to the bombardment of Yalta our cruisers were despatched to Trebizond, which they bombarded the same day at four in the afternoon, directing their fire on an eight-gun battery there. They also sank an enemy steamer which was lying fully laden in the port. Near Cape Yeros our ships

sank another steamer laden with foodstuffs, and a Turkish schooner.

Petrograd, February 10.

Times, Feb. 12, 1915. On the 8th inst. our torpedo-boat destroyers in the Black Sea bombarded three enemy batteries at Trebizond, destroyed two bridges in the region of Platana, and a third west of Rize. In the course of these operations they again sank more than fifty sailing vessels of the enemy.

THE *GOEBEN*

Athens, February 9.

Times, Feb. 10, 1915. The following message from Mytilene is published here :—

The Turks, under the direction of German officers, are actively engaged in fortifying the coast of Asia Minor facing Chios and Mytilene.

The *Goeben*, which has been completely repaired, cruises night and day in the Bosporus, accompanied by a destroyer. —*Reuter.*

NOTICE TO MARINERS

L.G., Feb. 12, 1915.

(No. 101 of the year 1915)

CAUTION WHEN APPROACHING BRITISH PORTS

PART I

Closing of Ports

[1] [*See* p. 13.] *Former Notice.*—No. 1 of 1915 ; [1] hereby cancelled.

(1) My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, having taken into consideration the fact that it may be necessary to forbid all entrance to certain ports of the Empire, this is to give notice that on approaching the shores of the United Kingdom, or any of the ports or localities of the British Empire, referred to in Part III. of this Notice, a sharp look-out should be kept for the signals described in the following paragraph, and for the vessels mentioned in paragraph (5), Part II., of this Notice, and the distinguishing and other signals made by them. In the event of such signals being displayed, the port or locality should be approached with great caution, as it may be apprehended that obstructions may exist.

(2) If entrance to a port is prohibited, three *red* vertical lights by night, or three *red* vertical balls by day, will be exhibited in some conspicuous position, in or near to its approach, which signals will also be shown by the vessels indicated in paragraph (5), Part II., of this Notice.

If these signals are displayed, vessels must either proceed to the position marked 'Examination Anchorage' on the Admiralty charts and anchor there, or keep the sea.

(3) At all the ports or localities at home or abroad referred to in Part III. of this Notice, searchlights are occasionally exhibited for exercise.

Instructions have been given to avoid directing movable searchlights during practice on to vessels under way, but mariners are warned that great care should be taken to keep a sharp look-out for the signals indicated in paragraph (2) above, when searchlights are observed to be working.

PART II

Examination Service

(4) In certain circumstances it is also necessary to take special measures to examine vessels desiring to enter the ports or localities at home or abroad, referred to in Part III. of this Notice.

(5) In such case, vessels carrying the distinguishing flags or lights mentioned in paragraph (7) will be charged with the duty of examining ships which desire to enter the ports and of allotting positions in which they shall anchor. If Government vessels, or vessels belonging to the local port authority, are found patrolling in the offing, merchant vessels are advised to communicate with such vessels with a view to obtaining information as to the course on which they should approach the Examination Anchorage. Such communication will not be necessary in cases where the pilot on board has already received this information from the local authorities.

(6) As the institution of the Examination Service at any port will never be publicly advertised, especial care should be taken in approaching the ports, by day or night, to keep a sharp look-out for any vessel carrying the flags or lights mentioned in paragraph (7), and to be ready to 'bring to'

at once when hailed by her or warned by the firing of a gun or sound rocket.

In entering by night any of the ports mentioned in Part III. serious delay and risk will be avoided if four efficient all-round lamps, two *red* and two *white*, are kept available for use.

(7) By day the distinguishing flags of the Examination Steamer will be a special flag (white and red horizontal surrounded by a blue border) and a blue ensign.

Also, three red vertical balls if the port is closed.



By night the steamer will carry :—

(*a*) Three *red* vertical lights if the port is closed.

(*b*) Three *white* vertical lights if the port is open.

The above lights will be carried in addition to the ordinary navigation lights, and will show an unbroken light around the horizon.

(8) Masters are warned that, before attempting to enter any of these ports when the Examination Service is in force, they must in their own interests strictly obey all instructions given to them by the Examination Steamer. In the absence of any instructions from the Examination Steamer they must proceed to the position marked 'Examination Anchorage' on the Admiralty Charts and anchor there, or keep the sea.

Whilst at anchor in the Examination Anchorage, Masters are warned that they must not lower any boats (except to avoid accident), communicate with the shore, work cables, move the ship, or allow any one to leave the ship, without permission from the Examination Steamer.

(9) In case of fog, Masters are enjoined to use the utmost care, and the Examination Anchorage itself should be approached with caution.

(10) Merchant vessels, when approaching ports are especi-

ally cautioned against making use of private signals of any description, either by day or night; the use of them will render a vessel liable to be fired on.

(11) The pilots attached to the ports will be acquainted with the regulations to be followed.

PART III

Ports or Localities Referred to

United Kingdom

Alderney
Barrow
Barry
Belfast
Berehaven
Blyth
Clyde
Cromarty
Dover
Falmouth
Firth of Forth
Guernsey
Hartlepool
Harwich
Jersey
Lough Swilly
Milford Haven
Newhaven
Plymouth
Portland
Portsmouth
Queenstown
River Humber
,, Mersey
,, Tay
,, Tees
,, Thames
,, Tyne
Scapa Flow
Sheerness

Canada

Esquimalt
Halifax
Quebec

Mediterranean

Gibraltar
Malta

Indian Ocean

Aden
Bombay
Calcutta
Colombo
Karachi
Madras
Mauritius
Rangoon

China Sea

Hong Kong
Singapore

Africa

Durban	Simons Bay
Sierra Leone	Table Bay

Australia

Adelaide	Newcastle
Brisbane	Sydney
Fremantle	Thursday Island
Melbourne	

Tasmania

Hobart

New Zealand

Auckland	Port Lyttelton
Otago	Wellington

West Indies

Bermuda	Port Royal, Jamaica

PART IV

Sweeping Operations

H.M. vessels are constantly engaged in sweeping operations off ports in the United Kingdom.

Whilst so engaged, they work in pairs connected by a wire hawser, and are consequently hampered to a very considerable extent in their manœuvring powers.

With a view to indicating the nature of the work on which these vessels are engaged, they will show the following signals :

A black ball at the foremast head and a similar ball at the yardarm, or where it can best be seen, on that side on which it is dangerous for vessels to pass.

For the public safety, all other vessels, whether steamers or sailing craft, must keep out of the way of vessels flying this signal, and should especially remember that it is dangerous to *pass between* the vessels of a pair.

Authority.—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

By Command of their Lordships,

J. F. PARRY, *Hydrographer.*

Hydrographic Department, Admiralty,
London, 9th February 1915.

RANK AND EMOLUMENTS OF OFFICER AT HEAD OF NAVAL TRAINING SERVICE

At the Court at *Buckingham Palace*, the 10th day of February 1915. *L.G.*, Feb. 10, 1915.

Present—

The KING'S Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

WHEREAS there was this day read at the Board a Memorial from the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 3rd day of February 1915, in the words following, viz. :—

> 'Whereas by Section 3 of the Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865, it is enacted, *inter alia*, that all pay, pensions, or other allowances in the nature thereof, payable in respect of services in your Majesty's Naval or Marine Force to a person being or having been an Officer, Seaman, or Marine therein, shall be paid in such manner and subject to such restrictions, conditions, and provisions as are from time to time directed by Order in Council:
>
> 'And whereas we consider it desirable to confer on the Captain selected to supervise the Training Service of your Majesty's Navy the rank of Commodore, First Class, and to grant him a consolidated salary of £1200 a year, together with Table Money at the rate of 30s. a day payable when absent on inspection duties:
>
> 'We beg leave humbly to recommend that your Majesty may be graciously pleased, by your Order in Council, to sanction the rank and emoluments of this Officer accordingly, temporarily during the period of hostilities, with effect as from the 1st January 1915.
>
> 'The Lords Commissioners of your Majesty's Treasury have signified their concurrence in these proposals.'

His Majesty, having taken the said Memorial into consideration, was pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed. And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

BRITISH STEAMER CHASED BY SUBMARINE

Amsterdam, February 11.

Times, Feb. 12, 1915.

The British steamship *Laertes* arrived at Ymuiden this morning, having been attacked last night in the North Sea by a German submarine, which was supposed to be U 2.

Captain Propert, of the *Laertes*, who arrived this evening at Amsterdam in order to make a deposition before the British Consul, resolutely declined, on instructions from the owners, to make any statement for publication. He said, however, that his crew consisted of 50 men, of whom 23 were Chinese. The rest were British. The *Laertes* was bound from Java to Liverpool with cargo of spices, tobacco, etc., and was proceeding to Amsterdam when a hostile submarine sought to stop the ship.

The submarine pursued but did not overtake the ship. She discharged a torpedo, which, however, went wide, and also fired machine-guns, bullets from which are preserved by the captain of the *Laertes* as proof of the attack.

The *Laertes* is a vessel of 4,500 tons, and belongs to Messrs. A. Holt and Co.'s well-known Ocean Line.

Later.

Although Captain Propert refused to relate the incidents of his exciting encounter, certain facts have leaked out which seem to be well established. Evening was approaching when the *Laertes* was summoned to stop by a German submarine, believed to be U 2. Captain Propert, who, of course, was fully aware of the German Declaration and the risks incurred in the passage, paid no heed to the signal. He was flying no flag at the time, but, putting on full steam, he hoisted the Dutch flag. The submarine thereupon pursued the *Laertes*. At one period of the chase she seems to have approached as near as 500 yards to the vessel. Captain Propert, knowing the limitations of submarines, outwitted his pursuer by steering an irregular course, putting his helm alternately to starboard and port.

This zigzag course completely baffled the German boat, which then discharged a torpedo. Captain Propert saw it approaching, its track betrayed by a long line of bubbles on

the surface of the sea, and dexterously altered his course. This manœuvre enabled the *Laertes* to avoid the projectile, which passed harmlessly by her.

Then something seems to have gone wrong with the submarine's mechanism, for her chase of the *Laertes* stopped when she was about 500 yards from that vessel, which proceeding on her way was able to elude her pursuer.

The *Laertes*, still keeping the submarine under the closest observation, was surprised to see her enveloped in steam, apparently in difficulties. This was the last view the *Laertes* had of her pursuer.

The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement: *Times*, Feb. 15, 1915.

Captain William Henry Propert, of the steamship *Laertes*, having been granted a temporary commission as lieutenant in the Royal Naval Reserve as from the 10th February 1915, the King has been graciously pleased to award him the Distinguished Service Cross for his gallant and spirited conduct in command of his unarmed ship when exposed to attack by the gun-fire and torpedo of a German submarine on the 10th inst.

The Admiralty has conveyed to Captain Propert and the officers and men under his command an expression of high appreciation of their conduct, and has bestowed upon each officer a gold watch. A complimentary grant of £3 has also been made to every member of the crew. This exceptional recognition is intended to mark the example set by this merchant vessel.

NAVAL MISSION TO TURKEY

House of Commons, February 10, 1915.

MR. KING asked the First Lord of the Admiralty when the Naval Mission to Turkey was withdrawn? *Hansard.*

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (MR. CHURCHILL): The Naval Mission was withdrawn from Turkish service on the 13th September 1914, and actually left Constantinople on the 17th September.

IMPERIAL OTTOMAN DOCKS AND ARSENALS COMPANY

House of Commons, February 10, 1915.

Hansard. MR. KING asked whether the Imperial Ottoman Docks and Arsenals Company continued after 4th August to supply armaments and munitions of war to the Turkish Government?

MR. CHURCHILL: I am informed that the company supplied no armaments or munitions of war to the Turkish Government after the 4th August. The company merely continued to carry out its contractual engagements at Constantinople for the repair of ships until the outbreak of hostilities between this country and Turkey, when all the British employés were withdrawn.

MR. KING: Can the right hon. gentleman say anything about the plant of this company which was at Constantinople at the outbreak of the war?

MR. CHURCHILL: No doubt the plant has passed to Turkey for the time being.

ENEMY SHIPS CAPTURED

ibid. MR. FELL asked the number and tonnage of enemy ships which have been captured and are in British waters; if any of these ships are suitable for commercial purposes; and if it is proposed to use them at once for the purpose of carrying grain to this country from the River Plate?

MR. CHURCHILL: Thirty-six vessels captured from the enemy, with a total gross tonnage of 56,766, and seventy-three enemy vessels detained, with a total gross tonnage of 93,354, are now in ports of the United Kingdom. Of these, all steam vessels that are fit for sea and are not employed on Government service, are engaged in the ordinary trade of the country.

ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE

ibid. MR. PETO asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he will consider the desirability of using his influence with the shipowners in order that those officers of the Royal Navy Reserve who are now in active naval service, more especially those who were called out on the outbreak of the war, will

not lose seniority in the positions in the merchant service which they have perforce relinquished and that they will be reinstated in these positions on the conclusion of the war?

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA): We feel confident that the prospects of officers of the mercantile marine will not be allowed to suffer owing to their being on active service during war, and I do not anticipate that any representation to shipowners will be necessary.

TRAMP STEAMERS (MILITARY TRANSPORT)

MR. HUME-WILLIAMS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he will consider the possibility, in cases where the Government are using what are commonly known as tramp steamers for the purposes of military transport, of providing such steamers with boats or other life-saving appliances sufficient to cover, in case of disaster, not only the crew but also those who are being carried? *ibid.*

DR. MACNAMARA: The hon. gentleman may rest assured that the questions he raises have been fully considered and dealt with by the Board.

GERMAN SUBMARINES

MR. WATT asked how many submarines Germany possessed at the beginning of the war; how many of these have since been lost or destroyed; and how many new submarines have been launched by Germany since the beginning of August? *ibid.*

MR. CHURCHILL: As stated in returns already published to the House, shortly before the outbreak of war there were twenty-eight completed German submarines, and an additional sixteen were either under construction or had been authorised. Further, six submarines were stated to be under construction in Germany for foreign Powers, namely, one for Norway and five for Austria-Hungary. Since the outbreak of war no information on this subject has been published or authorised by the German Government.

H.M.S. *FISGARD II*

House of Commons, February 10, 1915.

Hansard. MR. FALLE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he is aware that when His Majesty's ship *Fisgard II* was lost on 17th September last [1] the crew and dockyard hands on board, that is, those who were saved, lost all their kit and possessions, and if it is proposed to give new kits, etc., to these men or to compensate them in money?

[1] [*See Naval* 1, p. 200.]

DR. MACNAMARA: The crew and dockyard hands lost all the effects they had on board when His Majesty's ship *Fisgard II* was lost on 17th September last. The crew have received compensation in kind in respect of their regulation kits. The examination of their claims, and those of the dockyard hands, for personal effects lost is now nearly completed, and compensation will shortly be granted in money.

TRAWLERS

ibid. MR. HERBERT CRAIG asked the Financial Secretary to the War Office the number of trawlers that have been hired by the War Office to serve as examination vessels; and whether he can give the House any information as to the circumstances under which the owners of trawlers in the service of the War Office are receiving more than four times the amount of the monthly rate of hire received by the owners of exactly similar trawlers requisitioned for the service of the Admiralty?

MR. BAKER: Two trawlers only are at present hired by the War Office as examination vessels. The conditions of the hiring and the services provided under the agreement differ so greatly from those in the case of the Admiralty that no fair comparison of the rates can be made.

NAVY SEPARATION ALLOWANCES

ibid. LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether Royal Fleet Reserve men and Royal Naval Reserve men serving in the R.F.A. *Petroleum* are allowed to make out allotments to their wives, thus allowing the wives to claim separation allowance; and if so, whether any allotments have been declared by these men and separation allowances paid?

DR. MACNAMARA: The scheme of Navy separation allowances extends only to naval ratings, Marines and Reservists, borne on the books of His Majesty's ships and paid at naval rates of pay. All men serving in the R.F.A. *Petroleum* receive mercantile rates of pay and consequently, although the full facilities for declaring allotments are open to them, separation allowance is not issuable in respect of them.

SECRET WIRELESS STATIONS

House of Commons, February 11, 1915.

MR. GEORGE TERRELL asked the Home Secretary whether *Hansard.* the Government are satisfied that they have control over every wireless station in this country capable of sending wireless messages to the enemy; and if not, whether he will consider the advisability of publishing such particulars of a wireless installation and the method of working it, as will enable the general public to assist the Government by searching for secret stations.

The POSTMASTER-GENERAL (MR. HOBHOUSE): My right hon. friend has asked me to reply to his question, as it is primarily one for the Post Office, which however acts in co-operation with the Home Office, Admiralty, and War Office. The Government are satisfied that the steps taken to ensure the detection of illicit wireless stations are adequate and that nothing would be gained by invoking the assistance of the general public in the manner suggested. Certain members of the public who have the necessary qualifications are already assisting the Government in the matter. I may perhaps draw the hon. Member's attention to a notice issued by the Admiralty on the subject which appeared in the Press on the 4th November. (*See Naval* 2, p. 28.)

INSURANCE POLICIES (WAR RISKS)

MR. PETO asked the President of the Board of Trade *ibid.* whether, though the different life insurance offices have agreed to waive the imposition of a war risk premium in respect to life policies held by those now engaged in His Majesty's Naval and Military Forces, they are imposing an additional premium of two guineas per cent. in the case of life insurance policies held by the captains and officers of vessels engaged by the

Government for transport duty and other services of great importance, where, in fact, the personal risk is considerably less ; and if so, whether he will consider the desirability of the Government intervening in this matter ?

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA) : I understand that the life insurance companies are asking for an additional premium of £3, 3s. per cent. per annum for new policies and £2, 2s. per cent. per annum for existing policies in the case of officers and others serving in vessels chartered by the Admiralty. It is not quite accurate to say that they are waiving the additional premium for those engaged in His Majesty's Naval and Military Forces. The exemption does not apply to members of the Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Reserve, nor to the Regular Army and Army Reserve, unless already insured at an all-risk rate. The additional premium demanded of those not so insured is, I understand, usually £5, 5s. per cent. per annum. The Life Offices Association and the Associated Scottish Life Offices Association have recommended that the premiums should be waived in the case of the Royal Naval Reserve, the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, the Territorial Force, and the new levies raised for the war only. The matter referred to by the hon. member has already been brought to the notice of the Admiralty, who are considering the advisability of approaching the companies on the subject.

COAL CARGOES

House of Commons, February 11, 1915.

Hansard. MR. WARDLE asked the President of the Board of Trade whether chartering agents of the Government have recently accepted freights on the open market for interned or captured German steamers to load coals at East Coast ports for London at the rate of 11s. per ton and upwards, such steamers still being chartered for similar business, while steamers hitherto regularly engaged in conveying coals for London have been requisitioned and loaded with gas coals for ports on the South-West Coast of France ; and, if so, whether he will state how this method of dealing with tonnage will increase the supply and reduce the price of coal in London ?

MR. RUNCIMAN : The reply to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. For the answer to that part of the

question which refers to the Admiralty, my hon. friend should address the Admiralty.

NAVAL CASUALTIES (JUDICIAL INQUIRY)

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the custom in the Navy with regard to holding a judicial inquiry following on the destruction of or serious damage to a warship has been discontinued; and, if so, will he give the reasons that have led to such a course being taken? *ibid.*

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (MR. CHURCHILL): The Board of Admiralty consider that it is not possible to lay down a rule on this subject in view of modern conditions. Each case must be judged on its merits, and the Board must exercise a complete discretionary power.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Are we to understand that each case has been heard on its merits, and no case has arisen for any judicial inquiry?

MR. CHURCHILL: Yes, sir.

LORD ROBERT CECIL: Can the right hon. gentleman say exactly what difference modern conditions of war make in this respect?

MR. CHURCHILL: The conditions of modern war are altogether different from former wars. The losses which take place owing to mines and submarines are quite different from any losses that occurred in former wars. That has a bearing on the question of courts-martial, for the losses of ships in former wars nearly always involved an act of surrender, whereas nowadays a ship is destroyed and there is no question of the capture of the ship. That is only one of many considerations for naval experts.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Will the right hon. gentleman consider the advisability of making a further statement to the House on the subject?

MR. CHURCHILL: I believe I am to bring in Navy Estimates next week, and these matters can be discussed then.

VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the Prime Minister, having regard to the fact that the German authorities have *ibid.*

wantonly broken the naval code of warfare contained in the Declaration of Paris, The Hague Conventions, and the Declaration of London, and in other ways have broken the laws and customs of war, whether the British Government will now place all food and raw material used to foster German industries on the list of absolute contraband of war immediately?

THE PRIME MINISTER: His Majesty's Government are considering, as the noble Lord is aware, the question of adopting more stringent measures against German trade, in view of the flagrant defiance by the enemy of the rules of warfare. I hope shortly to be able to make an announcement as to what these measures may be.

NAVY BOOTS (BRITISH AND FOREIGN LEATHER)

House of Commons, February 11, 1915.

Hansard. SIR CLEMENT KINLOCH-COOKE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is aware that since 1911 till within a few months ago the naval boot was made almost entirely of German or foreign material, and will he explain why the Admiralty were so anxious to serve the interests of German and other foreign leather manufacturers at the expense of the British manufacturers; whether a wearing test was furnished by the Admiralty when it was proved that the British material was in every way equal, if not superior, to the German or other foreign material; and whether, in spite of this fact, the Admiralty still continue using the German and other foreign material?

DR. MACNAMARA: Throughout the period mentioned in the first part of the question it has been stipulated in Admiralty boot contracts that the whole of the sole leather shall be of British manufacture. Contractors have been at liberty to use either British or foreign leather for the uppers, provided it was equal in quality to the sealed patterns. Since July 1912, two sealed patterns have been exhibited and issued together, namely, one with upper of British leather, and one with upper of foreign leather of equal quality. Thus British tanners of upper leather have had an equal opportunity with foreign tanners. At the request of the trade a six months' trial was made of the wearing qualities of a certain number of boots with uppers of British tanned leather in comparison

with a similar number of boots with uppers of foreign tanned leather, but owing to the impossibility of equalising the conditions of wear, the results could not be otherwise than inconclusive. So far as they went, they did not indicate any appreciable difference between British and foreign upper leather. As regards the last sentence in this question the hon. gentleman will probably see on reflection that it would be quite impossible to meet our needs at this time if restrictions as to sources of supply were insisted upon.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether in November last, the Admiralty received a deputation from the Light Leather Federation; whether that deputation asked the Admiralty to remove the German sealed standard pattern and to allow the specification to read that the Navy boots shall be made both of sole leather of British manufacture and of upper leather of British manufacture; what was the reply given; whether the German sealed pattern was then and there removed; and, if not, has it now been removed and at what date?

DR. MACNAMARA: The answers to the first two parts of the question are in the affirmative. The pattern with German upper leather, previously exhibited and issued with the other sealed pattern of English upper leather, was withdrawn immediately after the deputation had requested that step to be taken. The reply given on the other point referred to was that the question of stipulating for British upper leather, in addition to British sole leather, was one which could not be settled without further consideration. The present position I have already explained.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN: What is the reason for making a distinction between sole leather and upper leather?

DR. MACNAMARA: I think it is a question of durability, but I should like notice of the question.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he can now see his way to grant an all-British specification for naval boots; and whether he will consult with the Government on the justice of an assurance being given to British leather manufacturers that, if new plant be put down and the price adjusted to meet the Admiralty requirements, they will be secured in their position by the continued use of British material for naval boots?

DR. MACNAMARA: I think the points raised in this question will be found to have been answered in the two previous replies.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Are we to understand that the Lords of the Admiralty do not see their way to grant this request?

DR. MACNAMARA: At the present time we have, of course, to get supplies from the best sources available; we do not want soldiers to go barefooted to the fight.

MR. PETO: Has not the right hon. gentleman come to any decision as to the policy he will adopt after the present war is over?

DR. MACNAMARA: I have said that the question will be considered; in the meantime, I think we might as well postpone the fiscal controversy till we have beaten the Germans.

LOSS OF HIS MAJESTY'S SHIPS *BULWARK*, *GOOD HOPE*, AND *MONMOUTH*

House of Commons, February 11, 1915.

Hansard. MR. PRETYMAN asked the Secretary to the Admiralty whether pensions have been awarded to the widows and children of officers who lost their lives through the destruction of His Majesty's ship *Bulwark* on Scale B, whereas those pensions in the loss of the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* were on Scale A; whether the same discrimination has been shown in the case of dependants on the men of the lower deck who lost their lives on these ships; if not, whether officers and men can be similarly treated; will he say whether the scale of pensions for widows of marine officers is now lower than that of widows of naval officers of the same relative rank; and, if so, whether this inequality can now be removed?

DR. MACNAMARA: The hon. and gallant member is correct in his assumption that pensions on Scale B have been awarded in the case of the officers who lost their lives in the *Bulwark* and on Scale A in the case of the officers of the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*. Under present regulations the higher scale is only applicable where officers are killed in action or die as the result of wounds received in action, but the question whether the scale can be extended to cases such as the *Bulwark* is at present under consideration. There is

only one scale in the case of petty officers and men. The last part of the question, which doubtless has reference to the fact that certain marine officers when embarked hold higher relative rank than when ashore, is under consideration.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Do the payments under Scale B come out of naval funds or out of the Greenwich Hospital Funds?

DR. MACNAMARA: I imagine all these payments come out of the naval funds.

MR. PRETYMAN: When does the right hon. gentleman expect some decision to be arrived at, for till it is there are these widows receiving these very much smaller payments, and there is a great sense of injustice?

DR. MACNAMARA: With regard to the petty officers and men of the *Bulwark* the hon. and gallant gentleman may know that they are on the war scale. In respect of the officers, they are on Scale B—not so good a scale—because of the terms of the Regulations. I can assure the hon. and gallant gentleman that personally I have great sympathy with the suggestion that they should be on Scale A, and I will at any time exercise what influence I can to secure that result.

GERMAN RAIDERS

LORD C. BERESFORD asked the Prime Minister whether His Majesty's Government will, for the future, treat German raiders from the air and sea when captured as pirates, and publicly hang them for the murder of women and children in undefended places, when proved guilty of that crime after trial by court-martial, instead of treating them as honourable foes? *ibid.*

The PRIME MINISTER: I am not prepared to make any general statement. Each case as it comes must be decided on its merits.

AIRSHIP RAIDS

MR. FELL asked why the Zeppelin airships which traversed Norfolk recently were not fired at by the numerous forces stationed there; if there was ample opportunity for warning these forces of their passage and probable return so that an organised attack could be made upon them; and if the same immunity is to be afforded them on their next attack? *ibid.*

MR. TENNANT: It is obviously undesirable to make any detailed statement in answer to this question. It must not be assumed that, if fast-moving aircraft pass over places from which they cannot be effectively attacked and enjoy immunity from attack, the same good fortune will necessarily attend attacks directed against places where persons other than unprotected civilians are either present or can proceed.

MR. FELL: Are the orders of the War Office that these aircraft are not to be fired at?

MR. TENNANT: I do not think it desirable to make public the orders of the War Office.

MINE-SWEEPERS (PENSIONS AND ALLOWANCES)

Hansard. *House of Commons, February* 11, 1915.

MR. TICKLER asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will recommend the payment of the same separation allowances and pensions to the wives and dependants of the men serving on mine-sweepers as are payable to men in the Royal Navy?

DR. MACNAMARA: Navy separation allowance is payable only in respect of Naval ratings, Marines and Reservists borne on the books of His Majesty's ships and paid at Naval rates of pay. In the case of any men employed on mine-sweepers who fulfil these conditions the allowance would be paid, but the majority of the men so employed are in receipt of mercantile rates of pay which are usually found to exceed the pay of separation allowance of corresponding Naval ratings. Pensions and allowances to widows and dependants of men serving on mine-sweepers are paid under Naval Regulations, where the men during their lives were Naval ratings or Reservists, borne on ships' books and in receipt of Naval rates of pay; and under the scheme framed under the Injuries in War (Compensation) Act, 1914, where the men were not Naval ratings or Reservists and received Civil rates of pay.

HAGUE CONFERENCE, 1907 (CONVENTIONS RATIFIED)

ibid. MR. DENNISS asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he can now state which of the Conventions concluded

at the Second Peace Conference held at The Hague in 1907 have been ratified by the Government of Great Britain and Ireland, and which of them, severally, have been ratified by the other Powers engaged in the present War and other Great Powers of the world.

SIR EDWARD GREY: The information asked for by the hon. member is as follows:—

Conventions, etc., signed at the Second Peace Conference at The Hague, 18th October 1907

No. 1.—Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

No. 2.—Convention respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts.

No. 3.—Convention relative to the Opening of Hostilities.

No. 4.—Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.

No. 5.—Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land.

No. 6.—Convention relative to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities.

No. 7.—Convention relative to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships.

No. 8.—Convention relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines.

No. 9.—Convention respecting Bombardments by Naval Forces in time of War.

No. 10.—Convention for the Adaptation of the Principles of the Geneva Convention to Maritime War.

No. 11.—Convention relative to Certain Restrictions on the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Maritime War.

No. 12.—Convention relative to the Establishment of an International Prize Court.

No. 13.—Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Maritime War.

No. 14.—Declaration prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons.

TABLE OF RATIFICATIONS OF, AND ADHESIONS TO, THE CONVENTIONS SIGNED AT THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE, 1907

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.
1. Great Britain . .	—	R	R	R	—	R	R	RX	RX	—	R	—	—	R
3. Russia	R	R	R	RX	R	RX	R	—	R	R	—	—	R	—
2. France	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	RX	RX	R	R	—	R	—
4. Japan	RX	R	R	RX	R	R	R	R	RX	R	R	—	RX	—
6. Serbia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7. Montenegro . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Belgium	R	—	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	—	R	R
8. Germany . . .	R	R	R	RX	R	RX	R	RX	RX	R	R	—	RX	—
9. Austria-Hungary .	R	R	R	RX	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	—	R	—
10. Turkey	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
11. United States . .	RX	RX	R	R	R	—	—	R	R	R	R	—	AX	R
12. Italy	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

R=Ratified. X=Ratification of adhesion, subject to reserve. A=Adhered.

[For the text of the Conventions here numbered 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, see Appendix to *Naval* 1.]

COMPENSATION TO SEAMEN

House of Commons, February 11, 1915.

Hansard. LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the President of the Board of Trade if he has arrived at any decision on the recommendation of Sir H. Acton Blake to the Chief Industrial Commissioner that seamen of the mercantile marine should receive reasonable compensation for loss of kit in the cases of vessels molested by the enemy; and if he is prepared to extend the principle to the losses of effects sustained by masters and officers of interned British ships or of vessels captured and sunk by enemy cruisers since the outbreak of war, for which there is no recompense?

MR. RUNCIMAN: I understand that the recommendation referred to in the question was intended for the consideration of the parties concerned in the Liverpool inquiry, and not of His Majesty's Government. The Board of Trade are, however, prepared to give special facilities for insuring at a reasonable rate of premium the effects of masters, officers, and seamen for moderate amounts against war risks, provided that there is a prospect of those concerned availing themselves of a scheme

which has this object in view. The Board are at present in communication with representatives of Associations of Masters, Officers, and Seamen upon this subject.

LICENSED WATERMEN

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty why licensed watermen specially enlisted for examination duties between St. Helens and the Horse Fort at Portsmouth are not allowed separation allowance? *ibid.*

DR. MACNAMARA: The scheme of Navy separation allowance extends only to naval ratings, Marines and Reservists, borne on the books of His Majesty's ships and paid at naval rates of pay. The licensed watermen alluded to are paid at mercantile rates, and, consequently, separation allowance is not issuable in respect of them.

INTERNED ALIEN PRISONERS (PORTSMOUTH HARBOUR)

LORD C. BERESFORD asked the Prime Minister whether there are three large ships lying in Portsmouth Harbour containing about 4000 interned alien enemies; whether these alien enemies can have a full view of the proceedings in Portsmouth Dockyard and Harbour as well as of all signals made; whether other matters useful to the enemy could be observed by these prisoners; whether any of these prisoners have been released since their arrival at Portsmouth; if so, how many; and whether he can see his way to remove such a danger from the precincts of our first naval port and arsenal? *ibid.*

MR. CHURCHILL: The objections to prison ships lying in Portsmouth Harbour are admitted, though I am informed that, owing to the precautions taken, the amount of information that can be acquired by observation is not likely to be of any value. Owing to the large number of prisoners that had to be dealt with at short notice by the military authorities, no other arrangement at the time was possible, but steps are being taken to find other accommodation with as little delay as possible. From information supplied to me by the War Office, it appears that 351 prisoners have been released.

AIR RAIDS ON BELGIAN COAST

Times, Feb. 13, 1915.

The Secretary of the Admiralty made the following announcement last night :—

During the last 24 hours, combined aeroplane and seaplane operations have been carried out by the Naval Wing in the Bruges, Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe, and Ostend districts, with a view to preventing the development of submarine bases and establishments.

Thirty-four naval aeroplanes and seaplanes took part.

Great damage is reported to have been done to Ostend Railway Station, which, according to present information, has probably been burnt to the ground : the railway station at Blankenberghe was damaged, and railway lines were torn up in many places. Bombs were dropped on gun positions at Middlekerke, also on the power station and German mine-sweeping vessels at Zeebrugge, but the damage done is unknown.

During the attack the machines encountered heavy banks of snow.

No submarines were seen.

Flight Commander Grahame-White fell into the sea off Nieuport, and was rescued by a French vessel.

Although exposed to heavy gun-fire from rifles, anti-aircraft guns, mitrailleuses, etc., all pilots are safe. Two machines were damaged.

The seaplanes and aeroplanes were under the command of Wing Commander Samson, assisted by Wing Commander Longmore and Squadron Commanders Porte, Courtney, and Rathborne.

Main Headquarters, Berlin, February 12.

K.V.

After a long interval hostile warships yesterday appeared again off the coast. Enemy airmen dropped bombs on Ostend, but no military damage was done by them.

Paris, February 14.

Times, Feb. 15, 1915.

It is officially announced that French seaplanes from Dunkirk station successfully bombarded during last week

German military buildings and bodies of troops at Zeebrugge, as well as the railway station at Ostend.

The Secretary of the Admiralty communicates the following extract from *De Tijd* (February 22, 1915) :— *Times*, Mar. 10, 1915.

The Raid of the British Airmen.

Sluis, February 21.

The general opinion of the public is, that the raid of the British airmen was intended rather to obtain a moral effect, than to cause material damage. I was of the same opinion, until what I saw with my own eyes, and what I learnt from very reliable sources, made me change my mind. Besides the thirteen soldiers killed, and the thirty-five wounded in the Blankenberghe tram, and the submarine badly damaged at Zeebrugge, several batteries along the coast have greatly suffered, and a large number of guns have been totally destroyed. At Knocke, one officer and seven men were killed, as well as many artillerymen. The bombs did not kill any civilian, nor touch any house.

NOTICE TO MARINERS

(No. 108 of the year 1915) *L.G.*, Feb. 15, 1915.

ENGLAND—EAST COAST

River Humber—Pilotage

Former Notice (No. 84 of 1915) [1] hereby cancelled.

[1] [*See* p. 189.]

Mariners are hereby warned that, under the Defence of the Realm Regulations, 1914, the following instructions, respecting Pilotage of the River Humber, are now in force :—

Until further notice, the Outer Pilot Station of the Humber Pilotage District will be in the neighbourhood of the Bull Light-vessel.

All vessels proceeding into or out of the Humber must be navigated by way of Hawke and Sunk roads, passing to the northward of the Bull Light-vessel.

All vessels, irrespective of draught, size and nationality, bound to or from any place above Grimsby must be conducted by licensed Pilots over the whole or any part of the waters between Hull and the Outer Pilot Station.

In the cases of British vessels employed in the Coasting Trade of the United Kingdom, of British fishing vessels, and of British vessels of less than six feet draught of water, if bound between Grimsby and the sea, pilotage by licensed pilots will not be insisted upon.

When the Humber is closed to navigation, inward bound vessels must anchor in the neighbourhood of the Outer Pilot Station, and wait there until navigation is reopened, and pilots, when necessary, are available.

Authority.—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

By Command of their Lordships,

J. F. PARRY, *Hydrographer.*

Hydrographic Department, Admiralty,
London, 13th February 1915.

MERCHANT SHIPS (WAGES)

House of Commons, February 15, 1915.

Hansard. MR. PETO asked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been drawn to the recent increases in the pay of seamen and firemen; whether these increases have been demanded on account of the war, and after being declined by the shipowners were conceded under pressure; and whether, having regard to the fact that the captains and officers of merchant ships have made no demands in this way, he will, in view of the importance of their services to the country at the present juncture and the profitable nature of the shipping trade, recommend their case to the shipowners generally for greater monetary consideration than they are at present receiving?

The PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE (MR. RUNCIMAN): I am aware that increased wages are being paid to seamen, and, no doubt, the conditions of war have been a factor in the matter. As regards both the wages of seamen and the pay of masters and officers, the matter seems to me to be primarily one for arrangement between the parties concerned.

LOSS OF H.M.S. *FORMIDABLE*

SIR JOHN LONSDALE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty *ibid.*
if he is aware that on the 31st December, the night before the loss of His Majesty's ship *Formidable*, lights were observed at sea off Shoreham, and in a house on the sea-front at Hove flashlights were seen; was any report made by the police or the Coastguard of these incidents; and was any inquiry instituted?

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA): Full records are kept of all reports of signalling round the coast, and inquiries are made without delay. If the hon. member will forward details of the case to which he refers, it can then be ascertained whether the case has already been inquired into.

SIR J. LONSDALE: Will the right hon. gentleman inquire whether there are any yachts or motor boats at Shoreham owned by alien enemies or by Germans who have been naturalised?

DR. MACNAMARA: I will make inquiries.

TRAWLERS (RATE OF HIRE)

MR. HERBERT CRAIG asked the Financial Secretary to *ibid.*
the War Office whether the rate of hire for each of the trawlers hired by the War Office to serve as examination vessels is approximately £650 per month; whether he is aware that exactly similar trawlers are requisitioned for the service of the Admiralty at £100 per month; whether he is aware that the monthly charges borne by the owners of the War Office trawlers, from which the owners of the Admiralty trawlers are relieved, are estimated at about £200; and whether any investigation is being made into the circumstances under which the owners of trawlers in the service of the War Office are receiving more than four times the net amount received by the owners of exactly similar trawlers requisitioned for the service of the Admiralty?

MR. BAKER: The rate of hire in each case is approximately as given, but, as I stated in a reply to a previous

question,[1] no exact comparison can be made, nor can £200 be accepted as an estimate of the extra monthly charges on the owners of the War Office trawlers. Future terms are under consideration in connection with the approaching termination of the present agreements.

[1] [See p. 224.]

MIDSHIPMEN (ADMIRALTY REGULATIONS)

House of Commons, February 15, 1915.

Hansard. MR. PAGET asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he can take steps to remove or lessen the hardship borne by the parents of midshipmen now serving in His Majesty's ships who are compelled by the Admiralty's Regulations to pay £50 a year for the privilege of allowing their sons to fight for the country; and whether he can state what proportion of the £50, paid in advance half-yearly, is returned to the parents in the event of the midshipman being killed on active service?

DR. MACNAMARA: As I stated in reply to the hon. member for Hammersmith on the 4th instant,[1] I regret that I do not see my way to recommending a general remission of the private allowance payable on behalf of midshipmen, but where real necessity exists the Board of Admiralty is prepared to give favourable consideration to applications for whole or partial relief. With regard to the last part of the question, in the cases of midshipmen killed on active service, any sums deposited in advance in respect of a period subsequent to the date of death are returned to the guardians upon the closing of the private allowance accounts of the officers concerned.

[1] [See p. 191.]

GERMAN RAIDS (DAMAGE)

ibid. MR. FERENS asked the Prime Minister whether, in the event of damage arising from further raids by the enemy, compensation would be granted as in the case of Scarborough, etc.?

The PRIME MINISTER (MR. ASQUITH): As I recently stated, I am not prepared to give any general undertaking as regards future events. Each case will be considered on its merits.

SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES, 1915-16

MR. CHURCHILL'S STATEMENT

Order for Committee read. *ibid.*

The FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (MR. CHURCHILL): I beg to move, 'That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair.'

After the outbreak of war my noble friend Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, had to create an Army eight or ten times as large as any previously maintained or even contemplated in this country, and the War Office has been engaged in vast processes of expansion, improvisation and development entirely without parallel in military experience. Thanks, however, to the generous provision made so readily for the last five years by the House of Commons for the Royal Navy, no such difficulties or labours have confronted the Admiralty. On the declaration of war we were able to count upon a Fleet of sufficient superiority for all our needs with a good margin for safety in vital matters, fully mobilised, placed in its war stations, supplied and equipped with every requirement down to the smallest detail that could be foreseen, with reserves of ammunition and torpedoes up to and above the regular standard, with ample supplies of fuel and oil, with adequate reserves of stores of all kinds, with complete systems of transport and supply, with full numbers of trained officers and men of all ratings, with a large surplus of reserved and trained men, with adequate establishments for training new men, with an immense programme of new construction rapidly maturing to reinforce the Fleet and replace casualties, and with a prearranged system for accelerating that new construction which has been found to yield satisfactory and even surprising results.

I would draw the attention of the House in illustration to only three particular points. First of all, ammunition. If hon. members will run their eye along the series of figures for Vote 9, in the last five or six years, and particularly during the latter years, they will see an enormous increase in the vote. In time of peace one gets little credit for such expenditure, but in time of war we thank God it has been made. Then, Sir, oil. Most pessimistic prophecies were made as to the supply of oil, but no difficulty has been

found in practice in that regard. The estimates which we had formed of the quantity of oil to be consumed by the Fleet in war proved to be much larger than our actual consumption. On the other hand, there has been no difficulty whatever in buying practically any quantity of oil. No single oil ship has been interfered with on passage to this country. The price of oil to-day is substantially below what it was when I last addressed the House on this topic. Indeed we have found it possible to do what we all along wished to do, but hesitated to decide upon, on account of all the gloomy prophecies and views which were entertained—we have found it possible to convert the *Royal Sovereign* to a completely oil fuel basis, so that this ship equally with the *Queen Elizabeth* will enjoy the great advantages of liquid fuel for war purposes.

Then as to manning. No more widespread delusion existed than that although we might build ships we could never find men to man them. In some quarters of this country the idea was fostered that when mobilisation took place ships could not be sent fully manned to sea; but when mobilisation did take place we were able to man, as I told the House we should be able to, every ship in the Navy fit to send to sea. We were able to man a number of old ships which we did not intend to send to sea, but which, after being repaired and refitted, were found to have the possibility of usefulness in them. We were able to man in addition powerful new vessels building for foreign nations for which no provision had been made. We were able to man an enormous number—several score—of armed merchantmen which had been taken up and have played an important part in our arrangements for the control of traffic and trade. We were able to provide all the men that were necessary for the Royal Naval Air Service which never existed three years ago, which is already making a name for itself, and which has become a considerable and formidable body. We were able to keep our training schools full to the very brim so as to prepare a continual supply of drafts for the new vessels which are coming on in such great numbers, and over and above that we were able, without injury to any of these important interests, to supply the nucleus of instructors and trained men to form the cadres of the battalions of the Royal Naval Division which have now reached a respectable total

and which have developed an efficiency which enables them to be counted on immediately as a factor in the defence of this country, and very soon as an element in the forces which we can use overseas.

We have never been a military nation, though now we are going to take a hand in that. We have always relied for our safety on naval power, and in that respect it is not true to say we entered on this War unprepared. On the contrary, the German Army was not more ready for an offensive war on a gigantic scale than was the British Fleet for national defence. The credit for this is due to the House, which, irrespective of party interests, has always by overwhelming, and in later years unchallengeable majorities, supported the Government and the Minister in every demand made for naval defence. Indeed, such disputes as we have had from time to time have only been concerned with the margin of superiority, and have turned on comparatively small points respecting them. For instance, we have discussed at enormous length what percentages of *Dreadnought* superiority would be available in particular months in future years, and we have argued whether the *Lord Nelsons* should be counted as *Dreadnoughts* or not. The House of Commons as a whole has a right to claim the Navy as its child and as the unchanging object of its care and solicitude; and now after six months of war, with new dangers and new difficulties coming into view, we have every right to feel content with the results of our labour. Since November, when I last had an opportunity of speaking to the House on naval matters, two considerable events have happened—the victory off the Falkland Islands, and the recent successful cruiser action near the Dogger Bank. Both of these events are satisfactory in themselves, but still more are they satisfactory in their consequences and significance, and I shall venture to enlarge upon them and hang the thread of my argument upon them. The victory off the Falklands terminated the first phase of the Naval War by effecting a decisive clearance of the German flag from the oceans of the world. The blocking in of the enemy's merchantmen at the very outset and the consequent frustration of his whole plans for the destruction of our commerce, the reduction of his base at Tsingtau, the expulsion of his ships from the China Sea by Japan, the hunting

down of the *Königsberg* and the *Emden*, the latter by an Australian cruiser, were steps along the path to the goal finally reached when Admiral von Spee's powerful squadron, having been unsuccessfully though gallantly engaged off Coronel, was brought to action and destroyed on 8th December by Sir Doveton Sturdee. Only two small German cruisers and two armed merchantmen remain at large of all their formidable preparations for the attack on our trade routes, and these vessels are at present in hiding. During the last three months—that is to say, since Parliament rose—on the average about 8000 British vessels have been continuously on the sea, passing to and fro on their lawful occasion. There have been 4465 arrivals at and 3600 sailings from the ports of the United Kingdom. Only nineteen vessels have been sunk by the enemy, and only four of these vessels have been sunk by above-water craft. That is a very remarkable result to have been achieved after only a few months of war. I am sure, if we had been told before the war that such a result would be so soon achieved, and that our losses would be so small, we should not have believed it for a moment. I am quite sure, if the noble Lord whom I see in his place (Lord Charles Beresford), who has always felt, and quite legitimately, anxiety for the trade routes and the great difficulty of defending them—if he had been offered six months ago such a prospect, he would have said it is too good to be true.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: Hear, hear.

MR. CHURCHILL: Certainly the great sailors of the past, men of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, would have been astounded. During those two great wars, which began in 1793 and ended, after a brief interval, in 1814, 10,871 British merchant ships were captured or sunk by the enemy. Even after the decisive battle of Trafalgar, when we had the undisputed command of the sea so far as it can be tactically and strategically attained, the loss of British ships went on at a rate of over 500 ships a year. In 1806, 519 ships were sunk or captured—that is, the year after Trafalgar; in 1807, 559; in 1808, 469; in 1809, 571; and in 1810, 619. Our total losses on the high seas in the first six months of the war, including all ships other than trawlers engaged in mine-sweeping—including all ships, including losses by mines and

vessels scuttled by submarines—our losses in the whole of that period are only sixty-three. Of course, we must always be on the look-out for another attempt by the enemy to harass the trade routes. Although the oceans offer rather a bleak prospect to the German cruisers, and the experience of their consorts is not encouraging, the Admiralty must be fully prepared for that possibility, and we shall be able to meet any new efforts with advantages and resources incomparably superior to those which were at our disposal at the beginning of the war. The truth is that steam and telegraphs have enormously increased, as compared with sailing days, the thoroughness and efficiency of superior sea power. Coaling, communications, and supplies are vital and constant needs, and once the upper hand has been lost they become operations of almost insuperable difficulty to the weaker navy. Credit is due to our outlying squadrons and to the Admiralty organisation by which they have been directed. It must never be forgotten that the situation on every sea, even the most remote, is dominated and decided by the influence of Sir John Jellicoe's Fleet—lost to view amid the northern mists, preserved by patience and seamanship in all its strength and efficiency, silent, unsleeping, and, as yet, unchallenged.

The command of the sea which we have thus enjoyed has not only enabled our trade to be carried on practically without interruption or serious disturbance, but we have been able to move freely about the world very large numbers of troops. The Leader of the Opposition [1] in a speech which he made the other night [2]—I do not at all quarrel with the moderate and

[1] [Mr. Bonar Law.]

[2] [The following is the passage above referred to:—' I can assure the Prime Minister that I have heard from I cannot tell how many sources, friends of my own connected with the shipping trade, of ships that are lying idle for weeks and months. I will give the right hon. gentleman two examples, from friends of mine who are shipowners, of two different ships. I could give the names, but I am not sure that my friends would like me to do so, because they might think that the Admiralty would not be so fond of them in making contracts in the future. One ship was sent to the North to coal our Fleet. She discharged all her coal cargo except four hundred tons. She was then sent to Liverpool. My friend said he did not know what it was to do, but he supposed it was to discharge the coal. She lay there for a while, but did not discharge the coal. She then went to Cardiff, and loaded another cargo of coal, with the four hundred tons still in her. Any one with any idea at all of the way business is done will realise what that means. The other case is going on at this moment. A big ship has been

temperate tone of his criticism—quoted a letter of a shipowner as applied to the Admiralty Transport Department, in which the word 'incapacity' occurred. Of all the words which could be applied to the Admiralty Transport Department no word could be more unsuitable than the word 'incapacity.' I am going to give the House a figure which has no military significance because so many uncertain factors are comprised within the total, but which is an absolutely definite figure so far as the work of the Admiralty Transport Department is concerned. We have now moved by sea, at home and abroad, including wounded brought back from the front, including Belgian wounded; including Belgian and French troops, moved here and there as circumstances required, often at the shortest possible notice, with constant changes of plan, across oceans threatened by the enemy's cruisers and across channels haunted by submarines, to and fro from India and Egypt, from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, China, South Africa, from every fortress and Possession under the Crown, approximately 1,000,000 men without, up to the present, any accident or loss of life. If that is 'incapacity' I hope there will be an inexhaustible supply of that quality. The credit for these arrangements lies very largely with the head of the Admiralty Transport Department, Mr. Graeme Thomson—one of the discoveries of the war, a man who has stepped into the place when the emergency came, who has formed, organised, and presided over performances and transactions the like of which were never contemplated by any State in history. Indeed, so smoothly and unfailingly has this vast business, the like of which has not been previously witnessed, been carried through, that we have several times been compelled to remind the

lying up in the North for more than a month; two hundred tons only have been taken out of her, and my friend, who wrote only this week, said that he had no idea how much longer she would be kept idle. He used these words—I would not quote them if I did not think there was some justification for them:—

'"It all turns on the simple position that many of the men who are trying to handle things do not know what they are doing, and it seems an awful shame to throw the country's money away as it is being done. Freights amongst us are still booming, to which, of course, I could have no objection; but there is very little satisfaction in making money out of the present difficulty when one thinks of the incapacity which is the cause of it."'—*Hansard*, Feb. 11, 1915.]

soldiers whom we serve, and I now think it right to remind the House, that, after all, we are at war.

We are at war with the second Naval Power in the world. When complaints are made that we have taken too many transports or armed too many auxiliary cruisers, or made use of too many colliers or supply ships, I must mention that fact. The statement that the Admiralty have on charter, approximately, about one-fifth of the British Mercantile Marine tonnage is correct. With that we discharge two duties, both of importance at the present time: first, the supply, fuelling, and replenishing with ammunition of the Fleets; second, the transport of reinforcements and supply of the Army in the field, including the return of wounded. It must be remembered in regard to the Fleet that we have no dockyard or naval port at our backs, and that the bases we are using during the war have no facilities for coaling from the shore. We are not like the Germans, living in a great naval port at Wilhelmshaven, on which £15,000,000 or £16,000,000 has been spent. Rosyth is not finished, and will not be available for some time. Everything, therefore, required to keep the Fleet in being—supplies, stores, and, above all, fuel—has to be not only carried but kept afloat in ships. What are called the 'afloat reserves'—the great mobile reserves of fuel and stores maintained at the various bases used by the Fleet—are those which are fixed by the War Staff and approved by the Board of Admiralty after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief. When those amounts have been fixed the Transport Department have no choice but to supply them. It is necessary that there should be sufficient colliers to enable all the Fleet units at a particular base to coal simultaneously with a maximum rapidity twice over within a short interval, and extensive naval movements at high speed may at any moment necessitate this being put to the test. After two such coalings there must still be sufficient coal available for unforeseen contingencies, including delays in bringing further supplies through storm or foggy weather, or hostile operations leading to the closing of particular areas of water, or through the temporary suspension of coaling in South Wales, through damage to docks, railways, bridges, pits, or other local causes.

We cannot possibly run any risk of having the Fleet

rendered immobile. We must make assurance doubly sure. The life of the State depends upon it, and it follows, having always to be ready for a great emergency, with all the Fleet steaming at once continuously for days together—having always to be ready for that, it follows that during periods of normal Fleet movements the reserves of coal are often and necessarily turned over slowly, and colliers may in consequence remain at the bases for considerable periods. That is our system. The fact, therefore, that particular vessels are noticed by shipowners to be kept waiting about for long periods is no sign of mismanagement or incapacity on the part of the Admiralty, but it is an indispensable precaution and method without which the Fleet could not act in a time of emergency. The position at every home coaling base is telegraphed to the Admiralty nightly, and of every ship, and a tabulated statement is issued the same night. This statement is issued as the basis for comprehensive daily criticism, with a view to securing the highest possible economy compatible with and subject to the vital exigencies of war. So much for the Fleet and its supply and its coaling.

With regard to the Army, it should be remembered that we are supplying across the sea, in the teeth of the enemy's opposition, an Army almost as large as the Grand Army of Napoleon, only vastly more complex in organisation and equipment. We are also preparing other Armies still larger in number. I do not know on what day or what hour the Secretary of State for War will ask the Admiralty to move 20,000 or it may be 40,000 men. It may be at very short notice. He does not know, until we tell him, how we shall move them, by what route or to what ports. Plans are frequently changed on purpose at the very last moment; it is imperative for the safety of our soldiers and the reinforcement of our Armies and the conduct of the war. We have at the present moment a powerful and flexible machinery which can move whole armies with celerity wherever it is desired in a manner never before contemplated or dreamt of, and I warn the House most solemnly against allowing grounds of commercial advantage or financial economy to place any hampering restriction or impediment upon these most difficult and momentous operations. Careful and prudent administration does not stop at the outbreak of war. Everything in

our power will be done to enforce it and avoid extravagance. We shall therefore welcome the advice of business men on points where they can help us. Gradually, as we get more and more control of the situation, higher economy in some respects may be possible, but military and naval requirements must be paramount, rough and ready although their demands often are, and they must be served fully at the cost of all other considerations. I am afraid that I cannot hold out any hope of any immediate reduction in the tonnage required by the Admiralty.

More than a month ago, before these matters were at all ventilated in public, noticing the rise in freights, I directed the Fourth Sea Lord to hold an inquiry into the whole use of merchant ships taken by the Admiralty, including, particularly, transports, colliers and supply ships, but after the most stringent scrutiny and consultation with the admirals afloat, it was not found possible to make any appreciable reduction, and, indeed, since the 1st January the requirements of the Admiralty have actually increased. That is indeed only to be expected, as the size of the Fleet and the general scale of the military operations both grow continually. I am going into this subject a little at length because it is, I understand, to be the subject of a Motion later on in the evening, and I should ask for myself the indulgence of the House to attend to other business of a pressing nature, and leave the conduct of that debate in the hands of my right hon. friend the Financial Secretary. To sum up, then, the retention of a large number of full colliers and ammunition ships in attendance on the Fleet is a naval necessity. The retention of a large number of troop transports is a military necessity. In either case ships may be, and have frequently been, required at an hour's notice for urgent service which might be vital to the success of our operations. Coal must be ready afloat for the Fleet and troopships must be ready for the men, and no amount of business management, however excellent it may be, will get over that fact. It seems to me also, from reading the debate which took place the other night, that the impression existed in the House that the requisitioning of vessels at the outbreak of war was done recklessly and without consideration to the results to the commerce of the country. The number of ships taken up on

the outbreak of war was so enormous, the requirements were so varied, and the need so urgent, that every ship or vessel in port at the moment was taken. Discrimination, save in isolated instances, was therefore impossible.

It may be said that discrimination could have been exercised later. So far as possible this has been, and is being, done, but it must be remembered first that it is generally less disturbing to commerce to retain vessels to whose absence business conditions have been adjusted than to return them to their owners and take up fresh ships. Secondly, many vessels have been specially fitted for their work by the Government, and to fit others to replace them means delay and further congestion to docks and work. Also, while substitutes are being fitted, as the first ship cannot be released until the substitute is ready, two ships will be off the market during the period of refitting. Thirdly, it is militarily inconvenient to dispose of ships which the naval and military service have become used to handle, and whose officers and crews have learnt to do this special work. I can well understand that there may be some discontent among shipowners at present in consequence of Admiralty requisitions. Complaints are made that these requisitions are not fair as between shipowner and shipowner, and that all the tonnage of one line is taken and all the tonnage on another is left alone, and it is held to be a grievance when the Admiralty take the tonnage. But in other wars Admiralty business has been keenly sought after by shipowners. At the beginning of this war shipowners were only too glad to get their ships taken by the Government owing to the uncertainty of the naval situation and the possibility that ordinary cargoes would not be forthcoming. But now a change has taken place. The naval situation is assured for the present, and the requisitioning powers exercised under the Royal Proclamation have enabled the Admiralty to insist on rates of hire which, though they give a handsome profit to the shipowner, are very much less than can now be gained in the open market. The Admiralty rates are now a half or a third below the market rates, and cannot, of course, be expected to be popular with shipowners, although the market rates are enormously higher than they were at the time of the South African War. We are now paying 13s. to 17s. per gross ton per month compared with 20s. to 35s. so paid in the early

part of the South African War. Hence these complaints, and hence this talk of incapacity in certain quarters. I feel it my duty to defend the Admiralty Transport Department. I must, however, say that the general body of shipowners have loyally met the Government and have been content often and often to charter ships to us at rates very much below the market. The Admiralty is deeply indebted to the shipowning world in general for all the aid and co-operation which we have received, and we regard the closest union and good will between the Admiralty and the mercantile marine as indispensable at the present time.

I have said that the strain in the early months of the war has been greatly diminished now by the abatement of distant convoy work and by the clearance of the enemy's flag from the seas and oceans. There were times when, for instance, the great Australian convoy of sixty ships was crossing the Pacific, or the great Canadian convoy of forty ships, with its protecting squadrons, was crossing the Atlantic, or when the regular flow of large Indian convoys of forty and fifty ships sailing in company was at its height, both ways, when there were half a dozen minor expeditions being carried by the Navy, guarded and landed at different points and supplied after landing; when there was a powerful German cruiser squadron still at large in the Pacific or the Atlantic, which had to be watched for and waited for in superior force in six or seven different parts of the world at once, and when, all the time, within a few hours' steam of our shores there was concentrated a hostile fleet which many have argued in former times was little inferior to our own; and when there was hardly a Regular soldier left at home and before the Territorial Force and the New Armies had attained their present high efficiency and power—there were times when our naval resources, considerable as they are, were drawn out to their utmost limit, and when we had to use old battleships to give strength to cruiser squadrons, even at the cost of their speed, and when we had to face and to accept risks with which we did not trouble the public, and which no one would willingly seek an opportunity to share. But the victory at the Falkland Islands swept all these difficulties out of existence. It set free a large force of cruisers and battleships for all purposes; it opened the way to other operations of great interest; it enabled a

much stricter control and more constant outlook to be maintained in Home waters, and it almost entirely freed the outer seas of danger. That was a memorable event, the relief and advantage of which will only be fully appreciated by those who have full knowledge of all that has taken place, and will only be fully appreciated by those who not only knew, but felt, what was going forward.

Now, I come to the battle cruiser action on the Dogger Bank. That action was not fought out, because the enemy, after abandoning their wounded consort, the *Blücher*, made good their escape into waters infested by their submarines and mines. But this combat between the finest ships in both navies is of immense significance and value in the light which it throws upon rival systems of design and armament, and upon relative gunnery efficiency. It is the first test we have ever had, and, without depending too much upon it, I think it is at once important and encouraging. First of all it vindicates, so far as it goes, the theories of design, and particularly of big gun armament, always identified with Lord Fisher. The range of the British guns was found to exceed that of the German. Although the German shell is a most formidable instrument of destruction, the bursting, smashing power of the heavier British projectile is decidedly greater, and—this is the great thing—our shooting is at least as good as theirs. The Navy, while always working very hard—no one except themselves knows how hard they have worked in these years—have credited the Germans with a sort of super-efficiency in gunnery, and we have always been prepared for some surprises in their system of control and accuracy of fire. But there is a feeling, after the combat of 24th January, that perhaps our naval officers were too diffident in regard to their own professional skill in gunnery. Then the guns. While the Germans were building 11-inch guns we built 12-inch and 13-inch guns. Before they advanced to the 12-inch gun we had large numbers of ships armed with the 13.5. It was said by the opposite school of naval force that a smaller gun fires faster and has a higher velocity, and therefore the greater destructive power—and Krupp is the master gunmaker of the world—and it was very right and proper to take such a possibility into consideration. Everything that we have learnt, however, so far shows that we need not at all doubt the

wisdom of our policy or the excellence of our material. The 13.5-inch gun is unequalled by any weapon yet brought on the scene. Now we have the 15-inch gun, with which the five *Queen Elizabeths* and the five *Royal Sovereigns* are all armed, coming into line, and this gun in quality equals the 13.5-inch gun, and is vastly more powerful and destructive.

There is another remarkable feature of this action to which I should like to draw the attention of the House. I mean the steaming of our ships. All the vessels engaged in this action exceeded all their previous records without exception. I wonder if the House and the public appreciate what that means. Here is a squadron of the Fleet which does not live in harbour, but is far away from its dockyards and which during six months of war has been constantly at sea. All of a sudden the greatest trial is demanded of their engines, and they all excel all previous peace-time records. Can you conceive a more remarkable proof of the excellence of British machinery, of the glorious industry of the engine-room branch, or of the admirable system of repairs and refits by which the Grand Fleet is maintained from month to month and can, if need be, be maintained from year to year in a state of ceaseless vigilance without exhaustion. Take the case of the *Kent* at the Falklands. The *Kent* is an old vessel. She was launched thirteen years ago, and has been running ever since. The *Kent* was designed to go 23½ knots. The *Kent* had to catch a ship which went considerably over 24½ knots. They put a pressure and a strain on the engines much greater than is allowed in time of peace, and they drove the *Kent* 25 knots and caught the *Nürnberg* and sank her. It is my duty in this House to speak for the Navy, and the truth is that it is sound as a bell all through. I do not care where or how it may be tested; it will be found good and fit and keen and honest. It will be found to be the product of good management and organisation, of sound principle in design and strategy, of sterling workmen and faithful workmanship and careful clerks and accountants and skilful engineers, and painstaking officers and hardy tars. The great merit of Admiral Sir D. Beatty's action is that it shows us and the world that there is at present no reason to assume that, ship for ship, gun for gun, and man for man, we cannot give a very good account of ourselves. It shows

that at five to four in representative ships—because the quality of the ships on either side is a very fair representation of the relative qualities of the lines of battle—the Germans do not think it prudent to engage, that they accepted without doubt or hesitation their inferiority, that they thought only of flight just as our men thought only of pursuit, that they were wise in the view they took, and that if they had taken any other view they would, unquestionably, have been destroyed. That is the cruel fact, which no falsehood—and many have been issued—no endeavour to sink by official communiqués vessels they could not stay to sink in war, would have obscured.

When, if ever, the great Fleets draw out for general battle we shall hope to bring into the line a preponderance, not only in quality, but in numbers, which will not be five to four, but will be something considerably greater than that. Therefore, we may consider this extra margin as an additional insurance against unexpected losses by mines and submarine, such as may at any moment occur in the preliminaries of a great sea battle. It is for these important reasons of test and trial that we must regard this action of the Dogger Bank as an important and, I think I may say, satisfactory event. The losses of the Navy, although small compared with the sacrifices of the Army, have been heavy. We have lost, mainly by submarine, the lives of about 5500 officers and men, and we have killed, mainly by gun fire, an equal number, which is, of course, a much larger proportion of the German forces engaged. We have also taken, in sea fighting, 82 officers and 934 men prisoners of war. No British naval prisoners of war have been taken in fighting at sea by the Germans. When they had the inclination they had not the opportunity, and when they had the opportunity they had not the inclination. For the loss of these precious British lives we have lived through six months of this War safely and even prosperously. We have established for the time being a command of the sea such as we had never expected, such as we have never known, and our ancestors had never known at any other period of our history. There are those who, shutting their eyes to all that has been gained, look only at that which has been lost, and seek to dwell—they are not a very numerous class—unduly upon it. We are

urged to hold a court-martial in every case where a ship is lost in action, and to hear the talk in some quarters one would suppose that the loss of a ship by mine or submarine necessarily involved a criminal offence.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN: No, no.

MR. CHURCHILL: Not in the quarters which the right hon. gentleman frequents perhaps. One would suppose that it involves a criminal offence for which somebody should be brought to book. The Admiralty have lately given careful consideration to this question. No doubt the precedents both in peace and war favour, though they do not enjoin, the holding of a court-martial when ships are lost or captured, but the circumstances and conditions of modern naval warfare are entirely different from all previous experience. In old wars the capture or destruction of ships was nearly always accompanied by an act of surrender which was a proper and very necessary subject for investigation by court-martial. But mines and submarines, especially submarines, create conditions entirely novel, presenting to naval officers problems of incomparable hazard and difficulty. In these circumstances a court-martial would frequently be inappropriate in our judgment, and often even harmful. Losses by mine and submarine must frequently be placed on the same footing as heavy casualties on land. They cannot be treated as presumably involving a dereliction of duty or a lack of professional ability. Thirdly, the speed and skill of modern operations, and the continuous demands on the attention of the Admiralty and on the services of naval officers, especially officers of high rank, make the actual holding of courts-martial very difficult and inconvenient. Energy ought not to be consumed in investigations and discussions of incidents beyond recall, but should be concentrated on new tasks and new difficulties. Nothing could be worse for the Navy or the Admiralty than for public attention or naval attention to be riveted on half a dozen naval *causes célèbres* which would give opportunities for most acrimonious and controversial discussions, about which you may be perfectly certain two opinions would always remain at the close. When a clear case of misconduct or failure in duty can be presumed, a court-martial may be necessary. When technical or special matters are raised which it is desirable to elucidate with a

view to precautions being taken to prevent similar accidents in the future, Courts of Inquiry have been and will be assembled, but in all these matters, I must respectfully claim, on behalf of the Board of Admiralty, an absolute discretionary power with regard to holding courts-martial, or Courts of Inquiry, or the removal without trial of officers who have forfeited the confidence of the Board, or the publication of particular information on particular incidents. I ask the House, on behalf of the Board, for their confidence and support during the war in this respect. I would especially deprecate anything being done which tends to make officers, whether afloat or at the Admiralty, play for safety and avoid responsibility for positive action.

Losses have to be incurred in war, and mistakes will certainly be made from time to time. Our Navy keeps the sea; our ships are in constant movement; valuable ships run risks every day. The enemy is continually endeavouring to strike, and from time to time accidents are inevitable. How do you suppose the battle-cruiser squadron of Sir David Beatty was where it was when the action of 24th January took place? How many times is it supposed that the squadrons of the Grand Fleet, the cruiser and battle squadrons, have been patrolling and steaming through the North Sea, always exposed to risk by mine and torpedo before at last they reaped their reward? If any mood or tendency of public opinion arises, or is fostered by the newspapers, or given countenance to in this House which makes too much of losses, even if they are cruel losses, and even if it may be said that they are in some respects avoidable losses, even then I say you will have started on a path which, pressed to its logical conclusion, would leave our Navy cowering in its harbours instead of ruling the seas. When I think of the great scale of our operations, the enormous target we expose, the number of ships whose movements have to be arranged for, of the novel conditions to which I have referred, it is marvellous how few have been our losses, and how great the care and vigilance exercised by the admirals afloat and by the Admiralty Staff, and it appears to me, and it will certainly be regarded by those who study this war in history, as praiseworthy in the highest degree.

The tasks which lie before us are anxious and grave. We

are, it now appears to be, the object of a kind of warfare which has never before been practised by a civilised State. The scuttling and sinking at sight, without search or parley, of merchant ships by submarine agency is a wholly novel and unprecedented departure. It is a state of things which no one had ever contemplated before this war, and which would have been universally reprobated and repudiated before the war. But it must not be supposed because the attack is extraordinary that a good defence and a good reply cannot be made. The statutes of ancient Rome contain no provision for the punishment of parricides, but when the first offender appeared it was found that satisfactory arrangements could be made to deal with him. Losses no doubt will be incurred, but—of that I give full warning—but we believe that no vital injury can be done. If our traders put to sea regularly and act in the spirit of the gallant captain of the merchant ship *Laertes*,[1] whose well-merited honour has been made public this morning, and if they take the precautions which are proper and legitimate, we expect that the losses will be confined within manageable limits, even at the outset, when the enemy must be expected to make his greatest effort to produce an impression.

[1] [*See* p. 221.]

All losses can, of course, be covered by resort on the part of shipowners to the Government insurance scheme, the rates of which are now one-fifth of what they were at the outbreak of war. On the other hand, the reply which we shall make will not perhaps be wholly ineffective. Germany cannot be allowed to adopt a system of open piracy and murder, or what has always hitherto been called open piracy and murder on the high seas, while remaining herself protected by the bulwark of international instruments which she has utterly repudiated and defied, and which we, much to our detriment, have respected. There are good reasons for believing that the economic pressure which the Navy exerts is beginning to be felt in Germany. We have to some extent restricted their imports of useful commodities like copper, petrol, rubber, nickel, manganese, antimony, which are needed for the efficient production of war materials, and for carrying on modern war on a great scale. The tone of the German Chancellor's recent remarks, and the evidences of hatred and anger against this country which are so apparent in the German Press, encourage

us to believe that this restriction is proving inconvenient. We shall, of course, redouble our efforts to make it so. So far, however, we have not attempted to stop imports of food. We have not prevented neutral ships from trading direct with German ports. We have allowed German exports in neutral ships to pass unchallenged. The time has come when the enjoyment of these immunities by a State which has, as a matter of deliberate policy, placed herself outside of all international obligations must be reconsidered. A further declaration on the part of the allied Governments will promptly be made which will have the effect for the first time of applying the full force of naval pressure to the enemy. I thank the House for the attention with which they have listened to me. The stresses and strains of this war are not imperceptible to those who are called on to bear a part in the responsibility for the direction of the tremendous and terrible events which are now taking place. They have a right to the generous and indulgent judgment and support of their fellow countrymen, and to the goodwill of the House of Commons. We cannot tell what lies before us, or how soon or in what way the next great developments of the struggle will declare themselves, or what the state of Europe and the world will be at its close. But this, I think, we can already say, as far as the British Navy is concerned, that although no doubt new dangers and perplexities will come upon us continuously and anxiety will make its abode in our brain, yet the danger and anxiety which now are advancing upon us will not be more serious or more embarrassing than those through which we have already successfully made our way. For during the months that are to come the British Navy and the sea power which it exerts will increasingly dominate the general situation, will be the main and unfailing reserve of the allied nations, will progressively paralyse the fighting energies of our antagonists, and will, if need be, even in default of all other favourable forces, ultimately by itself decide the issue of the war.

MR. BONAR LAW: Let me first get out of the way the reference which the right hon. gentleman made to some remarks of mine with regard to the employment of some of our ships by the Admiralty. I am very far from complaining of the reference which has been made by the right hon. gentle-

man. He is not generally peaceful when he is attacked, and I recognise that the temper in which he approached it to-day is significant of the general frame of mind with which the House approaches all these questions, and I personally am not going to introduce heat where he has introduced none. The right hon. gentleman, however, entirely misunderstood the whole basis of the case which I was trying to put before the House of Commons. The very last thing in the world which I should do would be to suggest that the servants of the Admiralty, or the Civil servants of any Department of the Government, are inefficient. I believe, as I have always believed, that our Civil Service is the best in the world, and that it is as good to-day as it has ever been. That is not my position. All my complaint was that to men work is given to do which from their past, I think, they are incapable of performing adequately, while there are others who might be available who would be capable of doing that work. I do not suggest that it has been incompetently done, from the point of view of getting the troops transported or the supplies carried. Every word of the right hon. gentleman seemed to me to be a confirmation of the kind of complaint which I made. They will take care that they will have the ships when they are wanted, but the real ground of complaint is that proper care, by men who understand the business, is not taken to make sure that more ships are not kept idle than are required without any lessening of the efficiency. This is the first essential in a case of the kind. I am not going into this again, but I shall read one other extract from the *Shipowners' Gazette*. The right hon. gentleman is quite wrong in thinking that the shipowners are complaining because they are suffering. It is the other way. As a class they are gaining by what is happening, and they are gaining immensely. This is the case to which I have referred. If the right hon. gentleman wishes I will give the name, but I will not state it here. It is in reference to a steamer which can carry 4500 tons. It states:—'This steamer has been lying about different places in the North of Scotland since the 8th November, and, according to our last communication received from the master, dated the 8th February, at that time she had still 1100 tons on board.' In other words, she had still on the 8th February, 1100 tons of cargo to discharge,

of a total which did not exceed 4500 tons. In other words, this ship had been lying about doing nothing for three or four months.

MR. CHURCHILL: Really the right hon. gentleman, if I may say so with great respect, does not understand the facts. The fact that the ship had been waiting about doing nothing does not mean that she was not usefully employed. She has been carrying a portion of the indispensable fixed floating reserve of coal which is kept continually available at the different bases. If she was not carrying it, some other ship would have had to be carrying it. The whole of these ships, coal ships, ammunition ships and supply ships, are always waiting about until a sufficient quantity of the commodity in question has been accumulated, and is maintained regularly in a floating position.

MR. BONAR LAW: With all respect, the right hon. gentleman does not understand my position. Does any one suggest that, if proper arrangements were made, a ship carrying 4000 tons would be allowed to lie idle for three months, when a ship carrying 1000 tons would equally have been available, and could equally have been taken and used for the purpose for which this larger ship was employed? There is no use in discussing the matter, but I am perfectly certain that if the right hon. gentleman, instead of doing what every man would do in his place and defending the action of his Department, would have a return taken of the actual movements of a certain number of these ships and of what they have been doing day by day since the Government took them, and if he would consult with some competent shipowner as a result of that investigation, and then try to remedy the defect, he would, without any loss of efficiency, save this country an immense sum of money. However, we are dealing with much more important subjects than that. To win the war is more important than to win it cheaply. The right hon. gentleman has made an extremely interesting speech, to which the House has listened with great satisfaction and with great sympathy. I remember the speech made by him towards the end of the first half of this session[1] and, as it seems to me, there is an entirely different atmosphere now surrounding the Navy from that which existed then. During the first period of the war there was a feeling not so much

[1] [*See Naval 2*, pp. 319-328.]

of anxiety perhaps, but of doubt and uncertainty, as to the Navy. That was due, of course, entirely to some isolated incidents which had not been favourable to us. I have referred to some of them before. Perhaps they may be referred to again in this debate, but I shall not allude to them beyond saying this, that some of them—and I am sure the right hon. gentleman will agree with me—when the proper time comes, must be examined and must be discussed in this House, and perhaps must be criticised. But that feeling of uncertainty was never shared by me, and I said so in this House at the time. In considering the work of the Navy, not from the point of view of its effect on the Government, but from that of the position with regard to the nation, we have to look, not to isolated incidents, but to its work as a whole, and perhaps the best way for us to realise how successful is that work is to do what was done by the right hon. gentleman, to cast our minds back to the period before the war and to consider what were the dangers which then seemed to threaten us in the event of an outbreak of war.

The right hon. gentleman has referred to them. There were two. There was the danger of interference with our commerce. I think every one would have felt—I certainly did before the war broke out—that that was a very real danger, for if at that time we had received word that ships were being sunk or captured before we had the knowledge that our supremacy at sea was secure, it would have had an effect on the people of this country very much greater than similar incidents would have now. We are now threatened, as the right hon. gentleman has reminded us, with a new form of this kind of pressure. I was pleased to hear that he is not alarmed. No doubt the attempt will be made. I think that if it could have been made effectively it would have been made already, and I do not think that we have any reason to be greatly alarmed; and I am sure of this, that if the result is to compel us to exercise more firmly our sea pressure on the enemy the result will be nothing but advantage to the Allies. The other great danger—and it was a far more vital one—was that, inasmuch as we all knew that when war came it would come unexpectedly to us, but arranged by our enemies, the German fleet, which is an extraordinarily powerful weapon, which was kept constantly

in its full force ready for war, would catch us when we were divided, and, by fighting part of our Fleet, might do something to bring about a greater equality between the naval forces of the two countries. Both of these dangers, in my opinion, were averted by the promptitude with which the Admiralty mobilised our Fleet and placed it, I believe even before mobilisation was complete, in its war station, so as to prevent an attack upon our Fleet in parts, or even the escape of German cruisers to prey upon our commerce. That is a great achievement, and must be considered by us in regard to the work that is done by our Navy.

But in this war, as in every war in which we have been engaged since sea power was ours, the work of the Navy is to-day silent work. The right hon. gentleman referred in a striking phrase to the silence of the Navy. It is indeed unbroken except by the guns of the ships and the pen of the right hon. gentleman, both perhaps necessary, but especially the guns. There is something, as it seems to me, in the silence with which this work is done which ought to touch our imagination. For six months our great battle Fleet, its movements, its very position, the hopes and fears of those who control it, have all been shrouded in obscurity. We knew nothing of it. For a moment the veil was broken when the units of the Fleet swooped down upon the enemy in the South Atlantic and avenged—and more than avenged—the previous disaster in the Pacific. It was broken again in an action in the North Sea, and in both cases the lifting of the veil has not only given new confidence to the people of this country, but has shown that, when the time comes that the enemy are prepared to face our Fleet in part or in whole, the result will not be in doubt. As regards these raids they were not pleasant to the people of this country. It was not nice to think that German battleships could come and bombard defenceless towns and get away again without being touched. The last time they found that that was a risk which carried some danger, and perhaps it will not be so soon repeated. But if the Germans had any object at all in these raids, beyond desperation and the feeling that they must do something to justify the existence of their fleet, it was to tempt us to divide our forces so as to give an opportunity of attacking them in isolated positions. Certainly it

has not had that effect, and it will never have it. I remembered, and I turned up this morning a saying of Nelson which shows how completely in essence, in spite of all the changes, the problem of naval power remains the same. He said this more than 100 years ago: 'Our great reliance is on the vigilance and activity of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in the number of which, by applying them to guard our ports and beaches, would, in my judgment, tend to our destruction.' That is as true to-day as it was then, and the work of the Navy is to be ready for the time when the fleet of the Germans is prepared to meet us. I should like to say a word or two about the subject of courts-martial. I entirely disagree, so far as I understood him, with everything the right hon. gentleman said on this subject. I think he looked upon it entirely from the wrong point of view. It is the fact, as he has admitted, that during the whole of our past history courts-martial have been held. The right hon. gentleman seemed to think that to hold a court-martial was to condemn in advance the officer who had done something. It really is nothing of the kind. The use of the court-martial is quite as much to defend the honour of the man who has done something as to condemn him, and I do not follow the argument of the right hon. gentleman. He says that if an officer knows that he is liable to that sort of thing it will make him timid, and make him play for safety, and make our fleets cower under forts. What is the position under the right hon. gentleman's arrangement? The officer is still subject to the arbitrary action of the Admiralty. That is just as great a danger, and it may easily be a far greater danger than open examination in court-martial. I really cannot understand the ground on which the practice has been abandoned. The right hon. gentleman said, you cannot have a court-martial as to a submarine disaster with advantage. Why? If the damage inflicted by a submarine were an act of God which no precaution could guard against, then there would be something in the claim of the right hon. gentleman. Courts-martial have always been held upon ships which run aground, and if it be true, as I believe it is, that the danger from submarines can be guarded against by proper precautions, then surely there is more need, rather than less, for courts-martial being held, in order

to see whether every available precaution was taken to guard against the danger. There is something else I should like to say. I entirely agree with the right hon. gentleman that in a time of stress the Admiralty must have absolute power to dismiss any man whom they think incompetent, or even if they think they have a better man, though the first is not incompetent, to dismiss him without giving any reason. In no other way will you get efficiency, and nobody, in my opinion, can be too ruthless in such a position, and I would be the last to condemn the Admiralty, even if they made a mistake and dealt unjustly with some man, provided I knew, as I do, that in making these changes their one object was to secure the best man to do the work required. That is true.

But how is that affected by holding courts-martial in such cases as I have pointed out? It is better to speak frankly in all these cases, but I think it is even in the interests of the Admiralty that these courts-martial should be held. Rumours have reached me—I give them no credence whatever, and they must have reached the right hon. gentleman himself—that some of these disasters are due to direct instructions from the Admiralty itself, and it has even been said—I do not believe it for a moment—that this is one reason why courts-martial are not being held. I say let them return to the old custom, and they will get rid of that kind of thing. I am not going to speak too dogmatically about subjects which I admit I only partially understand. There may be reasons why this course should not continue to be adopted; but this I say, we have not got them yet. I said the other day that at a time like this the powers of a dictatorship must be given to the Government. I think that is right. That is the only way in time of danger that we can do the business of the nation. But with the best intentions dictators are apt to get to love their powers, and one of the evils of a dictatorship is secrecy. Where it is necessary let us have it, but if it is not necessary let us so far as possible stick to the old custom, where publicity has hitherto done no harm, and let us remember it was justified not only by the experience of years and years of peace, but was justified by experience in the Long War, which was as dangerous to this country as the war in which we are engaged.

What are the real problems which lie before us? I quoted the words of Nelson a short time ago, and anybody who thinks

about this war must be struck by the resemblance between the conditions under which we are asserting our sea power to-day and the conditions under which we asserted it one hundred years ago. The problems are really the same. Sir John Jellicoe for six months has been doing the same work in precisely the same way as it was done by Nelson when he lay off Toulon. The Germans are fighting on the sea in precisely the same way as the French fought against us. They are fighting a defensive war, which must be very galling to them, for it is not their method of carrying on operations on land, and it has resulted in the loss of the whole of their commerce. It is a most difficult kind of war for us to deal with. It requires above everything else, patience. It necessitates that so long as an immense fleet is in being, with its great efficiency in gunnery, the main duty of our Fleet is to keep itself together, ready to attack it the moment it shows itself. The dangers are the same to-day as they were a hundred years ago. One of these dangers was the attitude of neutral Powers. Sea power inevitably irritates neutral States in a way that the exercise of military power on land never could do. That was a great danger to our ancestors. They faced it, even to the extent of having a league of neutral Powers against them in Europe, and to the extent, which can never happen to us, I believe, of being involved in a war with America. So far, in connection with that danger, we have been helped by the clumsiness and brutality of the methods of our enemies, for any neutral State which feels itself aggrieved has only to ask itself this question: After what we have seen of the way in which the laws of war by sea and land have been disregarded by the Germans, what would be the position of neutral countries if the case were reversed, and sea power were in the hands, not of Great Britain, but of Germany? We have got to think of all this. I do not suggest for a moment that we should not pay the strictest attention, and the strongest regard even, to the interests and susceptibilities of neutrals, and we must respect their rights. But we are engaged in a life and death struggle. The weapon by which we hope to bring this war to a close is sea power, and no Government would be justified in giving up a single one of the rights which that sea power gives in the war in which we are now engaged. I think history may repeat itself again. Napoleon tried to delay the decision of

sea power for I do not know how many years. He was driven by sea pressure to hazarding at last. The same reasons which compelled Napoleon to take that step will, I think, have the same effect to-day, and they are stronger to-day, for Napoleon had only pressure by sea and our enemies are feeling the pressure by land. I think it not only possible but probable that that pressure may ultimately, will ultimately, compel the German Emperor to risk his Navy in a sea fight. The sooner the better, and, though in this war there is neither a Nelson nor a Napoleon, I think if the opportunity comes there will be another Trafalgar.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: The right hon. gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty has made a most remarkable speech, and a speech well suited to a most remarkable crisis in our history. At the end of his speech the right hon. gentleman called attention to a fact, about which my right hon. friend the Leader of the Opposition has also spoken, and that is as to how it would be possible to end this war as soon as that can be done. The suggestion made by the right hon. gentleman that the Government are considering whether they will not do away with all those treaties, such as the Declaration of London, the Declaration of Paris, and The Hague Conference, so far as Germany is concerned, would no doubt put the economic question on a far tighter strain on Germany, both as to the right of search and as to examining goods in neutral ships. But if I may venture to suggest to the right hon. gentleman the best way to bring the matter about is to recognise that we have Allies. 'We" is always stronger than 'I.' If we had a Note sent from France, from Russia, from Japan, and Great Britain, to say that we who are all equally concerned in ending this war, and are all equally concerned in stopping any supply whatever that could benefit Germany, then I do not think that we should have any trouble with the neutral Powers. I do not think we should have any trouble with the United States where we do know there is a large section of Germans and Irish who dislike the English, and dislike the English having command of the sea, although that gives the freedom of the sea to all. I do think it would be a very excellent idea if we could present a Joint Note, all of us being equally interested to end this war, from the four Allies. I do not think that has been done yet,

and I would recommend it to the right hon. gentleman merely to think of.

As to the right hon. gentleman's remarks in his most interesting speech, I agree in the main with everything he said; nearly everything he said. The action of the Fleet has simply been magnificent. There they are with their silent vigil—they are always on the look out. Nothing could have been better than the explanation of the right hon. gentleman of what the officers and men have been doing. There they are at sea always ready, engines always ready, bunkers always full, as far as they can be, and not one minute in which they may not be ordered out at full speed, and not one minute in which they may not be attacked. I say that the officers and men of the Fleet have maintained the splendid traditions of the past. With the forces they have had at their disposal they have saved us from invasion. They have maintained the freedom of the seas for everybody except our enemies, and they have spared us in this country all the agonies of France and Belgium. I think the right hon. gentleman will agree that no Government has ever before, since this war has commenced, been so loyally supported as the present Government has been by the Opposition. We want to help the Government to help to finish the war. But the Prime Minister the other day, very wisely I thought, invited criticism. I propose to refer to certain incidents. The right hon. gentleman himself has referred to them, but he does not take the same view of those incidents as I do and as a great number of other people do. They produced catastrophes involving loss of life of a very large number of officers and men. I hope in the remarks that I am going to make that I shall keep the subject within discreet and patriotic lines. Fair criticism is what I want to make. I think there are certain disquieting facts that call for investigation. The reasons for my criticism are as follows:—I maintain that the catastrophes that occurred, and I am merely speaking of submarine catastrophes and nothing else, were quite preventable, and I also say that most of the risks run that caused those catastrophes had no real, no definite, object in them whatever. My criticism is mainly to prevent a recurrence of them.

The right hon. gentleman was perfectly right in saying that you must run risks in war. Of course you must.

Either the Admiralty or an Admiral would be perfectly justified in losing a whole squadron of *Dreadnoughts* and sending them deliberately to their doom in order to win the action for the rest of the Fleet, and the officers and men would cheerfully undertake that order and do their best, although they knew it was certain death. We have lost by submarine attack the *Hogue*, the *Aboukir*, the *Cressy*, the *Hermes*, the *Hawke*, and the *Formidable*. I only take those six ships because they are ships with large ships' companies and ships that ought to have been defended by screens. The right hon. gentleman rather astonished me by saying that we had lost over 5000 men by submarines.

MR. CHURCHILL: Mainly by submarines.

LORD C. BERESFORD: I took it we had lost between three and four thousand by submarines. Speaking of losses, the Admiralty issued an Order after three cruisers had been lost that other cruisers or ships in the vicinity were not to proceed to the rescue of the men who were lost in a ship mined or torpedoed. There was some discussion about this matter in the Press. It seems an unnatural Order, but to seamen and men accustomed to the sea, it is a very wise Order. May I give the House an experience. There is not a captain hardly in the Service that has not a moment of intense anxiety as to what he should do in these circumstances. A man falls overboard in a gale of wind, and you will always get volunteers to man a cutter, it does not matter what gale the wind is blowing. The question is, is the captain justified in manning the boat with twelve men, an officer and a coxswain, that is fourteen men in all, in order to try and save the man overboard when the chances are that it is almost certain he will lose the other fourteen men? It is a terrible moment, we have all experienced it, and you are obliged to sacrifice the other man. I think the Admiralty Order is perfectly right, that when a ship is in company with a vessel that is mined or torpedoed, that no company ships are to go to her rescue. I think that requires explanation in the country, because there has been a good deal of discussion about that Order. With regard to the losses by the submarines, I maintain with regard to those six ships that the losses were unwarrantable, avoidable and preventable, and that there was no adequate compensation, or could not have been any adequate compensation, for the risks

run. It is due to the relatives and dependants that there should have been an inquiry and a court-martial. A court-martial ought to have been held to find out who was to blame for what they considered, and I consider, preventable disasters. I got a great number of letters from the relatives and dependants of those men lost by the submarine incidents, and the majority of them put this question, 'We consider so and so was murdered as he had no chance in a fair fight and the accident was preventable.' What does the Admiralty say about this? I find fault with the right hon. gentleman and the Admiralty that all we have ever heard was that those ships were of no military value. Why put them in and why put officers in them? It is very poor consolation and, I think, an unfeeling and unmerited remark. There was no sentiment of respect paid to the memory of one of those officers or men who went to their death under those circumstances. I think it would have been more in consonance——

MR. CHURCHILL: It is quite untrue to say that.

LORD C. BERESFORD: The right hon. gentleman says it is not true. I never meant to make an untrue statement, but I never saw in the public Press a single sentence with regard to the loss of those men except that the ships were of no military value. Perhaps the right hon. gentleman will tell me what it was.

MR. CHURCHILL: I will send you the statement.[1]

LORD C. BERESFORD: I am not only saying that. I have had frequent letters to say that that is all that anybody has received about them. In the remarks that I am making I hope nobody will think that I am going to criticise the Admirals. Nobody has a right to criticise the Admirals in any adverse way, because remember they have no right of reply. We have every right to criticise the authority which must be paramountly responsible for anything that occurs to the Fleet. If such matters as I refer to are not cleared up, there is no doubt that we shall be in danger of the officers and men of the Fleet losing their confidence in the authority which is absolutely necessary in war time. I would remind the right hon. gentleman also that on the occasion of the loss of the cruisers, the *Hermes* and the *Hawke*, not one of us said a word of criticism on those occasions. We do not want to criticise, we want to help the Admiralty all we can, but when you get

[1] [*See Naval* 1, pp. 269-70.]

an occurrence such as the *Formidable*, in which a whole squadron is risked, and one ship (the *Formidable*) was lost and another was hit, and I am not saying anything of advantage to the enemy or anything that everybody does not know, when we get those occurrences it is the bounden duty of people in this House to call attention to those things, mainly with the object that they should not occur again. What I want to know is this: Did the Admiralty, after the loss of the *Hogue*, the *Aboukir*, and the *Cressy*, the *Hermes* and the *Hawke*, give orders that no squadron or single ship should proceed to sea unless they proceeded at speed or had proper screens and torpedo boats? That is what the country wants to know. Remember this, that the submarine is considerably overrated, if what the right hon. gentleman himself described as proper and obvious precautions and care are taken. If the proper care is not taken the submarine is a most fatal and novel weapon of naval warfare. A single ship or a squadron should go at speed at sea, and both should be accompanied by the proper quota and units of torpedo-boat destroyers and small craft. I should like to explain why.

When a submarine comes up to the surface she has to look about. The first thing she will see will probably be a destroyer. It very often happens that the destroyer sees the submarine before the submarine sees the destroyer. The submarine has to look into its reflector, but the destroyer has most of its men on deck, and there are thirty or forty pairs of eyes level with the horizon. A cruiser has four, five, or six sets of signallers on the bridge. Directly a submarine comes up the destroyer signals to the cruiser, the cruiser alters her helm, zigzags about, and goes off at full speed. The submarine, when it sees a destroyer, will go down for its own safety. The whole position is altered. It is not a very speedy weapon of warfare in getting its sight on a ship. It is most problematical whether it will ever get a ship at speed, and it will not get a ship which has its proper quota of destroyers and small craft. Let me prove that. We have despatched hundreds of thousands of troops to the Continent; the water was full of submarines, the ships went at speed. We have had two actions off Heligoland; the water was full of submarines, and not only did the ships go at speed, but they had their full quota of small craft and destroyers. A more glaring example is the bombard-

ment of Zeebrugge, where the ships were often stationary; the water was full of submarines, there was the full quota of small craft and destroyers, and not one ship was hit. In manœuvres I have often been attacked by torpedo-boat destroyers. You can often see the torpedo fired, and you have only to put your helm over and you defeat the object of the man who fired it.

With regard to the orders of the Admiralty, I want to know why the squadron of which the *Formidable* was a part disposed of the two great safeguards against submarine attacks. This is common knowledge. She went out: everybody knew where she was going and what she was going to do. She disposed of or sent back the torpedo-boat destroyers, which were her first defence. When she got out into the Channel she went at slow speed. The Admiral would not have done that if the Admiralty had given definite orders, after the loss of the other three cruisers, that no ship was to proceed except at speed and with screens. That squadron proceeded to sea in an area of water that was known to be infested with submarines. I say that an explanation is necessary. We ought to know what was the Admiralty policy that brought about these avoidable losses. Either it was criminal negligence or it was crass stupidity, or it was dictated by what I may describe as amateur strategy. I have endeavoured to give the House these facts because the country is bewildered, the Service is uneasy, and the relatives and dependants of the gallant men who went down, from causes which were perfectly preventable, and from risks for which there was no obvious reason, have great cause for complaint. There is only one way to clear up the position, restore confidence, and prevent a recurrence of these events, and that is to stick to what has been the tradition and habit of the Service for centuries—have the survivors of ships that are lost in any way whatever tried by court-martial, and thus find out who is to blame, what was the reason for it, and clear up the matter before the whole world.

Why were these courts-martial not held? What the right hon. gentleman said just now is quite correct. A court-martial is not to convict: it is to free an officer from blame, and to make it clear to the Service and the public who was to blame. If you do not have courts-martial, it will be fatal to the confidence of the Service in authority, and it will eventually

be fatal to the discipline of the Fleet. Let me point out to you the injurious results which may arise from having no courts-martial. There may be, and there has been, in an accident of this sort, a case of unjustly throwing or inferring blame on an officer who was not to blame. In another case an officer may be to blame, but if there is no court-martial he may be given another appointment, white-washed, and be the subject of favouritism. To have no court-martial is unjust to the officer, bad for the Service, and more or less a danger to the State. Officers should have an opportunity of clearing themselves. The country should demand information. By what authority have the King's Regulations, the Admiralty Instructions, and the Naval Discipline Act been abrogated? Who did this? Courts-martial are not only a tradition of the Service; they are compulsory by the Naval Discipline Act. The country ought to know by whose authority this great Act has been abrogated. Such an autocratic proceeding is a danger to the State. If any hon. member will go to the Library and ask for the King's Regulations, the Admiralty Instructions, and the Naval Discipline Act, he will see that it is custom and the order of the Service that courts-martial should be held in such cases. As it is, the Admiralty seem to think that the Navy belongs to them. The Navy belongs to the country, and the old traditions and requirements which keep things clear, and put the blame on the proper authority, should not be abrogated without the consent of this House. The First Lord of the Admiralty gave an answer on the 11th inst., and has repeated it to-day, which simply amazes me, and ought to amaze the House. He said: 'The losses which take place owing to mines and submarines are quite different from any losses that occurred in former years. That has a bearing on the question of courts-martial.' And he defended that in the House to-day. These points make courts-martial more necessary. They are a new element in warfare. What is to protect our officers and men if you have a captain or an admiral who says, 'Never mind the mines; I 'll chance them.' Is he not to be tried by court-martial? What is to protect the officers and men if you have another admiral who says, 'I do not fear submarines; I will get rid of my screens and proceed at low speed.' Is not that a subject for court-martial? It is the bounden duty of this House to see that no officer's or

man's life is risked in any way whatever without a definite object in view, and never from a cause that is preventable. We owe it to our great Service to continue these courts-martial in every one of these cases. All the cases I have mentioned involved the loss, wreck, and destruction of certain vessels, and, worse still, the loss of officers and men, and courts-martial in such cases are specially provided for by the Naval Discipline Act, which, I repeat, has been abrogated by some autocratic authority at the Admiralty The right hon. gentleman said that courts-martial could not well be held without weakening the fighting line. There is a great Fleet somewhere; we do not know where, and if we did we should not say. But a court-martial does not take weeks; it may take only a forenoon. In the case of the *Goeben*, the court-martial was held at Plymouth. There are plenty of admirals and captains to constitute a court-martial. It is perfectly easy to send up the witnesses. It might not take more than a dog-watch to try the case and find out who was guilty. The right hon. gentleman's argument will not hold at all.

May I give an experience of my own with regard to a court-martial? When I commanded the *Undaunted* in the Mediterranean I was unlucky enough to run her ashore. It was a question of shifting the buoys and the leading marks. My Commander-in-chief, Sir George Tryon, one of the finest seamen we ever had in the Navy, when I went to Malta to be put right, said to me, 'I perfectly understand what happened; it was not your fault; it was nobody's fault. I will try you by Court of Inquiry, and the whole thing will be settled.' I said, 'I respectfully submit, Sir, that you should not do anything of the sort. I beg you to try me by court-martial. If I become an admiral some day, and a captain runs his ship ashore, if I try him by court-martial and he is found guilty, it may be in different circumstances, what will be said? It will be said, "Beresford ran his ship ashore, he was tried by Court of Inquiry. That is a secret Court, with no evidence on oath. Another man runs his ship ashore, he is tried by court-martial and found guilty."' The Admiral saw it at once. He said, 'Certainly; I see your point; I will try you by court-martial.' I was tried and acquitted. I mention that to show the importance that I attach to the question of courts-martial. A Court of Inquiry does not meet the case at all. A Court of

Inquiry is generally held with the object of framing charges for a court-martial. It is a secret inquiry, no witnesses are examined on oath, nobody is obliged to answer any question, and, although official, it is not public like a court-martial. If hon. members like they can buy the minutes of any court-martial in the Army and Navy. The court is sometimes closed for the reason that it may not be in the public interest to divulge the subject, but the whole of the minutes of evidence and the finding of any court-martial of either Service can be bought for a small sum of money. What substitute has the Admiralty put into force in place of these courts-martial? None whatever but an autocratic proceeding, in which the career and whole life of the officers of the Navy are entirely at the disposal of what I may call the freak or idea of the people at the Admiralty, or even the First Lord. That is all wrong—absolutely wrong. We must go back to the court-martial. I am perfectly certain that when the country knows the facts of the case they will insist upon it. I maintain that the Admiralty had no power in the world to do away with courts-martial. They had no power to do this, either under the Naval Discipline Act, the King's Regulations, or the Admiralty's Instructions, without coming to this House. Why does the right hon. gentleman shake his head? Does he claim he has the power?

THE CIVIL LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (MR. G. LAMBERT): The noble Lord is entirely mistaken. I do not think it is indispensable to the Naval Discipline Act.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE: What about the Naval Defence Act?

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: The right hon. gentleman must really read up the King's Regulations. He will then find it is not only according to the custom and tradition, but it has always been the case.

MR. LAMBERT: That is another matter.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: So far as I have spoken in this House now, I have endeavoured to put the case as clear as I can as to why you should not do away with courts-martial. I maintain it is the Naval Discipline Act. The wording of the clauses point out that you have got to have a court-martial. You speak there of the officers and men who have lost their ship being kept on full pay until there is

a court-martial. All the clauses point out that, in fact, you have to have a court-martial when a ship is lost. The right hon. gentleman shakes his head again, but I still stick to my opinion. I consider the question to be one of paramount importance to the efficiency of the Service and to the maintenance of the Naval Discipline Act. It is one which really indirectly touches the safety of the State. Let me quote the article I have just referred to: 'When a ship is wrecked or lost, until the court-martial shall have inquired into the cause of the loss or capture of such ship . . .' That means that the officers and men are to be kept on full pay till it is done. There are several other clauses, and I am sorry that I did not bring a copy of them. Article 616 says: 'Immediately after the court-martial to inquire into the loss of a ship which has taken place . . .' and so on.

MR. LAMBERT: I do not think the noble Lord quite follows me. He said that it made it obligatory upon the Admiralty to hold a court-martial. I do not think that is so. Of course, he may be better informed than I am.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: The right hon. gentleman is quite right to this effect, that an officer sometimes thinks he is very aggrieved and he demands a court-martial. He has no right to demand a court-martial, and the Admiralty say: 'No, we will not allow a court-martial.' But I maintain that the loss of a ship, and the loss of the people in it, is quite a different matter. It has been the custom and tradition to hold a court-martial, and I maintain that is the law. However, I will not dwell further on that point, except to say that it is very important, both for the officers and the men of the Fleet; it is felt very acutely by the dependants of these poor people who have been lost. Nobody knows why they were lost or who is to blame for that loss. I again repeat—and I cannot repeat it too often—they were lost from causes that were preventable and from risks run in which there was no object whatever.

MR. FALLE: First of all I should like to protest against the absence of the First Lord of the Admiralty. This is the one night in the year in which we might expect him to be in his place, but for some reason or other—he has not told us the reason——

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA): The First Lord stated during the course of his speech——

MR. FALLE: Yes, I heard it.

DR. MACNAMARA: That he had urgent business at the office, and therefore he might claim the indulgence of the House.

MR. FALLE: He also told us that, as the House will remember, last year, and the next day it was found that he had been presiding at the banquet given to Dr. Sven Hedin or some other explorer. No doubt during war time it is necessary for the First Lord to be at the Admiralty, but I do say this is the one night of the year in which he might have been here. He has given us a wonderful speech which will be best described, I think, by the term the Australians use—that is 'blowing.' It was principally made up of 'blowing.' When he was not doing that he was sometimes inaccurate, as when he told us that the Australian convoy came across the Pacific. He was following his friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he told us that France was peopled with Celts. I have another ground for complaint—that is the little the First Lord has told us. I maintain that we have a right to the fullest information that the First Lord can give, and that we should not have to wait until that information is given to foreign newspapers, even though those newspapers be the newspapers of our Allies. We have the first right to the information which may come to the First Lord, and which he thinks it is possible to give to the people of this country. I think the First Lord was perfectly right when he said that the Navy was as sound as a bell. We are all quite sure of that. What we are not quite sure of is of what kind of metal the clapper is made! To the newspapers the First Lord talks freely. He talks, in my humble opinion, of those things which he may understand, and he also talks of those things which he may not understand. He has given us his views on the subject of rats and on the digging out of rats, while *per contra* he has given us his opinion on a matter which he certainly cannot and does not understand—that is, baby-killing. If the First Lord can give us his views on the subject of orphan-making, it might have been more interesting, or on middle-aged

Reservists, or on obsolete, antiquated ships that can hardly in some instances steam, much less fire a gun.

The country, I think, is agreed that it is Heaven's mercy that Lord Fisher is at the Admiralty. When the First Lord finishes with naval matters he apparently tells foreign newspapers that, whatever happens, England will continue the war: whether or not the Allies break away from us and make peace, England will go on. By what authority does the First Lord speak in the name of England? He may have a right to speak in the name of Dundee, but he certainly has not the right to speak in the name of England; nor does it appear to me that he has a right to tell the Burgomaster of Antwerp: 'You need not worry; we have come here to save your city,' and to carry out that boast by landing untrained, unequipped, and unequal forces of exceedingly brave men, who naturally could do very little towards defending that city. None of us objects to the fact that a force was sent to defend or to attempt to defend Antwerp. What we do criticise is that the attempt to do it was made with an untrained and an inadequate force. The First Lord has absented himself to-night, while at the same time the country knows that he is continually running over to France. [An HON. MEMBER: 'Hear, hear!'] He was there, I believe, last week. Perhaps the hon. gentleman objects to the words 'running over.' Well, the First Lord was conveyed by train and by steamboat to the coast of France. I cannot myself say what is his object and what is the object of allowing the First Lord to go to France so frequently. It cannot be to hearten Sir John French. It cannot have anything to do with his Navy work. If the First Lord wants to go to France for the purpose of fighting, I am quite sure that nobody will say him nay.

I should like to make a few remarks on the first naval trouble that occurred. That was the loss of the *Pegasus*.[1] Here was a ship which was unable to steam, with guns obsolete, in waters where it is common knowledge that the Germans had a superior force. The First Lord tells us, and told us to-day, that at the outbreak of war we had a Fleet equal to all our needs. Why, then, was the *Pegasus* kept in Zanzibar waters so that she might fall an easy prey to the very first German cruiser that came along? When that

[1] [*See Naval* I, p. 215.]

German cruiser came along, it found the poor old *Pegasus* with her fires drawn and unable to steam, and the Germans massacred her men and sank the ship at a distance from which the poor old popguns of the *Pegasus* could not make any effectual reply. Those men, as letters that have been sent to my colleague and myself show, in the opinion of their people, were simply murdered. Why were these brave men in ships of no fighting value whatever, if it is a fact that the Fleet at the outbreak of war was equal to all our needs? We have had to send other ships now to Zanzibar waters to take the place of the *Pegasus*. Would it not have been far better to have sent the ships at the beginning? The second matter is a matter which has been spoken of at some length by my colleague—the loss of the *Cressy*, the *Hogue*, and the *Aboukir*. Those ships were sent regularly into the danger zone, and they were sent without the small craft that were built for the purpose of accompanying the bigger ships, and guarding them from danger—built to be the very eyes and ears of the Fleet. Yet these three cruisers were sent without their accompanying smaller vessels, and, of course, were sunk. But that was not enough for the First Lord. He sent the *Hawke* without smaller craft, and it shared the fate, and her men shared the fate, of the *Cressy*, *Hogue*, and *Aboukir*. What I should like to know is, what the ships were doing in those particular waters. Was it necessary for them to be there? That is to me the crucial question. The proof that they were not necessary there is that no others were sent to take their place. So persuaded were the men of the *Hawke* of the danger of being unattended in this dangerous zone that, positively, rafts were made on the *Hawke*, and some few men were saved when the fatal day came. We think, at a great naval port like Portsmouth, that these men gave up their lives owing to the ignorance of the First Lord.

There was another question touched on by my colleague—the escape of the *Goeben* in Mediterranean waters. That emphasises the absolute need of a court-martial. Here we have three battle cruisers under an Admiral and a certain number of battle cruisers under his second in command, and, notwithstanding that, the *Goeben* escapes, with the result that the Turk, our old ally, is forced into a war against us.

MR. PRINGLE: There was an inquiry.

MR. FALLE: What I am speaking about is a court-martial. The *Goeben* escaped, and the Turk, our old ally, was forced into a war against us, the cost of which we cannot yet estimate. What, I wish to know, were the orders that were given to the Admiral in command in the Mediterranean? It was said in this House at the time, and, in fact, it was common knowledge, that the orders of the Admiralty were that His Majesty's ships should run no avoidable risk, and it was under that that the *Goeben* escaped from our Fleet. There was no court-martial. The senior Admiral was brought home, and he submitted to a Court of Inquiry, and we were told that, as the result of that Court of Inquiry, he was exonerated from any blame. The fact remains that that gentleman, an Englishman and a sailor, is ashore. The second in command appealed for a court-martial, and he, holding a great historic service name, was triumphantly acquitted of any blame. I maintain that the senior officer should have been court-martialled just as much as his junior, so that the country should know on evidence taken on oath that he himself was blameless. It does not appear to me to be playing the game to give one man a Court of Inquiry and the other a court-martial. And how does that court-martial, which absolutely absolves the second in command, affect the Court of Inquiry, so far as it concerns the First Lord?

Then we got, saddest of all, the battle which was only touched by the right hon. gentleman—the sea fight off Coronel. There we had practically obsolete ships. I, for my own part, absolutely refuse to believe that the Admiralty, where we find the keenest and the finest brains in the Navy, did not foresee the concentration of the German ships. I find it impossible to believe that they did not foresee that squadron, and that they did not devise means and methods by which that squadron should be met. I dare say every member of this House has read that most pathetic letter[1] which was written by the doctor of the *Good Hope*, the last letter in fact which was received from the *Good Hope*, and which appeared in the *Times*. It was written, I believe, to his wife, and he said to her, 'Pray that the

[1 The following is the letter above referred to :—
The following letter was written to a friend by Mr. Francis C. Searle, who was serving as surgeon on board H.M.S. *Good Hope* when she was lost in the action off the Chilean coast. The letter was posted in a collier on Thursday, *Times*, Dec. 16, 1914.

Germans do not concentrate against us; for, if they do, it is all up with us,' and it was all up with them. They took an old ship, carrying two old 9.2-inch guns, against two of the finest cruisers of the German Navy, carrying sixteen 8.2-inch guns. The result was as certain as the sun shines. There was no fight possible, but I am told—I admit; of course, my information is not official, but only hearsay—that the Admiral's orders were to get into action at the earliest possible opportunity, the direct opposite of the orders given to Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne. Of course, if Admiral Cradock had those orders he had no option but to seek out the Germans, and to fight, although he knew that his force was absolutely inadequate. The *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* went with their brave crews to the bottom, and I believe that they went there by the ignorance

October 29, and the action in which the writer lost his life took place at sunset on Sunday, November 1:—

H.M.S. *Good Hope*, N. Cruiser Squadron, October 25.

I 'll start with the Spithead Review and Manœuvres, which lasted just over fourteen days. I was in the ship, as it was my war appointment. We paid off for four days, when I returned to the *Vernon*. Suddenly one night we got the order 'Mobilise,' and with an hour to pack two tin cases I found myself on board again here. Most of us brought only a change of gear, myself among them. Not even a watch overcoat, for the nights were warm. We were patrolling the Irish coast when war was declared, and when off the Southern Hebrides were ordered to sweep the Atlantic trade routes for hostile cruisers.

We reached Halifax on August 14 after many alarms, clearing for action when sighting any suspicious craft. We stopped many English merchantmen, and informed them of war and their course in consequence, but not a blessed German. Since reaching Halifax we have been a veritable flying squadron. When we had coaled who should come along but Cradock's flagship *Suffolk*. He liked this ship better than his own, so forty miles east of New York he shifted his flag and came aboard with his staff one Sunday afternoon.

Then to Bermuda, then St. Lucia, West Indies, then Trinidad, sweeping for the enemy all the way south. Then the coast of Venezuela and North Brazil (hot as blazes). Pernambuco next, to find twenty-three German merchantmen snugly ensconced behind the breakwater, and so in neutral harbour. Various islands off Brazil, and then to Montevideo. I took a broncho-pneumonia case ashore there in a tug, so saw something of what is quite a fine and typical Spanish South American town. The coast of the Argentine was bare, and so on south to Magellan Strait and a visit to Punta Arenas (Sandy Point), a Chilean town, but with a colony of eight hundred English and a good English club with two hundred town members. Of all towns I think this was to me the most surprising, for with my somewhat

or obstinacy of some amateur authority at the Admiralty; they went there by the opinion of a man who was gambling on chances. There is one thing we ought to be grateful for, and it is that the poor old *Canopus* did not succeed in arriving on the scene of battle, or she and all her brave men would have gone to the bottom. I want the orders given to Admiral Cradock to be put on the table of the House. I want to know if it were a fact that he was told to get into action at the earliest possible moment, and why those orders were different from those given to Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne? Did the Admiral comment when he received those orders, and what comment did he make? Is it a fact that he knew his force was quite inadequate to meet the German force, and is it a fact he asked for another ship? I understand that he did so. I understand

insular ideas, confined to the British Isles and the Mediterranean, I had looked upon it as a small Chilean convict settlement, devilish cold, convicts guarded by cut-throats, and no place for any of us.

We rounded the Horn twice and visited the Falkland Islands—most cold and desolate of our Empire outposts and the most southern. I met four of our profession there, a Dr. Pearce and his wife (both Edinburgh), a Guy's man, who is major of the local forces and O.C. as well, and another called Wace, once of Western Australia.

Of our plans, our bases, sources of supply, and composition of our forces I may not tell you, lest our mail be captured and valuable information fall into the hands of the enemy. It is a life stranger than any most of us have lived through. This has been my first experience, too, of being without fresh provisions and minus potatoes and having restricted grub. However, we mustn't grumble; yet war is the most unpleasant existence of any. Your next drink—' Damnation to our enemies.'

We are now in the Pacific, albatross sailing along in our wake, and snow-clad mountains of the Pacific slopes visible on the starboard hand. My first letter, and only one, reached me October 22 in a collier. Three months of mails is following somewhere, somehow. We send in a variety of ways—storeships, colliers, mail steamers, a stray bag at an out-of-the-way Consul's. Storeships are a snare and a delusion, we 've come to the conclusion.

So much is going on at home that we think the Admiralty have forgotten their trade route squadron ten thousand miles from London town. Who would have thought, who could have told yours truly, with one hour's notice, now rolling at sea exactly where he must not say. Five German cruisers against us. What 's the betting on the field? Pray to your penates we may prevent them concentrating.

The days are full of monotony. First-aid lectures are boring to a degree, for one can't say too much or it becomes a positive danger. Our casualties have so far been two. A stoker got buried in an avalanche of coal in a bunker and a sergeant of Marines got an acute heart attack—one buried off Venezuela, the other off the Horn. R.I.P.]

that he asked the Admiralty, and the Admiralty refused him, and he, brave man, had no choice but to go into action with an inferior and obsolete force, although we had been told that the Fleet at the beginning of hostilities was equal to all our needs. He had his orders; he had heard the melancholy fiasco of the *Goeben*; he saw his duty, and went for it then and there. The nation values and appreciates his heroism and sacrifice, and the heroism of the brave men who died with him. But they will not forgive the man, or the men, who sent him and them practically bound hand and foot to their doom.

There was another small point about which I asked the right hon. gentleman the other day. Five men were landed from the *Good Hope* on a small island off the coast of Chile. Those men were the only men of the *Good Hope* who were saved. The First Lord refused to give me their names. I cannot understand why, unless he thinks they would be hunted down by newspaper reporters, which is a very unworthy idea or suggestion. Of course, the names of those men, I admit, have been sent to their families, but the fact remains that there are a good many poor women whose husbands were signallers on the *Good Hope* who do not know this fact, and are hoping that their husbands are among these five. But the Admiralty, for some or other deep problem of State, refuses to give the names. I appeal to the right hon. gentleman who will answer —and I am very glad he will, instead of the First Lord—to give us, if possible, the names of these men, or, at any rate, afford us some reason why they should not be given, because I can assure him that there is a feeling among many women that, possibly, their husbands were saved, and they will not know otherwise until a pension is paid to them. After that miserable battle in the Chilean waters there came the blessed change at the Admiralty. Admiral Sturdee was sent out with two fine ships and three cruisers. Why could he not have been sent out at first? Why should the Admiralty have waited until two ships were lost, and the splendid complement belonging to those ships, all reserves of men in the prime of life—men who cannot be replaced? Why were those ships not sent out at the beginning, if it can be proved at the beginning of the war our Fleet was equal to all our needs?

Then we come to the loss of the *Formidable*. I am told that the Fleet had been cruising for several days over the same

ground, going every day within sight of land, on a bright moonlight night, without catchers or small ships—that is, without any screen whatever—steaming, I am told, at eight knots, with the result that she was lost. There were, no doubt, ships of greater value in the squadron, but that they escaped is only a piece of luck for us. Whose is the fault? The Admiral is a man known through the Service as a man of extraordinary ability. He was brought before a Court of Inquiry, a secret court, at which evidence is not taken on oath. With what result? He is taken away from his squadron, but he is given one of the best possible billets ashore. That does not seem fair to the Admiral himself or the nation, or to the great Service to which he belongs. Either he should be blamed or maintained where he was with the Fleet. He has the reputation of being the only man in the Service who was willing to do some work connected with Ulster. I do not know whether that has had anything to do with the Court of Inquiry, but whatever it is he should be court-martialled in fairness to the Service and to the nation. I think the First Lord will be called strictly to account for these matters when the war is over. We cannot bring him to book at the present moment, because there are many points which we cannot touch upon, but I think the right hon. gentleman is mistaken if he imagines that the country does not want and will not require of him an answer to those points. The day of reckoning will come. For the right hon. gentleman's attempt, as I believe, to run the British Navy on his own some reason will be required from him, and then he will meet with his fitting and proper reward. I for one do not think that reward will be the reward he either expects or thinks he deserves.

MR. BARNES: I wish to draw attention to two small matters. First of all, the present position in regard to the training scheme for officers which is now in vogue in the Navy; and secondly, to the position of the new naval force in connection with superannuation allowances. I have spoken of my first point in this House many times during the last few years, and, as the Secretary to the Admiralty knows, I am opposed to it through and through. I believe it is a bad scheme, and I am glad to know that there are other hon. members in the House of the same opinion. Unfortunately it has now been in operation so long that I suppose we must take it as a thing

that has been brought into being and is going to remain. I want to refer to one little corner of this question and its position from last year, and that is the position of cadets entering Osborne and Dartmouth, and the fees payable in respect of them. A year or two ago the fees payable amounted to £75 for each boy and certain other expenses were payable over and above that amount. Up to last year there was always 10 per cent. allowed for the sons of Navy or Army officers, who were entitled to enter at the smaller fee of £40. Last year that 10 per cent. was increased to 25 per cent., and even that 25 per cent. was not to be exclusively made up of the sons of Army or Navy officers, but might be drawn from any class of the community. I understand from the Secretary to the Admiralty that there has been a little further relaxation in regard to the money payable after eighteen years of age. I should like to have a statement as to the actual position on this point, and I wish to say, further, that if I am right as to the present position, it is one with which I am not at all satisfied. I believe that the only remedy for the present anomalous state of affairs in regard to the entry of cadets is to reduce the fees all round. At present we have 25 per cent. who are entering at £40 instead of £75, and I believe we have some remission of the money payable by the boys at a later stage of their training.

Under these circumstances I agree that the position is to some extent better than it was, but a system is not satisfactory which imposes upon a person because he is poor the necessity of going along to some authority and pleading poverty in order to get these fees remitted. I dare say there are some who go forward and plead that they are poor and are not in a position to get £75 a year, but I do not think you will get the best people to do that, and there are a large number of self-respecting people who would like to get their sons into the Navy as officers who would never think of telling the tale to the Board of Admiralty or any other board. Therefore, I appeal to the right hon. gentleman to use his great influence not to make distinctions between one class and another, but to reduce the fees all round so as to increase the area from which you may draw the boys for the future officers of the Navy. I am not making any charge against the officers of the Navy, and I am not saying a single word of a disparaging nature about them.

On the contrary, I believe that they are very smart men, and we owe a great deal to them. But, good as they are, it would be a good thing for the nation to increase and enlarge the section of the nation from which these officers are to be drawn, because, after all, brains are not the exclusive possession of any part of the community, and the larger the area of selection the better is the chance of getting the best men.

With regard to the new Naval Division, it seems to me to be neither fish, flesh, nor good red herring; it is a sort of amphibious body which is to operate on land or sea and possibly in the air. There is one thing about it, however, which works out very unfairly, and that is the superannuation allowance. At present the superannuation allowance for the wife of a sailor is less than the allowance in respect of a soldier. The reason given for this is that the sailor gets better pay, and therefore it is presumed he is in a position to maintain his wife. I agree with that, but there are a large number of men in the Navy, including mechanics, who start at 4s., 5s., or even 6s. a day, and it would be absurd for the community to be charged with the maintenance of their wives. The scale of superannuation allowance for the Navy is based upon a less amount for the wife and the children because the sailor has more money. That, however, does not apply to the new body which has been created, because it is drawn from men who have either been in the Navy before or who are willing to join this new body, and they have to join at what is called the ordinary seaman's rate, which is 8s. 9d. per week, or 1s. 3d. per day.

In the Navy proper the ordinary seaman's rate is a sort of sieve through which a man passes to the rating of an able-bodied seaman. I think the right hon. gentleman told us that there were between 6000 and 7000 of these men, and therefore we may reckon the rating of an A.B., which goes up to about 14s. or 15s. a week, and take that to be the rating corresponding to the pay of a soldier in the Army who gets 7s. a week. Now the ordinary seaman in this new body gets 8s. 9d., and therefore there is a difference of 1s. 9d., but because of the generally higher pay of the Navy, the superannuation allowance for the wife of the sailor in the new body is very much smaller than I think it ought to be. Take the case of a wife with six children—and it so happens that I had such a case sent me of a man who had joined this new force who had

been in the Navy before, and he was rated as an ordinary seaman. His wife gets 6s. per week, with allowances for the children, making the total 18s. per week. I want to compare the position of the wife of the man belonging to the new body with the wife of a private soldier. The wife of a man belonging to this new naval body with six children gets 18s. from the State—that is 6s. for herself and 12s. for the six children. Now take the wife of a private soldier; she gets 9s. a week for herself and allowances for the children, which bring the total up to 25s. 6d. I am not saying that she gets a penny too much, but my point is that the other woman gets too little. In consideration of the ordinary seaman belonging to the new force having higher pay his wife gets only 18s. per week, while the soldier's wife gets 25s. 6d. per week, although the higher pay of the man of the new force of the Navy is only 1s. 9d. more.

I put it to my right hon. friend that that is not fair. It may be true that the general scheme of the Navy, taken as a whole, works out fairly well, but if you take that little corner of it which I have mentioned, it works out very badly, and I imagine that the man belonging to this new force will have precious little chance of promotion. At all events, he is not going to sea or doing active service, and the probability is that he will be kept on shore doing odds and ends, and so long as the war lasts the probability is that the vast majority of these men will remain at 8s. 9d. per week, and because he is getting the higher pay as compared with the Army man his wife gets 8s. 6d. less than the Army man, although his larger pay amounts only to 1s. 9d. more per week. That is my point. I have put these two points very briefly. I should like to know the position of the cadets under the new training scheme. Whatever may be done in regard to the rearrangement of the fees will not be satisfactory unless it applies all round and places everybody on the same footing. I would like to have some assurance in regard to this new body that there will be either a rapid promotion of the men belonging to the new force, that their wages will be increased, or, if you like, they should be transferred to the Army, which seems to me the best thing to do with them. Then the pay would drop 1s. 9d., and the separation allowance would go up 8s. 6d.

MR. HOHLER: His Majesty's Government have indeed done everything they possibly can to bring this war to a

successful conclusion, and they certainly, so far as my knowledge goes, enjoy the confidence of the country. When my noble friend the member for Portsmouth (Lord C. Beresford), who is entitled to criticise, has so little to say upon the subject, I feel that I should do best to address the House with regard to the interests of the men. I wish to call the attention of the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty to the position of the widows and children of the officers and men who lost their lives in His Majesty's ship *Bulwark*.

DR. MACNAMARA: I have sent the hon. gentleman a reply to a question which I think will cover the point.

MR. HOHLER: I have omitted to see it, but do I understand that they will be treated upon a war footing?

DR. MACNAMARA: I cannot say that of them all.

MR. HOHLER: Then I must raise the point, because it is of the greatest importance. I have had a serious point raised from a number of sources and from different parts of the country as to whether or not the widows of the officers and the widows of the men who lost their lives in the *Bulwark* disaster are to be dealt with upon a war or a peace footing. It is a serious and vital question, and we ought to have a definite assurance from the Admiralty that these widows will be dealt with as if the officers and men had been killed in war. It is far too narrow a view to take of the great crisis in which we are engaged to say that because a man is blown up in the Medway he is not killed in war, but that if he is blown up at sea by a submarine or a mine he is killed in war. There ought to be a broad principle that the widow and dependants of every one, either in the Army or in the Navy, who is killed while serving the country for the purpose of the war should be treated as if, in fact, he had been killed in the war, and there ought not to be any technical distinction. There is no evidence to show how the *Bulwark* disaster was caused one way or the other. All we know is that these men were blown up. It may be—nobody knows; it is impossible to say—that it was the result of some defective machinery, but there ought not to be any pettifogging treatment of the question; there ought to be a broad line laid down, and the Pensions Committee—I regret there is no representative of that Committee in the House—should make it clear that every man while serving as a sailor or a soldier

in the present war should be entitled, no matter where he may be killed, to have his dependants treated upon a war basis.

DR. MACNAMARA: I do not know whether the hon. member thinks that the widows and dependants of the men are not treated on a war footing. They are. The only question at issue is as to the officers, and, under the Order in Council,[1] we have not yet been able, as I have explained in answer to the hon. member for Chelmsford (Mr. Pretyman) to pay pensions and allowances under Scale A, but we will certainly make representations.

[1] [*See Naval* 2, p. 331.]

MR. HOHLER: Of course that goes some way, but may I remind the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, with whom I have had correspondence on the subject, that his reply to me was that the widows of the men were being provisionally paid as if their husbands had been killed upon a war footing. That is a totally different thing from saying they are actually entitled to be paid upon a war footing. Do I understand that the widows and children of the men, at any rate, are entitled absolutely, and not merely provisionally, to be paid as if the men had been killed in war?

DR. MACNAMARA: Yes, the widows and children of the men are paid on a war basis.

MR. HOHLER: It is equally important that the widows and children of the officers should be so paid, but they are being paid provisionally as if the officers had been drowned.

DR. MACNAMARA: Under Scale B.

MR. HOHLER: Yes, as if they had been drowned. It is really very difficult to conceive anything more foreign to the truth than to say these men who were blown up were drowned. This must be wrong, and it is a most important point for the widows. I should like the Financial Secretary to explain why this distinction is drawn between the men and the officers. This House fights equally for both, without regard to any question of class, and, if the widows of the men are entitled to be pensioned as if their husbands had been killed in war, surely the widows of the officers are equally so entitled. I cannot understand the distinction.

DR. MACNAMARA: The men are under the White Paper Scale, but the officers are under long-standing Regulations. We cannot pay their widows and children on Scale A—the

war scale—until we get the terms of those Regulations altered. We are bound for the time being to pay on Scale B, but I have said that representations will be made to get the widows of officers put under Scale A.

MR. HOHLER: My recollection certainly is that the words used in the Admiralty Regulation in regard to the widows of officers are similar, if not precisely the same, as those used in the pension form which has been recently issued, and with regard to which amendments have been proposed. I have, however, raised the point, and I hope that justice will be done to these people. I cannot understand why the widow of a marine officer is always treated as if she were worth from £40 to £80 less than the widow of an officer of corresponding rank in the Army or Navy. I can see no good reason for it, and I do ask the right hon. gentleman to bring this matter and press it before the Committee which is dealing with this question of pensions, and before the Government, so that the widow of a marine officer may be placed in precisely the same position as the widow of a naval or military officer of corresponding rank. I ask him to do so all the more because I have communicated with the right hon. gentleman who is a member of the Committee, and he is under the impression that they have already done it. I can find nothing in the White Paper which has been issued, dealing in any way with the question. Again, I can find no provision dealing with the case of a step-child. I believe there are more cases, but I have heard of at least one case of a woman who had been married previously, marrying a sailor and the sailor becoming liable to support her child. The sailor was killed on the *Cressy*, and the Admiralty refused to recognise his step-child. They gave a pension to his wife, but wholly refused to recognise his step-child. I think that was entirely wrong. It was an obligation on the father to maintain the step-child, and why, if other children are recognised, the Government do not undertake the obligation of paying the children's allowance in this case, I am absolutely at a loss to understand. I have again written to a member of the Committee, and he tells me that the case has been dealt with. I have read and reread the White Paper and the Amendments, but I cannot find that it has been dealt with in any sense or form. It is an exceptional case, I admit.

There is no great number of these cases, but still they ought to be dealt with for obvious reasons. The case I have in my mind is that of a widow with one child by her late sailor husband, and one child by her first husband. She will get whatever pension is allotted—I think it comes to about 11s. per week for herself—and 4s. for one child, but she will get no allowance in respect of the other child; she will have to keep it herself, and the family will suffer. The case is clearly one, therefore, which ought to be dealt with. On this matter of pensions I want to ascertain from the right hon. gentleman why it is that the widows of the men who were drowned when the *Pathfinder* was blown up do not receive the separation allowance and allotment for twenty-six weeks.

DR. MACNAMARA: There was no separation allowance at that time.

MR. HOHLER: It is an injustice to those people who have been killed in the war under the circumstances I have referred to, that they should not be put on the same footing as those who have since lost their lives. Why should the widow of a man who lost his life on the *Pathfinder* not receive the same allowance as she would have received had he been killed but a few days later? It is extremely unfortunate that there is nobody representing the Pensions Committee in the House at this moment. I asked one of the members why these papers had not been dealt with, and he replied to me that he thought they had been. I can only repeat it is a monstrous injustice if these women are not put in the same position as the widows of the men who have been killed later in the war. There is no rhyme or reason for making a big difference between them. I think nothing has been done in their case because the sufferers are comparatively few in number.

DR. MACNAMARA: No, that is not it.

MR. HOHLER: At any rate, I have now raised the question, and I hope it will receive sympathetic treatment at the hands of the right hon. gentleman. The point may have been overlooked by the Committee, but that body has still to make a final report, and I hope before it does so these cases will have been considered. I want to call attention to another case of very great importance. A widow is entitled to twenty-six weeks' separation allowance, plus the allotment

that her husband made her in the event of his being killed. Of course, it is necessary the husband should have made the allotment. Unfortunately, owing to the sudden way in which disasters occurred shortly after the outbreak of war, there are several cases in which there is no reason to doubt that the husband, had he lived longer, would have made the allotment, but, owing to the fact that the allotment has not been received by the Admiralty, the Board hold that they have no authority to pay it. I fully appreciate the position they have taken up, but this again, I submit, is a matter which the Pensions Commissioners might have dealt with. I could produce evidence which would satisfy anybody that men had for a number of years been in the habit of making allotments to their wives when absent for a long period at sea. I sent the right hon. gentleman some cases to prove that. In one case, it turned out that the man came home to a port, and was employed on a vessel in a manner which enabled him to be constantly at home at week-ends. The result was, he found it more convenient, drawing his pay weekly as he did, to hand the money over to his wife personally, instead of making the allotment, although he had allotted money in her favour in the past. It is not impossible that the allotment paper went down with him in the particular vessel on which he was serving when it was sunk, but unfortunately, if he had made the allotment, it never reached home, and his widow has now to suffer. I submit that this woman ought to have the benefit of the twenty-six weeks' allotment, seeing that her husband has been in the habit of making an allotment in her favour. In these matters we ought to have some regard to the real facts, instead of being bound by stereotyped rules; there should be elasticity to enable us to deal with these cases. The human mind is not large enough to take in the curious set of circumstances when such facts do arise, and, therefore, I think there should be some elasticity enabling the Admiralty to deal fairly with these questions, and to make proper provision for the widows, although the Regulations may not absolutely provide for it. I have had another case brought to my notice in which a man had never previously made an allotment. He had only been married six months; he had been at home during that time, and there had been no need for allotment. Now the

widow gets none. I submit that that is entirely wrong, and I hope the right hon. gentleman will take great care that all these matters shall be brought before the Pensions Committee in order that these wrongs may be put right. Then, as regards the amendments of the Regulations made by the Committee, it is to me a matter of regret that they have not dealt more generously with the Navy. So far as I understand the recommendations of the Select Committee, the Navy gets little or nothing. It may be a mistake, but it appears to me the recommendations do not apply to the Navy at all.

DR. MACNAMARA: Oh yes, they do!

MR. HOHLER: It may be intended that they shall, but I should like to see it in black and white. I find that Clause 9 of the Select Committee's Report only refers to Class 5, and Class 5 has nothing at all to do with the Navy. The classes which are enumerated as being affected are in the Army alone. It may have been that the Committee did intend to apply the increased pensions both to the Army and Navy, but, as a matter of fact, I think it will be seen that, strictly speaking, they have not done so. May I just add a few more words on the question of the Navy pensions? It must be remembered that all classes do not get the same scales as engine-room artificers; some of the classes are not paid nearly as well. The seamen get comparatively little. The Marines, too, are very badly paid, and it should be borne in mind that the seaman has to find his own clothes, although he gets a kit on entering, and he has likewise to provide a great number of things for messing purposes. What I want to draw attention to is this: In the original pensions paper the pensions for widows proceeded on the footing that in the Navy the allotment was at the rate of 20s. per month. That was the minimum. In the Army the minimum was 3s. 6d. per week. When you come to the allowances for the children you will find that the Navy allowances are increased to 4s. for the first child, 3s. for the second, 2s. for the third, and 1s. for the fourth; but in the Army the scale is 5s. for the first, 3s. 6d. for the second, and 2s. for subsequent children. In the case of an Army man with a family of four children, the wife would get a separation allowance and allotment of 25s. 4d., while in the case of a

Navy man with a like family the wife would only get 21s. That is wrong. I submit the greater consideration should be given to the Navy, and that the allowances for children ought to have been increased. I think no good reason has been shown why the original Government allowance for the seaman and Marine, who are the worst paid classes in the Navy, was only 6s., which, with the allotment of 20s. per month, secures 11s. for the wife, while in the Army, the allotment being 3s. 6d. only per week, the wife gets a total allowance of 12s. 6d. Why should they not be put on the same footing? I do not think that the Navy has been fairly treated in this respect, and, in my judgment, the Select Committee should have been more generous and put the soldier and the sailor on precisely the same footing.

I want to say a word or two in regard to the stokers training as mechanicians in the Navy. The war has disturbed the whole of the arrangements in connection with this class, and has stopped their training. Cannot something be done so that they may not lose the opportunity of advancement which was open to them? I should have thought it quite possible to put them to some test to qualify them as active mechanicians. Then, again, there is a point in regard to the officers of the engine-room artificers. It does seem singularly hard that the men who have been doing this work, instead of being promoted, should have others brought in over their heads. With regard to the Royal Marines, great dissatisfaction is felt also in the matter of promotion. A number of quartermaster-sergeants were sent to France with the Royal Marine Brigade and the Royal Naval Division and there acted as officers. They have been brought home with the Royal Naval Division, and now a number of young fellows, without any experience and little or no training, have been put over their heads with commissions. Yet these men are still acting as officers without commissions. I think it is a great hardship. One ought to recognise that when a war comes it is the harvest of the soldier and sailor, and men who have been serving us for years ought certainly to be promoted to fill these positions, which would be a great advancement to them, instead of a number of young fellows without any training being placed over their heads. These men with years of service who have been acting as officers ought to receive the benefits of these

commissioned appointments, instead of them passing to somebody else.

That is a grave injustice which creates the greatest dissatisfaction. I gather that the answer to it is that at the end of the war we shall have more lieutenants than we know what to do with. My answer to that is that they should be pensioned as lieutenants. They have served their time. They are entitled to what was promised them. When the men are wanted, will you fill their posts with men brought in from the outside? Nothing could be worse in the interest of the Navy than that. Another point I wish to raise is in regard to the National Reserve. The men in the Navy have a real grievance in that respect. They joined it on the faith that they would in time of war receive a £10 or a £5 bounty, depending upon whether they were in Class 1 or Class 2. I actually know of cases where they have been paid off and the promise not kept. A man in the Navy who has joined the National Reserve, and who, we will say, has rejoined the marines or another naval branch, has been refused the bounty which all the other men get. The men are greatly dissatisfied, and feel they have been misled in regard to it. I have had cases before me where they were paid the bounty and were subsequently told, 'You must take that out in pay,' and have had deductions made from their pay because the bounty does not extend to them. The Admiralty should extend the bounty to these men, as they do to men in the Army, because they are equally deserving of justice as the latter. I hope the right hon. gentleman will take some steps to secure that the men who have rejoined the Navy, who were under no obligation to join except from a spirit of patriotism, should receive the bounty as do the soldiers who join the National Reserve. There is another question of importance with regard to pay. I look for a clear statement as to what is proposed to be done in regard to the men who were entitled to their pensions at the time immediately before the outbreak of war, and the men who have become entitled to their pensions since the outbreak of war. It is quite clear that in regard to the men who became entitled to it before the outbreak of war——

DR. MACNAMARA: Who were drawing it.

MR. HOHLER: Not necessarily. There were some who, although they were entitled to it, were not discharged for

pension. I suppose there was some kind of inkling that the war was probable or possible, and that they were held up and were not discharged for pension. I believe that under a Statute passed many years ago, if a man unfortunately after the outbreak of war becomes entitled to his pension, all that he gets extra is 2d. a day, or something of that kind. If, on the other hand, a pensioner is called up, he draws the full pay of his rating and he also draws his full pension. That is quite right, but it is a great injustice in regard to the men who were entitled to their pensions. All that I ask on their behalf is, and I am sure they will be quite content with it, that we may get an undertaking or statement from the Admiralty that at the close of the war those men who survive it shall receive their pensions, provided they were entitled to them, in addition to their pay. I notice the right hon. gentleman laughs at that.

DR. MACNAMARA: Oh, no!

MR. HOHLER: Well, he smiles at it; at any rate, he does not look sympathetic. The man who has served his time and is entitled to his pension is certainly entitled to more than 2d. a day for risking his life. It is not fair that he should merely receive the 2d. a day. If you are going to take a special Emergency Act to hold the Marines to the Service, and say, 'We have no right to retain you, but we will pass a special Act for that purpose,' you ought in honour to pay them on the footing they would have been paid. Every one of the men would have volunteered if they had been allowed to go back to their old ratings and get their pension and pay. You have taken them by Act of Parliament, and given them a niggardly 2d. instead of their pension. It is a very strong illustration of injustice. I call it very narrow treatment, and something should be done to place these men on a right and proper footing. It will not cost the Admiralty so much as they believe. I believe there were some twenty of them on the *Cressy* or one of the vessels that went down—I am speaking now of the seamen, not of Marines. Surely these men for the risk they have borne and the horror they have gone through are at least entitled to their pay as well as their pension. I ask the right hon. gentleman to say what can be done to relieve these men and put them on a fair footing. There is one other point in regard to quartermaster-sergeants in the Royal Marines. They joined the Royal Fleet Reserve upon an express under-

taking in writing, contained in a pamphlet issued by the Admiralty, that if they were to be called to the Colours to serve on active service they should rejoin in the same rating as that in which they left the Marines. These men are called up to serve in this war, and they are called up as, and only receive the pay of colour-sergeants instead of quartermaster-sergeants. What can be the justification for that? I submit that the Admiralty are bound to carry out their undertaking and put these men right, and to see that justice is done in response to the inducement held out to them.

SIR ROBERT PRICE: I beg to move to leave out from the word 'That,' to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof the words 'this House, while recognising the necessity for employing merchant shipping on military business, trusts that the Government will exercise their rights with due regard to the needs of the traders and consumers of this country.'

The Amendment which stands in my name on the Paper has been largely anticipated by the discussion last Thursday and to-day. Last Thursday [February 11] the Prime Minister, in a very long and very admirable speech, dealt with the subject at considerable length, and the First Lord of the Admiralty to-day did me the honour of replying to my Amendment before I had moved it. The Prime Minister on Thursday, however, dealt with the matter only from the point of view of foodstuffs. It is absolutely certain, and every one knows it, so that I need not argue the matter, that freights have risen enormously, not only for the necessaries of life, but naturally for other things as well, because the freight-owner is not at all particular as to what he carries. The effect on trade generally is, perhaps, more pronounced with regard to other articles than food, because food being an absolute necessity is carried somehow, and the extra burden is shifted on to the consumer. With regard to certain raw materials and certain commodities which have a very low rate of profit attached to them, there is a positive paralysis in some cases in some of these trades because the extra cost of carrying is more than the calculated net profit. Consequently, it is a matter of very great urgency and importance. I do not suppose for a moment that the Admiralty do not recognise that as well as we do. The Prime Minister examined the various causes of the rise in freights. The House will agree that he ultimately came down to this: that the

great main cause was the enormous amount of tonnage used by the Admiralty for warlike purposes.

We entirely recognise that that use of mercantile tonnage by the Admiralty is an absolute necessity of the case. We entirely recognise that they have a paramount right to the tonnage of the country, if it is necessary to the country's defence and the proper carrying on of this war. We quite agree that they should have all the tonnage they want. We know that their demands are very great. They have to convey large bodies of troops to France, to support them with all the necessaries of life and the munitions of war, and they have to look after the coaling and supplies of the Fleet. In addition, as the First Lord said to-day, and we fully recognise it, they have to be prepared with an ample reserve, so that at any moment when they are otherwise fully employed they have still ships left to carry out some urgent call. These facts we all recognise. Therefore the amount of tonnage they require is a very large one. But although we recognise that to the full, we want to be quite sure that they appreciate the position with regard to the rest of the country and have it constantly in their minds. It is quite true that the claims of the Navy are paramount, but, to put an absurd case, it would be no use the Navy keeping the sea clear for our commerce if we had no merchant ships left in which to carry that commerce. It is absolutely necessary, although possibly not of such paramount necessity, that there should be as ample a tonnage as possible left to conduct the business of the country.

The Prime Minister quoted the figures, which were also given to-day by the First Lord, showing that the Navy is using 20 per cent. of the mercantile tonnage of the country for this purpose, or 10 per cent. of the mercantile tonnage of the whole world. The figure is such a startling one that in the debate on Thursday, when the figure was repeated, I noticed that the Prime Minister hurriedly consulted his notes to see whether he had stated it. Of course he said it, and it is perfectly true. We are using this enormous tonnage, and we want to be quite certain that the Admiralty always have in their mind the necessity for as far as possible economising its use or using it in the most business-like way, and sparing as much as possible for the needs of the rest of the community. Those needs are very great. Several hon.

members have already adverted to them, and the Leader of the Opposition has already put in his plea for a business management. The First Lord of the Admiralty to-day rather hotly repudiated the necessity for a business manager, but undoubtedly certain things have been done with merchant shipping which I do not think would have been done by an ordinary man of business managing his own affairs. I do not believe for a moment that an ordinary man of business managing his own affairs, if he had any prisoners to keep, would keep them in expensive liners in the river Thames. We know that three very large and important liners have been used to keep prisoners in. For the purpose of economy it would have been cheaper to take the whole of Grosvenor Square, and furnish it handsomely, and keep them all there rather than to use these valuable steamers, of such importance to the country, for that purpose. I understood from the Prime Minister that the Admiralty have made other arrangements, and that these three ships were to be liberated to commerce, and for this relief much thanks.

But the Prime Minister said something further, and that was not confirmed by the First Lord of the Admiralty to-day, and I understood him to speak rather in a contrary sense. The Prime Minister said that the Admiralty were going to make such arrangements as they could for the releasing of such tonnage as it was possible for them to release from time to time in order to relieve the scarcity of shipping; but I did not understand that the First Lord to-day went nearly so far. I understood him to say that they wanted the tonnage, they had not any too much, and were not prepared to give up the use of any of it. I hope that what I understood from the Prime Minister is the fact, and that what I understood from the First Lord is not the fact, because although we recognise the right of the Admiralty to the tonnage, and wish them to have it if it is necessary for the war, we think that as far as they possibly can, they ought to recognise the importance of the commerce of this country and the difficulty there now is in carrying it on. We all recollect the fable—I think it was Æsop's fable—where the arms and the legs and the brains made up their mind that they were not going to work any longer to support the idle belly, and we know what happened in a neurasthenic kind of

way to the people who joined in this conspiracy. I do not for a moment think that the Admiralty do not recognise the importance of the commerce of this country; I have often heard them say that one of their chief functions is to provide an open sea for it, but I think there is a certain amount of obsession in favour of their own Department, and, if I were there, I should probably feel the same. They are so anxious to have every available piece of tonnage they can get hold of at their command, that they sometimes forget the importance of the other interests. The *Times* to-day, dealing with this Motion, referred to it as a kind of truism, from which I suppose they meant that it was the sort of thing any one would agree with. I hope the Admiralty will agree with it, and that we may feel quite certain that in commandeering or requisitioning tonnage, they really want it and intend to use it in a business-like way, and that they intend, as far as possible, to give consideration to the commerce of this country.

MR. LOUGH: I beg to second the Amendment.

I do not intend to utter a word of general criticism on the admirable way in which the Navy is performing its duties now. I have listened with very great pleasure to the excellent speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty, and I do not think there was a spot of weakness in it, looking at it from my hon. friend's point of view, except perhaps his treatment of this question. Our thoughts have been drawn towards this question of the dearness of necessities by the debate of last Thursday, and I am sure every one has made up his mind that almost the only practical point from which relief may come is this point which is raised by my hon. friend. Prices in this country are governed entirely by the supplies that come in. The Admiralty is in this position: It has taken charge of the mercantile marine of this country as completely as it has in usual times of the war marine. The whole of the mercantile navy is now at the disposal of the Admiralty. I should like to put the question in even a wider sense. All the ports are now in charge of the Admiralty. No ship is allowed to sail except by permission of the Admiralty. A great many ports are closed by the Admiralty action, and the great fleet of merchant ships that they have employed occupied a good deal of space in the ports, so that they are accountable for the congestion of the ports as well.

All my hon. friend asks is that, as it is absolutely for the Admiralty to take charge of such a vast section of the nation's interests, it should endeavour to manage it in such a way that as little harm should be done to those great commercial interests as possible. It is not for me to defend a point made by the Leader of the Opposition, but it struck me that in the little debate that took place between the First Lord of the Admiralty and the right hon. gentleman opposite, the Leader of the Opposition had the best of it with regard to that ship which was delayed for three and a half months in order that coal might be there ready for the Fleet. Coal must be there, we all agree, and we would not put a single obstacle in the way of it, but why could not one ship be kept full of coal and the other ships allowed to go away, instead of a quarter of their cargo being kept there for three and a half months, dangling about because some coal, if it were coal, was necessary? We only ask that as much consideration as possible should be given to business necessities in this matter by the Admiralty, and if they have not got skill of their own to work this matter out in a way which will not be detrimental to the great interests of the country, they should call on some business assistance in regulating these matters. Let them see the importance of the interests which will be sacrificed when a port is closed, or ships taken off a certain route, before they take action. I desire, in pressing the point very strongly, again to assure my right hon. friend and the First Lord of the Admiralty that it is not done in any spirit of unfriendliness to the Navy or through any want of appreciation of the great work which they have in hand at present.

DR. MACNAMARA: By the Rules of the House I am compelled to confine my remarks to the Amendment of my hon. friend, but I may be allowed to say with regard to the many interesting questions which have been raised—separation allowances, pensions, and so on—I have no doubt an opportunity will be given to make a statement upon them during the course of the debate to-morrow.

MR. BARNES: Will that apply to the two points I have raised?

DR. MACNAMARA: I have taken careful note of all the points put to me.

LORD C. BERESFORD: Courts-martial?

DR. MACNAMARA: That is a matter more of policy, which should be referred to the First Lord.

LORD ROBERT CECIL: Are we to have no further statement?

DR. MACNAMARA: I will communicate with the First Lord to-night, but I am compelled now to deal with the Motion which has been made.

SIR J. WALTON: The Amendment will not allow an opportunity for a full statement of our case to be submitted?

MR. SPEAKER: That does not follow. The hon. gentleman will have the privilege of replying.

DR. MACNAMARA: Part of the First Lord's speech broadly stated our position in advance, therefore the remarks I have to make cover ground which to some extent has been covered to-day. My hon. friend will be the first to realise that at the outbreak of hostilities every moment is of vital importance, and every step we took had to be taken instantly and swiftly, and delay might have had fatal consequences. There was no time to fix rates or to sign charter parties. We might have waited for all that, and made a nicer discrimination as to the amount we would take up. If we had done so, we might very well have been a day too late, and that day might have been a fatal one for the British Empire. In the first place, as regards the necessary auxiliaries for the Fleet at the outbreak of hostilities and the provision for firm transport, the only way was to deal with the situation at once and take up all available vessels, and to give an assurance to the shipowners, as far as we could, that they would be fairly considered later; and, remember, in a good many cases, adaptation for transport work particularly was necessary, and that involved a certain amount of delay. In all these matters we received ready assistance from the shipowners, and without that ready assistance we certainly could not have moved with the rapidity we did.

As regards payments, what we endeavoured to do was to make advances based upon the average rates which were at the time ruling for similar vessels under peace conditions. No doubt we could have gone to work more slowly, more circumspectly, and more cautiously. To use a railway simile, we could have taken care that there was no rolling stock in

any siding. But if we had done that, the indictment which we should have had to face to-day might very well have been a different indictment from that which we have to face. The indictment which has been made against us we can face, and I am quite sure we shall receive a generous recognition of the very heavy task which was before us at the outset of hostilities. The indictment of not having done the thing thoroughly and promptly is one which, of course, we can defend. I think it is not sufficiently understood as to what we did along business lines. I have noticed with great interest the constant reference to the necessity to deal with this in a business way. At the very outset the intention and method of exercising the prerogative of the Crown in this matter of requisitioning was announced by a Royal Proclamation. The Royal Proclamation provided for the appointment of an Arbitration Board, or rather a set of panels from which arbitrators could be drawn as and when occasion demanded, and the Board was formed in consultation with Lord Mersey. He was appointed the President. Various shipping associations, chambers of commerce, trade unions and so on were asked to nominate representatives.

MR. BONAR LAW: The right hon. gentleman is dealing with a point which I never touched at all. It is not a question of whether the shipowners who have given ships to the Government are fairly treated. The question is whether the Government are managing the ships which they have taken with proper regard to economy in the use of the ships.

DR. MACNAMARA: All I am anxious to do is to state the whole of the case, as far as I can, as to what our proceedings were, and to show that, at any rate as far as we could, in setting up this Board we have endeavoured, subject to the exigencies of the military situation alone, to follow business lines. The Board was constituted by the representatives of the shipping associations, chambers of commerce, and trade unions, and there were eleven Government nominees—a Board of seventy-four. That was constituted finally on 31st August for the purpose of considering the treatment, rates, and so on to be paid to shipowners. I quite recognise the distinction between what I am now calling attention to, and the criticism of the right hon. gentleman. Then we went on with the assistance of Lord Mersey to the question

of setting up panels to recommend to us for our guidance, though not for our necessary approval, the rates to be decided, and at the beginning of this year we agreed generally that the proposals they put before us could be accepted. We had the assistance also of Lord Inchcape, who was Chairman of the Sub-committee appointed by Lord Mersey, and their rates were very carefully considered. That is shortly what our proceedings have been. I agree there has been dislocation. I agree that we must have diverted the mercantile market probably rather seriously. I agree that our operations have reduced the number of available bottoms, and no doubt that has had an effect on freights in the mercantile market. I do think that those who make that criticism might remember one elementary factor in the whole matter, and that is Germany. War is war, and it is very difficult to conduct war on peace lines, which I rather think some people seem to think possible. It would be a very small consideration to the parties concerned if by a cautious and carefully thought-out scheme we had succeeded in giving Germany a great opening, but we have played our part in preventing that. I agree with the spirit of the Amendment, and I take no exception to the speeches of the hon. members who moved and seconded it. Our duty is to keep our eyes fixed on two vitally important considerations. The first is dependent for its success very largely upon the second. The first is to meet every military necessity fully and promptly at whatever cost; and the second is—I suppose every one will agree that it is a difficult task—to do that with as little dislocation of the business of the country as we can. These seem to me the two duties which are before us, and no one will deny that these tasks are not easy. They would not be easy at any time, but we will do our best to achieve what is required of us, and I hope my hon. friends will accept that assurance on my part, and consider that the ventilation they have given to the topic is sufficient, without further pressing the discussion.

SIR JOSEPH WALTON: The subject under consideration is indeed one of great importance, not only in relation to the trade and commerce of the country and in enabling it to proceed on normal lines, but on account of the bearing it has on food prices and the necessaries of life. We are all agreed

that the necessary commandeering of so large an amount of our mercantile marine as 4,000,000 tons has been one main cause of the enormous rise in freights for the transport of our food supplies and of the raw materials for our manufactures. No one of any party will desire that the military needs of the country should not be fully and adequately supplied, but the question before us in my judgment is rather whether this enormous portion of the mercantile marine which has been commandeered is being utilised on the best business lines and with the greatest advantage not only to the military needs of the country, but to the commercial needs of the country, as regards the food of the people. Taking, for instance, the coal trade, we know that it is the habit of coalowners in Northumberland and Durham when they make contracts for coal in London to cover themselves by entering into contracts with shipowners. The normal rate is 3s. per ton. I know cases in which large contracts have been entered into for the delivery of coal in London where freight has been entered at 3s. per ton, and where every ship owned by a particular shipowner who made the contracts was commandeered by the Government at the commencement of the war. I understand they are to receive from the War Office, or the Admiralty or the Government, equal to 4s. per ton from the Tyne to London, but on the other hand those coalowners who have thus contracted with shipowners found that the shipowners were utterly unable to give them a single ship to convey coal under these contracts because their vessels had all been commandeered by the Government. The result of this commandeering of the suitable ships specially designed for conveying coal is that the shipowners have had to pay as high as 13s. 6d. per ton for outside boats, not at all so well fitted and designed for the purpose as the boats they were deprived of.

The question is: Can we rely that the 4,000,000 tons of the mercantile marine commandeered are being managed to the greatest advantage? Are they under expert management? I understand from the First Lord of the Admiralty that they were under the management of Mr. Graeme Thomson. Is he a shipping expert? He may be a man of the greatest ability, as no doubt he is as a public servant, but I wish to know whether he is a shipping expert. I am told—and I shall be glad to be corrected if I am wrong—that he is not a shipping

expert at all, but a Civil servant. My suggestion to the Government is that they ought to call in the assistance of the best shipping experts in the country and place the management of this huge mercantile marine in their hands, on the distinct understanding that the first requirements they are to fulfil are those in connection with the military needs of the country, and that from time to time, when it might probably be found that considerably less than 4,000,000 tons of the mercantile marine of the country would more than meet the requirements of the military needs of the country, a certain number of ships could be returned with advantage to the ordinary trade and commerce of the country. This would promote a reduction of freights and would in turn cheapen the cost of the food supplies of the country and of the raw materials upon which we are vitally dependent for the carrying on of those industries which we are able to continue. I hope the Government will take the suggestion of the Leader of the Opposition most carefully into consideration, and that we shall soon have the welcome news that this huge mercantile marine which has been commandeered by the Government has been put under the most expert management possible.

I believe that we should find that everything required for the military needs of the country could be efficiently done without running any risk whatever, by substantially less tonnage of the mercantile marine than is now employed. I believe it is due to the trade and commerce of the country, and due also to the whole nation in the matter of cheap food supply, that action should be taken by the Government in this way. If this huge tonnage of the mercantile marine was placed under the most expert management, it would probably be found that they could spare a certain number of ships from time to time, even if they did not dispense with them altogether; and just in the same way as the interned ships are being devoted to the trade and commerce of the country, so from time to time trade and commerce might be assisted by allowing a certain number of these other vessels to take cargo coal, or food supplies, or anything else. There is a curious anomaly which I cannot understand. I believe that the owners of the commandeered ships are receiving equal to 4s. freight, as compared with the pre-war price of 3s., and yet if any one in the coal trade wishes to have the use of these interned ships to convey coal to London

he has to pay 11s. per ton. It hardly appears a fair and equable arrangement that the Government should be getting 11s. per ton for all the interned ships, whereas they are only paying the owners of the coal-carrying steamers 4s. per ton. That means that the gas companies in London are paying at least 7s. per ton more for coal than there is any necessity to pay, assuming that the 4s. paid by the Government is a fair rate for these cargo steamers. My own opinion is that if the assistance of shipping experts were called in, and if the Government approached this matter with a determination not only to provide effectually for military needs, but also to assist the trade and commerce of the country and prevent the rapid rise in the price of coal in London, which means a higher price for gas and a higher price for coal for the whole community, that rise in price could be considerably obviated if the Government would act on the suggestion I have made to employ the best shipping experts.

Question, 'That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question,' put, and agreed to.

Main Question again proposed.

MR. RAWLINSON: I wish to make a protest against the procedure this evening being made a precedent in the future. Some important points have been raised in the speech of my friend on my right, and also by hon. friends below the Gangway. In the ordinary course these would have been answered by the representative of the Admiralty this evening, but that course has been avoided, because hon. members opposite moved an Amendment. I shall content myself by making my protest to-night, for I understand that the matters which have been referred to can be raised again to-morrow. If it were not possible to raise it to-morrow, I feel sure that the Admiralty would perceive the unfairness of discussing the Amendment where the Main Question has been put. I merely make these remarks as a protest on this occasion because this very important question of court-martial can be raised to-morrow on Vote A.

DR. MACNAMARA: I may ask if, with your approval, we can continue the general discussion in Committee on A?

MR. SPEAKER: It does not require my approval. It is one of the rules of the House that on the first Vote of the Navy

Estimates any matter which is relevant to the Navy Estimates may be discussed.

Question put, and agreed to.

Navy estimates considered in Committee.

Resolved, A. 'That 250,000 officers, seamen, and boys, Coastguard, and Royal Marines be employed for the Sea and Coastguard Services for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1916.'

Resolution to be reported to-morrow (Tuesday); Committee to sit again To-morrow.

HEALTH OF THE NAVAL DIVISION AT THE CRYSTAL PALACE.

Admiralty, February 15.

Rumours in circulation that the general health of the Naval Division in training at the Crystal Palace is unsatisfactory are inaccurate. Cases of serious illness of every kind are bound to occur in any large body of men like the Naval Division, but on the whole the health of the men has been and is excellent, and there is no reason to anticipate any deterioration in this respect. Out of 8000 men the average sick list is under 150, or less than 2 per cent. *Times*, Feb. 16, 1915.

ALLOWANCES TO OFFICERS OF THE ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION

At the Court at *Buckingham Palace*, the 16th day of February 1915. *L.G.*, Feb. 19, 1915.

Present—

The KING'S Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

WHEREAS there was this day read at the Board a Memorial from the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 12th day of February 1915, in the words following, viz.:—

> 'Whereas by Section 3 of the Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865, it is enacted, *inter alia*, that all pay, pensions, or other allowances in the nature thereof, payable in respect of services in your Majesty's Naval or Marine Force to a person being or having been an

Officer, Seaman, or Marine therein, shall be paid in such manner, and subject to such restrictions, conditions, and provisions as are from time to time directed by Order in Council:

'And whereas we consider it desirable that the Officers of your Majesty's Naval Service acting as Battalion Commandants in the Brigades of the Royal Naval Division, and the Commanders in command of the Battalions of the Royal Naval Division at the Crystal Palace Depot, should receive Command Money at the rate of 5s. a day:

'And whereas we further consider that the Lieutenant-Commanders acting as Adjutants and Second in Command to the Battalions of the Royal Naval Division should receive an allowance at the rate of 2s. 6d. a day:

'We beg leave humbly to recommend that your Majesty may be graciously pleased, by your Order in Council, to sanction the payment of these allowances accordingly, with effect as from the dates on which the Officers concerned took up their duties.

'The Lords Commissioners of your Majesty's Treasury have signified their concurrence in these proposals.'

His Majesty, having taken the said Memorial into consideration, was pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed. And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

SOLDIERS AND SAILORS (PENSIONS AND ALLOWANCES)

House of Commons, February 16, 1915.

Hansard. MR. RAFFAN asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether the Government has accepted the recommendations contained in the Special Report of the Select Committee on Naval and Military Services (Pensions and Grants); and, if so, whether the increased scale of pensions and allowances will become operative as from 1st March next?

The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (MR. LLOYD GEORGE): The new scales of separation allowance and widows' pensions recommended by the Select Committee will be brought into force as from the 1st March next.

INSPECTION OF VESSELS

MR. WATT asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether all inspection of vessels built in Scotland for his Department is given to the one firm, namely, Lloyd's Register; whether he is aware that this firm has had to extend its staff on account of the Admiralty work; that other firms exist in Scotland well able to do this work, notably the British Corporation for the Survey and Registry of Shipping, and that such firms have little of their ordinary work at present before them on account of mercantile shipbuilding being set aside for Admiralty work; and whether under the circumstances he can see his way to divide the inspecting work of his Department? *ibid.*

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA): Such inspection is usually carried out by Admiralty officers, but in a few special cases has been entrusted to Lloyd's, but I have no information that they have had to extend their staff on this account. The capacity of the British Corporation for the survey of shipping is well known to the Admiralty, and in the case of any outside survey being required in future the Admiralty will be glad to consider the question of availing themselves of the assistance of the British Corporation.

MR. WATT: Is it not the case that the specifications lay down that the inspections must be done by Lloyd's Register, and is that fair to all parties?

DR. MACNAMARA: Whether that be the case or not, we will consider the capacity of the others.

MR. WATT: It will not be limited in the specification?

DR. MACNAMARA: If it were my answer would be incorrect.

GERMAN PRISONERS (CHARTER PRICE OF SHIPS)

MR. WATT asked what was the full charter price per month for the nine ships of 102,205 tons chartered by the War Office for internment of German prisoners; and since when had the earliest charter been running? *ibid.*

MR. BAKER: The full payment per month is approximately £86,000. The first ship was taken up on the 28th October last.

CATHOLICS IN THE FLEET

House of Commons, February 16, 1915.

Hansard MR. BOLAND: I beg to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty a question, of which I have given private notice, namely: Whether representations have been made to the Admiralty that the arrangements for the spiritual welfare of Catholics serving in the Fleet are inadequate, and what steps it is proposed to take to remedy this state of things?

DR. MACNAMARA: Yes, Sir. The question has been engaging the serious attention of the Admiralty, and my right hon. friend hopes shortly to be in a position to propose a conference on the subject with the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster and the Bishop of Waterford.

ENEMY SHIPS: BUSINESS COMMITTEE

ibid. MR. BONAR LAW: I beg to ask the President of the Board of Trade a question, of which I have given him private notice: What are the names of the Business Committee to which the management of enemy ships at the disposal of the Government has been committed, with full powers to deal with them; what are the terms of reference to the Committee, and at what date was it appointed?

The PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE (MR. RUNCIMAN): The preliminary arrangements for the requisitioning of thirty-four Austrian and German detained steamers for work in our home trade were made by an Interdepartmental Committee. As soon as these vessels had been transferred to the Government, about the end of January, the management of them was put into the hands of Mr. Everett and Mr. Newbigin, of Newcastle-on-Tyne. These gentlemen are efficient managers of vessels in the coasting trade, but their private interests do not clash with the duties now imposed on them, for the whole of their vessels have been commandeered for Admiralty service. The managers have instructions to charter the vessels at the market rate, while avoiding any pressure upwards to turn them round as rapidly as possible, and in other ways to run them as well as though they were their own vessels. The profits are paid into the Exchequer. The largest consumers of sea-borne coal in

London are enabled to keep in touch with the managers and the Government through an Advisory Committee appointed by themselves for this purpose, but their committee is not permitted to interfere in the management of the vessels.

MR. BONAR LAW: What arrangements are being made to deal with other ships as they gradually come into the hands of the Government?

MR. RUNCIMAN: I believe that of the total number of interned Austrian and German vessels only thirty-four are free for the merchant service. Some four or five others have been requisitioned for purely Admiralty purposes. There are no other steamers which are likely to come. As to abroad, as vessels come home we shall have to consider the matter from time to time. We have made no arrangements in regard to them at present.

NAVAL CASUALTIES

MR. KELLAWAY asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will state the number of casualties in the Navy since the commencement of the war? *ibid.*

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will give the House a summary of the facts already made public, namely, the number of officers and men of the Royal Navy and Royal Marine Forces killed, wounded, and missing, including the Royal Naval Division, specifying those killed and drowned through the effect of submarines, mines, gunfire, killed, wounded, and missing in the trenches, and by accident, up to date?

MR. CHURCHILL: The total number of officers and men serving under the Board of Admiralty, killed, wounded, missing and interned, since the beginning of the war, is as follows:—

	Officers	Men
Killed	348	5812
Wounded	45	352
Missing	8	5
Total	401	6169

To these may be added :—

Royal Naval Division

	Officers	Men
Killed	5	36
Wounded . . .	4	184
Missing	7	968
Interned . . .	39	1524
Total . .	55	2712

There does not appear to be any good reason for publishing the detailed information asked for, as to the relative losses from submarines, mines, gunfire, and accident. I should be very glad to have precise particulars on these points of the German losses, but no official statement has been issued.

NAVY ESTIMATES CONSIDERED IN COMMITTEE

House of Commons, February 16, 1915.

Hansard. The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA) : I should like at once to correct a misapprehension into which the noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth fell yesterday. I am quite sure that he will be the first to desire that the correction is made. The matter refers to the *Aboukir*, the *Cressy*, and the *Hogue*. The noble Lord complained that we paid no sentiment of respect to the memory of the officers and men who lost their lives. Let me read—in parts, not the whole—the following :—

'September 25th, the sinking of His Majesty's ships *Aboukir, Cressy*, and *Hogue*. The Secretary of the Admiralty authorises the following statement: "The loss of nearly 60 officers and 1400 men would not have been grudged if it had been brought about by gunfire in an open action, but it is peculiarly distressing under the conditions which prevailed. The absence of any of the ardour and excitement of an engagement did not, however, prevent the display of discipline, cheerful courage, and ready self-sacrifice among all ranks and ratings exposed to the ordeal. The duty on which these vessels were engaged was an essential part of the arrangements by which the control of the seas and the safety of the country are maintained, and the lives lost are as usefully,

as necessarily, and as gloriously devoted to the requirements of His Majesty's Service as if the loss had been incurred in a general action. In view of the certainty of a proportion of misfortunes of this character occurring from time to time, it is important that this point of view should be thoroughly appreciated." '

I am quite sure that the noble Lord must have overlooked that.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: I am very glad indeed to hear what the right hon. gentleman has just read to the House. I do not think that many of the relatives and dependants of those that went down could have seen it; I never saw it. Would the right hon. gentleman make some arrangements by which the note and respect to the memory of those who have died should be conveyed to the relatives? That, I think, would be very satisfactory. Probably they never saw the public notice; I did not.

DR. MACNAMARA: The statement I have read was issued in the way all our statements are. I can well believe some people did not see it. I will make a note of the suggestion of the noble Lord. I turn to the men of the Fleet, and I endorse with great pride all that was yesterday said as to their patient gallantry and devotion. I turn to say a word or two on a matter upon which inquiry has been made recently, amongst others by the noble Lord himself—the questions of prize bounty and prize money. Those two awards are different and must not be confused. Prize bounty is an award for taking or sinking the enemy's ships of war. Prize money is an award out of the proceeds of the capture of merchant ships as prizes. As regards prize bounty, we propose to proceed pretty much on the lines of the past. Prize bounty is payable under Sections 42 and 44 of the Naval Prize Act, which provides that: 'If His Majesty by Order in Council declares his intention to grant prize bounty, then such of the officers and crews of His Majesty's ships as are actively present either at the taking or the destroying of any armed enemy vessel shall have distributed amongst them a sum calculated at the rate of £5 for each person on board the enemy's ship at the beginning of the engagement.'

We propose to ask for sanction by an Order in Council to proceed along those lines for the award of prize bounty, but

we shall make a revision of the scale of distribution, because it does seem to us to call for some readjustment in order to be brought down to date. So much for prize bounty.

As regards prize money, our plans, which have been many times canvassed and discussed, have not yet assumed such definite form as that which I described as affecting prize bounty, but, at any rate, we have resolved upon one considerable change in the matter of prize money. In the past the net proceeds of a prize went to the crew of her actual captor in every case. This meant that the crews out on the trade routes came off in the matter of prize money better than those who were actually engaging the enemy. We, therefore, came to the conclusion that it would be very equitable to poll all the proceeds of prize, after due deduction for the cost of sales, and so on, and allow all those taking actual part in the naval side of the war to participate. That is the change we desire to apply as regards prize money. It involves a number of rather nice questions as to who is and who is not an actual participant in the naval warfare. For instance, there are men engaged to-day on arduous duties on shore in posts of danger. There are other men on shore duties which are not so exacting. Modern conditions involve a variety of questions. There are the Reserves; there are those who have only joined for the war; there is the participation of the ships of the Royal Navy overseas. All those questions take time and care for their proper treatment, and to the solution of these and other questions we have given, are giving, and shall give close attention. Representations have been made to us that we ought to pay out advances of prize money periodically, and not wait till the close of the war to make this award. Of course, we sympathise with that, but I am afraid I can hold out little hope that this will be practicable. I have, I think, said enough to show how very difficult that would be, particularly under a system of pooling, to carry into effect. Therefore, I regret I can give no undertaking in regard to the proposal that we should from time to time pay out advances of the money which will be ultimately due to those taking part in the campaign.

MR. RONALD M'NEILL: Would the case of representatives of men killed in action be taken into account?

DR. MACNAMARA: In the case of a man killed in action

his representative would have a due share, just as if the man remained alive at the end of the war.

MR. GERSHOM STEWART: With regard to old-standing accounts, will the right hon. gentleman pay out the sums due to those who have been engaged in the Persian Gulf in the last few years?

DR. MACNAMARA: That is not the question with which I am dealing now. It is a question in which the right hon. gentleman has very much interested himself, and I will take care the question is looked into.

MR. STEWART: But they may be all killed before then!

DR. MACNAMARA: The same thing will apply: the representative of the man will get whatever is due in any case. But I hope there will be no delay in paying what is necessary with regard to the Persian Gulf.

LORD C. BERESFORD: Will the question of prize bounty be settled as soon as it can be? I see the difficulty of settling prize money, but the question of prize bounty does not seem so difficult. Will that be settled before the end of the war?

DR. MACNAMARA: It is quite true that the question of prize bounty is simple, and we shall immediately proceed to ask for an Order in Council to carry that out; but the noble Lord must not take from that that we shall then be able to pay from time to time the proceeds of any particular action. That I cannot give any undertaking about, but I will bear it in mind. I desire now to refer to the Royal dockyards. Since 4th August our employés in those yards, officers and men, have by their efforts most admirably seconded their brothers in the field. In the Royal yards, overtime, night-shifts, and Sunday work have been continuous since the war began. Consequently a great strain has been put upon all concerned, from the Admiral Superintendent to the yard-boy, and everybody has responded faithfully. Ships coming in for repair have been got out again with great expedition, and workmen have cheerfully gone out to ships, where it was not expedient to move the ships from their stations, and remedied defects at sea with the greatest coolness and promptitude. The Board of Admiralty has reason to be satisfied and more than satisfied with the way the Royal yards have answered the call of duty at this time. Now the Committee is aware that the

Admiralty has a system—a very good system, if I may say so—under which once a year, if they so desire, all classes of men in the yards may present petitions respecting conditions of labour. These are heard in London and in the yards, and Admiralty decisions are subsequently promulgated as a result of this annual review and revision. Last year I had got through about three-quarters of the work when war broke out. I had visited Haulbowline, Pembroke, Devonport, Portsmouth, Chatham, Sheerness, and Dover, and had also received combined deputations from all the yards representing the larger classes of the workmen—shipwrights, boilermakers, fitters, skilled labourers, clerical staffs, and drawing office staffs—at the Admiralty Office in London. By that time I had received in all 345 deputations. But when war broke out the completion of this work had to be set aside. However, the Board of Admiralty took occasion to notify the men that whatever concessions the Board might make would be so dated as to secure that the men should not be prejudiced by the delay. I am now in a position to say that the full text of the replies of the Board to the petitions will be forwarded to each yard immediately. I propose to state now the principal concessions made. In the first place, to meet the pledge that the men were not to be prejudiced by the delay caused by the outbreak of war, the increases in time rates, omitting overtime earnings, which I shall now announce, will date as from October 1st last. These are the increases in time rates—

Shipwrights	Increase of 1s. per week.
Joiners	Increase of 2s. per week (1s. 6d. for established men).
Plumbers	,, ,, ,,
Painters	,, ,, ,,
Engine Fitters	Increase of 1s. per week on standard and predominant rate.
Ship Fitters	,, ,, ,,
Electrical Fitters	,, ,, ,,
Ordnance Fitters	,, ,, ,,
Boiler Makers	,, ,, ,,
Coppersmiths	,, ,, ,,
Founders	,, ,, ,,
Pattern Makers	,, ,, ,,

Smiths	Increase of 2s. per week on minimum rate (1s. 6d. for established men).
Sailmakers	Increase of 1s. per week.
Ropemakers . . .	Increase of 1s. per week on minimum for hired men.
Riggers	Increase of 6d. per week.
Skilled Labourers .	Increase of 1s. per week on minimum rate.
Labourers	Increase of 1s. per week.

The estimated approximate annual cost on present numbers of these concessions is about £95,000, of that £40,000 or nearly will go to the lowest class worker, the labourer, whose pay up to the 31st October was 23s. per week, and now it will be 24s.

MR. O'GRADY: What is the number of men covered by that sum?

DR. MACNAMARA: My hon. friend can make the calculation for himself. It is going to cost £40,000, commencing from the 1st October last. I cannot carry the precise figure in my head, but the hon. member can work it out. It is worth noting that labourers, the lowest paid of workers, were getting 20s. in 1905, 21s. in 1906, 22s. in 1912, 23s. in 1913, and 24s. in October 1914. In Haulbowline dockyard they get 1s. less throughout.

MR. BARNES: Do those rates apply to the torpedo factory at Greenock?

DR. MACNAMARA: To some extent Greenock is on the dockyard scale, and the labourers will get 24s. There is a special class at Greenock who are not yet on the dockyard scale, but as far as the men are on that scale those increased rates apply. In addition to these increases for mechanics, skilled labourers and labourers, we are granting improvements in wages and conditions of the yard craftsmen. Their petition is rather long outstanding, and they are a very deserving class, including civilian masters, mates, engineers, and seamen and stokers of the numerous tugs and vessels attached to the naval establishments. I need not go into the details as to the yard craftsmen, but the cost of the increased pay to them is approximately estimated at £13,000 a year. There is another class to whom concessions have been made, the storehouse clerks in the Navy ordnance

depots and the victualling yards. The first grade storehousemen will get an increase of 1s. per week; the second grade an increase of 2s. per week on the minimum and an increase of 1s. on the maximum; the storehouse assistants get an increase of 1s. on the minimum and 3s. on the maximum. These increases will cost approximately £4700 a year. The estimated total annual cost of all these concessions with regard to pay on the present numbers is about £113,000 a year, including £90,000 for skilled labourers and mechanics. This total increase in wages of about £113,000 is on the top of concessions made in 1913, which were estimated to cost £104,000. If you take the increases granted for the last ten years at the Royal dockyards it comes to this, that to-day, on the numbers we are employing, we are paying not less than £400,000 a year more in wages to our men than we should have been paying if these successive increases had not been granted. I think that is rather an interesting fact. There are several other matters which will receive further consideration. There is the case of the drawing office staffs, who have a petition before us now being considered, but I am not in a position to make any announcement at present, and I must not give any assurance because I am most anxious not to raise hopes that may not be fulfilled. There is one other matter in connection with the Royal dockyards. In 1913 we commenced an increase in the proportion of the men on the established and pensionable list. We continued that increase last year, and we shall still further increase the proportion this year. And further, in connection with the established workmen entering our service before the age of forty, they are now eligible for transfer to the establishment and the pensionable list up to the age of fifty. What is more, deductions from the age of entry will be made as regards the establishment so as to come within those limits in the case of men who have served satisfactorily in the Army or Navy or in other Departments of the Government service.

MR. FALLE: Will the increase to the establishment apply to the Works Department?

DR. MACNAMARA: We have given them all their due proportion of increase this year, and they will apply in due proportion to the Works Department. I will now leave the

Royal yards, thanking all concerned for what they have done in this time of national emergency. Finally, I should like to say a word or two about a matter in which we have been very much interested and upon which questions were put to me yesterday from various parts of the House, namely, the question of separation allowances for wives and children and other dependants, pensions for widows and orphans, and pensions for partial and total disablement. I would remind the Committee that the several schemes of the White Paper of 9th November, which were adopted by the House when it last met, were an enormous advance on the provision previously made for the sailor, the soldier, and their dependants. The separation allowances for sailors' wives and children were entirely new. Before the 1st of October last the State had never made any provision for sailors' wives, and prior to that there was no separation allowance for them. The better pay and the greater opportunity for advancement to higher rating open to the sailor as compared with the soldier, I imagine, appeared to justify the absence of the allowance. Either by allotment or remittance from pay a very great majority of the bluejackets have voluntarily from their pay made some provision for their wives and children. It is very interesting to note, and I call the Committee's attention to it particularly, that the granting of a State allowance to the bluejacket for his wife and children and other dependants for the period of the war from the 1st of October last has by no means led the bluejacket to take his responsibility less seriously, but quite the contrary.

Since the war and the introduction of allowances the number of the bluejackets' own allotments and remittances from pay have greatly multiplied. Let me give one or two figures. On the 1st of August 1914, we paid out 73,500 allotments for the month made by the sailors from their pay, and the amount so allotted was £165,000 for the month. On the 1st January 1915, we paid out 183,000 allotments, two and a half times as many, and the amount so allotted from pay was £478,000 for the month, three times as much as on the 1st August. The remittances too have gone up. During August 1914, we paid 12,756 remittances on behalf of the sailors, amounting in value to £112,858. During January 1915, we paid 15,718 remittances, amounting to £158,689.

Of course, the calling out of the Reserves will be responsible to a large extent for that great increase, but not by any means for all the increase. The new allowances have, as the Committee knows, been paid on the White Paper scale as from 1st October. We shall pay on the Select Committee scale as from 1st March, as announced just now by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in reply to a question. Further, early in April, we shall pay the sailor's monthly allotment to his wife in four weekly portions, so that on the same day in every week she will get not only her allowance but at one and the same time and in the same draft roughly a fourth of the monthly allotment which he has paid to her. The allowance and allotment, therefore, will now be paid weekly instead of the allowance weekly and the allotment monthly. I turn now to the pensions for widows and orphans. At the time of the Boer War for the lowest grade the widow's pension was fixed at 5s. per week, and the allowance for children at 1s. 6d. per week, both for the Army and the Navy. That scale came into operation on 1st April 1901. It was introduced by Mr. Brodrick, now Lord Midleton. It was debated in this House on 29th March 1901, and in the course of the debate Mr. Brodrick said: 'I really do not think that the provision which Parliament is asked to make for the widows of those who have fallen in the war is an illiberal one.' Whatever view may be taken to-day, fourteen years after this it is quite clear that no one in any part of the House, so far as I can see, took any exception to Mr. Brodrick's proposition that 5s. for the widows and 1s. 6d. for a child was not illiberal. There is no comment in the debate on the proposition that it was not an illiberal amount to fix. It was pressed upon Mr. Brodrick, however, that the soldiers' wives who, when married were not on the strength, should have the pension if their husbands were killed just the same as the wives of soldiers who, when married, were on the strength. He objected to that, and the Boer War widow's pension was confined to the wives who were on the strength, an extremely small number. At the commencement of the war there were 16,000 Army widows on the strength and 1100 receiving separation allowance, as against something like 750,000 now receiving separation allowance in the Army alone. He objected to widows who, when married, were not on the

strength getting the pension, and said that their claims would be considered by the Patriotic Fund. Whatever credit there is for it belongs to all of us, to whatever party we may belong, but so far as the State is concerned the provision made to-day for widows and orphans is out of all proportion to the pre-war provision. It is out of all proportion as regards the numbers deemed eligible for it, and it is out of all proportion as regards the individual amount of the pensions received. In point of fact, in 1903, under the Boer War system and when the widow could only get a pension if she had been married on the strength of the Army, the number of widows receiving the State pension—I am not referring to the Patriotic Fund or any other contribution—was about 3000 for both Services; and in that year I see that we put upon the estimates £64,000 to meet the claims of those widows. We made a provision, when we fixed the estimate for this financial year, 1914-15, twelve months ago, or a little earlier, of £43,000 for about 2000 widows and orphans. The estimates are necessarily speculative, but the Committee will realise at once that the cost of the White Paper scheme would have been many times that figure, and the cost of the scheme of the Select Committee would be at a still higher level. For the widow, without children and whose husband was of the lowest rank, the White Paper proposed 7s. 6d. per week with a possible 12s. 6d. if the woman were incapacitated from work. The Select Committee makes the 7s. 6d. 10s., to be increased to 12s. 6d. at the age of thirty-five and 15s. at the age of forty-five. The plan of increasing the amount of pension with advancing age is, I think, an improvement on our scheme, the White Paper scheme for which, with others, I was responsible. With regard to orphans, the hon. and learned member for Chatham (Mr. Hohler) last night said, 'As the Select Committee makes illegitimate children eligible, what about step-children?' I think it is a very good question to put, and I will take care that it is put. I have no authority, but I should imagine that the Select Committee intended step-children to be included. The hon. and learned member raised another question as to the payment of twenty-six weeks' separation allowances and allotments after the death of the husband. That was provided for from 1st October, when the separation

allowances and allotments were introduced. The hon. and learned member asked about continuing the separation allowance and allotment for twenty-six weeks in the case where the husband was killed before this thing came into existence at all, particularly in reference to such losses as the *Amphion*, *Pathfinder*, and *Pegasus*. Our authority for payment of the twenty-six weeks' allowances after death is to be found in paragraph 6 of the White Paper of 9th November :— 'The widow and children of any seaman, marine, or soldier who at the date of his death were in receipt of separation allowance will continue for twenty-six weeks after the notification of his death to receive the amount which was paid to them during his lifetime as separation allowance. If an allotment was in force at the time, they will also receive an amount equivalent to that allotment for the same period. The pensions commence at the expiration of this period.' That is to say, a widow who, at the date of the death of her husband, was in receipt of separation allowance. The hon. and learned member for Chatham did not go beyond that, and in the cases of the deaths in the *Amphion*, the *Pegasus*, and the *Pathfinder*, those widows were not in receipt of separation allowances. But in those cases what we did was at once to pay the Greenwich Hospital scale which was further brought up to the White Paper scale, and will on the 1st March be brought up to the still better pension recommended by the Select Committee. But the point made by the hon. and learned member is a good one, and I will undertake to make representation to the Select Committee, and I hope we may get definite proposals in regard thereto. Still, what we have done has been done strictly in accordance with the regulation I have just read.

LORD C. BERESFORD : Will they get back money ?

DR. MACNAMARA : I will make representations. Supposing they should have had twenty-six weeks' separation allowance from the death of the husband, if it is agreed by the Committee it is due to them, of course they will get that money, but I can give no undertaking.

MR. FALLE : Plus the minimum allotment ?

DR. MACNAMARA : The hon. gentleman has, quite unintentionally I think, put his finger on the difficulty. We should have to assume an allotment in that case, and there

was none, for the system of separation allowances was not in existence. The minimum allotment was compulsorily 5s. a week, and if we assume the 5s. it would be unfair as it would make the separation allowances probably less than the White Paper scale. The hon. gentleman may be well assured we will try our best to solve this problem with consideration and liberality to every one concerned. I turn for one moment to the allowances to the partially and totally disabled. Here again the proposals of the White Paper are on a scale far more generous than those obtaining before the war. The White Paper for the first time takes into consideration in awarding disablement pension, whether the man is single or married, and, if married, whether he has any children. I cannot understand why, in all these years, that aspect of the matter has not been considered by the authorities. The disabled man received an allowance, such as it was, without reference at all to the question whether he had to maintain a wife and children after disablement. In favour of the White Paper it may be stated that the scale for the first time, both for the Army and the Navy, takes into account the question whether a man is married and has children. The Select Committee goes beyond the scale of the White Paper as regards partial disablement. I see a little administrative difficulty which I need not go into now, but upon which I shall perhaps make representations to the Select Committee. It is an administrative feature of their proposal. I do not know that I need rehearse the new scale. Hon. gentlemen are familiar with it; but I will say this, it is not for me, although I was responsible with others for the rather less generous scheme of the White Paper—it is not for me, the son of a non-commissioned officer, to complain of the greater liberality of the Select Committee. But the Special Report discloses the fact that the Select Committee has followed in the main—I must say this if I may—the general foundations for the administration of assistance laid down by those responsible for the White Paper schemes.

As I said, and as will be seen by any one who studies the Table of Comparison on page 5 of the Select Committee's Report, the Select Committee has made substantial advances on the scheme of the White Paper. In the first place,

generally speaking, they have treated the children's provision on a more generous scale, and they have given some very useful information to the pension officers on the question of assessing the degree of dependence in the case of dependants other than widows and children. They deal with widows' pensions more generously and also advance the allowances to the partially and totally disabled. Although with others I was responsible for the scales of the White Paper I am very far indeed from being sorry that this matter has been reviewed by this Committee and touched with more generous hands, and since the Select Committee has thought fit, in all the circumstances, to take a larger view in these important particulars, it seems to me that those whose chief care and responsibility is for these men and their dependants are precisely those who may rejoice at the more generous treatment which the Select Committee, in the name of the State, thinks should be made. This White Paper, I am bound to say, was a great revolution on the past. Only those connected with the Service know how great the revolution is. But the Report of the Select Committee carries the revolution still further. I should be unmindful of old days and of old friends if I did not express pleasure at the work which has now been accomplished, and gratitude for the prospect which it unfolds. I do not forget the pension day that came once a quarter for the few, and the long line of broken men and women outside, pathetically holding out basins into which their old comrades threw assistance with recklessly generous hands. I greatly rejoice that under this provision, the like of which there is nothing in the naval and military systems of Europe—I greatly rejoice that under this provision those days are gone for ever. I greatly rejoice at the spirit of cordial and practical sympathy for the soldier and sailor and their dependants displayed by all parties in the House without any discrimination, and by all parties in the country since this war began. It is indeed a great advance on the past, and it reflects accurately a deeper sense of public responsibility towards those who fight our battles by land and sea. And anxious as this Committee most properly is to do the right thing by these people at this time, I think the Committee may accept the general scheme of the Select Committee, leaving it to the Departments concerned to work

out the details, and feel satisfied that their duty and their obligation have been fairly discharged.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE: I think I am right in saying that although we are in Committee of Supply the debate is to be a general one. That being so, I should like first to congratulate the Financial Secretary upon the very able speech he has just made. The right hon. gentleman always has the sympathy of this House, and I think the House always has his sympathy. Speaking as one of the members of the former, I can say I never brought a matter to his notice without his going into it with great care, and, as far as he could, he has always given a sympathetic answer. I shall have an opportunity later on of saying something in appreciation of the concessions which the Admiralty has made, and which the Financial Secretary has just announced, in the case of the workmen employed in the Royal dockyards. But, before I do that, I wish to say a few words upon more general questions. Every one in this Committee has the greatest admiration for the personnel of the Admiralty, and they will naturally endorse all that the First Lord said yesterday as to the ability and efficiency of the Department over which he presides. In other respects the First Lord's speech calls for eulogy, especially that part of it in which he reminded us that the time has now arrived when, in view of the enemy's departure from the accepted rules of warfare, further and still more drastic pressure from the Fleet has become a necessity. There were, of course, mistakes in the speech, which were mistakes principally of omission. There were also points of disagreement. Both points of omission and disagreement were made particularly obvious to the House yesterday by the speeches which were delivered by the Leader of the Opposition and the noble Lord the member for Portsmouth (Lord Charles Beresford). I do not think I am speaking for myself alone when I say that the reference to Rosyth was singularly unfortunate. The First Lord said:—'Rosyth is not finished, and will not be available for some time. Everything, therefore, required to keep the Fleet in being . . . has to be not only carried but kept afloat in ships.' That was a very important statement, because it will be apparent at once to the Committee, as it was to the House yesterday, that Rosyth as a naval base would have been of

the greatest advantage to the Navy to-day, and every one must regret, as I am sure the First Lord himself regrets, that Rosyth is not now available for that purpose. I do not propose to go into the question of majorities in this House—a question to which the First Lord at the beginning of his speech last night paid somewhat close attention; at any rate, it seemed to give him unbounded satisfaction—but I do feel compelled to say, and this I say in no party spirit whatever, that the situation at Rosyth is in no way due to any parsimony on the part of the Opposition. Like the First Lord, I wish to let that controversy stand over until after the war. Still, there are some things which ought to be and must be discussed, or, if not discussed, ventilated. As the Prime Minister in a speech he delivered in the House only a few days ago rather invited us than discouraged us to criticise, I shall take advantage of that invitation and say a few words on one or two matters connected with Admiralty policy. Perhaps at the close of what I have to say I may have to say a few words on some matters connected with the administration of the yards. Before doing so I should like to add my tribute, small as it may be, like the First Lord did yesterday and the Financial Secretary has done to-day, to the heroic and glorious work done by the officers and men alike in the Navy since the outbreak of war. One could have wished, and of course the Committee will be with me here, that it had been found possible to record in the daily Press some further details of the brave deeds of our sailors, many of whom have sacrificed their lives in the cause of duty. I suppose I may take it that the Admiralty are taking the necessary steps to see that these gallant deeds are preserved, not only to the present generation but to future generations. I should like the Financial Secretary to say something upon that if he replies to what I say. I am sure also, and the Committee will agree with the Financial Secretary, that great praise is due to the men in the dockyards. What he said about the work these men have done was not praising them at all too highly. They have done heroic work. Both night and day the shifts have been working, and it is in no small measure due to their arduous labours that the process of construction as well as that of repairs to ships has been so speedily accomplished.

I pass to a subject which excited some little interest in the House yesterday. I have not noticed that the Financial Secretary mentioned it in his remarks. Perhaps I may have been out of the Chamber at the time he did so, or he or the First Lord may refer to it later. I allude to the subject of courts-martial. On this subject the First Lord had much to say. All who heard the speech will admit that the First Lord made out a very good case so far as he was concerned, but of course when you go into a Court of Law or come to this House for judgment you have to hear the other side, and when you have heard the other side sometimes you decide that the side you last heard is the right side. I think that after the Committee have heard what I have to say to-day they will come to the conclusion that the First Lord was wrong and that what I am going to say is right. (HON. MEMBERS: 'Oh, oh!') If one does not say a few words in favour of oneself, no one else will. The abandonment of courts-martial without notice of any kind, the abandonment of this time-honoured custom, is not likely to find favour either in the House or the country.

LORD C. BERESFORD: Or in the Service.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Or in the Service. Nor is the position assisted at all by the First Lord's statement in the House the other day, because he did not exactly answer my question. The statement he made I will give in his own words. He said that: 'The Board'—that is, the Board of Admiralty—'must exercise complete discretionary powers as regards Courts of Judicial Inquiry.' I am not finding fault at all with those words, but I would point out that this announcement, coupled with the abandonment of courts-martial, practically places the Admiralty in the position of a dictator. Not only are our officers to be deprived of what has always been regarded as their special privilege and protection, but, in the absence of courts-martial—and this is a very important point to consider—the Admiralty will be able to cover up any mistakes on their part by blotting out any record of the transaction. It may seem to be rather a mean suggestion, but I assure the Committee that rumours are already going about that this is the end the Admiralty have in view. Personally, I do not attach any importance to such a suggestion.

DR. MACNAMARA: Then why repeat it?

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Nor do I think it is at all likely to be the case. I repeat it because the very fact of anything like that being said in that way shows the evils that must invariably follow from autocratic action of the kind. I think the Committee, with their usual fairness, will admit that I have a perfect right to repeat it, considering that I have drawn a fair deduction from the repetition. The Committee may remember, and the First Lord called my attention to it only a few days ago, in answer to a question that Lord Crewe had stated in another place that the holding of these Courts was mere custom and that it carried with it 'no statutory obligation.' In this statement the Civil Lord—who I am glad to see in his place to-day—is apparently in agreement, but both Lord Crewe and the Civil Lord appear to have forgotten entirely the Naval Defence Act. That Act affirms the principle of courts-martial, and provides that 'A court-martial shall be held pursuant to the custom of the Navy in such cases to inquire into the cause of the wreck, loss, destruction, or capture of the ship.'

LORD C. BERESFORD: That is the Naval Discipline Act.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE: The noble Lord will remember that the Naval Defence Act embodies Section 91 of the Naval Discipline Act. That is what I quoted just now. Let us look at the King's Regulations and the Admiralty Instructions. What do you find there? I turn up Article 177, which lays it down definitely that in the case of a ship captured, wrecked, or otherwise lost or destroyed, 'The captain and officers shall remain until a court-martial shall have inquired into the cause of the loss or capture.' Other articles in the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions also refer to courts-martial, and ordain that certain disabilities must follow in the event of an adverse verdict being given. It is clear, from these Regulations and Instructions, that the holding of a court-martial is contemplated. If one order is to be set aside, why not another? In fact, of what value are the King's Regulations, or, for that matter, of what value is legislation? On whose authority have courts-martial been abandoned? That question was asked yesterday in the House, and I repeat it to-day. We should like to know on whose authority courts-martial have been abandoned,

and on whose authority the provisions of the Naval Defence Act and the Navy Discipline Act have been set aside. I was always under the impression that an Act of Parliament could only be altered by Parliament itself, but, apparently, if it happens to deal with the Navy, it can be amended by the First Lord or by the Board of Admiralty, a proceeding which is hardly likely to be acceptable to a democratic community. Again Lord Crewe gave the House of Lords to understand that the holding of courts-martial was obsolete altogether, yet in the House of Commons, in 1907, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, in answer to a question, said that the only exception to the custom of holding a court-martial as laid down in the Naval Discipline Act, which is embodied in the Naval Defence Act, since 1866 to date, was that of a Coastguard cruiser and a torpedo-destroyer, but in the latter case an inquiry was held. Why was the Civil Lord so anxious to establish the custom of courts-martial in 1907 if he now says that it has no statutory obligation, is a matter of no concern whatsoever, and can be abandoned at will? The two quotations I have made require some explanation. I think the Committee will agree that to abandon a custom of such great tradition as that of courts-martial should not have taken place without the representatives of the people having some say in the matter.

I pass from the technical part of my argument to certain examples. In the case of the *Goeben* a court-martial would have been far more satisfactory, both to the officers concerned and to the people of the country, than an inquiry, but a court-martial apparently was not held. After the loss of the *Cressy* cruisers no inquiry or court-martial was held, yet there were many points connected with the disaster which seem to me to call for examination. For instance, the patrol was a very dangerous one, and the ships were not equal to putting up a fight—at any rate supposing it to be attacked by a very strong force of the enemy. Then, again, they offered a very easy target for submarines. It is all very well for the First Lord to say that our energy ought not to be consumed in the discussion of incidents beyond recall, but that hardly meets the case of the public or of the officers, who have rights and privileges to be considered. He might just as well say that a railway accident is beyond

recall, and what is the good of making any inquiry at all? So you might say with regard to crime—murders and offences against the law. It is all past and gone. What is the good of inquiring into it? If you use that argument you might pursue it almost to absurdity. It is an impossible argument for the First Lord to use. If it is allowed to pass you might say that anything can be done just as the Admiralty like, and no criticism or discussion can follow at all. That is a most dangerous precedent to set up. But the worst case is the *Formidable*. It is common knowledge that the *Formidable* and the other vessels accompanying her were going down the Channel at reduced speed and without a screen of destroyers. I should like to know whether that was in accordance with the Admiralty's instructions. The First Lord seems to be under the impression that the holding of courts-martial casts a slur on the officers concerned, and said it involved a criminal offence. Not at all, as I contradicted him yesterday. That is not the point at all. If any person feels the injustice of doing away with courts-martial it is the naval officer, for naval officers as one man would wish to see courts-martial kept up.

I come now to another part of my case, and that takes us back a long way. It takes us back to when the First Lord of the Admiralty ordered my noble friend (Lord C. Beresford) to haul down his flag, presumably as a protest against his criticism of the right hon. gentleman's policy. A Cabinet Committee was appointed to inquire into what the noble Lord had said and written, and it is satisfactory to find that the Committee agreed with the noble Lord that a War Staff should be appointed. A War Staff was appointed, and we are all very gratified that that was done. If it had been appointed when the noble Lord asked for it to be appointed the Navy would have been in an even better position than it is to-day. However, after two years of a War Staff we may congratulate the Admiralty upon a very great advance in their administration. It is, however, to the noble Lord's remarks with regard to cruisers, destroyers, and small craft that I should like to call attention. If the 154 cruisers and small craft which were abandoned in 1904 had been replaced with their equivalent we should not have been in the position that we are in to-day and that we have been

in during the last six months. It is all very well for the First Lord to say what wonderful things have been done on the trade routes. It is very fortunate for us that they have turned out so wonderful as they have. It is not all due to us; but they are wonderful things. But vessels like the *Emden* and the *Karlsruhe* have wrought considerable damage amongst our merchantmen. That is not all. The Prime Minister told us the other day that one of the reasons why the price of foodstuffs had gone up was the shortage of vessels. Seeing that half the vessels which are now being used are doing work which should be done by ships of war one can easily understand how the shortage has occurred. Again, the passing into the Naval Service of all available ships has entailed very large expense upon the country, and it appears to me that instead of ordering my noble friend to haul down his flag, the First Lord would have done very much better if he had listened to his advice, and not only would the country have been saved financially a considerable sum but fewer lives would have been lost and fewer merchantmen would have been seized, and fewer ships sunk. I have here a question, which perhaps the Civil Lord will be able to reply to, with regard to unnecessary expenditure in the use of these ships. The *Aquitania* was a new ship when the Admiralty took her over. The inside was ripped out of her, and later on her bows were damaged, and now she is hardly in the same condition as she was when she was taken over. I have not seen her, but from what I am told she is not worth very much now, and of course that will cost the country a great deal. That is a most unfortunate matter. All these matters would have been avoided if the Government had listened to what my noble friend said. It is somewhat surprising to me that, at a national crisis of this kind, when expert experience is so much needed, the Government have not availed themselves more of the noble Lord's assistance.

The system with regard to the disposal of prize money was, until recently, governed by an Order in Council passed in the reign of the late Queen Victoria. On 28th August [1] of last year this Order was cancelled and another Order was obtained on a Memorial to the King, stating that it was intended to substitute a system of bounties and gratuities. It was stated that the reason why it was wished to give

[1] [*See Naval* 1, p. 114.]

bounties and gratuities was that it was more equitable and that every man and officer in the Fleet should have a chance of obtaining some portion of the prize money, whereas before it generally went to the officers and men of the ships which took the prizes." That may be a very good plan—I do not say it was not—but meanwhile the Government set up a Committee of Claims. I believe this Committee of Claims has had a certain number of cases before it, but I am very certain that up to the present it has not considered the claims of the Navy. If that matter is deferred until the end of the war it will make a very great deal of difference, and I should like to know what is going to be done in the case of the officers and men who have lost their lives in the cause of duty. Are they or their representatives going to have an equal share in the prize money, because that is a matter of great importance to them and their dependants? A man who was in the Navy at the beginning should be treated exactly on the same footing as those who are in the Navy when the war is over.

An hon. member yesterday mentioned the question of Antwerp. This is hardly the moment to discuss a matter which is so closely connected with military policy, but, apart from all that, I am sure the Committee would like to know why so many young men without any training were sent to do duty in the trenches at Antwerp, and why they were sent without any knowledge of firing. Why have they never had any experience with regard to rifles, and why were they not properly clothed? I believe there were men in the trenches at Antwerp who had no overcoats and who had never been provided with overcoats. This has nothing whatever to do with military strategy. This has to do with naval policy, and the First Lord is answerable for the naval policy of the Government, and therefore he is answerable for these matters to which I have called attention.

I wish to say a few words about naval pay. In some cases the Admiralty have been very generous, but there is the pay of the naval officer yet to be considered, especially the pay of midshipmen and of men of warrant rank. These men correspond to the rank of sub-lieutenant in the Army, and a man on promotion to warrant rank from the lower deck is, as a rule, married, and with prices reigning as they

are to-day it is a very difficult thing for that man's wife and children to keep up a proper position. Take the case of a boatswain who is raised to warrant rank from the lower deck. Pay begins at 6s. a day. He can allot £6 a month, and he has to pay 30s. to £2 for his messing. The allotment of £6 per month would give his wife and children 30s. a week to live upon. That is hardly a sum of money which it would be considered possible for a naval officer to carry out the position in which he has been placed by the country.

Another question of naval pay which I have never yet heard brought to the notice of the House is the question of the pay of naval chaplains. There is no branch of the service which appears to have been so overlooked. The earliest age at which a chaplain can enter the Service is twenty-five, when pay starts at £210. After twenty years he receives £328, 10s., and then it increased by a shilling a day each year for four years until he reaches a maximum of £401, 10s. He may be retired at fifty-five or may be kept on till sixty. If you compare that with the pay of chaplains in the Army it does not compare very favourably. The Army chaplain gets, with home allowances, after a probationary period, £273, and rises in twenty years to £515. He can reach a maximum of £560, with home allowances. I wish to suggest that naval chaplains should receive 12s. per day for the first four years instead of the first five, then they should rise 2s. a day, instead of 1s., for every three years up to nineteen years, and then 1s. for every two years until the end of the twenty-seventh year, when a maximum of 30s. a day would be reached. This, of course, would be extra to the ordinary shore allowances. I do not know whether the Financial Secretary is aware that naval chaplains' pay has not been increased since 1870. Since that date the pay of every other rank and rating in the Navy has gone up considerably. It must be remembered that in the olden days a large proportion of the naval chaplains were also Naval instructors, and that this enabled them to earn a considerable addition to their ordinary pay; but all that has been abolished. A good many of the chaplains are married. There has been an increase in the cost of food since their present rate of pay was fixed. It may be asked, 'Is this the time to bring up the question of the pay of naval chaplains? Leave it alone

until the war is over.' I consider that this is the time to bring it up, because of the expense which falls upon the chaplains for the support of their wives and children. I hope I have made that point clear to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty.

I wish to ask a question with regard to allowances. The right hon. gentleman told me some time ago that separation allowances to the wives and children of warrant officers would be considered. Has that been done? I understood him to say that the matter was under consideration, and that he hoped the Admiralty would see their way to make the same allowances to them as in the case of the Royal Marines. There is another matter in connection with our naval policy to which I should like to call the attention of the Committee, namely, the question of Navy boots. It seems almost incredible that our sailors up to the outbreak of the war were compelled to wear German boots—that is to say, boots made with German leather. I say that deprived British workmen of work which ought to have been given to them. It has been given to foreign workmen. The right hon. gentleman told the House that the sole of the boot is always required to be of British manufacture, and that the manufacturer may use either foreign or British leather for the upper. The right hon gentleman is correct theoretically, but no British manufacturer would make a boot with the upper of English leather, because it has a different appearance to German leather, and therefore it is utterly impossible to make the upper to have the same appearance as the German sample given to him. Where does the equal opportunity come in for British and foreign workmen? The First Lord of the Admiralty says, 'Oh, they can do it; they can so manufacture their leather as to give it the appearance required.' I am not going into that technical point. I need not point out to the Committee that the Germans are not likely to let a trade like this go by and hand it over to this country. Therefore they were quite prepared to sell their boots practically at cost price, which, of course, means placing the English manufacturer in a very bad position.

In 1912 the Admiralty instituted a wearing test in relation to English and German boots. One would naturally suppose that an answer would be given shortly in regard to that

test, but two years elapsed before they were in a position to give an answer. They said that the test was 'somewhat inconclusive.' These are the words which are used in the statement which I have before me. What the British manufacturers want is an all-British specification, and that is what the Admiralty refuse to give. What the Admiralty say is, 'We will give you a specification that the leather must be British or other suitable leather.' Now, that will not do. The Secretary said he could not change it just now. Do I rightly understand him to say that when the war is over the Admiralty intend to take up the matter? That may or may not be so, but, at any rate, the argument which the Financial Secretary uses is not sound, because British manufacturers are in a position now to supply all the boots for the Navy and to make them of English leather, and therefore the Admiralty need not trouble at all about the scarcity of leather or anything of that kind. British manufacturers are prepared to make boots of British leather. The Financial Secretary says that will cost us more. Not at all. I believe I am correct in saying—I am speaking from information which has reached me from a reliable quarter—that British manufacturers can guarantee to produce British boots provided that they get an all-British specification, and provided also that the Admiralty say that they shall have the opportunity of making the boots all through the war, and when the war is over, and that they will not revert to the old German specification.

I must say a word in connection with the dockyards. The Parliamentary Secretary has certainly made a most interesting speech, and I am afraid that he has taken the wind out of my sails. I had intended to dilate somewhat at length about the grievances of the dockyard men. I had intended to make a reference seriatim to the claims of the workers who have received concessions. I am very glad to find that nearly all the workmen in the different branches at the dockyards have had their claims considered. I have ventured to bring to the notice of the right hon. gentleman from time to time during the past three or four years cases which had not received the attention which they merited. I am afraid that the Parliamentary Secretary is a little jealous of our Committee.

DR. MACNAMARA: Not at all.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Since we started to bring the claims of the men before the Admiralty, many changes have been made in the administration of the dockyards, and one cannot help feeling that the Dockyard Members Committee have had some share in bringing about these results. I am very pleased to find that the Parliamentary Secretary proposes to continue the policy of receiving men in London. That practice, I understand, is not only to be continued, and probably extended. It is a good thing to know from him that this is not going to be stopped. Some of them were afraid that their claims had been overlooked. The smiths and the riggers have been putting their cases before the Admiralty for a good many years, and one is glad to see that they have come in at last. As to the shipwrights, I think they are most deserving of the rise in wages which they have received. It was very greatly appreciated, and it is a thing which certainly ought to have been done. As to storehouse men, I am afraid our Committee have rather worried the First Lord and the Parliamentary Secretary. We have presented their case over and over again in the form of letters stating that they considered that some rise in wages should be given to them. It is exceedingly gratifying that the Parliamentary Secretary finds himself in the position to give them this rise. No one desires to find fault with anything which the Parliamentary Secretary has done in that respect. All who know him like him. They all believe what he says, and they are willing to trust their case in his hands. At the same time they desire to have their claims brought forward also by the Dockyard Members Committee. In that way they have two strings to their bow. What has been done in the case of the labourers will give very general satisfaction. A rise of a shilling has been given all round. The men at Haulbowline think that they also should have 24s. Personally, I should like to see them get that pay. Still I am quite satisfied with what has been given. Not long ago the Secretary read a letter to the House showing how little could be done with 22s. On that letter he based the rise to 23s. I had intended to urge that it should be 24s., but that has been done, and nothing remains for me except at some future date to propose a rise from 24s. to 25s. I am

satisfied that what has been done has been done on the whole very generously. I readily admit that the Board of Admiralty, acting on the advice of the Financial Secretary, have taken into consideration all matters connected with the yards, and have dealt with the men in a very proper and a very liberal manner.

MR. DUNCAN: I am sure that the House has listened with the greatest possible pleasure to the statement of the Financial Secretary, especially when he was giving his testimony to the vigour with which the men employed in the dockyards have performed their work. If there is one thing which is likely to be encouraging to the men who are following their avocations so strenuously it is some meed of acknowledgment, from those who are in a position superior to them, of the efforts which they are making. These men have made very great sacrifices by putting in such an enormous amount of time at their work, in many cases without any break, and I am rather inclined to think that there is a danger, in connection with Government as well as private contracts, that a great deal of sickness may result. But so far as I have come in contact with the men, they have shown the greatest readiness to perform their part of the work in such a way as to enable the various Government Departments to supply the Army and the Navy with everything essential to bring forth success. The statement of the Financial Secretary with regard to wages seems to have given an enormous amount of satisfaction to the previous speaker. I cannot follow exactly in the same strain. I happen to have a considerable connection with men employed by firms outside of Government employment. I will give a recent indication of what has happened. In the London area alone practically all the skilled workers within the past few weeks have received an advance of 3s. per week, while the labourers have received an advance of 2s. per week. I would remind the Financial Secretary that in Coventry, at least three years ago, labourers were in receipt of 27s. per week; so I think that he will begin to see, despite the blandishments of the last speaker, that the labourers are still a long way off from heaven as far as dockyard work is concerned. The only excuse which may be given for what, after all, is a very small advance in wages, particularly to labourers, is that possibly this question has

been hanging over for a very considerable period, and it may be that the considerations that exist now have, to some extent, been overlooked in considering this question.

I know that these matters, numbering hundreds, must take time, and that since the advent of the war, and the greatly increased cost of living, there are many new questions which have arisen since the consideration of the major part of these matters was before the Financial Secretary, and probably they have come after he had fixed in his own mind the amount of the advance that could be given. It is obvious that there will have to be a further consideration of this question. All sections of manufacturers in this country, in most cases without dispute, even in cases when the men and the employers have been bound by agreement, are showing a willingness to face the fact that the cost of living has increased beyond all reason and expectation, and the employers themselves in many cases have given what is termed a bonus of 2s. per week to the employés over and above the amounts fixed by the agreements, which may have been signed twelve months ago. I mention that because I am not complaining particularly of the advance given on this occasion. One can say, 'Here is another bob for the labourer to get a shillingsworth of joy and ginger, if he can.' The thing that amazes me most is that it is always a bob. It never seems to strike the imagination of those who consider these matters that surely they might on some very rare occasion spring a little more than a shilling. A couple of shillings would be a very welcome advance for these men.

After all, there is room for just a little more sympathy with the man who is at the bottom. I do not question the sympathy of the Financial Secretary, but there should be just a little more consideration given to the man who, after all, has the hardest time wherever he is, whether working for a private firm or for the Government. He is the man who has the hot end of the poker all the time. He is the man who has the most difficult problem in the country to face, even when he is getting 24s. per week. I am sure from my own experience that it is not the things which the 24s. will buy, but the things that the 24s. will never buy that give him the greatest concern. I hope that when this matter comes up for further consideration—and it must do so before very

long—the Admiralty and those who consider it will try to get out of the rut of a shilling, and see if they cannot spring the labourer a little more than a shilling when they make the next advance. At any rate there is no getting over this fact, that the advanced cost of living, as it exists now since the war, is very much greater than is represented by the shilling advance which the labourer is getting. Despite the fact that their wages go up, the condition of these men is really worse, because the cost of living is rising much more rapidly than their wages. That is a consideration that is not grasped as fully as it ought to be by those who consider the matter. In the main these men get a magnificent testimonial and a microscopic advance of wages. Even though this advance is given, I think that the wages are still a shilling below what the men are getting at Woolwich. I suppose that there are reasons for the difference, but I think that the Admiralty would have excelled themselves if they had jumped up to the Woolwich range and given a nudge to the whole Department that it was time for them to move. But I suppose that it is beyond all reason to expect that the Admiralty are going to show any great degree of advancement on these lines.

There was another point which struck me forcibly when the Financial Secretary was reading the rates of wages—that was the advance of 6d. to riggers. Is this an advance of 6d. per week or 6d. per day? If it is an advance of 6d. per week, how does the Financial Secretary expect that these men will ever spend all this wealth? It seems to me to be such an insignificant advance that it is almost a waste of time to offer it. In all my experience I never heard of an advance of less than one shilling per week, and it is very often a great deal more. The Financial Secretary tells the House that as much as £90,000 in one year is given in advances of wages to the men employed on production by the Admiralty—I am only taking his own division—but it would have been very interesting if he had given us the total number of men concerned. It is difficult to grasp what the effect of the advance is unless one gets the two sets of figures. I suppose that these figures seem to the Admiralty to be vast sums of money. I should like that the Financial Secretary would get to know what the advance of wages

which has been recently given to the railway men will amount to. This advance has been given, I understand, by all the railway companies of this country, and I hope of Scotland, and if he can ascertain by a little inquiry what the advances given by private employers amount to, I think that he would share my view that the Admiralty is a long way behind the large employers in this country. The right hon. gentleman tells us the gross total of the advance of wages that has been given by the Admiralty. I hope that when his next statement is made we shall at least have the number of men affected.

DR. MACNAMARA: They total about 50,000 men.

MR. DUNCAN: In that case the amount would not come to a shilling a week all round.

DR. MACNAMARA: They do not all get rises.

MR. DUNCAN: The next matter to which I wish to refer is the position of the artificers. I understand that they have received the same rate of pay for at least thirty years on end. I do not know whether that matter has escaped the attention of the Financial Secretary or whether it is still under consideration, or whether there is any hope of improvement so far as these men are concerned. I think that a case has been established for some special consideration for them. If he will consider this matter in conjunction with the grievances of the chaplains, and raise the artificers up to the chaplains' level, I am sure that the artificers will be overjoyed at the result.

MR. BIGLAND: The right hon. gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty in his speech made the remark that it should be remembered when criticisms are made, that we are at war. I am a profound admirer of the splendid work which has been done, and I shall say nothing at all by way of finding fault with the Admiralty, but rather with a view to urging that the Admiralty should have even more power put into its hands than it has now. Another remark which the right hon. gentleman made in his speech was this:—'We have not prevented neutral ships from trading direct with German ports. We have allowed German exports in neutral ships to pass unchallenged. The time has come when the enjoyment of those immunities by a State which, as a matter of deliberate policy, has placed herself outside all inter-

national obligations, must be reconsidered. A further declaration on the part of the allied Governments will probably be made which will have the effect for the first time of applying the full force of naval pressure to the enemy.' We were all pleased to hear that statement from the First Lord, though I have to say that his statement was a little tardy in being made. Some of us feel that an even more stringent attitude should have been taken up with regard to the matter of contraband and conditional contraband. The Committee know that in time of war all supplies going to the enemy are divided under three headings: 'Contraband,' 'Conditional Contraband,' and the 'Free List.' There is not much argument with regard to contraband, but there is a great deal of argument with regard to conditional contraband. If the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty should be able in his reply to answer one or two points it will relieve the whole of our minds with regard to several matters. As I understand the matter of conditional contraband, food is free unless it is understood and believed that the final place of deposition where it is agreed to arrive is for the forces of a Government against which we are fighting. The question, however, has to a certain extent been settled by the German Government openly stating that after a certain date they will control all the grain in their country. I want to ask——

THE CHAIRMAN: I am afraid that this is not the occasion on which to raise the subject with which the hon. gentleman is dealing. It is a matter for the Foreign Office, or for the Prime Minister. The Admiralty, as I understand, only carry out the orders of the Government with regard to definitions of contraband, and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, I take it, would have no authority to answer questions of the character raised by the hon. member.

DR. MACNAMARA: I can only take instructions.

MR. BIGLAND: The Foreign Office in a matter of this kind may be the authority, or have the final voice, in regard to some questions that I would wish to put, and I desire it to be understood that I make no protest against the Navy for having allowed so much to go through our lines in the way that has been permitted hitherto. I would observe that whereas our Navy has allowed certain vessels to pass through

its lines with charter parties and bills of lading, permitting the cargoes to go to certain ports, it does not seem to me, speaking as an Englishman, that the duty of a neutral party or a neutral country has been followed when those goods have gone from that neutral country into the enemy's country. I shall not under the ruling be allowed to carry that point further, as I had intended, but I should like to make a statement to the right hon. gentleman, and to put two questions which call for considerable comment. One has reference to the steamer *Kym*, the vessel which the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce took cognisance of, and I believe sent word to the Admiralty that, in their view, if that vessel was allowed to pass it would be a breach of neutrality on the part of the Danish Government. The Admiralty had orders to stop that cargo, and I understand that it is now warehoused in Newcastle-on-Tyne. It would be interesting to know why the Admiralty, having stopped that one particular cargo, did not continue the policy or action which they took in reference to this vessel, and extend it to other steamers carrying similar cargoes. A statement was made to the country by the Foreign Secretary with regard to the quantity of food which the Admiralty allowed to pass through the lines, and in reference to Denmark the figures were extraordinary. In the month of November, 1913, the value of the goods allowed to pass through was 558,000 dollars, whereas in last November the quantity of goods passing through from America alone to Denmark was 7,101,000 dollars.

THE CHAIRMAN: I must again point out to the hon. member that the Admiralty have no responsibility in this matter, except to carry out instructions, and the responsibility in regard to the position lies with the Government as a whole, in these matters mainly represented by the Foreign Office. It is on the Vote of the Foreign Office that the hon. member should raise his various points.

MR. BIGLAND: In regard to the points I desire to raise, I quite see that they are mixed up with matters pertaining to the Foreign Office as well as the Admiralty, and perhaps it will be better that I should defer what I have to say until the Foreign Office Vote is before the Committee.

MR. HOUSTON: I trust the House will forgive me if in

my remarks with reference to the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty, yesterday, I call attention to one or two mistakes which he made, and endeavour to remove one or two impressions which I fear the right hon. gentleman has unintentionally caused. I do not rise to criticise, and, including the First Lord of the Admiralty, I do not yield to any one in my admiration of the fighting men in our ships, proved to be inspired and animated by the spirit of Drake and Nelson, and to be as capable of making heroic sacrifices and performing heroic deeds as their forefathers did in the spacious days of Elizabeth, when the foundations of our Empire and supremacy of the sea were laid. The First Lord of the Admiralty, quite unintentionally I am sure, conveyed a wrong impression with regard to shipowners when he said :— 'At the beginning of this war shipowners were only too glad to get their ships taken by the Government, owing to the uncertainty of the naval situation, and the possibility that ordinary cargoes would not be forthcoming. But now a change has taken place. . . . The Admiralty rates are half or a third below the market rates.' My only reason for referring to this is that there has recently been a campaign directed against shipowners, who have been accused of unpatriotic and greedy action, and of thinking of nothing but gain. The facts are that at the beginning of the war no steamers were chartered by the Admiralty on behalf of the Government but were requisitioned, very often causing great inconvenience to the shipowners. Again and again a ship on a point of sailing had its cargo turned out, and it remained there a considerable time.

DR. MACNAMARA : The war.

MR. HOUSTON : I am finding no fault, I am speaking with no hostile feeling, I am directing no hostile criticism towards the Government, and my only reason for rising now is to defend the shipowners from the charges which are made. The shipowners have very few spokesmen in this House, and the few who are here, if I may say so, are workers rather than talkers, and are prepared, as a rule, to treat with silent scorn the attacks made upon them rather than to defend themselves. But in this particular case the words spoken by the First Lord of the Admiralty bear very great weight and might convey a very wrong impression to the

British public. The right hon. gentleman is quite aware that by instructions from the Admiralty, and in combination with the principal shipowners of the country, mostly liners, that the Admiralty Transport Arbitration Board was formed, with Lord Mersey as chairman. In September the freights were abnormally low, due to the dislocation of business throughout the world—financial difficulties, and difficulties of exchange. Freights being very low, the Board agreed to a certain rate for various ships, and the Admiralty at that time did not accept it. It was a very moderate rate indeed, based on these very low rates. In December the rates were booming. The British shipowners, as represented by this Board, did not, I believe, in any individual case ask for a single rise, and I think the right hon. gentleman will confirm me that they accepted the rate, which was agreed as being a reasonable rate, on the 22nd September.

DR. MACNAMARA: Some of them—generally.

MR. HOUSTON: I am defending the British shipowner accused of unpatriotism and of greed, and, as I have said, the shipowners, the owners of liners, were subjected to the very greatest inconvenience and to some considerable loss. The First Lord of the Admiralty stated, and stated correctly, that the rate of hire which many shipowners are receiving at the present moment is half to a third below the market rate, and yet those very shipowners, to carry out their obligations and their contracts, are saddled with the chartering of tramp tonnage at market rates, in some cases many shillings above what they are receiving from the Admiralty. They are not complaining, but I do submit that the British shipowners ought not to be considered unpatriotic. The First Lord of the Admiralty also made a very grave error which will, of course, be used as an argument by the critics and opponents of the shipowners. He says the losses cannot, of course, be covered by recourse on the part of the shipowners to the Government's insurance scheme, the rates of which are now one-fifth of what they were at the outbreak of war. We all admit that the First Lord of the Admiralty is a genius and a brilliant genius, but he suffers from a defect which is common to geniuses, and that is not giving sufficient attention to details. The rates are not one-fifth on ships, but they are now three-fifths on ships, and within the last day or two

the underwriters outside of the Government insurance scheme to whom shipowners have to go in many cases, are now charging very high rates. The rates have gone up very considerably, and I dare say the right hon gentleman will find out if he takes the trouble to inquire. At the beginning of the war on hulls the flat rate for one voyage was 25s. per cent. or one and a quarter, and 50s. for the round voyage of not more than three months, which worked out at £10 for the year. Those rates are now 15s. for one voyage and 30s. for the round voyage not exceeding three months. What the First Lord of the Admiralty was referring to was probably the rate of insurance on cargo, which was £5 at the beginning of the war and is now £1 per cent. That, however, has nothing to do with the shipowner.

It has been stated that the shipowner is now getting his insurance for one-fifth what it was at the outbreak of war, and, as I have pointed out, that is entirely inaccurate, and he is now paying three-fifths of what he was paying at the beginning of the war. At the beginning of the war by the Government insurance scheme, the Government underwriting 80 per cent., the value of any one ship was limited to £75,000. The owner could not insure any ship for more, though it might have cost him £150,000 or £300,000. Several ships at the outbreak of war, upon which this limit of £75,000 was placed by the Government scheme, were sunk by enemy cruisers, the owners losing all the difference between the £75,000 and the actual value of the ship. I do not even propose to criticise the Transport Department of the Admiralty or the gentleman who is described as one of the discoveries of the war. All I have to say about it is this, and I challenge the right hon. gentleman to contradict me, that a small Department of the kind with the few individuals who are now in it, and remember I have the greatest regard and respect for them, and they have done wonders, would find it absolutely impossible to attempt to do anything in the control or management of shipping without the active co-operation of shipowners in this country.

DR. MACNAMARA: We said so.

MR. HOUSTON: I think the First Lord yesterday, in belauding his own Department, rather damned the shipowner with faint praise. Afterwards he attempted to apply

some salve to their wounded feelings by a few compliments. I do not want to weary the House by quoting extracts from the right hon. gentleman's speech, but I say again that the Transport Department of the Admiralty would be absolutely helpless without the co-operation, the active co-operation, of the shipowners and of the officers and men of the mercantile marine. In that connection the Admiralty are receiving, and rightly so, the heartiest co-operation and assistance from every one, so far as I know, connected with the ships that have been taken for transport service. The right hon. gentleman, I think, will agree that the shipowners are divided into two classes—the liner class and the 'tramp' class. It is the liner class which has suffered the greatest inconvenience and loss by the dislocation of trade. In many cases the liner owner's business has been reduced to a state of chaos, and he has a heavy list of contracts which he has to carry out. The conditions are not so with the 'tramp' owner, whose ships have been taken by the Admiralty. I do not agree altogether with the instance put forward by my right hon. friend the Leader of the Opposition. I think it was rather a weak case, because the collier attending on the Fleet must be in attendance at all times. The conditions are entirely different with the Expeditionary Force ships and the armed merchantmen and the transport ships which have been carrying troops, material, etc. The First Lord yesterday spoke in unqualified terms of praise, and rightly so, of the transport of troops from all directions—from New Zealand, from Australia and Canada, aye, and across the Channel, where I think the greatest feat of all was performed. What would the Admiralty have done, or the Navy have done, in that transport work without the merchant ships? We all have the greatest admiration for the Navy, and the ships carrying troops, material, provender, and all supplies were, we all admit, safeguarded by the Navy, were it not for which this country would not be in existence at the present time as a free and independent nation. If it were not for the Navy our Empire as such would cease to exist; but the Navy would be helpless without the co-operation of what I may describe as the Cinderella sister service, the mercantile service.

I speak not only for the shipowners, but also for the officers and men of the mercantile marine. I hope that at

the end of the war, or perhaps long before it, when the right hon. gentleman the Parliamentary Secretary and the First Lord are at liberty to speak, that the deeds of the heroic seamen will be related. I could relate many of them at present, some of the details of the merchant seamen and the men of the Royal Naval Reserve who have been put in command of cross-Channel steamers as patrol boats, and who have done good service amongst the German submarines. I trust that the right hon. gentleman will shortly be able to tell the world at large that, in addition to our Navy, for which we have the greatest regard and esteem, the mercantile marine has also done good and heroic service. I do not for one moment wish to criticise any Department of the Admiralty. The First Lord of the Admiralty was entitled, and in fact it was his duty, to defend the Admiralty against any attack. But, in defending the Navy from attacks, which I do not know were altogether well directed, I think he might not have disparaged the British shipowner as he did, especially with such remarks conveying to the world at large that the British shipowner is thinking more of profit than of patriotism. I am quite sure that the First Lord, when he comes to read his own speech, will see the impression he might convey, and it was because of that I have ventured to address the House.

MR. BUTCHER: I desire to call attention to a question which has figured very largely in the public eye, and that is the question of the loss or destruction of His Majesty's ships and the necessity of holding courts-martial into the causes. This question was raised by my noble friend the member for Portsmouth (Lord C. Beresford) last night, and so far there has been no reply on the part of His Majesty's Government. I regret that the First Lord is not here, because I think it is a question which would really merit his attention. I trust we shall have an adequate reply to-day upon a subject which is exciting great attention in the public mind. The first point to notice in this connection is that there has been for the last two or three hundred years or more an invariable custom in His Majesty's Navy that whenever one of the ships of the Navy was lost or destroyed or captured, that there should be an inquiry into that by court-martial. But, more than that, that custom has been recognised in repeated Acts

of Parliament for the last two hundred years. Let me quote to the House an extract from a book of considerable authority upon Naval Law. It is the *Manual of Navy Law and Court-martial Procedure*, by Messrs. Stevens, Giffard and Smith, published in 1912. On page 156 you will find this :—'As far back as the Navy has existed it has been the custom in every case to hold a court-martial when a vessel was lost or captured.' That custom was not confined to peace. It is a custom which has prevailed in war time as well as in peace. I said that the custom was recognised in Acts of Parliament. 'By the Act of 1745 (18 Geo. II., c. 35) it was enacted that when a ship was lost the Articles of War should remain in force until either (1) the crew were regularly discharged; (2) were transferred to another ship; or (3) a court-martial was held "pursuant to the custom of the Navy in such cases to inquire into the causes of the loss of such ship."'

Similar expressions referring to the existence of this custom were found in Acts of Parliament relating to naval discipline in 1747, 1860, 1864, and 1866. The Act of 1866 (the present Navy Discipline Act), Section 91, enacts :—'When any one of Her Majesty's ships shall be wrecked or lost, or destroyed or taken by the enemy, such ship shall for the purposes of this Act be deemed to remain in commission until her crew shall be regularly removed into some other of Her Majesty's ships of war, or until a court-martial shall have been held "pursuant to the custom of the Navy in such cases to inquire into the cause of the wreck, destruction, or capture of the said ship.'

So that I do not think any one can dispute that that was the invariable custom, and has been ever since our Navy has been in existence. If that be so we ask why should that custom be broken. It never has been broken until the last two or three years. It was first broken by His Majesty's present Government, and indeed the First Lord, speaking last night, seemed to feel himself under some embarrassment, and not unnaturally, because while admitting the existence of the custom he endeavoured to excuse the holding of an inquiry into the loss of such a ship as the *Formidable*, which resulted in most lamentable loss of life, by saying that he refused to hold an inquiry because, as he stated amongst other things, the circumstances of modern warfare are different

from the conditions of ancient warfare. Why, have not the conditions of warfare been changing almost every year or every few years for the last three or four hundred years? Let me ask the right hon. gentleman, have not the circumstances of warfare changed very materially since His Majesty's Navy was established? Were they not changed by the introduction of steam and the introduction of ironclads? Yet until the other day no one ever suggested that these changes in the character of naval warfare were a sufficient reason for departing from the invariable custom of the Admiralty of holding courts-martial. The First Lord gave another reason why a court-martial could not be held in a case such as that of the *Formidable*. He said:—'Losses by mine and submarine must frequently be placed on the same footing as heavy casualties on land. They cannot be treated as presumably involving a dereliction of duty, or a lack of professional ability.' The suggestion was that unless there was some dereliction of duty or a lack of professional ability we should not hold a court-martial. That reason will not hold water for one moment, because if the right hon. gentleman had taken the trouble to read the Admiralty instructions in this connection he would have seen that Article 662a expressly contemplates the very case where a ship is lost and no one can be said either to have been lacking in professional ability or to have been guilty of a dereliction of duty. In such a case the Admiralty instructions say that there must be a preliminary inquiry to find out whether any one was or was not to blame. If no one was to blame a court-martial is to be held in one way; while if some one was *prima facie* to blame a court-martial is to be held in another way. So the fact that no one may be held liable to blame is no reason whatsoever for not holding a court-martial. But I do not wish to deal with the matter merely as a question of law and custom. I say that, even if there were no unbroken custom on the subject, in a case such as that of the *Formidable* it would be the absolute duty of the Admiralty to hold a court-martial. There are several reasons why I say that. In the first place it is unfortunately not the first case of the loss of one of His Majesty's ships under circumstances very similar to those which attended the loss of the *Formidable*. What we in this House, and what the

public desire, is that the causes of losses of that sort should be inquired into, and, if they are avoidable, that they should be avoided in future. From that point of view a court-martial is absolutely essential.

It is alleged that in the case of the *Formidable* there were two contributory causes, if they were not the only causes of the loss. It is said, in the first place, that there were no torpedo-boat destroyers accompanying this squadron of cruisers going down the Channel, although it was in a sea known to be infested by submarines. Another special circumstance alleged in this case is that the squadron was going at a very slow rate of speed. If a court-martial were held, we should know whether those two causes existed, and, if so, who was responsible. We should also be able to take care that such causes did not lead to disasters in the future. There is yet another reason why I think a court-martial should be held in such cases. It would in a large measure restore the confidence of the public. When disaster occurs, it is not publicity that shakes the public confidence; it is concealment. I believe that the people of this country are able to bear the news of disaster, but it is difficult for them to bear its concealment. It is in the interests of the public, who are interested in the successful prosecution of this war, that these cases should be inquired into. It is certainly in the interests of the officers and men of the Fleet. They are entitled to know what has led to these disasters. They are still more entitled to have steps taken by those responsible at the Admiralty, so that any avoidable causes of disaster may be avoided with the utmost care in the future.

There is yet one other reason that I may give. It is only just that we should relieve of all blame men who have not deserved blame, but unless an inquiry is held it is difficult for the public to know where to apportion the blame, and whom they ought to relieve from blame. If these inquiries are held we should be able to relieve those who ought to be relieved from blame, and, if any one was to blame, we should know on whose shoulders the blame ought properly to fall. It may be said that if courts-martial were held it might be necessary to take evidence which it would be detrimental in the public interest to have made public. As regards the procedure of courts-martial, there is ample provision made

for avoiding any such danger. The court has full power, if evidence is about to be given which it is not desirable to make public, to cause that evidence to be taken in private, so that the persons to whom it might be dangerous to communicate it shall not be informed of it. Furthermore, at a time like the present, the Press Censor has considerable power, and if there were anything in the course of a court-martial which it might not be desirable to communicate to the public, the Press Censor has ample power to prevent its publication. Therefore, I say that, notwithstanding the reasons against the holding of courts-martial given by the First Lord last night, there is a strong public desire and a strong public necessity for the holding of courts-martial into such disasters as those to which I have referred, in order to ensure, so far as it is possible, that such disasters may be avoided in the future.

LORD ROBERT CECIL: I had rather hoped that the Attorney-General would have replied before I spoke, as I should have liked to have heard his statement. I feel that this is a matter of very great importance. I am not at all criticising the absence of the First Lord. I know how tremendous the claims on his time are, and I recognise that it may be quite impossible for him to be here. But it is one of the misfortunes of the time that he should not be here to deal with what is really, in my judgment, far more a question of naval policy than a question of law. I am not going to say a single word on the law on the subject. I do not think it matters twopence whether or not technically, on a fair reading of the Statutes, the Admiralty should have held these courts-martial. I do not think that any Statute could compel the Crown—because, after all, when we speak of the Admiralty it means the Crown—to summon a court-martial. Whether they have broken the letter of the Statute or not, does not seem to me to make a great deal of difference to the issue we are now considering. The First Lord, in dealing with the matter yesterday, put forward several arguments, some of which have been dealt with by my hon. and learned friend, and about which I need not say much. I need not deal with the proposition that there would be a difficulty in securing the personnel for a court-martial—or for the three or four courts-martial which would be all that could possibly be summoned in this war—without interfering with

the operations of the Fleet. I cannot think that that is really a serious difficulty at the present time. There are several officers who could be assembled for such a purpose without interfering with the duties of the Fleet. A more serious argument was that if you had a court-martial on every naval disaster you would interfere with the *moral* of the officers, because they would say, 'If we lose our ships we shall be court-martialled,' and that would make them, to use the First Lord's words, 'play for safety.' With the greatest possible respect to his knowledge on the subject, I cannot bring myself to accept that view. After all, the practice of the Navy was always to hold a court-martial on an officer who lost or hazarded his ship. That was the practice in the time of Nelson, but I do not think there was any lack in the *moral* of the Navy at that time.

Just consider, if you really press such an argument as that: a court-martial was held in the course of this war upon the action, or the want of action, that resulted in the escape of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*. The officer applied for a court-martial, and he was honourably acquitted. If any charge was suggested by the court-martial, it was one of want of vigilance or of want of vigour. Might we not just as well argue that if you hold a court-martial into such a case you will encourage rashness in the officers of the Navy? I am bound to say that it appears to me that our naval officers are much more likely to suffer from rashness than from cowardice. If you are to have any such consideration in mind, which I myself deprecate, I should have thought that it told equally against a court-martial in such a case as that as it would against a court-martial dealing with a disaster. I, personally, altogether disregard that consideration. I do not think it would have the slightest weight with an officer in command of a ship or an admiral in command of a squadron if he knew that some action of his might or might not lead to a court-martial. There is something far graver, something far more insistent, than any idea of that kind could possibly effect. The officer would do his duty as he understood it, whatever the consequences were likely to be in regard to a court-martial at the conclusion of the action.

Let me state what appears to me to be the great advantages arising from a court-martial. In the first place, it

means an authoritative ascertainment of the facts accompanying a disaster. That seems to me a matter of very great importance. If we are ever to learn by misfortunes we must know exactly what happens. The second thing is perhaps even more important. I think it is vital that we should take steps to dissipate any misconceptions that may possibly arise in reference to a disaster. I do not pretend to be a judge, as my noble friend (Lord C. Beresford), of course, is, as to the circumstances of any particular event in the naval warfare of the last few months. We heard from him yesterday the view which he takes of the disaster of the *Formidable*. It may be right or it may be entirely wrong. It is his opinion. But it is freely stated; I did not hear it yesterday for the first time. With reference to other disasters which have taken place, every member of the House knows that there has been considerable criticism passed, not on particular individuals, but on the general conduct or general theory which underlies the circumstances that produced the disasters. Either that is true, and in that case it is very important that we should know it, or it is untrue, and then it is at least of equal importance that it should be authoritatively disproved. My noble friend told us yesterday that the disaster to the *Formidable* was produced by the fact that she was going at too slow a rate, and did not have sufficient protection from destroyers and smaller craft. Is that a fact? I do not know at all. How am I to know? But is it not very important that we should know of this important naval proceeding? It may be said, 'Oh, but the Admiralty know.' While I quite agree that it is of far more importance that the Admiralty should know than that the public should know, after all we do still live in a popularly governed country, and it is important that the people, too, should know this matter. I cannot help feeling that if it is true it should be known. I am quite certain that if it is not true it should be immediately disproved, for the thing is producing a very unfortunate impression. If it is true, somebody—I do not in the least know who—is clearly to blame. I am quite sure that Ministers themselves will recognise how very unfortunate it is that any such impression should go abroad that somebody is to blame for a very serious disaster, and that nothing has happened in consequence of it.

I then turn to a matter which is of equal importance, and really it is a corollary of what I have tried to say. I think it is vital that the officers concerned, if they are not guilty, and are really merely victims of an inevitable accident —which, knowing nothing about it, I think the most probable fact—it is clearly important that that should be made clear before their fellow countrymen. They ought to have the opportunity publicly of being exculpated altogether from any possible charge. Lastly, I personally attach great importance to complying with the established custom and practice. May I try, merely as an outsider, to state what I understand to have been done? I shall be very glad to be contradicted if I am wrong, but I understand it to have been the established custom and practice of the Navy down to at least the year 1906 that whenever a ship was either lost, or, I think they went so far as to say, hazarded——

LORD C. BERESFORD: Hazarded.

LORD ROBERT CECIL: If the captain hazarded his ship then there was a court-martial as a matter of course. It was not a question of any charge against him. A court-martial was held if he lost or hazarded his ship. I think that is a very valuable thing. The right hon. gentleman seemed to say that new conditions had come into warfare, and that it was not the same thing that it used to be where the loss of a ship implied the surrender of a ship, and he suggested to the House that the foundation of the practice in regard to courts-martial was that there was necessarily a *prima facie* case against the officer. There was a fact to be cleared up, and that was the cause of the court-martial. Is that right? I cannot think it. I am informed, and I believe it to be a fact, that if the ship was lost by shipwreck there was a court-martial, and obviously there was no *prima facie* case against the commander of that ship. I venture to assert that it is of the greatest possible value that such a practice should exist. There is another observation which I should like to make, and which I hope very much will not be misunderstood. There is a complete difference in this respect in the practice between the Army and the Navy. If I understand the matter aright, you cannot have a court-martial in the Army unless you are going to make a charge against an officer. You cannot have a court-martial merely

into an incident. That may be perfectly right in principle. But we all remember, not in this war, but in the Boer War, certain incidents which took place, and we all, or most of us at any rate, thought that it would have been very desirable if it had been possible, without throwing a slur on anybody, to have had a public inquiry into some of these cases. I think it is of enormous value that you have in the sister Service the fact that it is the custom when a disaster occurs automatically to have the inquiry. There is no suggestion against anybody. You had, I say, this inquiry until this Government unhappily changed the practice. You had an automatic inquiry to sift the facts and set at rest once for all doubts which might arise—an inquiry which would acquit the officers or condemn them, and would throw the blame, if there was any blame, where it ought to lie, and, if there was no blame, would exculpate. That is enormously valuable in practice. I trust, though the First Lord is not here, some one will make it his business to convey what some of us have tried to say in this House. We do very earnestly press this matter. We wish no attack upon the Government or anything of that kind; it is merely because we really do believe that in the interests of the conduct of the naval part of the war it is of vital importance that we should return to the older practice of allowing courts-martial to be held. I am informed that the officers of the Fleet are as strong as anybody in their desire for such a return to the old practice. I am sure that the man in the street, who, we all know, is interested in these matters, would favour such a return, and I, therefore, do very earnestly beg that the Government would very seriously consider whether they cannot alter their policy and practice in this respect.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SIR JOHN SIMON): Under the circumstances there is no reason to complain of the temper in which criticism has been put forward by the hon. and learned gentleman on this point, and by the noble Lord who has just followed him. I make no complaint at all about it; but I have one or two observations to make to the Committee, and I want hon. members, when I take or suggest a different view, to understand that there is no sort of resentment at this question being raised and pressed in the very fair way in which it has been put before the Committee. It

must have struck anybody who has listened to the two speeches that, though they resemble each other in being powerful speeches, they dealt with two quite different matters. The hon. and learned gentleman who first spoke alleged, and sought to prove, that there has been something illegal done and something contrary to the Statutes which he quoted.

MR. BUTCHER: May I explain? I did not suggest there is anything illegal in not having a court-martial, but I do say it is contrary to the invariable custom, which has been reasonable and referred to in Statutes.

SIR J. SIMON: We will get this out of the way. It is agreed there is nothing illegal about it. I do not know whether the noble Lord who is next to the hon. and learned gentleman will agree, because in the speech that he delivered yesterday he asserted in round terms that it is entirely contrary to law.

LORD C. BERESFORD: Entirely contrary to the law as we always understood it in the Service.

SIR J. SIMON: I am not in the least trying to chop straws about it, but only noting that obviously there are two points.

LORD C. BERESFORD: Hear, hear.

SIR J. SIMON: Without any disrespect to my profession, they are two different points in order of importance. I do not take the view that the legal point is anything like so important as the larger question of policy. Having looked into the matter, and having had the help of the Judge Advocate of the Fleet, who has spent a very large proportion of his professional life in the administration of this branch of the law connected with the Navy, I assert roundly that there is nothing whatever contrary to the law in the course which has been taken. I am not for the moment making any suggestion about policy. There is nothing whatever contrary to the law in what was being done. Not only so, but the real fact is that the noble Lord has gone very much beyond what is quite right and quite fair when he alleges that what has now happened is something which has happened owing to changed practice, and that it has never occurred until this Government unhappily introduced it. That really is not so. I will show the Committee in a moment that it cannot be so by testimony which we shall all readily accept. What is the allegation? The allegation is, I think, that

this new practice has been instituted in the lifetime of this Government, and that before, as a matter of course, all questions and disputes in regard to any ship which was lost or hazarded were subject to a court-martial. The noble Lord yesterday gave us one of his reminiscences which we always hear with so much pleasure. He told us that in his own experience, on a certain occasion, through no fault of his own, the ship for which he was responsible was hazarded, and that the Admiral, knowing the circumstances, did not want a court-martial. The noble Lord pressed with his well-known vigour that there should be one, and ultimately he got one. Is not that incident in itself quite sufficient to show that it is not true to say that up to the time of this Government, always and as a matter of course, without question and without request, a court-martial was held when every ship was hazarded? It was not so.

LORD ROBERT CECIL: I am very anxious that this thing should be stated accurately. Does that apply to a ship that was lost?

SIR J. SIMON: I am going to deal with that. The Committee will understand that I am not saying this thing out of any knowledge I possess, but after having made special inquiry. It may very well be that what I am saying has got to be most carefully examined before it is accepted as precisely right. At any rate I have done my best, and what I thought it right to do. After the question was raised yesterday I thought it right to communicate with the Judge Advocate of the Fleet who, I happen to know, has made a most careful historical investigation into this question, and what I am saying I am saying as a result of the inquiry which he has been good enough to give me the advantage of. Let me say this at once, quite fully and fairly. I believe it to be substantially true to say from the records—and it is certainly the impression in Parliament—that it has been the general custom, subject to exceptions, in the past for courts-martial to be held when a ship was lost or hazarded. I hope nothing I am saying will be thought to be an attempt to contradict that clear proposition. Really, however, if that is treated as a custom which had no exceptions it is going much too far. In the eighteenth century, so far as records are available, there were certainly cases when no courts-

martial were held. The occasions on which exceptions obtained from the general custom increased in the nineteenth century. I have had only to-day some figures which illustrate that point. There was a Report made to this House some years ago of all the ships of Her Majesty's Navy which had been lost otherwise than in action with the enemy over a long series of years.

LORD C. BERESFORD: Some of those ships had no survivors.

SIR J. SIMON: I assure the noble Lord if he will wait a moment he will see that point has not been forgotten. There were cases in which there was no court-martial. In the course of twenty-five years in the earlier part of the nineteenth century there were no less than twenty-one cases in which, so far as any record goes to show, there was no court-martial. Perhaps there was no survivor to be examined. Out of these twenty-one cases there were six ships which disappeared and were no more heard of. There were no survivors and nobody to put before a court-martial; but there is not the slightest reason in thinking that was so with regard to the others. The fact, therefore, appears to be, though the exceptions have not been numerous—certainly I shall not claim the exceptions as anything more than exceptions—the rule has been—and I think the Committee may take it that it is fairly right—that there really have been over a very long period of time exceptions, and just as undoubtedly, it is not, and I believe never has been Statute law that there must be a court-martial, so the limited number of exceptions are quite exceptional as compared with the large proportion of courts-martial. I quite agree that courts-martial have, in fact, not taken place. Let me give the Committee as clearly as I can—always being subject gladly to correction from the noble Lord from his practical knowledge if I make a mistake—what I believe to be the methods which may be followed, because it is important to distinguish them. That Section which the hon. and learned member for York (Mr. Butcher) quoted, Section 91, is not intended to be used, and cannot be used, except in cases where it is thought desirable to have a court-martial, but where at the same time the naval authorities are satisfied that there is no blame attaching to any survivor. If they think there is blame attaching to a

surviving officer or somebody subject to naval discipline, and if they decide on a court-martial, then the King's Regulations lay it down that they must not have that court-martial under that Section at all, but they have to make a charge under some other Section in the Act of Parliament. That is not only good and sensible law, but good and obvious common sense. If you want to have a court-martial, but your inquiries go to show that no one is to blame, then proceed under Section 91. In that case you do not level a charge against any one's head, and I think it is possible then, so to say, to have all the surviving members, officers and crew, before the Court at the same time. But if the inquiries that the authorities make go to show there is a reason for making an accusation—be it cowardice, be it treachery, or unwillingness to fight—against the responsible officer, or some other officer, then they must make that accusation, and that individual is court-martialled under another Section of the Act of Parliament. There are, therefore, two procedures, and you cannot use either of them whenever you please. Each is regarded as appropriate for a particular class of case. I hope the Committee will think it worth while having that pointed out, because it is easy to get into confusion about these things, unless one looks very closely into them or is familiar with them. Be that as it may, the history of the matter goes to show that, as time has gone on, in an increased degree there have been exceptions allowed to this general practice, and there has been no court-martial where it has been thought unnecessary to have one, either under the one head or under the other.

Consequently, in the end, we come down to a matter of policy. It is sometimes thought in this House that the qualification—if it be a qualification—of being a lawyer is a necessary disqualification for making any observation on any matter of policy, and certainly I do not claim any particular authority to offer an opinion about the matter. But I will point out one or two considerations that occur to me, and may occur to any member of this House, for what they may be worth. In the first place, surely it does not necessarily follow that that which may be a very proper and almost automatic practice in times of peace, when, at any rate, there is no special pressure upon the Service for imme-

diate fighting purposes, that that practice, which has been automatic and almost invariable, is to be followed in precisely the same way in times of war. If that practice is departed from in order to conceal something which ought to be known, then it is wrong to depart from it. But if the reason for departing from it genuinely is that, in the opinion of those who have the best means of judging, there are good public reasons, good national reasons, for making an exception, or, at any rate, having a postponement, then I submit to the Committee it is not really a good criticism of such a position to say, 'Ah, but the tradition over long periods of peace, the recollection of the noble Lord and others, is all to the effect that there ought to be an immediate court-martial.' In looking through such papers as I have been able to lay hands on to-day, even in the time of Nelson there was a case of a court-martial as to a ship which had come to grief, I think in 1809, not taking place until 1814, and I can understand the criticism, if it were urged, that if you have good reasons for not holding a court-martial now, ought you not, at any rate, to keep your hands free to hold a public inquiry if you finally so decide?

Then there comes the second consideration. I am not sufficiently expert to offer an opinion of my own which is worth anything on such a point. But it is obvious to every one of us, though we may be children in all matters of naval strategy and naval development, that the situation that arises to-day, when one of His Majesty's ships unfortunately comes to grief through a mine or a torpedo, does differ in obvious and very material respects from any disaster such as happened at the time of the Napoleonic wars. In old days, when a ship was lost in the course of a war, the strong probability was that she was lost after having been engaged with the enemy, by striking her flag, giving up the fight, running away, or getting driven on shore, things which involve, after all, a series of actions and decisions in the face of the enemy at a time when the responsible officer had a duty to fight the enemy to the end. The case of the sinking of a modern man-of-war by a mine or a torpedo is different. I do not say that is a reason in itself why there should never be an inquiry, but I press it upon the Committee—not as experts, of course, but as sensible citizens—the conditions

are so far different that if people who are expert say those differences ought to vary the practice now, are we in the House of Commons prepared to say that the differences are quite unimportant and irrelevant? There is one other question.

Modern warfare proceeds at such a rate and involves such sudden events, the report of which reverberates through the world, that in the interests of efficiency itself—although, no doubt, that word is often abused and taken merely as a means of protecting oneself from inconvenient positions—may it not well be that that which could be very conveniently and automatically done in the old days is a very much more difficult thing to do in this present case? I am told—and I can only take the information of those who have very great reason to know and speak with authority—that in the case of the *Formidable*, if a court-martial had been immediately decided upon, it would necessarily have involved a substantial interference for the time being with those in the Navy who were urgently needed to carry out their duties from day to day and hour to hour. And, therefore, from the point of view of the ordinary man who does not claim to be an expert, is it not clear to all of us that there are great differences in fact between modern conditions and old conditions? And, if so, are we really prepared to say that the expert judgment formed at the Board of Admiralty as to the expediency of a particular court-martial at this time is a judgment which ought to be rejected and denounced? In the middle of a struggle like this we have to do that which a democratic country always finds it difficult to do—we have to put a degree of confidence in various branches of the Executive, to withhold criticism, and to believe that they are acting for the best, which in times of peace is quite unnecessary.

For my part, I am bound in the end to be content with this; that it is not the decision of some particular member of the Cabinet, or of the Cabinet as a Cabinet, that there should or should not be a court-martial. That is the decision of the Board of Admiralty, and I am not prepared to give any encouragement to those who say, 'The Board of Admiralty contains great sailors, great seamen, and we are in the midst of a terrific war, but I still claim that my judg-

ment in this matter is much better than theirs, or, at any rate, I am at liberty to develop a judgment on this point.' I am perfectly conscious that an explanation of this sort is always open to the criticism that you should shield yourself by quoting the authority of other people, but there is no other way in which these matters can be decided in the midst of a great war than that persons who are giving their devoted attention to them should form a judgment and announce it, and that that judgment should be accepted. While I make no complaint whatever of the tone and temper in which this matter has been raised, I would ask the Committee whether the considerations I have pointed out, which merely present themselves to my mind as a plain man without any expert knowledge, are not those which require the House and the country to say that they must accept for the time being the decision of the Board of Admiralty in this matter. Obviously nothing illegal has been done, obviously there have been exceptions from this general practice, and must we not wait for happier times before embarking on a controversy of this sort?

MR. BONAR LAW: The right hon. gentleman has actually suggested that, though a member of the Cabinet, because he was a lawyer it might be considered out of place that he should speak upon policy. Why? They are all lawyers—they are nearly all lawyers. If you go to the War Council which is carrying on this war, I suppose the majority of them are lawyers. We have got to make the best of it, and we have got to assume that because of, or in spite of, that fact, even they are doing the work as well as we can expect it to be done. I said yesterday, when I put forward briefly, I think, all the arguments I can put forward, that I did not wish to be dogmatic about a subject I did not fully understand. I said at the same time that, as far as I could judge, there were no good reasons for the course which has been adopted. That was after listening to the reasons given by the First Lord. We have now had the advantage of the application of his brain to-day of another member of the Cabinet, and the fact that he belongs to a profession to which I have alluded does not make it probable that he will make less use of the arguments there are in favour of the course adopted. I ask the House to consider, not general

statements, but the weight of the arguments themselves which have been adduced. The right hon. gentleman said, quite correctly, that there is no legal necessity to hold these courts-martial, but we know what the custom is, and I should not ask any better statement of that custom than has been given by him. That statement is, I think, as admitted by him, that it practically has been a universal rule, with few exceptions, in times of war as well as in times of peace, when a ship was lost from any cause, or surrendered to the enemy, that a court-martial should be held. I think that is so far as regards the custom. On the face of it I should have thought that in this country where democratic institutions are now much more established than they were, and where the people have got a much larger share in the Government of the country, a rule in regard to publicity which was found necessary and advantageous in Nelson's days, might be considered as more necessary and more advantageous in the time in which we are now living. I listened to the arguments of the First Lord yesterday, and I have listened to those of the Attorney-General, and what do they all come to? I think the arguments of the Attorney-General are far more powerful than those of the First Lord. They come to this, that people who ought to know, say we are better without courts-martial, and therefore we ought to be content with that. That is the sum and substance of the case which the right hon. gentleman has presented to-day. Within limits I am prepared to bow to that view; but, after all, I should, at all events, like some reasons that seem to carry conviction to the ordinary mind in favour of the view just held by those who are in authority. The right hon. gentleman says we must remember that we are at war, and that what is necessary in time of peace may not be necessary in time of war. The great bulk of the precedents upon which courts-martial were held occurred in the time of the Long War. Then they come as a matter of course, and none of these disadvantages were really found to exist.

What are the disadvantages which the right hon. gentleman has pointed out? He says that modern conditions are different, and that the mine is quite a different thing from a ship surrendering to the enemy. That is quite true; but does the right hon. gentleman suggest that in the later and

better precedents we have in time of war of ships that were lost by running carelessly aground there would never have been a court-martial. Of course there would. Obviously, it is just as much in the interests of the Service that a man commanding a ship should exercise proper care in navigation as it is that the ship should fight properly. In either case if the commander does not do this the ship is lost, and the country suffers. As I strongly believe and stated yesterday, if it be true that proper precautions can do away with or diminish the risk of accidents from submarines, this makes it really more necessary that a full examination into the facts of each loss should be held so that we should find out whether proper precautions had been taken, and then the people can judge as to whether such precautions were taken. What is the other argument? The First Lord said yesterday that if a sailor knows that if he is liable to court-martial he will be inclined to play for safety. I thought that was a very poor remark, and it is poor for many reasons. In the first place he runs the same risk now. Nobody suggests that the loss is to be passed over. The view of the right hon. gentleman is, not that it is to be passed over, but that the fate of the officer is to be decided not by an open court-martial, but by the arbitrary decision of the Admiralty. That is no advantage to him.

But there is another consideration which makes it impossible that that argument can hold good. No sailor can play for safety in that way. They have been court-martialled in the past quite as much for what they have not done as for what they have done. Take the case of Admiral Byng, who I thought was badly treated. He was playing for safety, or at least that was the case against him, but it did not save him from a court-martial. Then we were told yesterday that to make a charge of that kind seems unfair to the officer, but there is nothing in that argument. I attach, myself, the greatest possible value to the argument used by my noble friend behind me that the custom in the Navy of having inquiries by court-martial automatically is a tremendous protection to the officers that command our ships. My noble friend quoted a case where an officer in the Boer War tried to get a court-martial and could not get it. The Navy, however, have this advantage, that in these

cases the question does go before a court-martial, and if the officer is not to blame nothing happened, he is exonerated and his honour is protected almost automatically. This, at least is certain, and I think it is one of the worst features of the new departure of the Government that the practice in the Navy will soon correspond to the practice in the Army. You are holding courts-martial so seldom that it will become obvious that when you do hold them it is because you think the man brought before a court-martial has done something which makes him *prima facie* liable to have a court-martial. I think that is a great disadvantage, and a serious loss to the sailors themselves.

Let me put another case. Every one knows that in a great service like the Navy there is apt to grow up a charge of favouritism. We all know that that constantly happens, and, if I may be pardoned, I may say that I am in favour of favouritism, or what is called favouritism, that is, a passing over people who have the natural right to promotion on the ground of seniority and selecting those who are better fitted for the job, especially in time of war. I consider that one of the most difficult tasks that the head of the Army or the Navy has is to exercise that power ruthlessly in the interests of the nation. It is easy enough if a man is obviously incompetent, but if you have a man who does his work pretty well and yet you know somebody else who would do it better, I say there is no duty more incumbent on the head of the Army or the Navy than to put aside all consideration and put the best man there. Just consider for a moment what the effect of this policy has on the possibility of unfair treatment. Obviously the Admiralty mind is not going to overlook these disasters or these accidents. It is going to judge them itself without any court-martial, and it is going to judge whether or not the captain was to blame.

What will inevitably happen? Human nature being what it is, if the Admiralty without a court-martial thinks somebody is not fit for his ship and takes him away from it, however much he is to blame, the heads of the Admiralty will not make him suffer in the ordinary advancement of his profession, and they will very likely give him some other job, perhaps more valuable than the one from which they take him. What is the effect of that? By making such an

appointment you are giving to a man who does not deserve it a post which, when the war is over, ought to have gone to one of the men who deserved it by distinguished service. How is that to be avoided? The position in which we are all placed brings us back to this: We have got to accept as unanswerable the arguments of the right hon. gentleman. We cannot press this or any other question to a division, and we cannot set ourselves up against the authority which is really carrying on this war. All we can do is to put our case as strongly as we can, and I wish to say to the right hon. gentleman for myself that from the beginning I have thought a good deal about this subject. I have discussed it with my colleagues, and we all feel—I am speaking of my colleagues on this side of the House—that so far as we can judge this is a bad departure, and we would like to see a reversion to the older practice. Having said that, we can say and do nothing more.

COLONEL YATE: I wish to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty two small questions of policy upon which I hope he will be able to give me some information. The first is whether the Admiralty are taking any steps whatsoever to further the construction of the Firth of Forth and Clyde Ship Canal? At Rosyth, in particular, we have not heard of any steps which have been taken to further the completion of those works, and I should be glad to hear from the right hon. gentleman whether that is a question of policy to be taken in hand by the Admiralty and pushed forward. My second question is whether the Admiralty will now withdraw the objections which they formally held to the vessels of the Royal Indian Marine being armed with guns? This matter has been inquired into of late years. We all know the magnificent service done by the Indian Navy in the old days. Some twenty or twenty-five years ago I was aboard the Royal Marine ship *Lawrence* in the Persian Gulf, and it was then armed similarly to His Majesty's ship *Sphinx*. Subsequently, when I went on board that ship, I was told that the Admiralty were so jealous of any other forces having guns that they had ordered the removal of the guns from that service. The Royal Indian Marine is fully commissioned all through, and I would ask now if the Admiralty have withdrawn their opposition and have decided to arm these vessels.

They do splendid service policing the Persian Gulf, and I trust that these vessels will be armed and that the Royal Indian Marine will be recognised as a fighting service. Those are the only two questions touching on policy which I hope the right hon. gentleman will be able to give us some information about.

MR. RONALD M'NEILL: I wish to ask a question with regard to the new rule about prize money. I am not going to make any criticism upon the change which the Government have made with regard to prize money, but I do think the right hon. gentleman will find, as indeed he himself anticipated, that in working out the provision they are now going to make for prize money he will be faced by very great difficulties. I put a question on this point, which has been very courteously answered to the effect that the prize money which is to be 'pooled' to the end of the war is to be awarded in proper proportion to the representatives of those who may unfortunately lose their lives before the war is over, and that they will lose nothing by the death of the sailor during the war. I suppose that when the prize money comes to be distributed all the latest Naval recruits will also have to have their share. If the war lasts longer than we all hope it will, there must be a great many young sailors who perhaps will join many months even from the present date and a very long time after the outbreak of the war, and they, I suppose, will also have to have their share. I suggest to the right hon. gentleman that a very difficult point which the Admiralty will have to consider is how the proportions are to be allotted between these various men and what principle is to be adopted, because mere length of service will not be a satisfactory test of those who are to obtain the larger or the smaller share. You will be faced by the old difficulty which has come down to us from the days of Holy Scripture. It is the difficulty of distinguishing between those who have borne the heat and the burden of the day and those who come in at the last moment. We know that in the original parable they all received an equal share of the prize money, but I think the Admiralty will find, if they adopt that sacred example, that they will not be following a very satisfactory course in the present instance. The question will surely arise, seeing the great number of men and representatives of

men who will have to have a share of the prize money when the war is over, whether it will go round, and whether the amount to be divided will not show that same sort of extraordinary progress we became accustomed to in connection with the land taxation of this country till we come to a minus quantity. Will the awards which will go to some of our sailors not work out at a minus quantity? I ask this question because I think it is a matter in which the House and the country will be deeply interested when the actual method of working comes to be disclosed, and I venture to express the hope that the Admiralty will find the solution, which certainly does not appear on the surface of these matters, and that they will be able to give satisfaction to all concerned.

It struck me when listening to the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty yesterday, that there was no part of it which was received with greater satisfaction, and no part, I believe, which was received with greater satisfaction in the country when it was read to-day, than that in which he described the bulwark of public instruments by which our enemy has hitherto been protected and which he said would now have to be reconsidered in the light of the conduct which our enemy has adopted towards us. It is legitimate in that connection, at all events for us on this side of the House, to remind the right hon. gentleman that the restrictions, for they are restrictions, upon our freedom of action, and therefore upon the efficiency of our sea power in some particulars at least, are restrictions against which we for a long time past have made a very sturdy protest. We contended, for example, against the Declaration of London. I could not help thinking, when listening to the right hon. gentleman yesterday on that point, that even in these days and in this great stress of war we may all say, 'Thank God we have a House of Lords.' The same line of criticism applies—although to pursue it at the moment would not be prudent—to other public instruments by which we are bound. The Declarations of Paris and of The Hague Convention have all been passed at different times by the influence of the military powers in Europe to the detriment of the naval power in this country. I mention them now because I think if we bear these things in mind at a time like this, when their

effect is prominent in the public mind, it may probably do something, when the right time comes, to prevent our reforging these shackles upon ourselves. We are, for the moment, only too thankful to hear that those instruments are likely to be cast aside, as we can cast them aside with a clear conscience in view of the conduct of the enemy.

I have not been able, unfortunately, to hear the whole of the debate to-day, and I do not know whether the right hon. gentleman opposite has really made any detailed reply to my noble friend the member for Portsmouth (Lord C. Beresford). So far as I have heard the remarks from the Government bench, no detailed reply has been given to the case he made in some of its particulars. I refer particularly to some incidents as the loss of the cruisers, the battle in the Pacific, and matters of that sort. There was one incident in which I have perhaps more particular personal interest than any of the others, and to which I do not think any allusion has been made in this debate. I refer to the loss of the *Niger*.[1] Listening to my noble friend when he spoke of unfortunate incidents which are avoidable, or ought to be avoided, I could not help thinking particularly of the loss of the *Niger*. If I refer to it, it is only in the same spirit as my noble friend, and in the hope that any criticism which we may temporarily advance with regard to past events may tend to make their recurrence less probable. The information I have with regard to the loss of the *Niger*, which went down within a few yards of the shore of my own constituency, is that she was torpedoed by an enemy submarine, and that the disaster was not only rendered possible, but in the view of many who knew the circumstances, was rendered certain by the orders received from the Admiralty to remain at anchor. The fact, at all events, is that lying off the coast of Kent, I think in or near the Downs, she was at anchor for a very considerable period. Her position was perfectly well known, and there was a large number of neutral vessels, or so-called neutral vessels, in the neighbourhood, which, so far as my information goes, were not subjected to any stringent examination.

[1] [*See Naval* 2, p. 235.]

The sailors on board the *Niger*, of course, were unavoidably in communication with people on shore. You could not keep them absolutely from saying what was in their mind,

and I was told at the time that the language used by the sailors on the *Niger* was that for days past they had been asking for it. I am told when the torpedo was discharged at the *Niger*, it was perfectly visible. The *Niger* was at anchor, and it would have taken half an hour to get her under steam. Those both on shore and on the vessel who knew the circumstances, say that the loss of that ship was absolutely and entirely due to that fact, which I suppose we must assume was owing to orders received from the Admiralty. I cannot believe that the commander of the ship himself would have remained at anchor in such a situation and under such danger, and, if so, the responsibility rests with the Admiralty for not having taught him a wiser course.

Does not the same sort of criticism apply to that most unfortunate action which took place off the coast of Chile? My hon. friend the member for Portsmouth (Mr. Falle), in an interesting speech yesterday, asked that the instructions sent to Admiral Cradock should be made known—I do not know whether the Admiralty intend to do so either now or at some future time—and that the communications received from Admiral Cradock should also be made known. It seems to me that those are the more important of the two, and the House and the country ought to be told—I do not say at this moment, but certainly at some time—whether or not Admiral Cradock, knowing the size of his own squadron and the strength he was called upon to meet, sent any representations to the Admiralty with regard to reinforcements, and whether those requests, if made, were complied with or not. And whether that is so or not, the fact remains that the Admiralty knew perfectly well the exact strength of the German squadron which might be concentrated against Admiral Cradock. They knew the vessels which were at that Admiral's disposal, and therefore they must have known exactly the chances which he had of victory if he came into conflict with the concentrated German Fleet. We know from what subsequently happened that consistently with the strategic requirements elsewhere the Admiralty were able to despatch to the South Atlantic, and, if that had been required, to the Pacific, at least two very powerful cruisers which entirely turned the scale and were able fortunately to avenge the loss. Why did not the Admiralty send those two cruisers in order to prevent the

loss rather than in order to avenge it? It was a catastrophe which they could have prevented as they avowed by their own subsequent conduct, and it has at all events taught us a lesson which it is to be hoped the Admiralty will take to heart.

Last night a very interesting speech was made by my hon. and learned friend the member for Chatham (Mr. Hohler), and on one of the points contained in his speech the right hon. gentleman gave a reply this afternoon. There were one or two points which he raised which the right hon. gentleman has put entirely on one side, and I would like to say a word or two about them. I refer in the first instance to the expedition to Antwerp. I am not going to indulge in any criticism as to the policy of that expedition. It is fairly understood now that there are a great many people in the country—there are certainly some of us on this side of the House—who hold a very strong opinion with regard to that expedition. The time may come when we shall be free to say what we think, but for the moment I am only concerned with the point raised by my hon. and learned friend with regard to the quartermaster-sergeants. Those quartermaster-sergeants sent over there acted during that expedition as officers. When they came back to this country, having had, I should say, a terrible experience, an experience which must have been very instructive to those who survived, they found themselves superseded by young and inexperienced officers who were put over their heads. My hon. and learned friend asked, and I repeat his question: Why was that injustice done to these men? It is not merely a question of injustice to these men, though that is bad enough. There is a much higher ground for objection to it than that. There is the objection that to supersede those men with young and inexperienced officers is not for the advantage of the Service.

It is really the same question applied to the Navy as that which was raised with respect to the Army not long ago by my right hon. friend the member for the Strand Division (Mr. Long). The only answer suggested, as I understand, is that after the war you would have a great number of officers of a certain rank on your hands and you would not know what to do with them. I really do think it is absurd that,

in this enormous war in which we are now engaged—by far the greatest so far as the magnitude of the forces employed is concerned—we should allow our procedure in these matters to be guided by the normal rules which would apply in the case of an ordinary war, when an Expeditionary Force of two or three hundred thousand men might be engaged in India or elsewhere. We are now dealing with millions of men, with a force such as we have never had before, and we ought to treat the occasion as unique, to fight the war right to the end, and to make the best use we can of our resources, without thinking of what is going to happen afterwards. When this war is over we shall have all sorts of unprecedented circumstances to deal with, and we should not allow such considerations to govern our conduct of the war itself.

There is one other point raised by the hon. and learned member for Chatham yesterday to which no reply has been given. It is the case of the quartermaster-sergeants of Marines who have joined the Royal Fleet Reserve with a definite, unmistakable undertaking from the Admiralty that, if called up for active service, they shall go back to the rating which they held before they left. These men have that pledge, which was given by the Admiralty in writing, in their mind. They have, however, not been called back to the rating of quartermaster-sergeant as before, but have been employed as colour-sergeants, with that status and pay only. There is a similar and analogous point in the case of the National Reserve men who are joining the Marines. The men were promised that when they did rejoin they should receive in Class 1 a grant of £10, and in Class 2 a grant of £5. That promise has not been kept, and I would impress on the right hon. gentleman that these undertakings to the Reservists, whether with regard to their status or pay or bounty, should be borne in mind. It may be that these things apply to only a limited number of men, and that they have been overlooked by the Admiralty, but such incidents cause great dissatisfaction; they are talked of as breaches of faith on the part of the Government to men serving the country. They have a bad effect on recruiting and on public spirit in the places where the facts are known. I hope, before this Vote is taken, we shall have from the Front Bench opposite some definite assurance that these

matters will be looked into and a remedy applied to the grievances of which we complain.

MR. DUNCAN MILLAR: I should like to mention two points, one of which has already been dealt with by the right hon. gentleman this afternoon. It relates to the badges or tokens to be issued to those who are employed in our big industries in connection with Admiralty contracts. I should like to thank the right hon. gentleman for his statement this afternoon that it is the intention of the Admiralty to recognise all men who have been asked to remain at their duties in our big steel works and shipbuilding yards, and who have been prevented offering their services to their country in consequence of the demands made on them by those industries. Every one of us feels there are many skilled workers who are really rendering greater service to their country by remaining at their work, and it is not fair that they should be exposed to any form of criticism on account of the fact that they have not along with their fellows joined the Army. I am glad to know that the Admiralty are undertaking to give them a form of recognition which they deserve, and I trust it will be made perfectly clear that there will be no discrimination against any workers engaged on Admiralty work, and that they will all have the recognition direct from the Admiralty, although it may be given them in the form of a badge handed to them by their employers. There are many such employés in the constituency I have the honour to represent, and there is a strong feeling among them that it should be made perfectly clear that they have been asked to remain at their work, and that they have done so notwithstanding the desire on their part to give their services in the field.

The other point I desire to touch upon relates to those who have been recently thrown out of employment on account of the war in the fishing districts throughout the country. I had the honour formerly to represent a constituency in East Fife, where there are a great number of fishermen engaged, and their experience has not been peculiar in any degree. It has been the experience of fishermen all over the country that, owing to the necessary restrictions placed on them, many have been thrown out of employment and are in great distress. Indeed, many have been seeking

employment in different parts of the country and have had great difficulty in finding it. I know the Admiralty are sympathetic towards this class of men. I believe they have endeavoured to utilise their services in connection with Admiralty work. Many are doing magnificent work with mine-sweepers. We, as a nation, ought especially to recognise their services in that respect. Others again are using their experience as seafaring men to man coal ships and store ships, and otherwise assist the Admiralty. I would like to suggest to the right hon. gentleman the placing of some Admiralty contracts in those districts which suffer most. There are many men who, on account of their age, are unable to serve in the Navy. There are many industries dependent on the fishing industries which have been seriously affected, and perhaps the right hon. gentleman might see his way to place one or two Admiralty contracts in districts which have suffered, such as East Fife and St. Andrews Burghs. There are many men fitted to do good service for the Admiralty in connection with the gear required. They could make kit bags for the Navy, they could work on sails and other fishing gear. I know the Admiralty have done something to meet cases like that. It has shown the greatest sympathy for fishermen, but it might be able to do a little more in the way of placing local contracts with those fitted to undertake them, so as to relieve this highly deserving class in their sore trouble. I am sure the Admiralty is desirous of doing everything in its power to meet these cases.

MR. PETO: The First Lord of the Admiralty yesterday mentioned how he had been able to meet the demand for men for the Fleet, and he went further and called the attention of the House to the fact that we had been able also to man an enormous number—several score—of armed merchantmen which had been taken up and had played an important part in our arrangements for the control of traffic and trade. The right hon. gentleman might have gone further and pointed out the enormous amount of work which is being done auxiliary to the work of our Navy by merchant seamen in various capacities. The hon. member who last spoke referred to the work of mine-sweeping. If it were not for the fact that we have men in the Royal Naval Reserve, and a very large number of volunteers for commissions in

the Royal Navy during the war, who have undertaken these duties, we should undoubtedly not have carried on the war as far as we have gone, with a success which has hitherto attended us. I do not think either the public or the Board of Admiralty have really recognised the great sacrifices and great services which have been rendered to the State by our merchant service. I was pleased to see in a leading article in *The Times* to-day, that attention was called to this matter, and that, in speaking of the silent watch of our Fleet, *The Times* said :—'We must think, too, of all the officers and crews of our mercantile marine now called upon to face new and unfamiliar dangers,' and it went on to point out that 'the extraordinary threats of the enemy have given the British mercantile marine an unsought-for place in this war.' I want to ask the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty whether he will consider, with more sympathy of a practical kind, the case of the officers of the Royal Naval Reserve. I want also to know whether the increase in pay recently granted to lower grade naval officers, particularly to lieutenants—a rise of 1s. per day for every two years of service—applies to officers of the Royal Naval Reserve. I should like the right hon. gentleman to consider in relation to this question of pay whether it is not time to take some action in the direction of promotion for those who have only the rank or rating of sub-lieutenant and whose pay, of course, is very much less than that of lieutenants in the Royal Naval Reserve. This applies, I believe, to a good many men who are officering our mine-sweepers. Are they in receipt of the increased pay of sub-lieutenants. It has gone up from 5s. to 7s. 6d., but, surely, 7s. 6d. a day for work of this kind, considering the responsibility and danger, is inadequate. It is a little over £2 a week, and is considerably less than is earned by the casual carpenters engaged in erecting soldiers' huts in our camps. When doing this very difficult work, surely £2 per week cannot be considered to be reasonable remuneration. There are other ways in which these officers who have given up their ordinary work in the merchant service in order to take on these naval duties are positively worse off than before. Officers of the Army and Navy who wanted to insure their lives had special arrangements made for them with the great insurance companies, instead of the

very large additional premium which was first asked for. That has been held to apply to officers in the Royal Naval Reserve. But officers who are commanding our transports, and do not happen to be officers in the Royal Naval Reserve, are called upon to pay a very large premium for any policy they may want to take out. They have also to pay a very large premium if they want to effect a policy of insurance on their kit, and this means a very considerable deduction from their pay in consequence of the work they are doing. If an officer wishes to insure his life for £200 he pays £6 for premium alone, while if he wants to insure another £100 upon his kit, that adds a further £4 to the premium, representing a deduction of £10 per year from his wages in the shape of premiums for war risks alone. In the case of the raids on Scarborough and other coast towns the Government have already taken a responsibility in respect of the civil population for the loss they have sustained through the bombardment of our coast. I do not wish to go into that as a matter of policy, although I think the Prime Minister was very wise in saying when he replied to an hon. member yesterday that there was no general rule, and that each case would be considered on its merits. But I ask the Financial Secretary to consider that if it is reasonable for the Government to repay the loss to an ordinary civilian who is undertaking no special duties in connection with this war should he suffer loss through the bombardment of a coast town, that officers who are undertaking these essential duties on our transport colliers and other auxiliaries of the Fleet, if they lose their kit, and are lucky enough to get off with their lives, as was the case with those vessels which were torpedoed off the Mersey the other day—is it reasonable that the Government in those cases should not give them something to repay them for the loss of their kit? There is an actual loss due to the action of the enemy, and it is the loss of a man to whom that means practically everything. The sextants and other instruments, uniform and the rest of it, often run in the case of a marine captain up to £100 or £150 in value, and their loss is a very serious one indeed. It is extremely hard, whereas the insurance companies have been approached by the Government with a view to their charging no special war risk in the cases of officers in the Army or

Navy, that nothing is done to meet the case of life insurance policies and insurance policies to cover kit of those officers who are serving on the auxiliary ships of the Fleet.

I want to touch on another question closely connected with this. The officers in command, and the other officers on our transports are not given any special position of authority with regard to the crew, and they are not allowed to wear their naval uniform, even when they are officers of the Royal Naval Reserve. The Committee will remember the name of one officer who happened to be the officer in charge of a Cunarder who saved a number of lives in a recent disaster. He is not vested with that authority over the crew which is so essential for the maintenance of discipline on this very important service, and he is not allowed to wear his naval uniform, because these are not appointments which are given to officers of the Royal Naval Reserve. Fifty-three of these officers signed a representation to the Director of Transports pointing out that the want of discipline on these transports was a very serious matter indeed. I have asked, and some other members have asked, whether something cannot be done in the way of giving them commissions in the Royal Naval Reserve, as if they were officers of the Royal Naval Reserve who were taken on for naval duties, and giving them the right to wear the uniform as well. The answer was that it would not effect the purpose of giving them any special control over the crew, because those crews were not under the Naval Discipline Act. I would ask the right hon. gentleman whether he will not carefully consider what has been the actual state of affairs on frequent occasions on these transports with battalions of our soldiers on board. They have had to put to sea when practically the ship has had to be run by the officers themselves and one or two apprentices because, owing to the lack of discipline, the crew were not in a proper position to navigate the vessel.

This is a matter which must be viewed from two aspects. These officers are not gaining anything in respect of increased pay. On the contrary, they are put to increased cost. They are told by the companies, who, in many cases, own the ships which have been chartered by the Government, that all questions of promotion must stand over during the war. They are not pressing that, but they do ask that they shall

be given proper authority to enable them to carry out the responsible duties entrusted to them. I should like to read to the right hon. gentleman a short extract from a letter written by an officer of one of these vessels. He says:—'I notice that we are popularly credited with receiving some kind of war bonuses, some say £1 per month, and others 15s., on wages, and I beg to point out that this statement (with regard to ships in this company at least) is entirely false, no consideration whatever having been given us so far; and, in fact, we are in many respects losers by serving in a transport. All forms of promotion in the company, we are informed, must be overlooked during the war. The Government will give none of us commissions in the R.N.R. or employ us in the pilotage. Leave of absence is entirely stopped, and any facilities for seeing anything of our homes or families during the past nine months have been absolutely denied to us.' That letter was written on the 10th February. It described the actual condition which for eight months' service has obtained in this responsible service. I would suggest to the right hon. gentleman, as regards pay, that as the question of war bonuses was settled, as was pointed out by the President of the Board of Trade at question time yesterday,[1] between the men and the shipowners themselves, by mutual agreement in the early part of the war, and as no such representation has been made on behalf of the officers, that it is really for the Admiralty to see that a reasonable war bonus is given to the officers who are undertaking these duties. I do not want to give the Committee the impression that it is any question of grousing or grumbling. Whatever decision may be given, the officers of the merchant service will be proud to carry out whatever duties are entrusted to them. Whether, in meeting the increased risks due to the policy announced by the enemy, or whether in acting as auxiliaries of our Navy, they will not be found wanting, but it does behove the Admiralty to use the influence they can use to see that services of this kind are recognised in a reasonable manner during the war, and that when the war is over some special form of State recognition, showing that the country appreciates the services they have rendered and the risks they have run, shall be given to these officers and men in every case.

[1] [*See* p. 238.]

MR. TYSON WILSON: I should like to join in the appeal made by the hon. gentleman who has just sat down, that captains of ships who are in the Royal Naval Reserve should be allowed to wear their uniform. They are entitled to that honour at any rate. I wish to call attention to another matter in respect of which I have written to the right hon. gentleman, namely, the discharge of joiners from the Portsmouth dockyard. I have been under the impression for many weeks past that the Royal dockyards could not get sufficient men, but now I have received a complaint that during the past four weeks some fifty joiners have been discharged, while men engaged in another trade and who do similar work to that which joiners generally do have been kept on and paid a subsistence allowance of £1 per week in addition to the ordinary wages to which they are entitled. I would suggest to the right hon. gentleman that that is not fair to the joiners and that it is bad economy on the part of the Admiralty. I only make this statement in order that the right hon. gentleman may inquire into it. I have verified it as far as I possibly could by writing letters to individuals who have communicated with me, and I have done my best to ascertain whether their statements are correct. I am told that there is any amount of work in the Portsmouth Dockyard which is really joiners' work, and that this work is being done by men who get the special subsistence allowance of £1 per week—such work as fitting up bookcases, cupboards, screens, and shelves. I am also told that this is joiners' work pure and simple. Complaints have also reached me that a considerable amount of work has been put out to contract which could be done in the dockyard. I am told that in the stores department work could be done but they have not the money to do it. When they have applied to the construction department they have been told, 'Oh, we have no time to deal with that!' I suggest that there should be a proper understanding between the various departments in the dockyard, in order that the work should be done in the dockyard and should not be put out to contract. I am told that recently the stores department wanted work done in respect of tables, bookcases, screens, and other articles, but were told that the money for the stores department was practically exhausted. When they applied to the other department they were told

that they could not do anything in the matter, and the work was put out to contract. I have also complaints from the dockyards that work in connection with the trawlers and drifters used for mine-sweeping is also let out by contract, whereas if there were proper co-ordination of work in the dockyard the work could be done there.

DR. MACNAMARA: I do not quite follow the point. Is it the repairing of the vessels?

MR. TYSON WILSON: The fitting of them, I believe. I am told it is let out by contract, and that in some instances the cost of doing the work in the dockyard would be about £80 per trawler, whereas it has actually cost from £300 to £350 by being let out. It is not let out on contract, but I understand it is arranged that commission is paid, as in the case of the huts that have been built for the Army. I am told also that a good deal of the work upon transports, hospital and prison ships could be done in the dockyard, whereas it is often let out to shipbuilders and repairers. To give a case in point, the *Soho* was estimated by the dockyard authorities to cost, for fittings, etc., some £5000. It has been done by employers who have received commission, and it has cost £13,000. On the mine-sweeping kites a considerable amount of work has also been done by joiners which was nearly all given out to private firms. The cost was considerably more than if it had been done by the dockyards themselves. I suggest, with the object of keeping fully employed the whole of the workmen connected with Portsmouth Dockyard, and other dockyards if necessary, that the fitting referred to should be given to the joiners or shipwrights, and that so far as possible the work of each individual trade should be given to the members of that trade. I have heard very strong charges of favouritism made against the management of the Portsmouth Dockyard. I do not suggest that there is favouritism shown, but there may be unconscious bias in favour of a certain trade, and I should certainly suggest to the Department that it would be wise, in connection with the various trades in the shipyards, if each trade had a manager or superintendent who was in a position to take on the men himself, instead of their being taken on by a general manager or superintendent. Without the least doubt there is a considerable feeling of irritation at present

amongst the men engaged in joinery work in the shipyard, and in the interests of the Admiralty and of the nation it is not wise that men who receive a subsistence allowance of £1 a week should be kept at work whilst men who are only receiving the ordinary rate of wage are discharged. Therefore I suggest that the right hon. gentleman should make inquiries into the matter with the object of rectifying the complaint I have made, and if the statements I have made with regard to wages and subsistence, and also certain trades working almost night and day, while other trades are only working ordinary time, are found to be correct, they should try to allocate the work in such a manner that the grievances complained of will not occur again.

MR. FALLE: I should like to congratulate the right hon. gentleman on his opening statement to-day, and to thank him for his efforts on behalf of the poor men who are working in the dockyard—efforts which have been so successful. We all know there is not a man who has the interests of the worker more at heart, or has done more for them, than the right hon. gentleman. The first point I want to bring forward is the question of the retired and pensioned officers of the Royal Marines. They are not quite rightly treated, more especially in these generous times, when every one seems to think he has a right to get everything that is due to him. The Army officer, retired and pensioned, who returns to service during this war receives his pension and his full pay. The Royal Marine officer on return to work loses immediately, *ipso facto*, his pension, and receives full pay. It is the more curious because his non-commissioned officers and his men all receive their pensions as well as their full pay. He is the only one who does not receive pension, but full pay. I have many cases, but I will take the case of one who is a major. His retired pay and pension is £225 a year. He loses that and comes back to serve his country and receives, as full pay, £275 a year. That is, he is serving his country for £50 a year. His bombardier is receiving £56 a year; so this officer returns to serve his country and shed his blood, if necessary, for a smaller sum than is given to a non-com. It seems to me that the matter has only to be stated to show that it is not quite right. It is fair to say that he is given for each year he serves a bonus of 25 per

cent. You can calculate a bonus of 25 per cent. on £275, and even then he is working for very little indeed. The Navy man, I admit, suffers under exactly the same disability. On return to the Service, if he is a pensioned officer, he loses his pension for the time being and receives his full pay. But the retired officer of the Navy continues to take steps in his profession. If he retired as lieutenant he may be made a commander or a captain, or may even rise to admiral, and, of course, his pension naturally moves with him. The Royal Marines should have that privilege. If an officer is not to have his pension during the time he is serving, he ought to be allowed a step, or two steps, as the case may be, according to the time he serves, so that the matter may be in a measure equalised.

There is another point, that of apprentices in dockyards. This is a matter which, though it concerns only a very few, is, I consider, of very considerable importance. These men, of course, are very highly educated, and they rise, in many cases, to be designers of our ships. There is an examination once a year, and the last examination ended on 10th August the year before last. In the case of Portsmouth Dockyard there are three young apprentices who were allowed by the Admiralty to join the Territorial Force in June, and immediately war broke out they were called up to their units. If these men had been allowed to wait five days in the dockyard, if they had not been good-plucked ones, or even if they had gone sick, they would have been fully qualified men on 10th August, but because they had lost five days they are still rated as apprentices, and they must return after the war is over to complete five days in the dockyard before they receive the wages of a man. They are now with their regiment, and they are receiving the difference between soldiers' pay and the pay of apprentices, which is, of course, a very small sum. This, it seems to me, is a matter which should be looked into and rectified. It can only occur once every year, and it can only affect a very limited number of men, or rather boys. In five days these apprentices could have completed their time and been accepted as men, and, in these generous times, it seems to me it is ungenerous not to give them their five days.

Another point to which I desire to refer is the position

of ships' stewards. It will be generally admitted that the lower deck as a whole suffers from not being in the limelight. The soldier is in the limelight, and any brave deed he may accomplish is immediately reported on. But the sailor, and in a less degree, of course, the ship's steward, serves in what you might call a watertight compartment under the observation of one officer only. In fact, they do not fight as they did in olden days, on an open deck, where the whole of the crew and officers could see them. That is naturally a disadvantage. There was a Committee—the Thursby Committee—which was to report on these ships' stewards, but the finding of the Committee has been deferred, and the consequence is that these men are in the position they have been in for a good many years, and they think—and I think they have a strong case—that they ought to be moved forward and upward. They think they ought to be allowed to be advanced to flagships, to naval bases, to depot ships, and to the Royal Naval Division, and I do not see and have not been able to find any reason why they should not. They do not see why they should not be employed at the Crystal Palace, for instance, as quartermasters. At the Crystal Palace at present there is a schoolmaster from an industrial school. No doubt he is a very able and very exceptional man, and is qualified for his post, but he is there as quartermaster, and these men who have served in the Navy all their lives think they have the first call on such posts. There is a petty officer in the R.N.V.R. there as an assistant-paymaster. The ships' stewards think they have a greater claim to be made quartermasters than even a petty officer in the R.N.V.R., and I entirely agree with them.

These men in my opinion, and in their own, would have made better assistant-paymasters than even the men whom the Admiralty has taken on for temporary service, however good these men may be. The examination for writers and for ships' stewards is exactly the same, and it takes place at the same place and on the same day. Both were instituted at the same time, and warrant rank was given to both at the same time. There were twelve warrant officers among the writers and ten among the ships' stewards, but quite recently fifteen new warrant officers have been made among the writers—not undeserved, I am quite sure—but not a

single one has been given among the ships' stewards, and the consequence is that now there are twenty-seven writers who are warrant officers and there are only ten ships' stewards, as there were before. They think it may be that because a great number of them are at sea the Admiralty forgets them. Here I do not agree with them. The Admiralty's eye is big enough and intelligent enough to follow a man even when he is at sea. But that is what the Service feels. That is what the ships' stewards think, and they think that higher ranks should be open to them—they should not be shut off, and they should receive augmentations of pension, not only for themselves but for their widows. They have not received augmentation either for themselves or for their widows for a very considerable number of years.

There is one other point that I have frequently discussed with the right hon. gentleman, and that is the separation allowance to warrant officers. It is the most difficult subject I have touched, but I should be very glad if he would give us any information on that subject. I do not refer to the older warrant officers, but I think the warrant officers of the first five years might be included in the separation allowances, for they have for the first five years very considerable expenses—new expenses—and they are in very responsible posts. A friend of mine, who has been obliged to leave the House, has asked me to put to the right hon. gentleman the question of the prize money in the Persian Gulf. It is not the amount of prize money as it arises after the new Resolution, but the prize money between 1910 and 1914. That money has in many cases not yet been paid. I shall be grateful to the right hon. gentleman if he can give us any indication when that prize money is likely to be paid.

MR. HOHLER: I regret that I was not present when the right hon. gentleman the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty replied to the speech I made yesterday. I was unavoidably absent, and did not expect that he would reply so soon. I understand that the hon. member for the Blackfriars Division (Mr. Barnes) thinks that the case of a stepchild should be considered in connection with the pension scheme. I understand that the scheme deals first with married men and unmarried men. It deals also with widows and their children and the dependants of unmarried men. It is obvious that a

stepchild is not the child of the soldier or sailor; consequently a stepchild does not come into that branch. I gather that the right hon. gentleman is going to look into the point and make it clear.

DR. MACNAMARA: I will consult my Committee.

MR. HOHLER: I quite understand that. The only other point on which I desire to say a word is travelling allowances. I desire, on the part of the men of His Majesty's Navy, to acknowledge the concession which the Admiralty have made. They appreciate it enormously. It is of very great value. I wish to ask whether the Admiralty will consider its extension. Roughly stated, the concession given is that if a ship comes into a port which is not its own port, then travelling expenses are given, or a free pass is given to the man who is going to his home. A further concession is given. If a man comes from action he gets a free pass; if he comes from action on land, which, of course, would apply generally to a Marine, he gets a free pass. Obviously these are very great advantages, and the men greatly appreciate them. I ask the right hon. gentleman to consider whether, in the stress and emergencies of this war, the concession could not be given to those going home on leave. I have in my mind the case which I think the right hon. gentleman has before him. It is the case of a youth from London. His ship came to Plymouth, and I believe his port is Portsmouth. I have a letter from his father to the effect that the lad in coming home to see his father in London had to pay 18s. 8d. for his return fare. His wages are 4s. 1d. per week. It seems to me that the Admiralty might in a liberal spirit consider whether they could not extend the concession so that when a man comes home on leave to see his parents he should be entitled to do so at the expense of the country. I think it has been largely done in the case of soldiers from the front. I think we should extend a similar concession to the men of the Navy. You never can tell but that the visit may be the last, and I think that if something could be done in the way of giving this concession, the Admiralty would earn the gratitude of the whole of the men in the Navy.

MR. DENNISS: I wish to refer to an impression that is very widely held all over the country, and which has been expressed in many communications to the Press, namely,

that the commerce of this country is suffering by reason of the large number of ships that have been commandeered by the Admiralty for the purposes of the war. I should like to quote the most authentic figures that can be obtained on the subject. The figures I have are from the report by Sir Norman Hill to the Liverpool Steamship Association. They are figures which, I believe, have been supplied to the Government, and which the Prime Minister relied upon when he made his speech the other day. The overseas trade of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Belgium which have all ceased now amounts to 22 per cent. of the world's trade; but the trade of some neutral countries has increased and the trade of some other countries of the world has decreased. In the result Mr. Hill finds that the overseas trade of the world has decreased by 30 per cent. In regard to the ships of the world which have to carry that trade the ships of Germany, Austria, and Hungary form 14 per cent. of the world's shipping. The value of the imports into this country during five months to the end of December has decreased 20 per cent. and the exports have decreased 41 per cent. Therefore it follows, I think, that there are plenty of British ships to carry on British shipping, and there are certainly sufficient ships in the world to carry the whole commerce of the world. Without in any way trenching on the debate which is to take place to-morrow I would only say in a sentence that apparently the shortage of ships in the world is put down to the Admiralty taking the ships. It is not true. The truth is that British ships at this moment are carrying cargoes of foodstuffs to Italy and Sweden, leaving their own country in the cold. These cargoes are getting into the country of the enemy.

SIR J. HARMOOD-BANNER: I wish to refer to the prohibition on the export of wire, which I think has been done to a considerable extent by the Custom House authorities beyond what was intended by the Admiralty when they put on the prohibition. With regard to anything which the Admiralty themselves require for the purposes of the Navy, it is perfectly correct to put on that prohibition and to carry it to its greatest extreme. The manufactures of the country should be at the command of the Admiralty. But the prohibition which is now being carried out has gone so far as to prevent the export of wire to Portugal for the purpose of

making sardine box openers. It is a very large trade, and yet the export of this wire to Portugal is prohibited. The effect of the prohibition will be that there will be no sale. The Admiralty will not buy the wire and customers will not buy it, so that men will be put out of work. The effect will be that if the Admiralty want the wire there will be no men to make it. Unless the Admiralty want the wire, I ask them not to put on the prohibition. I do not mean the prohibition to any countries which are not playing the game and which might supply Turkey, Austria, or Germany. Put on the prohibition as much as you like to these countries, but as regards our Allies, the Argentine and the East Indies, there are certain qualities of wire which might be exported. Do not let the Admiralty say, 'We will neither buy the wire nor allow it to be exported. If they take that line the effect will be that the wire will not be made at all, and the people who are now employed in making it will be turned out of work.

DR. MACNAMARA: If I dwell very briefly on the points which have been raised in the debate, it must not be assumed that I have not taken note of the views expressed or that they will not be looked into so far as possible. The hon. and gallant member opposite asked if I could tell him what has been done in regard to certain matters. He always asks his questions so perfectly that I am sorry that I have to tell him I can give him no information as regards the arming of the vessels of the Royal Indian Marine. I understand that this matter has been under consideration for some time between the Home Government and the Indian Government. I think the hon. and gallant member understands that when the Indian Navy was given up at the end of the 'sixties the Royal Navy was made responsible for naval defence, and that the vessels retained in the marine were vessels required for Indian transport and for the policing of the waters. As to whether we shall ever get any further with these matters I cannot give any undertaking. The hon. member for East Kent made an interesting comment on the difficulties that confront us in reference to the distribution of prize money, and made a comparison with the adoption of the much simpler method of awarding the proceeds of capture to the captors. We shall have to do our best to solve these difficulties, and we do not underestimate them. The hon.

member referred to a question which was put yesterday by the hon. and learned member for Chatham (Mr. Hohler). The hon. member for Chatham said :—' A number of quartermaster-sergeants were sent to France with the Royal Marine Brigade and the Royal Naval Division, and there acted as officers. They have been brought home with the Royal Naval Division, and now a number of young fellows, without any experience and little or no training, have been put over their heads with commissions.' As I understand it, there was a member of the Royal Marines who went out with acting-warrant rank ?

MR. HOHLER : I understand that there are sixteen.

DR. MACNAMARA : Then I must look into it a little more. Do I understand that sixteen of them received acting-warrant rank ?

MR. HOHLER : Sixteen of them are now acting as officers, but have received no commissions, while a number of young fellows from public schools have been placed over their heads.

DR. MACNAMARA : They got acting-warrant rank, but other people have got commissions. Is that your point ?

MR. HOHLER : Yes.

DR. MACNAMARA : It is quite impossible that I should be familiar with the whole of the details of the administration, but if there is anything in the contention of the hon. and learned gentleman I will look into it. My attention was called also to another point raised by the hon. and learned gentleman, as to the status of quartermaster-sergeants, Royal Marines, discharged to pension—Royal Fleet Reservists. The suggestion is that in the pamphlet we undertook that they should return to a certain rank, and that as an actual fact we broke faith ?

MR. HOHLER : Yes.

DR. MACNAMARA : I do not know whether the hon. and learned gentleman has looked into the pamphlet ?

MR. HOHLER : I have, and I will send the right hon. gentleman a copy of it with pleasure.

DR. MACNAMARA : Then I will send the copy back with my comments. I think that the hon. gentleman will find this, that Royal Fleet Reservists, according to the pamphlet, have to be paid according to the rank in which they are enrolled. But all who are enrolled above the rank of colour-sergeant will be enrolled as colour-sergeants. That is the

meaning of the pamphlet. However, when so clear-minded an hon. member misreads it, I can well understand other persons, quartermaster-sergeants themselves, misreading it. The point is that all who join above the rank of colour-sergeant are enrolled as colour-sergeants. However, that matter is receiving our consideration with a view to seeing whether there is any injustice being done in enrolling quarter-master-sergeants as colour-sergeants. Then I was asked by the hon. member for East Wilts (Mr. Peto) to consider the question of the pay of the Royal Naval Reserve officers. I do not suppose that he expects me here and now to give any undertaking upon this matter or to raise hopes that may not be fulfilled. I will look into the matter. Then with regard to life insurance policies, I gave an answer the other day,[1] and said that the Government were considering the question of making representations upon the subject. I have not lost sight of that. The hon. member asked whether officers in the Royal Naval Reserve or the Royal Volunteer Naval Reserve should not be given some distinction in order that they might exercise greater authority over their crews. I do not know whether that was the sole reason. If that was the sole reason, I pointed out the other day that it would have no effect, because these crews were not under the Naval Discipline Act.

[1] [*See* p. 226.]

MR. PETO: I ask that considering the nature of their service they should be put under the Naval Discipline Act.

MR. MACNAMARA: I cannot give an undertaking as to that. I would merely point out that a badge or uniform or commission would not give them any greater authority, because the crews are not under the Naval Discipline Act. I understand that the hon. gentleman thinks that they should be. I cannot undertake to do more than consider the matter, and neither can I do more than consider the proposition that there should be a war bonus paid. All these points I have taken down for consideration. The hon. member for South-East Lancs. (Mr. Tyson Wilson) raised a point as to a number of joiners being discharged at Portsmouth, and suggested that the work had been done by others at lower rates, so low apparently that he seemed to think that it was worth our while to give them a subsistence allowance of 20s. a week. I shall be very glad if the hon. gentleman will give me particulars about this. I imagine that it is the old question of

demarcation of work between the joiner and the skilled labourer. I imagine that the skilled labourers are being asked to do rough joinery—the knocking together of crates and so forth, which is common in the dockyard organisation.

MR. FALLE: Is the right hon. gentleman aware that joiners are being discharged at the present moment?

DR. MACNAMARA: I can say that we do not want any real tradesman's work to be done by other persons than tradesmen. When it comes to the rough work of joinery and so forth, it can be done by the skilled labourer, and I rather imagine that that's the sort of thing which my hon. friend has in mind, though I doubt very much whether we should be paying a subsistence allowance of 20s. a week to a number of skilled labourers brought from a distance, and certainly I do not think that it can be correct to say that we deliberately brought skilled labourers from a distance and paid them 20s. a week in order to turn them on to rough work. And for this reason, that it would be financially unsound. The skilled labourer doing joinery might be getting from 24s. to 28s. a week, and the 20s. subsistence allowance would bring the total amount paid up to from 44s. to 48s. per week; whereas the joiners who would be dismissed to make room for the men brought from a distance would certainly get nothing like that. I forget for the moment the rate for the joiners. It is certainly not from 44s. to 48s. So, if the suggestion is that we send joiners away and bring skilled labourers from a distance and pay them a subsistence allowance, that would be an unsound operation from the financial point of view, because we should have to add the skilled labourer's wage to the 20s. a week, which would bring the total amount above what would be paid to the joiners. My hon. friend referred to our putting trawlers in private yards for repair work, and seemed to think that more of that work should come to the Royal dockyards. The same thing was said about contract work which is put out. There, again, the exigencies of the Service must control our policy. If there should be a trawler, or maybe some other craft, near some port or other where it might be difficult to get it down to one of the Royal yards, and she is put into a private yard, the mere fact that there was a desire to put her into a Royal yard would not justify a long journey, and perhaps a dangerous

journey, to get her into Chatham or Portsmouth. I do not think that either of the hon. members who represent those districts would make that claim. I am familiar with the contention as to the Royal Marine pensioned officers when called up for service. I am familiar with the contrast made between their treatment and that of the pensioned Army officer, and even the pensioned Navy officer. Again I regret greatly that I cannot undertake to do more than continue to consider their case. I cannot give any undertaking that we shall be able to make any change. I am familiar also with the case of the apprentice who has only got a week or two to close his apprenticeship when he joins the colours and who then receives his civil pay as an apprentice, minus 7s. a week, his soldier's pay. If he had joined five days later in the case stated, or some weeks later in cases which have come to my knowledge, he would be rated as a man, and he would get his pay as a civilian at a man's rate, and the difference between that and the 7s. would be a great deal more than the difference between his pay as an apprentice and the 7s. I do not deny that that is a rather hard case, but the hon. member for Portsmouth will realise that there will be all sorts of cases of a similar kind in the Civil Service where men are on the verge of promotion, and would have had promotion if they had stayed on in their office for some time longer, and he will see, on reflection, that he raises a much bigger question than he imagines.

MR. FALLE: These men should not be penalised because they happened to go and serve their country.

DR. MACNAMARA: The hon. gentleman is raising a larger question than he imagines, though the case he quotes, I admit, is a hard one. However, it does not lie in my hands. He will recognise that there are other Departments concerned in this, but I will take note of the representations which he makes. With regard to ships' stewards, I have noted very carefully the point which he raises; and with regard to the separation allowance for warrant officers, the White Paper provides a separation allowance for the warrant officers, Marine, and for chief petty officers, and equivalent ratings. I understand that the hon. gentleman asks separation allowances for commissioned warrant and warrant officers in the Royal Navy, and Royal Marine gunners. But

again I say I cannot give any undertaking. With regard to free passes, the hon. member for Chatham said that we have shown a considerable amount of generosity in the treatment of that matter, and he suggested that we should still further extend our system of giving free passes. I took a note of the case which he mentioned about a boy paying 18s. 6d., though his pay was much smaller than that. That is again a matter which is not entirely in our hands. There are three Departments concerned—the War Office, the Admiralty, and the Treasury. All I can do is to consider carefully the representations which have been made. Then there was the question of the export of wire, which was referred to by the hon. member for Everton (Sir J. Harmood-Banner). I will look into that, although it had not been brought to my notice until he mentioned it. I am not quite sure that we are the only Department responsible for that, though I am sure that those who have made the prohibition are well advised. I think that I might now ask the Committee to give us the Vote.

MR. DUNCAN MILLAR: May I ask if any further assistance is to be rendered to the fishermen?

DR. MACNAMARA: In regard to that matter we have very largely satisfied what is known as the Admiralty List, and we are very much in touch with the Local Government Board and the Board of Trade to ascertain where unemployment and hardship are likely to arise, so that we may act as effectively as possible. It is said that these fishermen have lost their employment and that, as they have had good training, something might be done to give them employment. I am not sure that something has not already been done in that direction to some small extent, but at any rate I will consider whether anything can be done.

MR. PETO: Will the right hon. gentleman answer one question, whether the rise given to lieutenants in the Navy applies also to lieutenants with temporary commissions who are now serving. There is also the case of lieutenants who are serving on mine-sweepers.

DR. MACNAMARA: The question of pay is a very complicated one, and perhaps the hon. gentleman will put a question on the paper.

Question put, and agreed to.

DEATH OF THE *BLÜCHER'S* CAPTAIN

The death of Captain Erdmann, of the German cruiser *Blücher*, which was sunk in the action off the Dogger Bank, occurred yesterday at Edinburgh Castle Military Hospital. Captain Erdmann was on January 25, the day after the battle, taken to Edinburgh as a prisoner of war, and fell ill shortly afterwards. The exposure to which he was subject on his ship had affected his health, and he developed pneumonia, from which he died. Captain Erdmann was one of the best authorities in the German Navy on naval gunnery, and had, since January 1913, been president of the German experimental gunnery staff. *Times*, Feb. 17, 1915.

The funeral, with military honours, took place yesterday from the Military Hospital at Edinburgh Castle, of Alexander Karl Erdmann, captain of the German cruiser *Blücher*, which was sunk in the North Sea battle. *Times*, Feb. 19, 1915.

The coffin, over which was laid the German flag, was carried on a gun-carriage drawn by six horses. There was a firing party of forty men of the 4th Royal Scots, and another party of fifty men of the same regiment followed. Behind the gun-carriage were two naval officers. As the procession left the Castle the pipers played 'The Land of the Leal.' Crowds of people lined the route to Newington Cemetery, where the burial took place. The service at the grave was Lutheran, and was conducted by the German pastor in Edinburgh.

FURTHER AIR RAIDS ON THE BELGIAN COAST

Admiralty, February 16:

The Air operations of the Naval Wing against the Bruges-Ostend-Zeebrugge District have been continued. *Times*, Feb. 17, 1915.

This afternoon forty aeroplanes and seaplanes bombarded Ostend, Middelkerke, Ghistelles, and Zeebrugge.

Bombs were dropped on the heavy batteries situated on the east and west sides of Ostend Harbour; on the gun positions at Middelkerke; on transport wagons on the Ostend-Ghistelles road; on the Mole at Zeebrugge, to widen the breach damaged in former attacks; on the locks at

Zeebrugge; on barges outside Blankenberghe; and on trawlers outside Zeebrugge.

Eight French aeroplanes assisted the naval machines by making a vigorous attack on the Ghistelles aerodrome, thus effectively preventing the German aircraft from cutting off our machines.

It is reported that good results were obtained.

Instructions are always issued to confine the attacks to points of military importance, and every effort is made by the flying officers to avoid dropping bombs on any residential portion of the towns.

Times, Feb. 25, 1915.

The Secretary of the Admiralty regrets to announce that in the recent naval air attacks on the Ostend-Zeebrugge-Bruges districts four flying officers were reported to be missing.

One of these officers—Flight-Lieutenant D. Murray—has since reported himself from Flushing. Lieutenant Murray was compelled to alight in the open sea, and was eventually picked up by a Dutch torpedo-boat.

The three other officers reported missing are Flight-Lieutenant E. G. Rigall, Flight-Lieutenant the Hon. D. O'Brien, and Flight-Sub-Lieutenant T. Spencer, and it is regretted that no further news has been obtained of them.

Paris, March 5.

An official statement issued here says:—

The daily *communiqués* described the bombardment of the German positions on the Belgian coast carried out by French aircraft about February 20. Dutch newspapers to-day state that these operations achieved the following results:—

1. At Zeebrugge, parts of the Gare Maritime were destroyed and submarines were damaged.

2. Thirty-three German soldiers were killed and fifty-two wounded by a bomb which fell on a train near Blankenberghe.

3. Several batteries along the coast suffered and many members of the gun crews were killed.

4. At Knocke, a German officer and seven men were killed. No civilian was hurt, and no damage was done to buildings.—*Reuter.*

ADMIRAL BEHNCKE ON THE NAVAL SITUATION

Berlin, February 16, 1915.

Admiral Behncke, of the Marine Department, has made a statement to Lieutenant-Commander Walter R. Gherardi, Naval Attaché of the American Embassy at Berlin, which is given out officially as the best exposition of the situation with respect to Germany's declaration of the waters round the British Isles as a war-zone. Admiral Behncke's statement follows :— *New York Times*, Feb. 17, 1915.

'Up to the present time Germany in the war at sea has followed the London Declaration. Great Britain has not followed such Declaration, nor the stipulations of the Paris Treaty, whereon the conduct of war on the sea was based before the London Declaration. In waging this commercial war Great Britain had in view the subjugation of Germany by starvation. Germany has in every way sought to call the attention of the neutral Powers and all others to the necessity that she is under to obtain food for her civil population, which is her right under the laws of war.

'No results could be obtained from her efforts. Since the shutting off of food has now come to a point where Germany no longer has sufficient food to feed her people, it has become necessary for her to bring Great Britain to terms by the exercise of force. Germany knows that by the use of submarines Great Britain can be placed in a position where food will be lacking. Germany has the submarine force to do it. Her life as a nation and the lives of her people depend upon putting this campaign into action, and she must do so. Difficulties lying in the way of this campaign have been largely connected with the care which it is desired to bestow on neutral ships and the lives on board all commercial ships, whether neutral or enemies.

'First, in arming her merchantmen with guns for self-defence Great Britain has adopted a policy against which Germans have strongly protested. The United States took the British point of view. It is impossible for German submarines to approach British merchantmen and make examinations without exposing themselves to gunfire or bomb attack, against which a submarine boat would be helpless.

'Secondly, Great Britain has advised her merchant fleet

to fly neutral flags; to cover the names, and to alter funnels and painting so as to escape the consequences of their nationality (here Admiral Behncke produced a copy of an English wireless message sent broadcast to ships to this effect). This plan was designed to bring Germany into conflict with other nations. Germany does not wish in the slightest degree to harm American or other neutral ships or cargoes unless carrying contraband. She is, however, in the position where her life depends upon putting into effect the only means she has of saving herself. She must, and will, use this means. Commanding officers of submarines have been given orders to make every effort to safeguard neutrals. In spite of the precautions which a submarine might take without risking her own destruction, it is possible that neutral ships may be destroyed through error or accident. For this reason a strong warning has been issued. In addition, the British coast is mined by the British themselves for protective reasons, and will be mined by Germans as an act of offensive warfare. Ships are therefore in danger from mines.

'In spite of the great effect that the Admiralty feels that the use of submarines will have in bringing the war to a rapid close, they do not wish to put it into effect to the detriment of neutral commerce and the rights of nations on the high seas. They have, therefore, stated that if Great Britain will abide by the Declaration of London without modification or by the Treaty of Paris, whereby food supplies necessary for the civil population can be freely brought into Germany, the whole matter of a submarine blockade will be dropped by Germany. This proposal has been transmitted through diplomatic channels, and, if accepted, the matter is no longer one provocative of trouble between America and Germany.'

Admiral Behncke called Commander Gherardi's attention to the fact that Great Britain when, by her proclamation, she closed the North Sea, did not give free passage to American ships bound for the neutral country of Holland, but compelled the ships to pass through certain channels, take an English pilot aboard, and undergo a search for contraband of war at the hands of officers of British warships.

Admiral Behncke then said Germany was prepared to

suggest to the United States an even freer and safer method for American ships bound either through the Channel or to English ports—namely, that several American warships should wait in some port on the south-west coast of Ireland, and when communicated with by wireless by an American merchantman, one of them should proceed to the place indicated and convoy the merchantman through that portion of the sea which Germany, following the example of Great Britain, had declared to be dangerous.

'Of course,' said the Admiral, 'ships under convoy, by the rules of international law, are not subject to search, but the country to which they belong is upon its honour, as it were, to see that they do not carry contraband.

'American warships have distinctive masts and are well known to the officers of the German Navy, and either by night or day they and the vessels under their convoy would be respected by German submarines.

'This is a safe method to follow for American ships which desire to enter those portions of the seas proclaimed dangerous by Germany, and differs only from the rule adopted by Great Britain with reference to American ships passing through the Channel in that American ships, instead of being compelled to enter a British port, take a British pilot, and be searched by officers of a British warship, would be permitted to pass unmolested to their destination without being subjected to search, the Imperial German Government being willing, of course, to accept the implied word of honour of the United States that the ships carry no contraband of war.'

[For the text of this interview we are indebted to the courtesy of the *New York Times*.]

SUPPOSED FOREIGN SPIES

The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement :— *Times*, Feb. 17, 1915.

'Information has been received that two persons, posing as an officer and sergeant, and dressed in khaki, are going about the country attempting to visit military works, etc.

'They were last seen in the Midlands on the 6th inst., when they effected an entry into the works of a firm who are doing engineers' work for the Admiralty. They made

certain inquiries as to the presence or otherwise of anti-aircraft guns, which makes it probable that they are foreign agents in disguise.

'All contractors engaged on work for His Majesty's Navy are hereby notified with a view to the apprehension of these individuals, and are advised that no persons should be admitted to their works unless notice has been received beforehand of their coming.'

LOSS OF TWO GERMAN AIRSHIPS

K.D., Feb. 17, 1915.

We are informed that the airship 'L 3,' whilst on a reconnoitring trip, went down owing to motor damage in a southerly gale on the Island Fanö on the west coast of Jutland. The airship was lost, but the whole crew was saved. We are also informed that during the violent southerly gale to which the 'L 3' fell a victim on February 17, the airship 'L 4' was also lost. She went ashore owing to damage to her motors, near Blaavands-Huk in Denmark, and was eventually driven out to sea. Eleven men of the crew are saved including the commander; four are missing. The rescued men are provisionally being taken care of at Varde.

BRITISH COLLIER BLOWN UP

Times, Feb. 17, 1915.

The Admiralty have received information from the French Government that the British collier *Dulwich* has been blown up six miles north of Cape Antifer. Twenty-two men out of a crew of thirty-one were saved by the French cruiser *Arquebus*. [See p. 406.]

ROYAL MARINE OFFICERS

House of Commons, February 17, 1915.

Hansard.

LORD C. BERESFORD asked how many general officers and other senior officers of the Royal Marine forces are at present retired whose age and physique would allow of their employment; and whether the Board of Admiralty can see their way to recommend the employment of some of these officers in the New Army?

DR. MACNAMARA: There are twenty-eight general officers, Royal Marines, retired. I have taken the noble Lord's

definition 'other senior officers' to cover the cases of colonels and lieutenant-colonels retired. Of these officers there are twenty-one on the retired list. I should imagine that few of the forty-nine retired officers in question are now available by age and physique for active service. There are thirteen Royal Marine general officers and four officers on the Reserve List of Colonels, Royal Marines, of whom fifteen were unemployed at the outbreak of hostilities. Since that date two of these officers have been given appointments.

CARGO SHIPS (SHORTAGE)

MR. PETO asked the Prime Minister what proportion of *ibid.* the steamships waiting their turn to discharge cargo at Genoa are on the British register and are carrying cargo from foreign countries; and, in view of the shortage of ships for carrying foodstuffs to Great Britain and cargo for British industries, if he will take steps to regulate the supply of shipping so that British needs may have the first call of British ships?

MR. RUNCIMAN: My right hon. friend has asked me to reply to this question. I understand that nineteen British ships, all carrying cargo from foreign countries, are awaiting their turn to discharge at Genoa. As regards the latter part of the question I cannot say more than that steps are being taken to add to the amount of tonnage available for the trade of the United Kingdom by the utilisation of prize ships and detained ships, and by dealing with congestion at ports.

COAL TRANSPORT

MR. GRANT asked the President of the Board of Trade *ibid.* whether, in view of the shortage of tonnage for the transport of coal from the Whitehaven area, and to the consequent distress thereby threatened, he can entertain a proposal for the use of interned German cargo boats for such purpose?

MR. RUNCIMAN: All the available enemy steamers detained in the United Kingdom are being used at the present time for the purpose of bringing coal to London. Inquiries have been set on foot as to enemy sailing ships which may be made available for the needs of Whitehaven.

TRANSPORT, COALING, AND MINE-SWEEPING OPERATIONS

House of Commons, February 17, 1915.

Hansard. MR. PETO asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he has obtained the services of all the officers of the merchant service that he requires for transport, coaling, and mine-sweeping operations in connection with the work of the naval and military forces of the Crown?

DR. MACNAMARA: Yes, sir; I should like to take this opportunity of expressing the appreciation of the Admiralty of the valuable services which these officers are rendering to the country.

MR. PETO asked the Prime Minister out of what funds he intends to compensate sufferers through the bombardment of East Coast towns; and whether out of the same funds he will grant compensation to those captains, officers, and crews of merchant ships who through the operations of the war suffer in a similar way by the loss of the necessary effects and nautical instruments which they carry with them?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: My right hon. friend has asked me to answer this question. Relief for damage caused by the raids which have already taken place will be given from Imperial funds. With regard to the latter part of the question, I would refer the hon. member to the answer[1] given by my right hon. friend the President of the Board of Trade to the noble Lord the member for Portsmouth on the 11th instant.

[1] [*See* p. 234.]

PRIZES OF WAR

ibid. MR. FELL asked if the steamship *Apolda*, 4930 tons, the steamship *Hamm*, 4598 tons, and the steamship *Birkenfels*, 5639 tons, were captured by British cruisers as prizes of war in August, and taken to Capetown; if these prizes, with their cargoes, are still at Capetown; if steps will be taken to at once utilise the cargoes and use the ships, and what is the reason for the delay which has taken place in the matter?

DR. MACNAMARA: The vessels referred to are still at the Cape. I understand that the Overseas Prize Disposal Committee have been using every endeavour to send the cargoes on to Australia, but that many serious difficulties have been

encountered. As regard the *Birkenfels*, I am informed that an agreement for the navigation of the ship to Australia is on the point of conclusion. In the case of the *Hamm* and *Apolda*, which are not prizes, but detained ships, it is hoped that it will be possible to make an arrangement at no distant date. There are difficulties in their case which were not present in the case of the *Birkenfels*. It was necessary to get into touch with a very large number of consignees before any steps could be taken to make any arrangements for completing the journey. I may say that the proportion of enemy cargoes in these vessels is small.

MR. FELL: Cannot the Government do something to expedite cases like these? There are three very valuable ships, and their cargoes, which have been for more than three months absolutely wasted?

DR. MACNAMARA: I have endeavoured to show the serious difficulties that have been encountered.

ADMIRALTY TRANSPORTS (RATES OF PAYMENT)

House of Commons, February 18, 1915.

MR. ANDERSON asked the First Lord of the Admiralty *ibid.* whether certain shipowners whose ships are in the employ of the Admiralty Transport Department have recently held a meeting to demand increased rates for the hire of those ships; whether he is aware that Lord Inchcape, the chairman of the Arbitration Committee, in delivering his award determining the rates of payment, said that he trusted that the shipowners would not look upon the rates as a minimum on which increases might be built; whether any and all additional working expenses are to be charged to the Government by specified prearrangement; and whether the shipowners mentioned are basing their demands for advances, ranging from 25 per cent. to 40 per cent., upon the claim that others are doing much better in the open market?

DR. MACNAMARA: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. Lord Inchcape was chairman of certain sub-committees of the Arbitration Board, which, on 22nd October last, reported to Lord Mersey, President of the Admiralty Transport Board of Arbitration, for his information and advice, the basis, general scale, or rate at

which payment to owners of ships requisitioned for Government service should be assessed. In forwarding these recommendations of the sub-committees to the President, Lord Inchcape made the statement referred to. The sub-committees recommended that the owners should be indemnified against any extraordinary out-of-pocket expenses arising out of the requisition. The rates suggested to us on 22nd October as equitable by Lord Inchcape's sub-committee have been agreed to by the shipowners for the period from the date of requisition down to 31st December last. Many, indeed, have agreed to the rates in question for the whole period of chartering, however long. But it is the fact that a very large section of the shipowners are asking higher rates to meet altered circumstances since 1st January. The whole matter of these requests is at this moment the subject of careful consideration by the Board.

INTERNMENT SHIPS

House of Commons, February 18, 1915.

Hansard. SIR HAROLD ELVERSTON asked how much per ton is being paid for the hire of the old ships on which aliens are now being interned; and what is the approximate amount paid per month for the hire of these ships?

MR. BAKER: The vessels, which are not correctly described as old, were requisitioned, not hired. The rate of payment ranges from 15s. 6d. to 17s. 6d. per ton per month, with a reduction of 6d. per ton per month after two months. The approximate monthly payment for the first two months was £86,000, afterwards £83,000.

NAVAL BRIGADE, CRYSTAL PALACE (DEATHS FROM MENINGITIS)

ibid. MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he has had any recent report on the health of the naval troops at the Crystal Palace, and whether there have been any deaths from meningitis?

MR. RONALD M'NEILL asked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many men of the Naval Division are in training at the Crystal Palace; how many medical men are there

available for attendance upon them; and how many cases there are among the men there in training?

DR. MACNAMARA: There are at present 6578 officers and men victualled at the Crystal Palace. Fourteen medical officers are attached. There were on Tuesday 184 men on the sick list. As regards cerebro-spinal meningitis, there have been fifteen cases up to date, the first case occurring on 16th January. I regret to say that eight of the cases have proved fatal. Every declared case has, of course, been transferred to an infectious hospital, and contacts have been removed for purposes of observation to another naval hospital, where, of course, they are carefully isolated. A special medical officer with expert knowledge of the disease has been appointed to the Division at the Palace, to devote himself solely to dealing with the matter. Further, a special bacteriologist has been attached for the purpose of elucidating the origin of the disease in this case. Apart from cerebro-spinal cases, the general health at the Palace is very good. The average number on the sick list is about 2 per cent.

MIDSHIPMEN (ROYAL NAVY)

MR. SHIRLEY BENN asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the increased rates of pay of certain grades of junior officers in the Navy will apply to officers of the Royal Naval Reserve, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, and to other officers at present in the Admiralty service not entered on the regular staff of the Navy; and whether he will consider the desirability of improving the financial position of midshipmen serving in the Navy? *ibid.*

DR. MACNAMARA: The increased rates of pay of certain grades of junior officers recently introduced apply to officers of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, whether permanent or entered temporarily for the war. I am afraid that I can give no undertaking as regards the second part of the question, but I may remind the hon. member that, as I stated in reply to the hon. member for Cambridge on the 15th instant,[1] where real necessity exists the Board of Admiralty is prepared to give favourable consideration to applications for whole or partial relief in respect of the private allowance payable on behalf of midshipmen.

[1] [*See* p. 240.]

NAVY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1914-15

House of Commons, February 18, 1915.

Hansard. Motion made, and question proposed, 'That an additional number, not exceeding 32,000 officers, seamen, and boys, be employed for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1915; beyond the number already voted for the year.'

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA): I ought shortly to explain why this Supplementary Estimate is necessary. In the first Estimates for the year 1914-15 we took power to work up to a maximum of 151,000 active service ratings in Vote A. On mobilisation we turned over all the Reserves to Vote A—Royal Fleet Reserves, Royal Naval Reserves, and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserves. On the 5th August we came for a Supplementary Estimate of 67,000 men, very largely due to the fact that on mobilisation we turned the Reserves over to Vote A. Recruitment has still gone on, and will go on to the 31st March. I am speaking now of the present financial year. It will no doubt go on after that. In order that we may not have more men on Vote A than Parliament has granted, we now ask to include 32,000 more, making the total for the year 250,000. I should explain that we do not need a Supplementary Vote for the pay, as we took £8,800,000 in the 1914-15 Estimates, and any excess beyond that we shall be able to finance out of the Vote of Credit.

(Question put, and agreed to.)

WAR RISKS AT SEA

Times, Feb. 18, 1915. The Board of Trade announce that arrangements have been completed under which compensation will be payable in the case of all persons employed in any capacity on board British merchant ships who may be injured owing to hostilities. A special scheme has been brought into operation to provide for cases which are not already covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. The arrangement also applies to fishing vessels insured under the Government scheme.

The Government scheme for insuring British fishing vessels against war risks, which was started in August last by the Board of Trade in co-operation with the British Fishing

Vessels War Risks Insurance Association, is being continued for a further period of three months at a reduced rate of premium. The scheme has proved very successful in enabling fishing vessels to continue to ply their industry, thus maintaining a supply of fish, keeping fishermen in occupation, and assisting the trades which are connected with the fishing industry.

NAVAL BENEFITS FOR MERCHANT SEAMEN

The President of the Board of Trade makes the following announcement :— *Times*, Feb. 19, 1915.

'Under the War Risks scheme the Government have decided to extend to such British crews of British merchant vessels as may lose life or limb owing to attacks by an enemy warship, submarine, or aircraft the same scale of benefits as would be payable to the men or dependants of men of similar rank in the Royal Navy.

'This will take the place of the lesser payments receivable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, for the amounts of which the shipowners will continue to be liable, the additional sums necessary to provide the naval scale of benefits for merchant seamen being provided from the War Risks Insurance Fund.

FIRST NEUTRAL VICTIM OF SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN

The Secretary of the Admiralty last night made the following announcement :— *Times*, Feb. 20, 1915.

The Rear-Admiral at Dover reports that the Norwegian tank ship *Belridge* was struck by the torpedo of a German submarine to-day near Folkestone. Pieces of the torpedo have been found on board the ship. The *Belridge* was a neutral ship proceeding from New Orleans to Amsterdam.

THE *CAMBANK* TORPEDOED

Liverpool.—The steamer *Cambank* on passage from Cardiff to Liverpool was torpedoed without warning by a German submarine off the coast of Anglesey. Three of the crew were killed by the explosion, two, who jumped overboard, were drowned. The rest of the crew were rescued. *K.V.*, Feb. 20, 1915.

GERMAN SUBMARINES IN THE CHANNEL

C.O., Feb. 20, 1915.

On the evening of 15th February, off Cape d'Antifer, a German submarine torpedoed without previous warning the English collier *Dulwich*, which was on passage from Hull to Rouen. The vessel foundered quickly, but the crew, thirty-one in number, were able to lower their boats and embark in them. The destroyer *Arquebus* which was cruising in the neighbourhood, picked up twenty-two men shortly afterwards. [See p. 398.] A boat containing seven other men put in at Fécamp.

On the 16th at 1.30 A.M. the French steamer *Ville de Lille*, on passage from Cherbourg to Dunkirk sighted the German submarine U 16 to the northward of the Barfleur light. She attempted to escape, but her speed was insufficient. The submarine overtook and sank her by means of bombs placed in the hold, after giving the crew ten minutes to save themselves in the two boats she carried.

The submarine next approached a Norwegian steamer with similar intent, but she withdrew to the eastward, dived, and disappeared, on the arrival of the Cherbourg division of torpedo craft.

At 2 A.M. on 18th February, a German submarine, probably the U 16, torpedoed the steamer *Dinorah* off Dieppe. As the watertight bulkheads held, the vessel did not founder and was able to reach Dieppe. The *Dinorah* is an Austrian steamer captured at the outset of the war and since in French employ.

BRITISH STEAMERS SUNK BY GERMANS

Belfast.

K.V., Feb. 22, 1915.

On Saturday afternoon towards five o'clock a German submarine held up an English collier in the Irish Sea. It allowed the crew five minutes' time to get into the boats and then sank the vessel.—*Reuter.*

Buenos Ayres.

K.V., Feb. 22, 1915.

The German steamer *Holger* arrived yesterday with passengers and crews of the English steamers *Highlandbrae*

(7600 tons), *Potaro* (4400 tons), *Hemisphere* (3500 tons), *Semantha* (2850 tons), and the sailing ship *Wilfrid*, all of which were sunk by the German auxiliary cruiser *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. The *Holger* was unable to leave within twenty-four hours, and was interned.—*Reuter.*

ATTACK ON THE DARDANELLES

Admiralty, February 20.

Yesterday morning at 8 A.M. a British fleet of battleships and battle cruisers, accompanied by flotillas, and aided by a strong French squadron, the whole under the command of Vice-Admiral Sackville H. Carden, began an attack upon the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles. *Times*, Feb. 22, 1915.

The forts at Cape Helles and Kum Kale were bombarded with deliberate long-range fire. Considerable effect was produced on two of the forts. Two others were frequently hit, but, being open earthworks, it was difficult to estimate the damage. The forts, being outranged, were not able to reply to fire.

At 2.45 P.M. a portion of the battleship force was ordered to close and engage the forts at closer range with secondary armament. The forts at both sides of the entrance then opened fire, and were engaged at moderate ranges by *Vengeance, Cornwallis, Triumph, Suffren, Gaulois, Bouvet*, supported by *Inflexible* and *Agamemnon* at long range. The forts on the European side were apparently silenced. One fort on the Asiatic side was still firing when the operation was suspended owing to failing light.

No ships of the Allied Fleet were hit. The action has been renewed this morning after aerial reconnaissance. His Majesty's aeroplane ship *Ark Royal* is in attendance with a number of aeroplanes and seaplanes of the Naval Wing.

Constantinople, February 19.

Headquarters reports that early this morning British and French warships bombarded the outer forts of the Dardanelles, firing some four hundred shots without achieving any result. One soldier was slightly wounded in the leg by stone splinters. *K.D.*

Constantinople, February 20.

K.D. Headquarters states that eight armoured ships bombarded the outer forts for seven hours without silencing them. The enemy fired six hundred shots from great calibre and 15-centimetre guns. Three hostile armoured ships were damaged, one flagship heavily. On the Turkish side one man was killed and another slightly wounded.

Times, Feb. 24, 1915. The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement :—

Unfavourable weather with low visibility and a strong south-westerly gale has interrupted the operations at the Dardanelles.

The outer forts were seriously damaged by the bombardment of the 19th.

Times, Feb. 26, 1915. The Secretary to the Admiralty makes the following statement :—

The weather moderating, the bombardment of the outer forts of the Dardanelles was renewed at 8 A.M. this morning (February 25). After a period of long-range fire a squadron of battleships attacked at close range. All the forts at the entrance of the Straits have been successfully reduced. The operations are continuing.

Admiralty, February 27.

Times, Mar. 1, 1915. The entrance to the Dardanelles was guarded by four principal forts, namely, Cape Helles Battery, Fort Sedd-el-Bahr, Fort Orkhanieh Tabia, and Fort Kum Kalessi Tabia, which will be described for convenience as A, B, C, and D.

These forts are armed as follows : A, two 9.2-inch guns ; B, six 10.2-inch ; C, two 9.2-inch ; and D, four 10.2-inch and two 5.9-inch.

The weather having improved, although the wind was still from the south-west, the attack on the above forts was resumed on Thursday morning (February 25) at 10 A.M. The *Queen Elizabeth, Agamemnon, Irresistible,* and *Gaulois* began by deliberately bombarding Forts A, B, C, and D,

respectively, at long range. Fort A replied, and one shell at 11,000 yards hit the *Agamemnon*, killing three men and seriously wounding five.

The *Irresistible* and the *Gaulois* made excellent practice on Forts C and D, while the *Queen Elizabeth* concentrated with great accuracy on Fort A, putting both of its guns out of action by about 11.30 A.M. The *Vengeance* and *Cornwallis* then ran in under cover of long-range fire and engaged Fort A at close range. The reduction of Fort A was completed, while Forts C and D opened a very slow, inaccurate fire.

The *Suffren* and the *Charlemagne* next delivered an attack on Forts C and D, advancing to within 2000 yards of them. It was then seen that they were in no condition to offer effective resistance. The *Vengeance*, *Triumph*, and *Albion* were then ordered in to complete the reduction of the forts. All four were reduced by 5.15 P.M.

Sweeping operations, covered by a division of battleships and destroyers, were immediately begun. The enemy set fire to the village at the entrance as darkness fell.

A report has also been received of the operations on the 26th. The Straits have now been swept up to four miles from the entrance. The *Albion* and *Majestic*, supported by the *Vengeance*, proceeded to the limit of the swept area and began an attack on Fort Dardanus (E) (four 5.9-inch guns), and some new batteries which have been erected on the Asiatic shore. Fire in reply was ineffective.

After being shelled from inside the Straits, the enemy retired from the forts at the entrance, and during the afternoon demolishing parties were landed at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr from the *Vengeance* and the *Irresistible*. Forts A, B, and C, were then completely, and Fort D partially, demolished. The enemy encountered in Kum Kale were driven out over Mendere Bridge, which was partially destroyed. Two new 4-inch guns concealed near Tomb of Achilles were also destroyed. Four Nordenfelts covering the entrance were destroyed.

Our casualties on the 26th were one killed and three wounded.

The operations are proceeding.

Paris, February 26.

The bombardment of the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles was resumed yesterday at long range at eight o'clock in the morning. This was followed by a cannonade at shorter range. Four forts, one of which was completely manned by Germans, were totally destroyed.

Mine-sweeping in the straits has been begun under the protection of battleships and cruisers of the combined fleets.—*Reuter.*

Constantinople, February 26.

K.V., Feb. 26, 1915. Headquarters reports as follows :—

Ten large armoured ships began a bombardment of the forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles yesterday at ten o'clock in the morning.

The firing lasted until half-past five in the afternoon, when the ships retired in the direction of Tenedos. According to observations made, a hostile ship of the *Agamemnon* type and two other armoured ships were damaged by the fire of the forts on the Anatolian coast.

Paris, February 27.

Times, Mar. 1, 1915. It is officially announced that the *Suffren*, the *Gaulois*, and the *Charlemagne* played a very active part last Thursday (February 25) in the destruction of the forts at the mouth of the Dardanelles. While three British battleships opened a slow and methodical fire on the three forts Cape Helles, Sedd-el-Bahr, and Orkhanieh, the *Gaulois* took as its target the great fort of Kum Kale, which defended the entrance to the straits on the Asiatic side.

The firing of the *Gaulois* was of remarkable precision. When this slow and methodical fire had brought about the expected results, the other battleships fired at a closer range to complete the destruction of the enemy's batteries. The *Suffren* and *Charlemagne* thus approached to less than two kilometres from the forts of Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale, which were only able to fire a few shots without effect. The forts were effectively reduced at 5.15 P.M. Our three battleships sustained no damage.

Constantinople, February 27.

Last Wednesday hostile ships bombarded the outer forts of the Dardanelles with heavy guns for seven hours, causing damage at some points. Notwithstanding the bombardment our casualties were only five killed and fourteen wounded. The enemy fleet continued the bombardment to-day, but in the afternoon they retreated out of the range of our batteries at Sedd-el-Bahr. *Times*, Mar. 1, 1915.

Amsterdam, February 28.

The Headquarters Staff announces that the enemy's fleet has shelled at great intervals the fort of Sedd-el-Bahr at the entrance to the Dardanelles. *Times*, Mar. 1, 1915.

CUNARD STEAMSHIP COMPANY.

House of Commons, February 22, 1915.

MR. LOUGH asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the Admiralty have taken the various steps contemplated in the agreement with the Cunard Steamship Company entered into in 1903-4; whether the two ships built under the agreement, or other ships of the company, have been utilised as contemplated in the agreement; and whether the rates of remuneration paid to the Cunard Company for services rendered during the war, as compared with that paid to other steamship companies, have been sufficiently favourable to recoup the Government for the total annual expenses incurred under the agreement? *Hansard.*

DR. MACNAMARA: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the second part of the question, the *Lusitania* and *Mauretania* have not been used as armed merchant cruisers, but other vessels of the Cunard fleet have been so used under the provisions of the agreement, one of the vessels being the *Carmania*, which achieved success in action with the *Cap Trafalgar*. As regards the last part of the question, the rates of remuneration paid to the Cunard Company for the services of their steamers as armed merchant cruisers during the war are less than

those conceded to other owners of the same class of ship, but the question whether the saving so made is sufficient to recoup the Government for the annual outlay under the agreement must be considered in conjunction with the other advantages to secure which Parliament sanctioned the subvention; and can hardly be discussed within the limits of question and answer.

DECLARATION OF LONDON.

House of Commons, February 22, 1915.

Hansard. MR. DENNISS asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with reference to the Convention known as the Declaration of London, which of the Powers engaged in the present war and which of the other great maritime Powers have ratified or adhered to its provisions, and in respect of which, if any, of its articles reservations have in any case been attached?

MR. PRIMROSE: No ratification of the Declaration has yet been deposited.

LORD C. BERESFORD asked the Prime Minister whether he can now lay upon the Table of the House the modifications in the Declaration of London, in view of the recent German announcements of their intention to disregard the laws and customs and international obligations connected with the sea?

MR. PRIMROSE: I am not yet in a position to make any announcement.

NAVAL RECRUITING STATION, EDINBURGH.

ibid. MR. HOGGE asked whether advantage will be taken of the present circumstances to remove the naval recruiting station from Johnston Terrace, Edinburgh, to a more prominent thoroughfare where the advantages of joining the Navy could be more prominently displayed?

DR. MACNAMARA: As far as I am aware, the premises at Johnston Terrace, Edinburgh, which I understand have been used as Naval and Marine recruiting offices for many years, meet all requirements in the existing circumstances, and I do not think that there are sufficient reasons for making

a change. Recruiting is quite satisfactory, and it would appear that if greater activity should be necessary a more fruitful plan than the payment of higher rentals would be expenditure on advertisements in local newspapers and on posters.

NAVAL BOMBARDMENT (EAST COAST).

MR. KELLAWAY asked the Prime Minister the number of women and children killed or wounded during the recent naval raid on the East Coast of England? *ibid.*

The PRIME MINISTER (MR. ASQUITH): The number of women killed was thirty-nine, of children killed, thirty-nine. The Scarborough authorities have been unable to give the number of women and children wounded. The number at the Hartlepools and Whitby were, women 133, children 177. The figures of killed include those who died of wounds.

MR. KELLAWAY: Might I ask if the Government will be prepared to suggest to the Recruiting Committee the advisability of issuing these figures as a recruiting poster?

The PRIME MINISTER: They are now, I think, very well known.

MR. KELLAWAY asked the Prime Minister whether he will give the number of persons killed or wounded amongst the civil population during the recent naval raid on the East Coast of England?

The PRIME MINISTER: The total number of killed among the civil population was 127; of wounded (including an estimated figure for Scarborough), 567.

GERMAN BLOCKADE

ANNOUNCEMENT BY PRIME MINISTER

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the Prime Minister whether he can now make an announcement as to whether the British Government will immediately place all food and raw material used to foster German industries on the list of absolute contraband of war; and whether he will consider the possibility, in order to make this declaration more powerful, of sending a joint Note from the Allies, France, Russia, Japan, *ibid.*

and Great Britain, all equally concerned in ending the war, stating their determination to enforce these stringent measures with a view of hastening the end of the war?

The PRIME MINISTER: The allied Governments are considering what action it would be proper for them to take by way of reprisals against the German policy of attacking and destroying British, allied, and neutral merchant vessels without warning, and without any attempt to save the lives of the civilian and innocent crews. Pending such decision, which I hope will soon be announced, I can make no statement as to the nature and scope of the measures to be taken or the form in which they will be made public.

LORD C. BERESFORD: Might I ask the Prime Minister, with regard to his reply, whether it will be a joint Note, and not a Note specially from Great Britain?

The PRIME MINISTER: I cannot yet say that. There certainly will be a Note from Great Britain, and I hope a joint Note.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE (CADETS)

House of Commons, February 23, 1915.

Hansard. MR. BARNSTON asked if cadets at Dartmouth College and the midshipmen in the training cruisers were distributed among the ships of the Fleet for active service at the outbreak of the war; if some of these lads have lost their lives; if under the regulations their parents are charged £50 a year; and will he see that in the future, while these lads are risking their lives for their country, the parents are not compelled to pay the Admiralty for the services of their sons?

DR. MACNAMARA: The answer to the first three parts of the question is in the affirmative. As regards the last part, I may remind the hon. gentleman that, as I stated in reply to the hon. member for Cambridge on the 15th instant,[1] in the case of the private allowance payable on behalf of midshipmen, the Board of Admiralty is prepared to give favourable consideration to applications for whole or partial relief where real necessity exists; and, further, that in the case of midshipmen killed on active service, any sums deposited in advance in respect of a period subsequent to the date of death are returned

[1] [*See* p. 240.]

to the guardians upon the closing of the private allowance accounts of the officers concerned.

SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES, 1915-16

Resolution reported,

'That 250,000 officers, seamen, and boys, Coastguard, and Royal Marines be employed for the Sea and Coastguard Services for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1916.' *ibid.*

Motion made, and question proposed, 'That this House doth agree with the Committee in the said Resolution.'

MR. HOGGE: If the point I desire to raise is in order, it will take but a very short time to explain it. A question was addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty the other day with regard to the methods of recruiting for the Navy, and I suggested that in Edinburgh—which is now the heart of naval activity and enterprise—the recruiting station is situated in a street which is not accessible to the general public, and where the advantages of joining the Navy cannot be adequately displayed to the public. I am perfectly certain, in view of the fact that there is great activity in the city, it would pay the Admiralty to make further efforts to advertise the Navy in a better manner. It has been suggested that Princes Street would be a better place for the recruiting office, and I hope the Government will be able to fall in with the local desires in that respect.

MR. BOOTH: I want to refer to a matter also affecting recruiting for the Navy, and that is the uncertainty that exists in the minds of some men whether their life policies will carry, without any extra premium, when they join the Regular Forces. I think this opportunity should be taken by the Admiralty to point out the concession made under that head. I find in an answer which the Secretary to the Admiralty gave to the hon. member for Devizes (Mr. Peto) he seemed to be under the impression that there had not been as many concessions on this point as is really the case. I should like to read to the House a short letter which was sent to the right hon. gentleman on this point on the 5th October. It is as follows:—

ASSOCIATION OF INDUSTRIAL ASSURANCE COMPANIES AND COLLECTING FRIENDLY SOCIETIES.

High Holborn, W.C., *October* 5, 1914.

DEAR SIR,—Your letter of the 2nd instant addressed to the Secretary of the Pearl Assurance Company regarding the case of Corporal C. C. Morgan has been handed to me.

In reply to your letter generally I should like to say that at the meeting of this Association (of which you will observe the Pearl Assurance Company are members) held on the 16th ultimo, as to the result of a report submitted by the actuaries of several of the offices in the Association, who had been giving the subject their consideration for the previous two or three weeks, it was decided that for the present all claims—ordinary and industrial—in respect of the Regular Forces be honoured in full without any abatement or without any surcharge in respect of an extra premium; and further, that no extra premium be imposed or any abatement made in the sum assured in respect of Territorials, new levies, etc., for this war only. These recommendations apply only to policies effected up to and including the 4th August, 1914. With regard to new contracts, the tariffs recommended by the Life Offices Association were adopted.

I have no doubt you will be interested to learn the foregoing decision of this Association, which I trust will afford you considerable pleasure and satisfaction.—Yours truly, F. D. BOWLES, F.S.,

Hon. Sec.'

That letter was sent to the Admiralty as well as to the War Office. It elicited only a formal acknowledgment from the Admiralty. I am afraid they did not give that attention to it which the document deserved, and which the War Office gave to it. I do not know whether I am in order in referring to the answer from the War Office—I am only doing it by way of contrast—but the War Office concluded their acknowledgment by saying :—' The Council propose to make known this decision to the Army generally, and are sure that it will be received with the greatest satisfaction by all concerned.' I suggest that the Admiralty might have taken the same course. I do not know that they have not, and I should like some assurance from the Secretary to the Admiralty, if he takes the same favourable view, that pains will be taken to circulate the information among the men generally.

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA) : With regard to the point raised by the

hon. member for East Edinburgh (Mr. Hogge) that the recruiting station at Edinburgh is not in a suitable place, I have to say that the present office has been used for a good many years for the purposes of recruiting, and we are quite satisfied with the recruiting which has been carried on. We are of opinion, if we desire to spend more money in this matter, our best policy would be to devote it to newspaper advertisements and posters rather than paying increased rental. With regard to the point raised by the hon. member for Pontefract, I am familiar with the facts, as I was a party, with officials from the War Office, to the negotiations which ultimately led to these concessions. I have paid, I hope, a tribute to the assurance companies for what they have done. When I replied to my hon. friend the other day there was an unexplored part of the matter still remaining to be dealt with. It was a question whether something could not also be done for the mercantile marine. That point had been put to me by the hon. member for Devizes, and it had not been taken up in the communications between the companies and ourselves. I thought it was a point which we might consider, and I still think so. But I am very mindful of what the assurance companies have done, and if the hon. member thinks that the tribute I have paid to them is not sufficient, I hope he will now accept my assurance that we fully appreciate the concession.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolution reported,

2. 'That a sum, not exceeding £1000, be granted to His Majesty, to defray the Expense of Wages, etc., to Officers, Seamen, and Boys, Coastguard, and Royal Marines, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1916.'

Resolution agreed to.

Resolution reported,

'That an additional number, not exceeding 32,000 Officers, Seamen, and Boys, be employed for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1915, beyond the number already voted for the year.'

Resolution agreed to.

A GERMAN STEAMER SUNK BY A MINE OFF EMDEN

Berlin.

K.V., Feb. 23, 1915.

The cotton steamer *Evelyn*, which came in contact with a mine and was sunk off Borkum on her way to Bremerhaven, was sailing along the East Frisian coast without a German pilot in spite of the warnings issued by the Germans. We hear from competent authorities that the captain of the *Evelyn* declared in his evidence that it was his intention to steer a course leading farther North. He was, however, held up by an English warship on the way, and advised by an officer to choose the more southerly course and to keep as near as possible to the East Frisian coast.

BRITISH TRANSPORT SUNK

Berlin, February 23.

K.D., Feb. 23, 1915.

Yesterday afternoon at 4.45, the British troop-transport steamer 192 was sunk off Beachy Head by a German submarine.

FRENCH ATTACK ON A GERMAN SUBMARINE

C.O., Feb. 27, 1915.

On February 23 a flotilla vessel attached to the second French light squadron discovered and fired at a German submarine navigating on the surface some eight miles S.W. of Cape d'Alprecht, near Boulogne. The submarine was hit several times before she dived. A coating of oil marked the place where she disappeared.

SUBMARINE ATTACK ON PASSENGER BOAT FROM FOLKESTONE TO BOULOGNE

Times, Feb. 24, 1915.

The Secretary of the Admiralty last night made the following announcement :—

The Folkestone and Boulogne cross-Channel passenger boat was attacked last night, shortly after leaving Boulogne Harbour, by a German submarine.

The torpedo passed thirty yards ahead of the ship.

The passengers, numbering ninety-two, consisted of civilians and included among their number some neutrals.

RESTRICTION OF NAVIGATION

The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement :— *Times*, Feb. 24, 1915.

Mariners are warned that the navigation and use of the undermentioned area is entirely forbidden to all ships and vessels of every size and nationality :—

Bounded on the North-West by a line joining (*a*) and (*b*) :

(*a*) Latitude 55° 22½′ N., longitude 6° 17′ W.

(*b*) Latitude 55° 31′ N., longitude 6° 02′ W.

Bounded on the South-East by a line joining (*c*) and (*d*) :

(*c*) Latitude 55° 10½′ N., longitude 5° 24½′ W.

(*d*) Latitude 55° 02′ N., longitude 5° 40½′ W.

Bounded on the South-West by a line joining (*a*) and (*d*).

Bounded on the North-East by a line joining (*b*) and (*c*).

All traffic wishing to proceed through the North Channel must pass to the southward of Rathlin Island between sunrise and sunset ; no ship or vessel is to be within four miles of Rathlin Island between sunset and sunrise.

This order is to take effect from the 23rd February, 1915.

THE *DESAIX* IN THE RED SEA

As a result of a demonstration by the cruiser *Desaix*, the Turkish authorities have released the French Consul at Hodeidah, who had been carried off into the interior. The *Desaix* has brought the Consul back to Suez. *C.O.*, Feb. 20, 1915.

Paris, February 26.

It is officially announced that on the 23rd inst. the French cruiser *Desaix* made a demonstration at Akaba. A landing party, supported by the fire of the warship, dispersed a small force of Turks holding the village.—*Reuter.*

BLOCKADE OF GERMAN EAST AFRICA

Foreign Office, February 23, 1915.

His Majesty's Government have decided to declare a blockade of the coast of German East Africa as from midnight February 28th-March 1st. The blockade will extend along *L.G.*, Feb. 26, 1915.

the whole coast, including the islands—*i.e.*, from latitude 4° 41′ South to latitude 10° 40′ South.

Four days' grace from the time of the commencement of the blockade will be given for the departure of neutral vessels from the blockaded area.

THE *DAGUE* SUNK AT ANTIVARI

Paris, February 26.

It is officially announced that the French torpedo-boat *Dague*, which was escorting a supply convoy for Montenegro, struck an Austrian mine in the harbour at Antivari on Wednesday (February 24) and sank. Thirty-eight men of the crew are missing. The work of landing supplies was not interrupted, and the convoy returned safely.—*Reuter.*

A FRENCH MINE-SWEEPER SUNK

Paris.

K.V., Feb. 24, 1915. The *Temps* announces that the mine-sweeper *Marie* struck a drifting mine in the Eastern harbour of Dunkirk on Sunday evening (February 21) and sank at once. Four men of the crew were drowned, several others, including the master, were seriously injured.

CLAN MACNAUGHTON PRESUMED LOST

Press Bureau, February 24.

Times, Feb. 25, 1915. The Secretary of the Admiralty regrets to announce that H.M.S. *Clan MacNaughton*, armed merchant cruiser (Commander Robert Jeffreys, R.N.), has been missing since the 3rd February, and it is feared that the vessel has been lost.

Unsuccessful search was made, and wreckage supposed to be portions of this ship has since been discovered. The last signal received from the *Clan MacNaughton* was made in the early morning of February 3, and it is feared that she was lost during the bad weather which prevailed at that time.

GERMANS HOLDING PILOTAGE CERTIFICATES

House of Lords, February 24, 1915.

Hansard. The EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, I beg to ask His Majesty's Government how many certificates for pilotage for the River Thames or for any part of the United Kingdom

were held by German or Austrian subjects, or by naturalised Germans or Austrians, when the war broke out.

The UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (LORD ISLINGTON): My Lords, at the outbreak of war five pilotage certificates for the London district and three for the Humber (except in and out of Grimsby) were held by German subjects, all being masters in the employment of the Argo Steamship Company, of Bremen. No pilotage certificate for any other port in the United Kingdom was held by a German or Austrian subject. So far as the Board of Trade have been able to ascertain, no pilotage certificate was held by a naturalised German or Austrian, but the pilotage authorities are not in all cases in possession of information with regard to the antecedents of the holders of certificates. The total number of pilotage certificates held by masters and mates in the United Kingdom at the date mentioned was about 2500.

DETAINED ENEMY VESSELS

The EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, I beg to ask the noble Lord opposite whether His Majesty's Government have considered the case of the seventy-three enemy vessels, with a gross tonnage of 93,354 tons, which Mr. Churchill stated on February 10 in the House of Commons are now detained in the ports of the United Kingdom; whether this number and tonnage represent all the enemy vessels that are now so detained; how long those vessels have been thus detained; whether he can say why His Majesty's Government have not instructed Mr. Attorney-General to apply to the Prize Court for a condemnation of these vessels; and whether there is any reason why, in default of such an application by the Attorney-General to the Prize Court for condemnation of any enemy vessel, the captors of such vessel may not themselves apply for its condemnation. *ibid.*

LORD ISLINGTON: Including a number of small vessels, the total number of ships belonging to enemy subjects detained in the United Kingdom is eighty-three, with a total gross tonnage of 100,448 tons. All these vessels were seized in ports in the United Kingdom at the outbreak of war with the countries to which they respectively belong, and have since been detained. The Attorney-General has applied to

the Prize Court for adjudication in each case, and the order of the Court was that the vessel should be detained until further orders. The cases have thus been dealt with, and there is no reason to reopen them. The detention of the ships rather than their condemnation is in accordance with the Sixth Hague Convention, 1907, ratified by His Majesty's Government in 1909. The judgments of the Prize Courts have been so framed, however, that in the event of reciprocal treatment not being obtained for British ships which were seized in enemy ports on the declaration of war, the Crown will be at liberty to apply to the Court for condemnation of the ships. The Crown, acting through the officers of Customs and Excise, is the captor of these ships.

PRIZE MONEY

House of Commons, February 24, 1915.

Hansard. The EARL OF SELBORNE had the following Notice on the Paper :—'To ask His Majesty's Government whether it is true that they have set up a Prize Claims Committee to consider of a distribution to individuals, whose claims have been rejected by the Prize Court, of portions of Prize Money ; and if so, whether he can inform the House what are its qualifications, and what cases in respect of what vessels and of what persons are now under consideration by that Committee ; and whether it is intended that while all Prize Money is withheld from the officers and men of the Navy, part of it shall be distributed to persons selected by the Prize Court Committee.'

The noble Earl said : My Lords, the noble Marquess who leads the House has asked me to defer this question, for he is not able to be here to-day, nor would he find it, I understand, convenient to answer the question yet. I also understand from the message I received that he will be good enough to let me know as soon as he is in a position to answer it. I hope that there will not be great delay, because the question involved is one of considerable importance.

ADMIRALTY COURTS-MARTIAL

ibid. The EARL OF SELBORNE rose to move to resolve :—'That this House is of opinion that the established custom of the

Navy by which a court-martial is held to investigate the loss of any of His Majesty's ships is founded on the best interests both of the Navy and of the public, and that it is expedient that it should be maintained.'

The noble Earl said: My Lords, the subject of my Motion is one, I venture to think, of great importance, and your Lordships must bear with me if in the course of my speech I read a certain number of quotations. But before proceeding to my argument I wish to refer to some remarks[1] which the First Lord of the Admiralty made on this subject in the House of Commons a few days ago. He pleaded that Parliament and the country should repose confidence in the Board of Admiralty. I have said before, and I wish to repeat to-day, that we have confidence in the Board of Admiralty and wish to support that Board to the best of our ability. The Board of Admiralty contains some very distinguished men. I suppose no member of your Lordships' House has had a better opportunity than I have of gauging to the full the great ability of Lord Fisher, and I wish to say without any reservation that we are conscious of the very special and immense responsibility which rests on the First Sea Lord in time of war, and desire to give him and the whole of the rest of the Board of Admiralty all the help we can in the fulfilment of that great responsibility, for which his most singular gifts so admirably fit him in a time of national crisis.

[1] [*See* p. 254.]

But, my Lords, if we have misgivings, they have been entirely caused by the conduct of the First Lord of the Admiralty. If he (Mr. Churchill) had been content, if he was now content, to fill that great part which is his own as a member of the Board of Admiralty—as Lord Goschen put it, *primus inter pares*—he would have far less criticism than he has to meet. But it is because he has so often separated himself from the Board of Admiralty, because he has so often made pronouncements in which his own personality alone appeared and in which the Board of Admiralty was never mentioned, and because we know he has made weird excursions of his own to Belgium in semi-naval uniform that we feel in doubt sometimes whether he is speaking as Mr. Churchill or as First Lord of the Admiralty. If we could be reassured when he speaks and acts that he is only speaking and acting as part of that great body, then he may be assured

of our constant confidence. We do not pretend to have the same confidence in his private individual judgment as we have in the collective judgment of the Board of Admiralty.

When the noble Marquess who leads the House was referring to this question of naval courts-martial, I think in the beginning of January, he said that there was no statutory obligation to hold a court-martial in the case of the loss of a ship; that it was more a custom than a legal obligation. He was perfectly correct. But the best comment upon that which I have seen was written to me by a distinguished Admiral. This is what he wrote:—'The British Navy is very much like the British Constitution. Many of its most important customs are unwritten.' There is a very wide field for research into this matter, wide in its bulk though not wide in the multitude of authorities. As your Lordships know, the historian of the Navy was the late Sir William Laird Clowes. His work extends, I think, into seven bulky volumes, and he is the only man, I suppose, who has read through the records of all the naval courts-martial. Therefore there is no authority extant, either in the Admiralty or outside, greater than that of Sir W. Laird Clowes on this question of the custom of the Navy in the matter of courts-martial.

Let me state to you the effect of Sir W. Laird Clowes's views on this matter. I do not think any one could study his works without coming to the conclusion that the Admiralty has made a complete departure from the established practice of the Navy in declining to hold a court-martial in the cases of the loss of His Majesty's ships since the outbreak of the present war. An examination of the naval records by Sir W. Laird Clowes reveals the fact that since 1652 the rule was established that in the case of every ship lost, captured, or surrendered, a court-martial should be assembled to deal with the captain or other survivor of the vessel. I will give your Lordships two illustrations to show how, in Sir W. Laird Clowes's mind, this rule practically did not admit of an exception. There was a ship called the *Jack*, which struck her colours on July 21, 1781, and upon which no court-martial was held. Sir W. Laird Clowes infers from that fact that she was not a King's ship at all, but probably a merchantman. Again, in referring to the case of the

Blanche, a 44-gun frigate which in 1805 surrendered to a French force of four ships and one hundred guns and sank within a few hours, Sir W. Laird Clowes writes as follows on the subject of the court-martial held over Captain Mudge :— 'In this case it is clear that the *Blanche* was in a desperate condition when she surrendered. The usual court-martial on the loss of the ship honourably acquitted Captain Mudge and congratulated him on his able and gallant conduct.'

I find, from the same authority, that from the Revolution of 1688 down to the year 1901, when he finished his researches, there was a total of 1008 of the King's ships that were lost, and no one can find in Laird Clowes any evidence whatever that any one of those in which there were survivors was not the subject of a court-martial. I do not say there were no such cases. I am not in a position to prove that. I say that any one studying Laird Clowes, who is the greatest authority, cannot find that he thought that there were any exceptions in this great list. I see that the Attorney-General the other day, speaking in the House of Commons, said there were twenty ships, all I think of a date somewhere between 1815 and 1840 or thereabouts, that were lost in which there was no court-martial. I dare say he is quite right, but I should be glad if the noble Lord who is going to reply on behalf of His Majesty's Government would give me the names of those ships, because it would be a very interesting matter for investigation to see what Laird Clowes said about them and what the explanation is. Of course, there never were courts-martial in cases of ships of which there were no survivors ; but Laird Clowes certainly thought that the custom of the Navy was practically universal in cases of ships lost where there were survivors.

I should like next to quote the Admiralty Regulations on this subject, because they entirely bear out the contention which I am trying to advance. I will first read No. 177 of the King's Regulations :—'When one of His Majesty's ships shall be wrecked, or otherwise lost or destroyed, or taken by the enemy, the command, power, and authority given to the captain, and to the other officers and the crew with respect to each other, shall remain and be in full force, as effectually as if such ship were not lost, until a court-martial shall have inquired into the cause of the loss or capture of

such ship, or the officers and crew shall be otherwise disposed of and separated, as directed by the Naval Discipline Act.' Then there is Regulation No. 616. It is a long one, and I will read only half of it; but the second half, which I shall omit, has no bearing on the argument. The Regulation is headed, 'Lives, Stores, Books, and Papers,' and runs:—'If a ship is wrecked or otherwise lost or destroyed, the captain will use every exertion to preserve the lives of the crew; and when as many of them as possible have been saved, he is to use his utmost endeavours to save the stores, provisions, and furniture of the ship. He is to give his particular attention to the saving of all books and papers relating to the ship's accounts, that he may be enabled to cause the necessary books to be made out for transmission to the Admiralty immediately after the court-martial to inquire into the loss of the ship has taken place.' Then Regulation No. 1355, which is headed 'When Ship has been Wrecked,' runs:—'In the event of a ship being captured, wrecked, or otherwise lost or destroyed, the officers and ship's company shall, subject to provisions of the Naval Discipline Act in force at the time, be entitled to full pay until the time of their being discharged, or removed into other of His Majesty's ships, or of their dying, unless the sentence of the court-martial held on the loss of the ship shall otherwise direct.' I do not think anybody could read those extracts from the King's Regulations without coming to the conclusion that the Admiralty have always hitherto contemplated the continuance of the custom of holding a court-martial in the loss of any one of His Majesty's ships.

Now I pass to the reasons given in the House of Commons the other day by the First Lord himself why this custom of the Service has been suspended. I must say that this part of his speech was very poor stuff, quite unworthy of his intelligence; and I think I can show your Lordships that those words are not unjust. First of all, the First Lord of the Admiralty said:—'To hear the talk in some quarters, one would suppose that the loss of a ship by mine or submarine necessarily involved a criminal offence. . . . One would suppose that it involved a criminal offence for which somebody should be brought to book.' Again he said:—'Losses by mine and submarine must frequently be placed

on the same footing as heavy casualties on land. They cannot be treated as presumably involving a dereliction of duty or a lack of professional ability.' Those are the words of a man who knows what the naval view of courts-martial is, but who is trading on the ignorance of the public and throwing dust in their eyes; because there never has been connected with the holding of a court-martial any presumption of professional incapacity or of dereliction of duty, nor has it ever cast a slur on the officers tried. If the First Lord did not know that, then all I can say is that he was ignorant of a fundamental principle of naval discipline of which he ought not to have been ignorant; but if he knew it, then it was not an honest argument to attempt to cast discredit on the suggestion that courts-martial should be held by saying that the loss of a ship necessarily involved a criminal offence or a lack of professional ability.

The First Lord's next argument was concerned with the altered conditions of naval warfare—a perfectly legitimate point to discuss, but, as I think I shall be able to show, not really germane to the question. The First Lord said:—'The circumstances and conditions of modern naval warfare are entirely different from all previous experience. In old wars the capture or destruction of ships was nearly always accompanied by an act of surrender, which was a proper and very necessary subject for investigation by court-martial.' There were quite as many cases of court-martial when ships were lost by wreck. The real fact is that the particular cause and the circumstances of the loss have nothing whatever to do with it. The only question is that the ship has been lost. How or why it has been lost has nothing whatever to do with the principle that because the ship has been lost it ought to be the subject of a court-martial. Therefore however much the conditions of naval warfare change, those conditions may have some effect on the expediency or convenience of the time of holding the court-martial, but they have no bearing whatever on the principle whether or not a court-martial ought to be held. The First Lord's next argument referred to that particular point. He said that the conditions of naval warfare now are such that sometimes the actual holding of a court-martial might be very difficult and inconvenient. I concede that at once. No reasonable person

would ever say that it should be other than a matter entirely at the discretion of the Admiralty when the court-martial is to be held. And with regard to the losses, there is a long list, of which we know, beginning with the *Amphion* and ending with the *Formidable*. I am quite prepared, if the Admiralty say so, to bow to their decision and admit that the time may not yet have come when a court-martial can be held in all these cases with convenience, or possibly without disadvantage, to the public service. But I am not prepared to believe that in the case of none of these ships could a court-martial have been summoned without grave loss to the public service.

The First Lord went on to say :—' Nothing could be worse for the Navy or the Admiralty than for public attention or naval attention to be riveted on half a dozen naval *causes célèbres*.' That is a quite deliberate erecting of a figure of straw in order to be able to knock it down. In the whole history of the Navy there has been no case—except the case, perhaps, of Admiral Byng, which I think became a *cause célèbre* after Admiral Byng ceased to exist—that I know of in which public attention was riveted on a naval *cause célèbre* when it was going on. The proof of the absurdity of the First Lord's argument lies in the fact that only the other day Admiral Troubridge was tried by court-martial by order of the Board of Admiralty in connection with the escape of the *Goeben*. Was public attention then riveted on a naval *cause célèbre*? Why, the public never knew that the trial was being held. The evidence has never been published. The Admiralty had it entirely in their power to keep the matter secret, and they have the same power with respect to any court-martial that may be held. So that the First Lord's argument will not stand examination for a moment. The fact is—and this is what I wish to lay particular stress upon—that this question of the holding of a court-martial in the case of ships that are lost in war or in peace is not merely a question between the Board of Admiralty and the captain or officers concerned. It is a much wider question even than that. It is a question between the officers involved and the rest of the naval service, and it is a question between the Navy and the public. The officers who are involved in the loss of a ship have the right that they should be cleared

of responsibility before the rest of the great Service to which they belong, and the nation has a right to know under what circumstances the valuable ships that belong to it have been lost.

I will now quote Sir W. Laird Clowes to show your Lordships how this matter has been viewed for many generations past by the Navy, and how false is the impression on this subject which the First Lord attempted to give. This is the substance of Sir W. Laird Clowes's observations :—' It was understood that a court-martial on the loss of a ship need not necessarily imply any charge against the captain or other survivor. The whole story of the British Navy makes it clear that a captain and his ship are always associated for administrative purposes, and the captain has, of course, always been held absolutely responsible for the safety of his ship. If a ship is lost, no matter in whatever circumstances, the incident must be accounted for by the captain ; and if the captain has been lost the court-martial is held upon any survivor with the object of determining, from such facts as are available, the causes of the disaster.' Again :—' The attitude of mind of officers of the Navy towards the supreme importance of courts-martial will be gathered from the action of Captain Pakenham, of the *Crescent*, who, when his ship struck to the Dutch in 1781, refused to resume his command, considering that a court-martial was necessary to clear him from guilt.' And further :—' The principle of holding courts-martial achieved in its fulfilment two practical results :—(1) Ascertaining the cause of the loss of the vessel and fixing responsibility of those concerned ; and (2) providing for public information such facts relating to the destruction of public property as the taxpayers of the country are entitled to be made acquainted with.' I had a letter from a distinguished Admiral, and these were the words he used :—' Courts-martial are not at all meant as a slur on the captain or surviving officers and men, but a public opportunity for them to clear themselves.' And lastly I would give you the opinion on the same subject of two distinguished naval correspondents who write to the daily Press. It is necessary to make this evidence cumulative because I want the public to understand that the attitude of mind of the Navy to courts-martial has been quite different from what was sug-

gested by the First Lord. The first of these naval correspondents writes :—' When a ship of His Majesty is lost, it is the rule that the captain of the ship is tried by court-martial, or, if he is lost with the ship, the survivors are tried. The assembling of a court-martial does not necessarily imply that an offence has been committed. The principle is that the reason why the ship was lost must be made clear.' And the other naval correspondent writes :—' The institution was maintained in olden days quite as much for the protection of officers who lost ships innocently as for the punishment of officers who lost them wrongfully. It was to the naval officer what the verdict of a jury is to the subject—the palladium of his liberties, the final acquittal of his peers.' I think in the face of that evidence it will be impossible for the noble Lord who is going to answer me, or for any other speaker or writer on this subject, to pretend, whether these courts-martial should be held or not, that the holding of them involves any slur necessarily on the officers who are the subject of the investigation.

I do not want to weary your Lordships with extracts, but I have some interesting cases here which I should like to cite because they all bear on and illustrate the subject and enable one to understand what the custom of the Navy has been. I have taken them as particularly interesting cases extending over a great period of years. After the action of the Dutch on July 26, 1657, William Howe, of the *Virgin*, was tried by court-martial and shot. The captains of the *Blacknose, John Elizabeth,* and the *Blessing* were dismissed the Service. The next case is that of the captain of the *Cumberland,* which was lost on October 10, 1707. He was court-martialled on his release from captivity—I ask your Lordships' particular attention to that fact—and honourably acquitted. Captain Wyld, of the *Royal Oak,* whose ship was lost on the same occasion, was dismissed the Service ; and Captain Bolton, of the *Chester,* was absolved from all blame. I pass on to May 8, 1744, when the *Northumberland* was lost. The captain, Thomas Watson, was killed. The first-lieutenant, Thomas Craven, and Allison, the master, were court-martialled. Craven was honourably acquitted, but Allison was condemned for surrendering the ship and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. In 1756 the *Warwick* was taken

by the French. This is a very remarkable case. Captain Molyneux Shuldham was a prisoner of war for two years, and on his release was tried by court-martial and adjudged to have done his duty. The officers of the *Berwick*, taken by the French on March 7, 1795, were court-martialled as soon as prisoners were exchanged, and they were honourably acquitted. On August 18, 1812, the *Attack* was forced to strike her colours to Danish gunboats. Lieutenant Simmonds and his officers and men were most honourably acquitted by court-martial. H.M.S. *Tiger*, which was run ashore at Odessa on May 12, 1854, was the subject of a court-martial which sat on board the *Victory* at Portsmouth in April, 1855—very nearly a year afterwards. The president of the Court was Rear-Admiral W. F. Martin, and the surviving officers and men of the ship were put on trial. The court-martial sat on the 12th, 13th, and 14th of that month, and resulted in the acquittal of the lieutenant, Alfred Royer, and the reprimand of Francis Edington, the master.

I have given cases from every war, from the time of the Dutch wars and the wars of Cromwell right up to and inclusive of the Crimean War, to show how constant and how absolutely unbroken has been this custom. The last case that I am going to cite is that of the *Captain*, which, as your Lordships will remember, was lost, I think, off Finisterre on September 6, 1870. Her captain, Captain Burgoyne, and the designer of the ship, Captain Coles, were both lost. Out of the ship's crew 475 were lost, and 18 saved. A court-martial was held on the survivors. I do not think there was a single officer among them; there may have been a warrant officer, possibly there was a gunner, but certainly there was no higher officer. On June 16, 1871, Lord Lauderdale used these words in your Lordships' House:—'The court-martial that had sat to inquire into the loss of the *Captain* found that the ship capsized by pressure of sail, assisted by the heave of the sea, and that the sail carried at the time of her loss, regard being had to the force of the wind and the state of the sea, was insufficient to have endangered a ship endued with a proper amount of stability. And they added: "The Court, before separating, find it their duty to record their conviction that the *Captain* was built in deference to public opinion expressed in Parliament and in opposition to the

views and opinions of the Controller and his Department, and that the evidence all tends to show that they generally disapproved of her construction." ' Those are remarkable words to be found in the finding of a naval court-martial, and they show, I think, the extraordinary value of investigations of this kind. Here was the *Captain* lost, and the court-martial had the courage to say that she was lost because of her defective design, and that her defective design was not due to the fault of the Controller of the Admiralty but because there had been political and Parliamentary interference with the Controller, and the ship had been built to this design in spite of his remonstrance. You could not have a clearer case of the great value to the public of courts-martial in order that they may know why their ships are lost.

Now I come to the words used by Lord Crewe in this House, in which he stated the circumstances under which in the opinion of the Admiralty, as voiced by him, courts-martial should be held. The noble Marquess said:[1] 'The general view which the Admiralty take is that, where there is any question of a failure on the part of an officer to obey orders, to act with due sense of responsibility, or to take proper precautions, or in cases in which misbehaviour on the part of a crew or any portion of it is alleged to have led to disaster, it is advisable that a court-martial should be held; but in cases where those considerations do not in any degree arise, speaking generally the Admiralty hold that a court-martial may not be necessary.' I do not want to dwell now on the fact that those latter words, if that is the final view of the Board of Admiralty, imply a complete departure from the established custom of the Navy for more than two and a half centuries; but I wish to lay stress on the words which Lord Crewe used as to the circumstances in which the Admiralty think a court-martial should be held. Take the case of the *Formidable*. I know nothing whatever about the circumstances of the loss of that vessel, but I have read in the public Press allegations in respect of the loss of the *Formidable* that exactly comply with the conditions laid down by Lord Crewe. The mere fact that these allegations have been publicly made seems to me a very strong argument indeed for holding a court-martial in this case; and I would apply exactly the same argument, though perhaps in a lesser degree,

[1] [*See* p. 186.]

to the loss of such ships as the *Cressy*, the *Hogue*, and the *Aboukir*. It is not a question merely between the Admiralty and the officers concerned; it is a question between those officers and the whole of the Navy, and between the Navy and the public.

I have laid down what I believe to be the undoubted custom of the Navy, a custom practically unbroken in peace or war for 250 years. Because even if the noble Lord can give me the names of ships where there were survivors and where there was not a court-martial, he certainly cannot give me the names of many; and the proportion that they can possibly bear to the numbers of cases in which courts-martial were held must be so small that my contention that this has been the unbroken practice of the Navy in peace and in war remains literally and actually true. I have tried to show what the attitude of the Navy to this question has been, and to dispose altogether of the suggestion that a court-martial necessarily involves a criminal offence or a slur on the character of the officers tried. I have, I think, succeeded in disposing of the arguments of the First Lord, which really were, as I have already said, quite unworthy of his powers and his intelligence. And I have shown also that the Admiralty, by its own Regulations, has always contemplated the holding of these courts-martial.

Having said that, I wish to state quite clearly that the responsibility in this matter can rest only on the Board of Admiralty. The Board of Admiralty can hold these courts-martial when they choose. There is no obligation on them to hold the court-martial the week after the ship has been lost. From the cases I have read, I have shown that even at the time of the Crimean War a court-martial was held a year after the ship was lost; and in the case of the Napoleonic wars courts-martial were held on the return of officers to England after years of captivity. Therefore the argument of immediate inconvenience, although it may be quite sound for the moment, cannot be held permanently valid as a reason for never holding a court-martial on the loss of these ships. Again, I can quite understand that evidence might come out in the course of some of these courts-martial which in the interests of the public service the Admiralty might not think should become public property; but that, again, is entirely

within the power of the Admiralty to control. They have controlled it; not one single word has been published in respect of the court-martial on Admiral Troubridge. They could preserve exactly the same secrecy in respect of the evidence given at any court-martial.

But I have one word to say about that. When the Admiralty hold a court-martial, although they have the right to withhold the evidence if they think it would be to the detriment of the public service to publish it, they have, in my opinion, no right to withhold from publicity the result of the court-martial. They have no business to bring an officer to trial and not publish the result. I say this with special reference to the case of Admiral Troubridge, because although it was announced with the authority of the Press Bureau that he had been ordered to haul down his flag and come home to be tried by court-martial, there has never been, so far as I know, any official announcement that he has been acquitted by that court-martial.[1] The whole of the public knowledge on that subject has been derived from unofficial information in the public Press, and I say, in the most emphatic way, that although the Admiralty have the right to withhold the evidence in the interests of the public service, they have no right to suppress the result of a court-martial when once an officer has been tried.

[1] [*See Naval 2*, p. 236.]

In this connection I wish to read an extract from the First Lord's speech the other day,[2] and I do so because whereas I have been obliged to differ from his attitude in respect to his other statements, I am in a position entirely to endorse and support this one. The First Lord said:—'I must respectfully claim, on behalf of the Board of Admiralty, an absolute discretionary power with regard to holding courts-martial or Courts of Inquiry.' I have conceded that, though I think that the discretionary power would be very ill-used if the whole practice of holding these courts-martial is abrogated. The First Lord went on to say that the Board of Admiralty must also have absolute discretionary power as to 'the removal without trial of officers who have forfeited the confidence of the Board.' I entirely agree with that. In a period of great national emergency like the present there is no question that the Admiralty should have and must exercise the power of removing an officer from his command

[2] [*See* p. 256.]

even without trial if he has forfeited their confidence. Again, the First Lord said that the Admiralty must reserve an absolute discretionary power as to 'the publication of particular information on particular incidents.' I have already said that I entirely concur with that. That, again, must be left to the judgment of the Board of Admiralty.

I have detained your Lordships at great length, I fear, but to make my case it was necessary to build it up with some kind of historical sequence. I make the Motion with which I shall conclude my speech because I have a deep conviction that this custom was for the best interests both of the Navy and of the public service. I think the Government are in danger of confusing two different principles in their policy of secrecy. There are matters which in a time of war like this should be kept from the possible knowledge of the enemy at all costs. With that I quite agree. But there are other matters which it is more important that our people should know than that the enemy should not know, and I think the Government have sometimes forgotten that and gone too far. After all, the strength of the nation at this time is based on its unity, on its confidence in the public service, and on its belief that the Government trust it. No greater blow could possibly be given to our national strength than that the public should have any cause to believe that the Government was wavering in its confidence in their patriotism or in their power of endurance. It is because the complete screen of secrecy which has been shut down on these naval disasters is bad for the national temperament, because I believe it proceeds mainly from a want of confidence in the public which the public have not deserved, and because I believe also that the suspension of this practice is injurious to the naval service, that I make this Motion.

The FIRST COMMISSIONER OF WORKS (LORD EMMOTT): My Lords, the noble Earl has spoken with his usual ability in introducing this Motion, and he has been dealing with a subject of which he has evidently made a considerable study. I can assure him, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that we have no complaint to make of his introducing this subject of debate to the House or the length of the speech which he has delivered on this important matter. He certainly has the advantage of me in one respect. He was

for a considerable time First Lord of the Admiralty, whilst I have never had the advantage of being associated with that Board. In the debate last week Lord Curzon said, with perfect truth, that a Department is better defended by a Minister who is familiar with the daily working of the Department than by some one who gets up the case for the occasion. I am sometimes inclined to wish that it were possible here to adopt the practice which obtains in some other countries of allowing a Minister to defend the policy of his Department in either House of Parliament. I wish it particularly to-day, for the noble Earl made a rather violent attack on my right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, and I think it would have added to the reality and to the liveliness of this debate were my right hon. friend able to come here and speak for himself on this occasion.

The EARL OF SELBORNE: I entirely agree.

LORD EMMOTT: However, that is not possible; and I have been asked by the Government to reply in the first place to the noble Earl. If the noble Earl will allow me, I shall dismiss the personal part of the case and deal entirely with the matter on its merits. The Motion which the noble Earl has moved asks the House to express the opinion that it is the established custom of the Navy that a court-martial should be held to investigate the loss of any of His Majesty's ships. The noble Earl, I noticed, did not claim that it was illegal not to hold a court-martial; but that has been said by some critics. I must in the first place state, in the most positive manner, that there is no law and no regulation which necessitates the holding of a court-martial in the case of the loss of any ship. I state that not only on my own authority but on the authority of the Judge Advocate of the Fleet, whose knowledge of the law in regard to this matter is, I am sure, unquestioned by anybody.

When the noble Earl proceeded to prove his point, I confess that I did not altogether follow him. The first Regulation which he read—Regulation No. 177—does not seem to me to bear out his point in the least degree. That Regulation says:—'When one of His Majesty's ships shall be wrecked, or otherwise lost or destroyed, or taken by the enemy, the command, power, and authority given to the captain and to the other officers and the crew with respect

to each other, shall remain and be in full force, as effectually as if such ship were not lost, until a court-martial shall have inquired into the cause of the loss or capture of such ship, or the officers and crew shall be otherwise disposed of and separated, as directed by the Naval Discipline Act.' There is nothing in that to indicate that it is an invariable custom to hold a court-martial.

Although during the long history of the Navy the line has never been very clearly drawn between them, there are, as a matter of fact, three methods of formal investigation which can be used in regard to casualties in the Navy. The first is a court-martial where it appears that there may be a *prima facie* case for a charge against an individual officer or individual officers. If, for instance, an officer is accused of not having used his utmost exertions to bring his ship into action when ordered to do so, or if he has failed to encourage inferior officers or men to fight courageously, or if he has surrendered his ship without sufficient reason or has improperly withdrawn from the fight—in such a case a court-martial may be held in regard to a specific charge of breach of statute against the officer impugned. In that case, of course, the charges are formulated and delivered, and the officer has every opportunity of knowing beforehand the case which he has to meet, and the court-martial is held under Sections 2, 5, and 29 of the Act. The second case of a court-martial is a different one. In that case a court-martial is held to inquire into the loss of a ship and to ascertain whether or not there is reason to believe that any one is to blame. Sections 91 and 92 of the Act refer to this kind of court-martial. It is usual in that case for all the survivors to be nominally before the Court, and sometimes during the course of the investigation it is found that a case is made out for blame against a particular officer, in which event the other kind of court-martial may be held later in order to investigate the specific charge. The third kind of formal investigation is a Court of Inquiry held under the King's Regulations. That is necessarily private; no evidence is taken on oath, and in nearly all cases nowadays a Court of Inquiry precedes a court-martial. Those are the three methods of formal investigation that are adopted with regard to losses in the Navy. So far as the law goes, the

Admiralty has a complete discretion which, if any, of these methods of investigation should be adopted, or whether all of them should be dispensed with. It is quite evident that this must be so, for certainly the Admiralty has discretion which of the three should be adopted, and there is no law or regulation which says that any one of the three must, of necessity be held. Neither has any officer in the Navy a right to demand a court-martial of his own will.

I shall be told, of course, that it is not claimed that a court-martial is a legal necessity, but that a custom has grown up of holding a court-martial in the case of every loss of a ship—a custom so universally observed that it has become a recognised practice, whatever the circumstances, whether we are at peace or at war. If so, I am not quite clear how far this custom is supposed to go. I presume that it only refers to cases of ships that are lost, and that it does not refer to all ships that are stranded or hazarded or to innumerable smaller accidents that occur. I gather, too, that it does not refer to a great many of the breaches of the Naval Discipline Act, as to which, again, the Admiralty has always decided whether or not a court-martial should be held. In regard to all these, the Admiralty decided on the merits of the case put before it. I gather that this discretion is not impugned.

The claim, as I understand it, is that whenever a ship is lost, and particularly when valuable lives are lost at the same time, a rigid custom has grown up that a court-martial must be held into the circumstances. I have occupied such spare time as I have had during the last few days in examining the precedents. I do not want to overstate my case, and I willingly make this concession to the noble Earl—that in the majority of cases of the loss of a ship in the past a court-martial has been held—but the rule has been by no means a universal one. The noble Earl referred to a return dealing with ships belonging to His Majesty's Navy that were lost between 1815 and 1840. My right hon. friend the Attorney-General said in another place[1] that in this return, which I have in my hand, there were twenty-one cases of ships lost in regard to which no court-martial had been held, and out of those twenty-one only six were cases in which the ship and all on board were lost, so that there was nobody to hold a court-

[1] [*See* p. 358.]

martial upon. The noble Earl asked whether I would give him the names. I shall be very glad to do so, but he will not expect me to read them out now. In a later return I find one rather typical case. In 1878 the *Helvetia* collided with a coastguard cruiser, and the latter sank. In that case a Board of Trade inquiry was held into the collision. The finding of the inquiry was evidently considered quite sufficient, and apparently no inquiry of any sort or kind was held by the Admiralty into that occurrence. Therefore, whilst I admit that it has been usual to hold a court-martial, I cannot admit that a rigid custom has grown up. On the other hand, the only case of the loss of a ship during this war which is really comparable to these long lists of losses of which I have spoken in the period since 1815 was the case of the *Oceanic*, and in regard to that a court-martial was held and specific charges were framed against the officers in charge.

When the noble Earl invited the House to say that it is an established custom to hold an inquiry into every loss, he puts his case far too high. He would take away the discretion always hitherto vested in and always hitherto used by the Admiralty, a discretion which certainly ought not to be interfered with at the present time. In opposition to the claim which the noble Earl makes, I venture to put forward another. It is not my own discovery. I have it from other people who have studied this question far more deeply, and who are far more competent to give an opinion upon it than I am. The view I put forward is this. I maintain that the precedents show that it has not been the custom to hold a court-martial in time of war unless a ship or some of the men on board were captured, or unless some definite charge was made against somebody. I believe that rule is far better justified by the facts than the Resolution which the noble Earl asks the House to adopt this evening. I have not had time to study every precedent, particularly the precedents of Napoleonic times, but I believe that the view which I have just expressed is a correct induction from what occurred in Napoleonic times. In the Crimean War there were three cases of ships lost—the *Viper*, the *Tiger*, and the *Jasper*. The only court-martial held to inquire in regard to those three ships was on the *Tiger*, and she was captured by the enemy. In the other two cases the officers were tried on

specific charges. In the China War there were three courts-martial on the only three ships lost, but they, again, were lost in an action with the Peiho Forts; two of them sank and one was stranded.

I have dealt with the law and custom of this case. The only other question I have to deal with is whether or not the recent action of the Admiralty as to courts-martial is justified by the circumstances of the time. I need not remind you that we are at war. We are in the greatest war, as regards numbers and armaments employed, that the world has ever seen. New factors appear in this war, factors different from any that our Navy has had to deal with in any previous war. The torpedo discharged from a submarine is a new factor; the reckless sowing of mines on our trade routes without notice is a new factor, and the fact of those mines being large enough to blow up a huge battleship is a comparatively new factor. In these circumstances I say that the Admiralty is justified in holding that cases of loss may occur in which it may not be necessary to hold a court-martial. I speak on this question with some diffidence, for, as your Lordships know, I am only representing the Admiralty for the occasion. But I will venture to put before the House, before I sit down, some reasons which seem to me to be very strong and to justify the Admiralty in the course which it has adopted. The claim is that a court-martial should be held as to every case of loss. The Admiralty view is that in a number of cases of loss that have occurred a court-martial is unnecessary. But I desire to say on behalf of the Admiralty that, wherever they have felt that it would be useful or that information could be obtained which they had not in their possession, a Court of Inquiry has been held.

My second point is this. The new factors to which I have alluded have fundamentally changed the position of naval warfare. Many more cases must occur under present conditions than have occurred in the past where a ship is lost without any blame being attributable to anybody. We cannot look into the minds of our predecessors, but I think it is abundantly clear that the customs before and even long after 1815 were not conceived in the light of the experience of 1915. In the old days practically no warships were sunk or captured in fight by the enemy except by gunfire or board-

ing, and at that time all the fighting was above the level of the sea. In this war no ship of His Majesty's has been captured by the enemy; not a single sailor has been captured from one of our ships by the enemy; and therefore the conditions have not arisen under which, as a rule, courts-martial have been held in the past.

In the third place, the holding of any considerable number of courts-martial—a large number is asked for by the noble Earl—at a time of intense pressure such as this, involving the presence, as they would, of officers of high rank whose services are urgently needed elsewhere at every moment, must necessarily interfere with the main work of the Navy. I do beg that your Lordships will not underrate the practical inconvenience. If an Admiral has to be tried by court-martial, the Court must be formed either of senior flag officers or captains who are not employed afloat at the present time and consequently have very little experience of war conditions—and thus they would make a rather unsuitable Court—or his judges must be the Admirals commanding the battleship and cruiser squadrons and captains commanding battleships and cruisers of the Grand and Channel Fleets. These Fleets have to proceed to sea at a moment's notice. Their squadrons are in constant movement. The difficulties of convening and maintaining a Court under such conditions are enormous. The greatest inconvenience was caused in this respect by the trial of Admiral Troubridge, which, while it lasted, sensibly impaired the mobility of a portion of the Channel Fleet and hampered the naval operations. Again, the witnesses may be very numerous, and they must be collected from ships all over the Fleet, which is in constant movement. Many of these witnesses would be men holding positions vital to the fighting efficiency of these ships. No one can tell how long a trial would last, as in cases of this importance counsel would be employed and every latitude given to the defence. If the Court were interrupted, the whole of the proceedings might have to be recommenced; and as long as the Court sat the whole of the energies of the flag and other officers involved would be employed in connection with it.

I must again remind your Lordships that we are at war, and, furthermore, that the great naval decision has not yet

been taken. At any moment the Fleets may have to go to sea, and the work and responsibility of the Admirals in command are of the most exacting and unbroken nature. The speed and scale of modern operations and their complexity are out of all relation to those of former times. But even in the time of Nelson it is not clear that serious military advantages were not lost by the holding of courts-martial. I would remind your Lordships particularly of the fact that the court-martial on Admiral Calder led to the withdrawal from Nelson's fleet of one of its most important units on the eve of Trafalgar. If the absence of that unit had led to a different decision at Trafalgar the whole course of history might have been altered by the holding of a court-martial. Even after the court-martial is over the practical inconvenience does not cease, because the members of the Board of Admiralty have to give the closest possible attention to hundreds of pages of evidence and prepare their opinions upon it. All this may be very well or necessary after the war is over or after the enemy has been decisively beaten, but it is not a position which should be insisted upon at the present time.

Every effort has been made from hour to hour and day to day to cope with the dangers with which we are confronted, and the whole of the attention of the Admiralty must be concentrated upon the immediate urgency. It will be time afterwards to apportion responsibility for any mistakes that may have been made. For the time being the interest of this country is in the successful prosecution of the war, and that must be considered to have paramount claims. I desire most earnestly to impress that practical argument upon your Lordships. I think that practical difficulty must have been felt in old times, for I find one record of a court-martial held in 1814 on a ship which had come to grief in 1809. Well, that was after Trafalgar. Our command of the sea at that time was unchallenged and unchallengeable, but in this war the great naval battle has yet to be fought. I do not shut my eyes to the fact that this argument is carrying me rather far if it is pushed to its logical conclusion, but I use it for this purpose. It does, at any rate, clearly prove that it is undesirable at a time like this, whatever may be done later, to hold courts-martial which are unnecessary and from which

the Admiralty feels it has nothing to learn which it cannot learn in other ways. And if there are some here who think that my argument goes too far, I am authorised to state emphatically—and I can give this amount of consolation to the noble Earl—that the action of the Admiralty during the war is entirely without prejudice to any action it may deem desirable to take when the war is over.

There is one other reason why in the middle of a war, if it can be avoided, it is not advisable to have courts-martial which call for great public attention. The experience of courts-martial in the eighteenth century shows that they led to great bickerings, to constant dissatisfaction, and not infrequently actually set the nation by the ears when the energies of the nation were badly needed for the war in hand. The case of Admirals Matthews and Lestock in 1744 was one; the famous case of Admiral Byng in 1757 was another; and an even more famous case was that of Admirals Keppel and Palliser in 1779. In all those cases there were pamphlets written and debates in Parliament, some of them of a highly personal character. There was a great stir in the country, and it cannot be said that this did other than harm to the prosecution of the war in hand. On all these grounds I ask the House to pause before it adopts the Resolution of the noble Earl. In matters of the greatest possible importance, in questions of the highest strategy, in the disposition of the Fleet, in everything that is vital to the safety of these islands at the moment, we are bound to trust the Admiralty. Ought we to try to force on the Admiralty now, in regard to the loss of ships and even the loss of brave men who, alas! have gone to their deaths, the holding of courts-martial from which they are convinced they have nothing of importance to learn which they cannot discover by other means?

I have shown—indeed, it is not disputed—that no law has been broken. I have shown, I hope conclusively, that no invariable custom has been disregarded. In these circumstances the Board of Admiralty claim full and free discretion as to whether they hold courts-martial or not. This is a decision to which they have come after giving the matter their mature deliberation, and which they consider indispensable to the prosecution of the naval war in which they are engaged. In this matter they earnestly desire that the

House will support them with its confidence and goodwill. I have stated the case to the best of my knowledge and ability, and I am now content to leave it in your Lordships' hands.

The EARL OF DESART: My Lords, I desire to say a few words on this matter, and having regard to the speech to which we have just listened, what I had thought of saying may be reduced to extremely small proportions. I do not think Lord Emmott would suggest that there was anything in the speech of the noble Earl or in the Resolution itself which would necessarily affect the absolute discretion of the Admiralty in any particular case to take the course they thought fit. If it were so, I can only say that I should not support the Resolution. But it does appear to me that a great part of the noble Lord's speech was directed to meeting a case which was not made at all by the noble Earl. The noble Earl appeared to me to concede to the full that there was no absolute legal or statutory obligation on the Admiralty to hold a court-martial. Notwithstanding that he urged—I venture to think rightly—that the custom was so nearly general as to be practically universal, but that in particular circumstances the Admiralty might exercise their discretion and abstain from holding a court-martial. I venture to think that there is no word in the Resolution that necessarily fetters the Admiralty's discretion. The words of the Resolution are:—'That this House is of opinion that the established custom of the Navy by which a court-martial is held to investigate the loss of any of His Majesty's ships is founded on the best interests both of the Navy and of the public, and that it is expedient that it should be maintained.' The noble Earl himself was at pains to say that he could conceive that at the time of or immediately after a disaster which might render a court-martial desirable it might be quite inexpedient to hold a court-martial; and he gave instances in which courts-martial had been postponed to a convenient and proper time. The effect of this Resolution, therefore, would in no way be to force the hands of the Admiralty to hold a court-martial at a time when the holding of it could in any way affect the movements of the Fleet or the interests of the Service.

I am not quite clear what the Government's position is.

It will be remembered that with the exception of the case of the *Oceanic* there have, in fact, been no courts-martial in respect of the losses of ships. I am not making and do not intend to make any complaint of that. I think that every one in the country is prepared to support the Admiralty to the utmost, and I can assure the noble Lord that I speak to-night in no spirit of criticism. My desire is to understand exactly the position which the Government take up. There having been no courts-martial held, it was not unnatural that this fact should be the subject of inquiry. In my opinion the noble Lord went too far if he contested—I am not quite sure that he did contest—the statement that the holding of courts-martial in these cases was the custom of the Navy. I think he must have overlooked some words contained in Section 91 of the Naval Discipline Act, 1866. It is a very short section, and I will read the whole of it :—'When any one of Her Majesty's ships shall be wrecked or lost or destroyed, or taken by the enemy, such ship shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to remain in commission until her crew shall be regularly removed into some other of Her Majesty's ships of war, or until a court-martial shall have been held, pursuant to the custom of the Navy in such cases, to inquire into the cause of the wreck, loss, destruction, or capture of the said ship.' I think that the words 'pursuant to the custom of the Navy in such cases' can only mean one thing—that the draftsmen of that Act and the Parliament that passed it assumed that the holding of courts-martial was a general custom. I am not going to say it was invariable, for I think there were a good many exceptions.

But the real point is that attention was called in Parliament to the absence of these courts-martial, and I think that if the answer then given had been the answer that has been given to us to-night, it is quite possible that this debate might not be taking place. The First Lord of the Admiralty, in his interesting statement to the House of Commons,[1] and the Attorney-General, in the course of the same debate, said that as a matter of principle during the war disasters to His Majesty's ships would not form the subjects of courts-martial; that it should be the rule that there should not be courts-martial, and the exception that there should. That seemed to me exactly the converse of the

[1] [*See* p. 255.]

true proposition, and I think the statement led to misunderstanding.

An officer may meet with a disaster at sea in which to all appearance, as far as the public can judge, perhaps as far as his brother officers can judge, there may have been some want of caution or apparent negligence on his part. That may or may not be true; it may or may not have been the result of superior orders; but unless and until the officer in question has the customary opportunity of a court-martial he remains not only with his career damaged but with his reputation at stake. As regards the employment of officers, nobody would dispute the absolute discretion of the Admiralty; but there is something besides employment. The reputation of an officer is of great value to him, and the way in which he can re-establish his reputation, if he can, is by appealing to his brother officers who are the most competent tribunal to try the issue and to pronounce upon it. It is, in fact, the trial by his peers to which he is entitled. I do not for one moment contest that it might be extremely unsuitable to hold a court-martial at a particular moment. If the answer given by the noble Lord to-night means that in important cases or in cases where there is any real reason for it, investigation will at some time or another be made, then speaking for myself, and myself only, I should say that, both as regards the public and as regards the Service, it ought to be a fairly satisfactory answer.

But I still think there is some ambiguity in the speeches of the First Lord and the Attorney-General. Secrecy and silence, however right at the moment, are not right for ever, and at some time things may be disclosed which it might not be right to disclose at this time. In that connection there is one point that does rather press upon me. It is true that the law—because it is the law under the King's Regulations, which are statutory—provides that a court-martial should be open. I can conceive circumstances in which it would be most undesirable, certainly during the war and very likely after the war, that all the evidence produced before a court-martial and even perhaps the technical findings should be disclosed. I speak only for myself when I say that I should not be disposed to offer any opposition to an alteration of the Regulations which would empower the

Government or the Lords of the Admiralty in suitable cases and on their own responsibility to publish merely the finding —the conviction or acquittal, or something which would indicate the general result of the finding—without details. That would get rid of one difficulty. But I am certain that no member of the Government would desire to withhold anything in the way of justice from those who by their great gallantry are at this moment shielding us and providing us with relative immunity from the consequences of war, and I am sure that no action they may take or word they may say will lead any naval officer to think that at some time or another in a serious case he may not receive at the hands of his brother officers that justice which I contend with some confidence should be afforded him by the custom of the Navy over a period of certainly more than one and a half centuries. I am sorry to have troubled your Lordships at this length, but it seems to me most important that we should know to-night what is the real position taken up by the Government on this matter. I can assure them that in everything they do in the interests of the great Service for which they are responsible, they will have the support not only of this House and of the other House but of every man in this country.

The MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, perhaps before the noble Earl on the front bench opposite replies to the extremely temperate observations of my noble friend who has just sat down I may be permitted to say half a dozen words. I noted with pleasure that the noble Lord who speaks for the Admiralty told the House that he made no complaint of my noble friend (Lord Selborne) for having brought this subject before us. Indeed, it would have been impossible for His Majesty's Government to complain of the course which my noble friend has adopted, because if one thing has been established clearly by these discussions it is this, that His Majesty's Government have introduced a very marked change of policy with regard to the granting of courts-martial. It was our duty to call attention to that new departure. We have never claimed that the old practice was founded upon the letter of any Act of Parliament, but we do point to the fact that the custom of the Navy is referred to again and again in various Statutes, some of which have been quoted

this evening. My noble friend Lord Desart, in particular, quoted with great effect a clause from the Naval Discipline Act referring to the established 'custom of the Navy.' We have never contended that the custom was absolutely invariable, but we have contended, and we contend still, that it was a well-established custom; and I think the noble Lord who spoke for the Admiralty himself admitted that it was the general custom although there were exceptions, upon some of which he dwelt during the course of his argument.

That there was to be a new departure was made clear by the noble Marquess who leads the House when he made a short speech upon this subject the other day.[1] We gathered from him that the old custom was to be abandoned, and that courts-martial were to be granted only in certain cases which the noble Marquess specified with great clearness. He mentioned, in particular, cases where there had been a failure on the part of the officer in charge of a ship to obey instructions; cases in which there had been a failure to take necessary and proper precautions; cases where the officer had failed to assume responsibility which it was his duty to assume. Those were cited as the exceptional cases in which courts-martial might be granted, the rule being that trial by court-martial was no longer to be granted according to the old usage of the Navy. I think, if I may say so, that His Majesty's Government have made a mistake in attempting to minimise the extent of this change of policy. They have tried, by searching about in musty records for precedents, to show that the custom was not invariable. But beyond doubt this policy is a new departure, and a very conspicuous new departure which has attracted a great deal of attention both in and out of the Service.

[1] [*See* p. 185.]

I was not greatly impressed by the reasons adduced in support of the change. The noble Lord who speaks for the Admiralty ran over them this evening. I confess that it struck me, as he proceeded, that most of his arguments had been anticipated by my noble friend behind me (Lord Selborne), and that some, at any rate, of the reasons which he mentioned were of a singularly inconclusive character.

I take, in the first place, the plea that the conditions of naval warfare have been profoundly altered. No one will dispute that. The mine and the torpedo are new features

in naval warfare. But is that really a reason why an officer who loses his ship should not have the right of claiming a court-martial? The argument is founded upon what I believe to be a fallacy—I mean the fallacy that a court-martial involves an accusation against a particular officer. That, I think, is not so. A court-martial is instituted for two reasons —in the first place, to give the officer in charge of the ship an opportunity of clearing himself of any suspicion with regard to the manner in which he has handled her; and, in the second place, to give the public an opportunity of knowing something of the facts of the case. Surely for both of those reasons a court-martial is not less necessary because a ship has wandered into a mine-field, or otherwise got into difficulties, than it was in the days when mines and torpedoes were unknown.

Another reason that I have seen alleged seems to me also a most inconclusive one. I have seen it said that the apprehension of a court-martial would lead officers to 'play for safety' and not take risks when in the interests of the Service they ought to take them. I believe that to be a profound misconception. Let us take the case of an officer who is hesitating whether he shall take a risk or not. What is it that makes him hesitate to take it? Not because he is thinking of a court-martial when he comes home, but because he is thinking of the precious lives on board his ship, of the value of the ship itself, of the injury to the defences of the Empire if that ship should be lost. Those are the things, if anything, that would make him think twice, and not the fear of being tried by court-martial. If there is any doubt upon that point I believe that it can be resolved if His Majesty's Government would make it their business to ascertain how this matter is regarded by naval officers themselves. I am assured that in the great majority of cases if they had to set upon one side of the account the liability to be tried by court-martial and on the other the denial of the opportunity of clearing themselves and the risk of being, perhaps, subjected to penalties without a court-martial—which is a thing that may happen—they will infinitely prefer to face the court-martial rather than to abide the issue in another way.

Then comes a reason to which I am inclined to attach

more weight than to the others. The noble Lord opposite (Lord Emmott) dwelt with great force upon the detriment which would be occasioned to the Service if, at a moment when all the energies of the Navy are concentrated upon the great naval struggle which is in progress, officers were withdrawn from their ships and made to serve upon courts-martial. I think that argument is entitled to weight if you are to assume that it follows of necessity that the court-martial must be convened at once. But I think the noble Lord himself gave us cases—certainly my noble friend Lord Selborne did—where the court-martial did not take place immediately, but took place months or even, perhaps, years after the loss of the ship, and when, consequently, there would not be the same difficulty in convening the Court. If we are to accept my noble friend's Motion, I should do it with the mental reservation that I did not for a moment contemplate that a Court ought always to be assembled immediately, but that it could be assembled at whatever time the Board of Admiralty in their discretion thought convenient.

Another reason that the noble Lord advanced was the danger that in the course of these proceedings secrets might be revealed which it was desirable to keep from the public generally, and especially from the enemy. Cannot that difficulty be overcome by the simple expedient of carrying on the inquiry with closed doors and denying the publication of the evidence to the public? The very thing happened in the case of the court-martial on Admiral Troubridge. That gallant officer was acquitted, but so far as I am aware the proceedings of the Court have been carefully kept secret. I own therefore that I am not greatly impressed by the reasons which have been brought forward on the part of the Board of Admiralty. But what impressed me much more is that I thought I detected throughout the speech of the noble Lord a desire to take a much less rigid view of the case than has hitherto been taken by the Department for which he speaks. He claimed that we must allow the final discretion to rest with the Board of Admiralty. We none of us dispute that. On the contrary, we recognise to the full that the ultimate decision in all these cases must rest with the Board of Admiralty; and my noble friend went out of

his way to guard himself against any claim to deny that discretion to the Board. But we venture to suggest that this new policy—for it is a new policy—should be applied with great care and tact; and unless I misunderstood the noble Lord I gathered from him that he was prepared to admit that what was being done to-day was to be regarded as a special measure, justifiable while the war was in progress, but without prejudice to what might happen when the war was over. That is, I think, a not unimportant admission on the part of His Majesty's Government; and if I have not misinterpreted the noble Lord, I am not sure that if I were in my noble friend's place I should not be content with that assurance. But if he desires anything more, I venture to suggest—and I think that what I am suggesting is not out of accord with what was said by my noble friend on the cross benches (Lord Desart)—that my noble friend's Resolution might end with the statement that it is expedient that the established custom should be maintained, with the insertion of the words 'subject to any necessary exceptions.' That would concede to the full that liberty of judgment of which we do not desire to deprive the Board of Admiralty; and if the noble Earl (Lord Beauchamp) who is for the moment leading the House saw his way to accepting the Motion so amended, I am able to say that my noble friend behind me (Lord Selborne) would gladly insert those words.

The LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (EARL BEAUCHAMP): My Lords, the noble Marquess appreciates, I am sure, the difficulty to which he has already called attention in this House, under which we suffer when a debate of this kind is initiated here. It was only the other day that the noble Earl, Lord Curzon, referred to the disadvantage under which your Lordships' House suffers from the absence of any direct representative of the Board of Admiralty when we discuss naval matters. Your Lordships will therefore realise all the more readily the difficulty when I am asked at somewhat brief notice to accept an amendment of or an addition to a Resolution of this important kind. The noble Earl who moved the Resolution realises, no doubt, that the mere passage of it by your Lordships' House would probably not of itself affect in any way the practice of the Board of Admiralty. It would be necessary for a similar Resolution

to be passed by the House of Commons before it would become operative. In those circumstances I confess that I should deprecate the passage of this Resolution at the present time, for the reasons which have been put before your Lordships by my noble friend behind me (Lord Emmott).

It seems to me that a large part of the discussion which has taken place has ranged round one, perhaps not the most important, part of the Resolution which is now before your Lordships. Whether it be 'the established custom of the Navy' has really been the question which has attracted the attention of the noble Lords who have addressed the House. I feel it would have been of greater use had we been able to devote more time and attention to the other part of the Resolution, and to have discussed whether the discontinuance of this custom was in the best interests of the Navy and of the public. It is true that the noble Earl on the cross benches (Lord Desart) referred to it from the point of view of the Navy, and it is to that I wish to refer. Meanwhile I think it is only fair to point out that we have in the King's Regulations a perfectly clear Regulation which points out that the present practice of the Board of Admiralty is no sudden or new departure from what was contemplated in the past, because in Regulation No. 666*a* it is laid down that a court-martial should not be called unless upon full consideration of all the available information there is reasonable ground for thinking that any one or more of the survivors is to blame. It is therefore not a sudden decision that has been come to by the Board of Admiralty since the beginning of this war.

The noble Marquess who leads the Opposition was unready to lay the same emphasis upon the arguments which were used by my noble friend behind me with regard to the changed circumstances of modern warfare making any difference to the continuance of the former custom, and he specially said, I think, that courts-martial were held not only to find out what might be the cause of the loss of the ship, but more for the sake of the officer himself. To deal for one moment with the first of those questions, it is perfectly obvious that in a great many cases there is not now the same obscurity with regard to the loss of a ship as there very often was in times gone by. There does not seem to be any obscurity if

a ship has been lost by a mine. Therefore there is less need for an inquiry than there was in days when the loss might perhaps have been due to many other and different circumstances.

Let us take the case of the object for which these courts-martial should be held. I do not suppose it would be said that they should be held for the sake of the Admiralty. The Admiralty has the means, by a Court of Inquiry, of obtaining all the necessary information if the authorities do not think they possess it already. For the sake of the public? In a great many cases it was suggested by the noble Earl opposite that some of the information which was collected by the Admiralty should be withheld from the public; and I think we can all see how exceedingly reasonable that course of action would be in cases where matters of a technical kind would have to be given in evidence. On the question of privacy, it is perfectly true that in cases we can call to mind there has been no dispute on the ground that the evidence was kept private and only the conclusions given to the public. But in those cases generally the conclusions have been favourable to the officer. Your Lordships might very well consider that there might be charges, until the full evidence was given to the public, that the officer had not been fairly dealt with if the decision of the court-martial had not been in his favour.

But on behalf of the officers, is not there this consideration—namely, whether an inquiry on a specific charge is not very much fairer to the officers than such a roving inquiry as a court-martial to inquire generally into their conduct on this or that occasion? But as the noble Earl opposite no doubt realises, a court-martial on a specific charge in a case of any difficulty is always preceded by a Court of Inquiry. Definite charges are framed, and a circumstantial letter—that is the technical phrase, if I am rightly informed—which corresponds to the opening speech of the prosecutor, is given to the accused some days before the trial. The letter so given is generally perfectly clear in showing the particular respect in which the accused officer will have to make his defence. I ask your Lordships to contrast this with the position of those people whose conduct is inquired into under the other kind of court-martial. In that case there is no charge; there

is no circumstantial letter; the accused has no means of knowing what points are made against him except in so far as he may gather them as he hears the evidence. In those circumstances I believe you would generally find, in a case of this kind, that the naval officer himself would not like the inquiry to be held under the specific paragraph in the Act to which we have been referred by more than one previous speaker.

I do not know that I can usefully add anything more in answer to the observations which were addressed to your Lordships by the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition, except to deprecate once more the passage of this Resolution by your Lordships' House at a time when all our energies are concentrated upon the successful prosecution of the war. I can readily repeat the assurance which was given by my noble friend behind me with regard to the attitude of the Admiralty in these cases—that the decisions which they have so far come to have been arrived at without prejudice. And it is not in my own opinion impossible, as time goes on and we see that the present practice has not had the detrimental effects which the noble Earl fears, that even noble Lords opposite will come to see that the course which has been adopted by the Admiralty is a proper and wise one.

VISCOUNT ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I confess that I was more impressed by the opening sentences of the speech of the noble Earl who has just sat down than by the arguments which he adduced at a later stage. He began by saying that it was extremely difficult for him and for any noble Lord on the Government bench at present to say precisely what view the Admiralty would take of the Resolution if amended as my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition has suggested that it should be. What we on this side of the House feel is this. We do not want at all to interfere with the discretion of the Admiralty. We feel that there may be grave difficulties in detaching from the Service officers of high standing to attend a court-martial at the present time. We are perfectly willing to agree that the Admiralty should not be pressed in that matter, and that any court-martial that might be thought necessary by the Admiralty should be postponed until such a time as it can be conveniently taken. But we feel that the Admiralty have substituted another

custom for what up to the present time has been the custom of the Navy in these matters. That my noble friend Lord Selborne has conclusively proved. In our view it is advisable that that custom, subject of course to exceptions, as every custom must be, should be continued. But the Admiralty have reversed the custom, and made it the rule not to hold a court-martial when a ship is lost or taken by the enemy.

LORD EMMOTT: There has been no case of 'taken by the enemy.'

VISCOUNT ST. ALDWYN: Then let me say lost. Lord Emmott mentioned three cases in the China War. I am not quite sure that he did not say that one or more of those three cases was of a ship taken by the enemy; however, they were lost in an attack on forts, and that is precisely the kind of case in this war. Take the *Formidable* and other ships named by my noble friend. There the matters, so far as a layman can express an opinion, really did demand some kind of inquiry. It does suggest itself to me that it is not advisable for us to treat this as a Motion hostile to the Admiralty or to His Majesty's Government. We do not want to ask the House to divide upon it. We feel however, that, amended in the way my noble friend has suggested, it is a Motion that in substance the Admiralty, after consideration of this discussion, might find themselves able to accept; and in order that an opportunity for further consideration may be given I would venture to move the adjournment of the debate so that the House may not at the present moment, in the absence of the noble Marquess who leads the House, express any opinion at all upon the Motion.

(Motion agreed to, and adjourned *sine die*.)

BRITISH SHIPS (TRANSFER RESTRICTION) BILL

House of Commons, February 24, 1915.

Order for second reading read. *Hansard.*

Motion made, and question proposed, 'That the Bill be now read a second time.'

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE BOARD OF TRADE (MR. J. M. ROBERTSON): This is an emergency measure, to continue only during the continuance of the war. It is not so much a matter of serious necessity as of expediency to

make clear the legal powers of the Board of Trade. In December last the Board of Trade issued a circular inviting all persons interested to consult with them, and they have had no difficulty whatever in persuading shipowners to carry out their wishes. I need not point out how dangerous it would be that ships should be transferred to neutrals in the present state of things. The shipowners have shown themselves very ready indeed to assent to the wishes of the Board of Trade. There is always the possibility of some person raising the question of the legal powers possessed by the Board of Trade, which are not so full as we wish. If we have no legal power to prevent an owner from transferring his ship, this Bill gives power to the Board to refuse to permit the transfer of a British ship unless the Board are satisfied of the expediency of the transfer. I need hardly point out that it gives power that the Board should be satisfied that there is no objectionable transaction. The object of the Bill is to make definite and clear the legal power of the Department to prevent an undesirable transfer.

MR. RUTHERFORD: I think we ought to be grateful to the hon. member representing the Board of Trade who tells us that the object of the measure is to make matters clear. It seems to me that although he admitted the Bill now before the House is an emergency Bill it is really a piece of panic legislation. The first clause of the Bill says:—'A transfer made after the twelfth day of February, nineteen hundred and fifteen, of a British ship registered in the United Kingdom, or a share therein, to a person not qualified to own a British ship, shall not have any effect.' Down to that point the clause appears to be fairly clear. If a transfer were made to-day of a British ship registered in Great Britain to somebody who was not qualified to own it, it would not have any effect, and, therefore, the clause amounts to nothing whatever. Down to that point it simply states a self-evident fact. But going on another word or two, it says:—'Unless the transfer is approved by the Board of Trade.' I think that if the intention is to give the Board of Trade power to approve of the transfer of a British ship to somebody who is not entitled at present to have it transferred to him, then the Board of Trade ought to tell us so, and the House of Commons would know that it is sought to pass an Act of

Parliament enabling somebody who hitherto has not been able to own a British ship to own one for the first time. I listened carefully to the explanation given by the hon. member, and certainly it did not convey to my mind that the effect of this Bill, if passed, was going to be to enable a British ship to be transferred to somebody who at present is not capable of owning it.

MR. PRINGLE: Then it would cease to be a British ship.

MR. RUTHERFORD: Then there is an end to the transaction. But, if I may respectfully call the attention of the hon. member to the fact, this is the assent to the transfer of a British ship registered in the United Kingdom, and it does not say anything whatever on the lines indicated by the hon. member. It is perfectly true that that may be the intention, and if that is the intention of this Bill I think that we ought to be informed of it. Then the second clause makes an exception as regards ships registered in certain places, and we have had no explanation as to why British India, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand should be left out. Why British ships or ships belonging to British citizens who may live in parts of the world other than those mentioned here should be treated differently is something of which we have had no explanation. I think that when we are told that the new Bill, which is now being introduced, is intended to operate only during the war, and when it is placed before us and we are trying our best to make out what is its real intention, we ought to be very careful, for the sake of a few minutes in this House, to see whether we can really understand what is sought to be done.

MR. ROBERTSON: I quite agree with the hon. member that we should be very careful in regard to all legislation of this kind. In reference to his first point, I may say that the clause simply follows the forms of words already found in the Merchant Shipping Act, and is simply to prevent a British ship from being transferred to any outside owner where it might not be desirable to allow the transfer to take place. The phrase 'person entitled to own a British ship' is the wording of the Merchant Shipping Act, and it is desirable to keep the wording of the various Merchant Shipping Acts as far as possible on the same lines. In the cases mentioned in the Schedule, which are excluded from the operation of

the Act, they themselves will regulate the shipping. British India, the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of South Africa, New Zealand, and Newfoundland, will regulate shipping themselves. That is an understood thing. The purpose of the Bill simply is to regulate shipping in the United Kingdom and those ports where there is British control.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill read a second time, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House for to-morrow (Thursday).

PRIZE SHIPS

House of Commons, February 24, 1915.

Hansard. MR. FELL asked the First Lord of the Admiralty why the three prize ships which have been lying at Cape Town since last August cannot be at once sent on to their respective destinations under prize crews and there unloaded, and the British cargo delivered to the British consignees and the doubtful or foreign cargo landed and left for future decision, and the ships then utilised for commerce, in which they are so needed?

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA): It is not possible to undertake the expense and risk of dealing with other people's property in this manner, unless the owners, or some one on their behalf, will indemnify the Admiralty against expense and loss. Arrangements with this object in view are practically complete, and, as a matter of fact, one vessel—the *Birkenfels*—was on the 11th instant handed over to the representative of the shipping company which has been entrusted with the contract for the purpose of being prepared for the voyage. Arrangements for the other vessels are in progress. It should be understood that this procedure involves a departure from procedure previously observed in regard to prize ships, and the arrangements have involved a great deal of telegraphing and communication with various authorities.

MINE-SWEEPERS

ibid. MR. TICKLER asked the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty if his attention has been called to the services rendered

by the mine-sweeper *Solon*, No. 55, to the steamship *Gallier*, which had struck a mine off Scarborough on the night of 25th December last; that the skipper, T. Trengall, R.N.R., has been awarded the D.S.O. for approaching this vessel through a mine-field at great risk; and whether he cannot see his way clear to recognise the services of at any rate some of the crew, who risked their lives so freely and ungrudgingly, as this has already been done in another case?

DR. MACNAMARA: I have only just received the hon. member's question, and I have not had time to make due inquiry. I will do so and communicate with the hon. member at once.

FREIGHTS

House of Commons, February 25, 1915.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, in spite of the use of the interned steamers, the expected reduction in freights from the Tyne to London has not taken place; and what is now the rate? *Hansard.*

MR. ROBERTSON: My right hon. friend has requested me to answer this question. There was some reduction in freights when these vessels started running, but there was afterwards an upward tendency. I understand that 14s. 6d. was the last rate paid to an outside boat, and 12s. to an interned steamer.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, in order to ease the freight rates for coal from the Tyne to London, he can arrange for some of the colliers which take coal from Cardiff to the North Sea Fleet to take a cargo from the Tyne to London on the way back instead of returning empty?

MR. ROBERTSON: Certain colliers have already been temporarily released by the Admiralty for the purpose indicated, and the practice will be continued so far as Fleet considerations permit.

SIR FORTESCUE FLANNERY: Would the hon. gentleman consider the desirability of representing to the Admiralty that they should pay part of the excessive rate out of the savings on the hire of these colliers at 4s. per ton?

MR. ROBERTSON: I will convey the suggestion to the Admiralty.

INVALID MILITARY PRISONERS

Hansard. *House of Commons, February* 25, 1915.

MR. YERBURGH asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether he is aware that Admiral Chilcott and Colonel Stratton, both invalids of over sixty-five years of age, who were sent from Nauheim to Giessen *en route* for the concentration camp at Ruhleben, but were too ill to proceed there, were sent back to Nauheim and are still detained at that place; and whether, as on the grounds that they were military prisoners of war they were not permitted to leave Germany with other British persons of over fifty-five years of age, steps can be now taken for their early release in exchange for invalid military prisoners in this country?

SIR E. GREY: The German Government refused to include Admiral Chilcott and Colonel Stratton among those who were released as being over the age of fifty-five on the ground that they were retired officers and possibly capable of performing some military duties. On 10th December His Majesty's Government proposed that these two retired officers should be included among those to be released as certified incapacitated for military service. The German Government refused this suggestion, and stated that the release of these officers should form the subject of special negotiation. His Majesty's Government informed the United States Ambassador on 20th January that any reasonable proposal on this matter would be entertained. His Majesty's Government at the same time pointed out that they could not offer prisoners of the same category in exchange as such individuals had not been detained in this country, but that they were prepared to exchange for these officers two German subjects equally valueless from a military point of view. No reply has been received to this communication, but the matter will continue to receive the attention of His Majesty's Government.

LOSS OF H.M.S. *BULWARK* (OFFICERS' PENSIONS)

ibid. MR. PERKINS asked the Secretary to the Admiralty whether the scale of officers' pensions to be paid in respect of the loss of the *Bulwark* has now been settled?

DR. MACNAMARA: No, Sir. The matter is still under consideration, the present position being that the Admiralty, in conjunction with the War Office, are drawing up a scheme of pensions for the widows and children of officers which it is hoped to transmit for the consideration of the Select Committee at an early date. In the case of the *Bulwark* the pensions are meanwhile being paid under Scale B.

MR. CHURCHILL'S INTERVIEW IN THE *MATIN*

MR. JOWETT asked the Prime Minister if the opinion recently *ibid.*
expressed by the First Lord of the Admiralty to a *Matin* interviewer,[1] to the effect that should France and Russia withdraw from participation in the European War Great Britain would fight to the bitter end, was published with the authority and sanction of His Majesty's Government?

[1] [*See* p. 164.]

The PRIME MINISTER (MR. ASQUITH): My right hon. friend specially stated in the interview that he could not conceive that such a contingency could arise, and I am in absolute agreement with him. I see no reason to differ from the views he expressed in the interview.

GERMANY AND BRITISH MERCHANT SHIPS

MR. YERBURGH asked the Prime Minister whether the *ibid.*
hospital ship *Asturias* was attacked by the torpedo of a German submarine off Havre on the 25th January 1915; whether two British merchant ships were torpedoed without warning by a German submarine off the north-west coast of France on the 30th January; whether it is now the avowed policy of the German Admiralty to torpedo merchant ships wherever met with in British waters without warning; and whether, in view of the acts which have been committed and the policy now announced, His Majesty's Government will consider the desirability of issuing a Proclamation declaring that the crews of German vessels which may be captured where engaged in operations which contravene the rules of civilised warfare will be treated as criminals and not as prisoners of war?

The PRIME MINISTER: The facts are correctly stated in the first three parts of the question. As regards the last

part, I must refer the hon. member to the answer which I gave to the noble Lord the Member for Portsmouth on 22nd February.[1]

[1] [*See* p. 414.]

STATISTICS OF THE ENEMY BLOCKADE

Times, Feb. 26, 1915.

The Secretary of the Admiralty authorises the publication of the following figures :—

ARRIVALS AND SAILINGS OF OVERSEA STEAMERS (OVER 300 TONS) OF ALL NATIONALITIES AT UNITED KINGDOM PORTS

Week.	Arrivals.	Sailings.
Dec. 31 to Jan. 6	605	575
Jan. 7 to 13	632	723
Jan. 14 to 20	821	763
Jan. 21 to 27	823	680
Jan. 28 to Feb. 3	677	743
Feb. 4 to 10	754	664
Feb. 11 to 17	752	686
Feb. 18 to 24	708	673

BRITISH VESSELS SUNK BY GERMAN SUBMARINES (SINCE FEBRUARY 18)

Date.	Ship.	Tons.	Position.
Feb. 20.	*Cambank*	3112	Off Anglesey
,, 20.	*Downshire*	337	Off Calf of Man
,, 23.	*Branksome Chine*	2026	Off Hastings
,, 24.	*Oakby*	1976	Off Beachy Head
,, 24.	*Rio Parana*	4015	Off Beachy Head
,, 24.	*Western Coast*	1165	Off Beachy Head
,, 24.	*Harpalion*	5867	Off Beachy Head

N.B.—S.S. *Deptford*, sunk off Scarborough on February 24, probably struck a mine.

PASSENGER TRAFFIC TO HOLLAND

HOME OFFICE RESTRICTIONS

ibid.

The following arrangements have been made by the Home Secretary, in consultation with the naval and military authorities and the Foreign Office :—

1. On and after Monday, March 8, no person other than a person in His Majesty's service or a person who is a member of, or is travelling on behalf of, a foreign mission, will be allowed to embark for Holland, at Folkestone or Tilbury, until he has obtained a permit issued by the Home Office.

2. Application should be made in person at the Permit Office, Downing Street, between the hours of 10 A.M. and 4 P.M. on week days, on and after Thursday, March 4, and should be made at least three days before the date of sailing. Permits will be issued with as little delay as possible, but the office cannot guarantee their issue in any definite time in cases where inquiry is necessary.

3. All applicants will be required to produce their passports with their photographs attached and their certificates of registration, if any, and must furnish the names and addresses of two British subjects to whom references can be made. They must also produce satisfactory evidence as to the object of their journey.

4. Employés of firms, or persons acting on behalf of firms or other persons must, in addition, produce certificates from their employers as to the nature of the business on which they are proceeding abroad.

5. In the case of persons living at a distance from London, a preliminary application may be made in writing.

Not less than one week after making the written application, a personal application must be made at the Permit Office and the passport produced, except in cases where the permit has already been refused.

NOTICE TO MARINERS

(No. 137 of the year 1915)

IRISH CHANNEL—NORTH CHANNEL

Restriction of Navigation

Mariners are hereby warned that, under the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Regulations, 1914, the following Order is made :— *L.G.*, Feb. 26, 1915.

The navigation and use of the undermentioned area is entirely forbidden to all ships and vessels of every size and nationality :—

Bounded on the North-West by a line joining (*a*) and (*b*) :
(*a*) Latitude 55° 22½′ N., Longitude 6° 17′ W.
(*b*) Latitude 55° 31′ N., Longitude 6° 02′ W.
Bounded on the South-East by a line joining (*c*) and (*d*) :
(*c*) Latitude 55° 10½′ N., Longitude 5° 24½′ W.
(*d*) Latitude 55° 02′ N., Longitude 5° 40½′ W.
Bounded on the South-West by a line joining (*a*) and (*d*).
Bounded on the North-East by a line joining (*b*) and (*c*).

All traffic wishing to proceed through the North Channel must pass to the southward of Rathlin Island between Sunrise and Sunset ; no ship or vessel is to be within four miles of Rathlin Island between Sunset and Sunrise.

This Order is to take effect from the 23rd February 1915.

Authority.—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

By Command of their Lordships,
J. F. PARRY, *Hydrographer.*

Hydrographic Department, Admiralty, London,
22nd February 1915.

U-BOAT ATTACKED BY S.S. *THORDIS*

Times, Mar. 2, 1915.

The captain of the steamer *Thordis*, bound from Blyth to Plymouth, which arrived at Weymouth yesterday, claims to have sunk a German submarine off Beachy Head.

Times, Mar. 4, 1915.

The British steamer *Thordis* arrived at Plymouth on Tuesday night, and was boarded at daylight by Mr. Carozzi, editor of *Syren and Shipping*, who is investigating whether the ship sank a German submarine and was entitled to the *Syren* award of £500 and other awards totalling £1160.

The entry in the official log was as follows :—

'At sea, February 28.—About 9.30 morning, while proceeding from Blyth towards Plymouth (Beachy Head bearing N.E. by N., distance eight to ten miles), observed periscope of submarine on starboard bow. Ordered all hands on deck in case of emergency. Then observed submarine pass across our bow on to port beam, where it took up position thirty to forty yards off. Shortly after, noticed wake of torpedo on starboard beam. Put helm hard over to starboard and ran

over periscope, when I and crew heard and felt a crash under the bottom. Did not see submarine after, but saw oil floating on the water. Proceeded on voyage.

'(Signed) J. W. BELL, *master*; JOHN PEGG, *mate*.'

The crew are convinced that the submarine was sunk. The *Thordis* will probably be dry-docked at Plymouth on Admiralty account.

The editor of *Syren and Shipping* is of opinion that the statement of the captain and crew confirms the first report as to the sinking of the submarine. Meanwhile, he awaits the report of the Admiralty examination of the dry-docking of the vessel, which may afford corroborative evidence. It is interesting to note that the *Thordis* only received British registration three days before leaving Blyth, having previously sailed under the Norwegian flag.

In conversation yesterday Captain Bell said :—

'At no time was the conning-tower visible, but at intervals the periscope could be discerned, sometimes six feet clear of the water and sometimes almost submerged. Suddenly we saw her alter her course, and at a distance of 500 or 700 yards she launched a torpedo at us. We were able to watch its wake through the water and our lifeboats were got ready. The steamer was by this time almost stopped, and this really accounted for our escape. As we pitched heavily in the seaway, the torpedo passed clear under our stern without touching the *Thordis*. The general opinion is that something then went wrong with the machinery of the submarine. She closed on the collier, and when the latter was thrown by the seas right on top of her, there was a crash, the noise of rending plates, a shock felt all over the steamer, and then a quantity of oil came to the surface. The periscope disappeared from view, and nothing more was seen of the submarine.'

The Secretary of the Admiralty made the following announcement last night :— *Times*, Mar. 6, 1915.

The S.S. *Thordis* has been examined in dry dock, and the injuries to her keel and propeller confirm the evidence of Captain Bell and the crew, that on the 28th February the

vessel rammed and in all probability sank a German submarine which had fired a torpedo at her.

Times, Mar. 8, 1915.

The following is circulated through German wireless stations under date Berlin, May 7 :—

With regard to the reports in the English press that the formerly Norwegian, now English, steamer *Thordis* rammed and sank on February 28 off Beachy Head a German submarine which had apparently attacked it, the Wolff Bureau in Berlin learns from reliable sources that on February 28 a steamer tried to sink one of our submarines by ramming it, it is true, but that the submarine suffered inconsiderable damage only, and that it has safely returned to its home port.

Times, Mar. 19, 1915.

When the steamship *Thordis*, which rammed a German submarine in the Channel, arrived in the docks of the Manchester Ship Canal yesterday, the agents of the ship handed to Captain Bell a letter in the following terms which they had received from the Admiralty : "I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to inform you that they have granted a temporary commission of lieutenant in the Royal Naval Reserve to Captain J. W. Bell, of the steamship *Thordis*, to date from February 28. (2) I am further to inform you that the King has been graciously pleased to award the Distinguished Service Cross to Lieutenant Bell for his services in command of the *Thordis* on the aboye-mentioned date, when he rammed a German submarine."

Times, Mar. 20, 1915.

The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement :—

The following gentleman has been granted a temporary commission as lieutenant in the Royal Naval Reserve : John William Bell, captain of the steamship *Thordis*. Dated February 28, 1915.

The King has been graciously pleased to award the Distinguished Service Cross to the undermentioned officer :—

"Lieutenant John William Bell, Royal Naval Reserve, of

the steamship *Thordis*, for his gallant and spirited conduct in ramming a German submarine, which had fired a torpedo at the *Thordis*, on the 28th of February 1915.

The *Syren and Shipping* has decided that the first British merchant vessel to sink a German submarine is the steamer *Thordis*, 501 tons, which, on the morning of February 28, sank one of these craft off Beachy Head. The *Syren and Shipping* award of £500, with other sums subscribed by its readers amounting in all to £660, therefore goes to the captain and crew of the *Thordis*. *Times*, Mar. 30, 1915.

The following German war news is officially circulated through German wireless stations and received by the Marconi Company :— *Times*, April 19, 1915.

Berlin, April 17, 1915.

The *Shipping Gazette* of March 26 reports that the captain of the steamer *Thordis*, arriving in Manchester on April 18, received a letter from the Admiralty, whereby the rank of Lieutenant in the Royal Marine Reserve, and, in the name of the King, the Medal for Special Merit were awarded him for the ramming of a German submarine. It is thereby proved that the English Government approves and rewards the attitude of its commercial vessels which make attacks on armed vessels contrary to international law, and therefore step outside the sphere of international law. Such vessels may now less than ever expect warning or consideration.

PROMOTIONS, APPOINTMENTS, HONOURS, AND REWARDS.

Admiralty, 4th February 1915

Royal Naval Reserve

The King has been graciously pleased to confer the Royal Naval Reserve Officers' Decoration upon the following Officer :— *L.G.*, Feb. 9, 1915.

Engineer William Henry Reynolds.

CENTRAL CHANCERY OF THE ORDERS OF KNIGHTHOOD

Lord Chamberlain's Office,
St. James's Palace, S.W.,
8th February 1915.

L.G., Feb. 12, 1915.

The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following promotion in the Most Honourable Order of the Bath in recognition of the meritorious services of the under-mentioned Officer during the War :—

To be an additional member of the Military Division of the First Class or Knights Grand Cross :—

Admiral Sir John Rushworth Jellicoe, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.

L.G., Feb. 16, 1915.

The following gentleman has been granted a temporary commission as Lieutenant in the Royal Naval Reserve :—

William Henry Propert, Captain of the steamship *Laertes*. Dated 10th February 1915.

The King has been graciously pleased to award the Distinguished Service Cross to Lieutenant William Henry Propert, Royal Naval Reserve, of the steamship *Laertes*, for his gallant and spirited conduct in command of his unarmed ship when attacked by the gunfire and torpedo of an enemy submarine on the 10th February 1915.[1]

[1] [*See* pp. 220-1.]

Admiralty, 13th February 1915

Royal Naval Reserve

L.G., Feb. 16, 1915.

The King has been graciously pleased to confer the Royal Naval Reserve Officers' Decoration upon the following Officers :

Lieutenant-Commander Walter Heaver Abraham Sugden.
Lieutenant-Commander Edmund Kemp.
Engineer John Davies.
Paymaster Jeremiah Jeremiah Leonard.

Admiralty, February 16, 1915

Brigade Staff

Royal Naval Division.

L.G., Feb. 19, 1915.

Captain W. L. Maxwell, 127th Baluchis, to be a Brigade-Major with the temporary rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the Royal Marines. Dated 21st August 1914.

Admiralty, February 22, 1915

In accordance with the provisions of His late Majesty's Order in Council of the 8th December 1903 :— *L.G.*; Feb. 26, 1915.

Rear-Admiral Reginald Arthur Allenby, M.V.O., has been placed on the Retired List at his own request. Dated 18th February 1915.

Consequent thereon, the following promotion has been made from the same date :—

Captain Cecil Frederick Dampier, A. de C., to be Rear-Admiral.

Admiralty, February 25, 1915

The King has been graciously pleased to confer the Decoration of the Royal Red Cross on Miss Mary Barbara Bennet, Sister in Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service. *L.G.*, Feb. 26, 1915.

DETENTIONS OR CAPTURES OF ENEMY SHIPS OR CARGOES

Vessels Detained or Captured at Sea by His Majesty's Armed Forces

(In continuation of previous notification published in the *London Gazette* of January 29, 1915.)[1] *L.G.*, Feb. 12, 1915.

List of Vessels

Name and Tonnage.	Nationality.	Where detained.
Heldos (1934)	Norwegian	Falmouth
Uffe (1869)	Danish	Leith

[1] [See p. 153.]

Ships whose Cargoes, or part of them, have been detained

(In continuation of previous notification published in the *London Gazette* of January 29, 1915.)

LIST OF VESSELS

Name.	Nationality.	Cargo detained at
Cacique	British	Hull
Esneh	British	Liverpool
O. B. Suhr	Danish	Hull
Sandefjord	Norwegian	Halifax (N.S.)

Foreign Office, February 11, 1915.

ADMIRALTY MONTHLY ORDERS

Admiralty, March 1, 1915.

108.—*Rewards to Coast Watchers and Civilians on Shore*

The Admiralty offer the following rewards to persons on shore for information concerning hostile Submarines, Minelayers, and other War Vessels, and for reports of Mines washed up :—

	Amount not to exceed a Maximum of—
For information which directly leads to the actual capture or destruction of an Enemy War Vessel down to and including a Minelayer or Submarine	100 *l.*
For information which leads to the Enemy War Vessel, Minelayer or Submarine being sighted and chased, the information being proved to be accurate although the Vessel was not destroyed	25 *l.*
For information of the movements of Enemy War Vessels, or other Vessels engaged in minelaying or other hostile or suspicious action, the information being proved to be accurate and valuable and delivered at the earliest possible moment	5 *l.*
For the first report of a Mine washed up on shore, in cases where the Mine is actually recovered	1 *l.*

Persons living near the sea are advised to ascertain the address of the nearest Coastguard, Naval Officer or Head Coastwatcher in their district.

If they observe hostile Vessels they should report immediately to him either personally or, if he is at a distance, by telegraph, stating:—

(1) Number of Vessels sighted.
(2) Description, *i.e.*, Submarine, Destroyer, large hostile Warship, or suspected hostile fishing Vessel.
(3) Place off which sighted.
(4) Direction in which moving, and speed (*i.e.*, whether fast or slow).

Only Vessels actually seen should be reported, not matters of hearsay or rumour. In no circumstances should the making of the report be delayed. Messages or telegrams should be signed with the name and address of the person communicating them.

Mines washed ashore should be reported in the same way, but should not be touched.

The amount of the reward will be determined by the Senior Naval Officer. Rewards to Crews of Fishing and other Vessels are on a different scale which is announced in a separate poster.

Admiralty, 4th February 1915.

Copies of the above notice in poster form have been distributed to Senior Naval Officers in the United Kingdom, and to officers of the Board of Trade, Board of Customs, Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, Scottish Office (for Fishery Board for Scotland), Board of Agriculture and Technical Instruction in Ireland, Royal Irish Constabulary, Congested Districts Board for Ireland.

The rewards are payable to paid as well as unpaid watchers.

110.—*Lights on Motor-Cars, etc.*

. . . Orders have been given to the Police by the Home Office and Scottish Office under Regulation 11 of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Regulations, 1914, directing that

in all places where the lighting of the streets has been reduced, whether by Order made by the Home Secretary or Secretary for Scotland, or by a competent Naval or Military Authority, or otherwise, the use of powerful lights on motor or other vehicles is prohibited until further order.

The Police have been informed that it has been found that the rays from a powerful motor headlight may, where the general lighting has been reduced, illuminate the streets or buildings sufficiently to enable an aircraft to identify its position and thus defeat one of the main objects for which the lighting has been reduced. The purpose of the Order is to prevent the use of brilliant lights of this description; it is not intended to interfere with the carrying of lights which are reasonably necessary for safe driving at ordinary speeds.

III.—*Fishing in Moray Firth—Relaxation in the Orders prohibiting*

The following relaxations in the orders prohibiting fishing in Moray Firth have been approved, viz. :—

(*a*) Permission to fish to be given to sail and motor boats only.

(*b*) Fishing to be permitted along the coastline only within eight miles of low-water mark. Dredging for bait to be also permitted within this area.

(*c*) Fishing vessels to return to port by 10.0 P.M., and not to leave port before daylight.

(*d*) The area between a line drawn from Tarbat Ness to Findhorn and a line drawn from South Sutor to Nairn Lighthouse to be entirely prohibited for fishing.

(*e*) In case of fog, fishing vessels are to return to Port.

(*f*) Fishing will be entirely at fishermen's risk, and no compensation claims whatever will be entertained for damage or loss of boats and fishing gear, or for personal injury or loss of life.

It must be understood that Torpedo Craft, etc., are constantly patrolling the waters of Moray Firth, running at high speed. Fishing boats will incur considerable risk, and damage or destruction of fishing gear will very likely result.

(*g*) Every vessel or boat fishing in the above area is to be provided with a permit issued by the Fishery Board for Scotland, and countersigned by or on behalf of the Rear-Admiral, Invergordon.

(*h*) Fishermen failing to comply with the above regulations are liable to have their fish confiscated by any patrol vessel, and are liable to severe legal penalties under the provisions of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914.

(*i*) It is hoped that all fishermen will co-operate with the Naval Authorities in seeing these rules are complied with; if they are abused all fishing will again have to be stopped.

(*j*) Nothing contained in these orders shall be deemed to authorise fishing in any place where it is forbidden by Law or by Local Regulations.

112.—*Naval Air Service—Reorganisation*

The existing arrangements for the administration of the Naval Air Service have been under consideration, and it has been decided that in consequence of the great development which has taken place recently in this branch of the Naval Service, the existing organisation is no longer capable of yielding the best results.

2. The present system, which if the ordinary naval procedure were strictly observed would have necessitated Admiralty orders to Air Stations being issued through the Commander-in-Chief at the Nore, is especially unsuited for a state of war, and has, in fact, already been modified in practice.

3. Their Lordships have accordingly decided that the whole of the Naval Air Service, including Air Stations, Seaplanes, Aeroplanes, Airships, Balloons, Kites, and Seaplane Carriers, shall forthwith, subject to any exceptions which may be approved by them hereafter, be placed under the orders of the Director of the Air Department, who will be solely responsible to the Board of Admiralty for its proper administration.

4. In the event, therefore, of Commanders-in-Chief and

others needing aircraft assistance, they must apply, if time permits, to the Admiralty, in order that the necessary steps can be taken to detail aircraft for their service without upsetting the general arrangements. In emergency, application is to be made to the Air Station concerned, the Commanding Officer of which is to use his utmost endeavours to meet requirements.

5. The title 'Inspecting Captain of Aircraft' will be abolished, and the Officer at present holding that appointment will be appointed to H.M.S. *President*, for duty on the staff of the Director of the Air Department for carrying out inspectional duties as ordered.

6. All officers and men of the Naval Air Service who are at present borne in H.M.S. *Pembroke* are to be transferred to the books of H.M.S. *President*, the accounts being actually kept at Deptford until it becomes possible to transfer them to district pay offices which it is proposed to establish, and as to which further instructions will be given in due course.

7. Subject to any special arrangements which may be approved from time to time by their Lordships, the officers in charge of any Air Station will be responsible to the D.A.D. for the general conduct and efficiency of the establishment, but he will keep the local Commanders-in-Chief or Senior Naval Officers informed of all such matters as concern them.

8. It is intended that the relation of the Naval Air Service to local Senior Naval Officers shall be similar to that of the Coastguard, with such modifications as may be desirable. . . .

114.—*Officers—Periods of Half Pay and Scale of Full Pay*

Discharge to Half Pay (or to Retired Pay in the case of Officers re-employed from the Retired, Reserved, or Emergency Lists) for periods of less than a month (thirty days) is abolished as from the 1st January 1915 for all Officers below the rank or relative rank of Captain except in the case of prolonged sickness, for misconduct, or at an Officer's own request.

The following revised rates of full pay have been approved, to take effect as from the 1st January 1915 :—

	Present Scale.			New Scale.		
	s.	d.		s.	d.	
Lieutenant, R.N., on promotion	10	0	a day,	11	0	a day.
,, ,, after 4 years	11	0	,,	12	0	,,
Sub-Lieutenant	5	0	,,	7	6	,,
Assistant Paymaster, on promotion	5	0	,,	7	6	,,
,, ,, after 2 years	7	0	,,	7	6	,,

Note.—The above rates of pay to apply to Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants, R.N.R. and R.N.V.R., and to Assistant Paymasters, R.N.V.R., except Assistant Paymasters, R.N.V.R., serving in the Royal Naval Division.

Royal Marine Officers entered prior to 1st January 1912

	s.	d.		s.	d.	
Lieutenant, R.M.A. or R.M.L.I. :—						
After 3 years—						
R.M.A.	7	5	a day,	8	6	a day.
R.M.L.I.	7	0	,,	8	6	,,
After 6 years—						
Both	9	0	,,	10	0	,,

Note.—Afloat pay in both cases to be the same as shore pay.

	s.	d.		s.	d.	
Captain, R.M.A. or R.M.L.I. :—						
Under 1 year—						
R.M.A.	12	1	a day,	12	6	a day.
R.M.L.I.	11	7	,,	12	6	,,
After 1 year—						
R.M.A.	12	7	,,	12	6	,,
R.M.L.I.	12	0	,,	12	6	,,

Note.—Afloat pay to be 12s. 6d. a day under one year, and 13s. a day over one year, as at present.

Captains now in receipt of the rate of 12s. 7d. a day to retain it.

Royal Marine Officers entered after 1st January 1912

	Present Scale.			New Scale.		
	s.	d.		s.	d.	
Probationary 2nd Lieutenants, after 2 years	6	0	a day,	7	6	a day.
Lieutenants, R.M., on promotion	10	0	,,	11	0	,,
Captain, R.M., on promotion	12	0	,,	12	6	,,

Quartermasters, R.M.

Present Scale.		New Scale.	
R.M.A.	R.M.L.I.	R.M.A.	R.M.L.I.
On appointment—			
s. *d.*	*s.* *d.*	*s.* *d.*	*s.* *d.*
9 6 a day,	9 0 a day,	10 6 a day,	10 0 a day.
After 5 years—			
11 0 a day,	10 6 ,,	12 0 ,,	11 6 ,,
After 10 years—			
12 6 a day,	12 0 ,,	13 6 ,,	13 0 ,,
After 15 years—			
14 0 a day,	13 6 ,,	15 0 ,,	14 6 ,,
After 20 years—			
15 6 a day,	15 0 ,,	16 6 ,,	16 0 ,,

115.—*Acting Mate (E)—Promotion to*

The normal system of qualification for promotion to Acting Mate (E) is suspended for the present, and the following arrangements are to be made temporarily :—

The qualifications of any junior Warrant Officers and Petty Officers who are recommended by their Commanding Officers for promotion are to be considered by a Committee of Officers in each Squadron appointed by the Flag Officer in command, and the names of those who are held to be in all respects suitable for Commissioned Rank are to be forwarded at once to the Admiralty through the usual channels. From these candidates a selection will be made for immediate promotion to Acting Mate (E). All candidates so promoted will be required to undergo courses after the termination of the war.

116.—*R.N.R. Officers in Auxiliary Patrol—Allowances*

The under-mentioned allowances are payable to Royal Naval Reserve Officers in the Auxiliary Patrol service, except those Officers who have signed the form of agreement T. 124*b* at inclusive rates of pay. (*No allowances are payable to the last-mentioned Officers*) :—

Commanding Officers—		
Command Money when in command of a trawler, drifter, or yacht or groups of such vessels—		
	s. d.	
Captains and Commanders .	5 0 a day	
Lieutenant Commanders and Lieutenants .	3 9 a day plus 1s. a day additional full pay.	In addition to mess allowance 2s., and Victualling allowance 1s. 5d. a day.
Sub-Lieutenants and Warrant Officers . .	2 0 a day	
Navigating Officers—		
(*a*) Navigating allowance to Officers who possess a deep-sea master certificate . .	2 6 a day	

Hard-lying Money is payable to Officers living in trawlers and drifters at the following rates :—

	s.	*d.*	
Lieutenants and Officers of higher rank .	3	0	a day
Sub-Lieutenants and Warrant Officers .	2	0	,,

(*a*) *Note.*—The names of Officers paid N. allowance under the authority of this Weekly Order should be immediately reported to the Accountant-General.

Navigating allowance is not payable to Officers who do not possess the deep-sea master's certificate, and if any such Officers have received the allowance payment should cease as from 1st instant, and the amount paid to 31st December last should be reported to the Accountant-General.

130.—*Service Motor Cars—Offences by Drivers*

Numerous cases have recently been brought to notice by the Police Authorities of offences by drivers of Service motor cars.

Officers and men employed on duties connected with Service motor cars and motor cycles are, therefore, to make themselves acquainted with the legal enactments on the subject of the driving, etc., of motor vehicles, in order that these provisions may be observed.

The mere fact that a machine belongs to H.M. Service does not by itself afford a justification for the non-observance of the law.

133.—*Desertions from Hired Ships, etc.*

In cases of desertion from ships taken up on hire or otherwise by the Admiralty, the crews of which are subject to Naval Discipline, a Warrant for the deserter's arrest should in every case be issued, irrespective of whether the deserter's services are required on board the ship from which he has deserted, the question of his detention or discharge being deferred until his arrest is effected.

A return should also be rendered to the Director of Transports showing the name and rating of the deserter, his ship and place of desertion, with particulars as to the disposal of his effects.

134.—*Post Office Savings Bank Accounts*

Considerable difficulty having been experienced at the Post Office Savings Bank in tracing the Accounts of Seamen, R.N., whose Deposit Books have been lost with their Ships, steps should be taken to bring before the notice of Ships' Companies the desirability of all Depositors in the Post Office Savings Bank furnishing some relative or friend on shore with (1) the name of the Post Office at which his Account was opened, and (2) the number of the Account. These particulars are printed on the outside cover of Deposit Books, and if quoted in any application respecting an Account would enable the Post Office to refer to it without delay.

INDEX

Aboukir, H.M.S., loss of:
Admiralty tribute, 312-13.
Non-holding of court-martial:
Lord C. Beresford on, 268-73.
Mr. Falle on, 278.
Dr. Macnamara on, 312-13.
Viscount St. Aldwyn on, 455.
Earl of Selborne on, 54, 432-3.
Adjutant, S.S., driven ashore at mouth of Rufiji, and crew made prisoners, 206.
Admiralty, *see under* Great Britain.
Aerial Navigation:
British raids:
Belgian ports, 236-7, 393-4.
Cuxhaven, Earl of Selborne on, 52.
Zeebrugge, 127.
French raids on Belgian coast, 236-7, 394.
German airships, loss of *L 3* and *L 4*, 398.
German attempt to drop bombs on vessels going to rescue survivors of *Blücher*, 124.
German raid on Dunkirk, 127.
German raiders, treatment of, question and answer in the House, 231.
Zeppelin raids:
on East Coast towns, 94-7.
Immunity from attack, question and answer, in the House, 231-2.
Libau, and Zeppelin destroyed, 130.
Agamemnon, H.M.S., attack on Dardanelles, 407-9.
Agnew, Walter L., Midshipman, survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable*.
Akaba, demonstration by French cruiser *Desaix*, and party landed, 419.
Albion, H.M.S., attack on Dardanelles, 409.
Alexandretta, *see under* Syria.
Allen, Captain J. D., H.M.S. *Kent*, description of Falkland Islands battle, 89-90.
Allenby, Rear-Admiral Reginald Arthur, M.V.O., placed on retired list at own request, 469.
Allendale, Viscount, on alien enemies in Great Britain, 32, 33, 35.
Allison, Master of *Northumberland*, case of (1744), 430.
Alton, Paymaster-in-Chief C., C.B., mentioned in despatches, 150.
Amphion, H.M.S.: 428.
Payments to widows of men lost on, 322.
Anderson, Wm. C., M.P., question *re* Admiralty transports, rates of payment, 401.
Antivari, *Dague* sunk by mine at, 420.
Antwerp, *see under* Belgium.
Apolda, S.S., prize of war, 400-1.
Aquitania, Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke on expenditure on, 331.
Arabia, Hodeidah, French Consul at, release by Turks, 419.
Arethusa, H.M.S., action off Dogger Bank, 122-7.
Argo S.S. Co., Bremen, holding of British pilotage certificates by masters employed by, 421.
Ark Royal, H.M.S., at Dardanelles, 407.
Arquebus, French cruiser, 398, 406.
Asia Minor, coast, fortification by Turks under direction of German officers, 214.
Askold, Russian cruiser at Jaffa, 21.
Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., M.P.: 142, 143.
Letter to Mr. Rea *re* State compensation for damages on East Coast, 46.
Replies to questions in the House:
Mr. Churchill's interview in the *Matin*, 461.
Compensation for damage by German raids, 240.
East Coast bombardment, casualties, 413.
German blockade, 414.
German submarine war on merchant ships, 461-2.
German violation of international law, 228.
Treatment of captured German raiders, 231.

Astræa, H.M.S., bombardment of Kwale Island and Kiwindje, 206.
Asturias, British hospital ship, attack on, by German submarine, 165-71, 461.
Admission by German Embassy at Washington, 169.
Correspondence between Lord Robert Cecil and Dr. T. J. Macnamara, 169-71.
Statements by master and officers, 167-9.
Attack, H.M.S., in action off Dogger Bank, 124.
Attack, case of (1812), 431.
Augagneur, Victor, French Minister of Marine:
Statement on German attacks on merchant ships, 143-4.
Visit to England, 142-3.
Aurora, H.M.S., action off Dogger Bank, 122.
Australia:
Navy, Marquess of Crewe on assistance by, 59.
Occupation of Bougainville, 21.
Austria-Hungary:
American Government's attitude towards, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 114.
Arrangement with, *re* repatriation of British and Austrian subjects, and position *re*, 42-3.
Hague Conventions ratified by, 234.
Ships in Great Britain, *see* Interned enemy ships, *under* Great Britain.
Subjects in Great Britain, *see* Alien Enemies, *under* Great Britain.
Austrians, question *re* holding of British pilotage certificates by, and reply, 420-1.
Aylen, Lieut. Clarence Edward Henry, awarded Royal Naval Reserve Officers' Decoration, 151.
Azores, German cable, cutting of, referred to, 101.

B 11, operations in the Dardanelles, 13th Dec., awards of D.S.M. for, 148-9.
Babington, Flight Comdr. John Tremayne, Companion, Distinguished Service Order, 147.
Bacon, Rear-Adm. Reginald Hugh Spencer, C.V.O., D.S.O., granted temporary commission in Royal Marines, as Colonel Second Commandant, 151.
Baden, German transport, Falkland Isles battle, 85-6, 90-3.
Baden-Powell, Major-General, 39.
Baker, H., M.P., replies to questions in the House:
Chartering of ships for internment of German prisoners, 309.
Payment for hire of ships on which aliens interned, 402.
Trawlers hired by War Office as examination vessels, 224, 239-40.
Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., M.P., 142, 143.
Ballard, Commander, H.M.S. *Formidable*, 3, 8.
Baltic, German cruiser *Gazelle* attacked by submarine in, 129-30.
Bamford, Francis G. H., Boy 1st Cl., H.M.S. *Tiger*, mentioned in despatches, 125.
Barnes, George, M.P.:
Question *re* warrant engineers, R.N.R., promotion, 209-10.
on R.N.D. superannuation allowances, 285-6.
Speech in debate on Navy Estimates, 283-6.
on Training scheme for officers, 283-5, 286.
Barnston, H., M.P., question *re* midshipmen on active service, 414.
Barr, Comdr. James, H.M.S. *Carmania*, Companion, Order of the Bath, 149.
Barrett, Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. A., K.C.B., K.C.V.O., report on operations near Shatt-el-Arab, 98.
Bartholdt, Mr., 135.
Bath, Most Honourable Order of the, *see under* Great Britain.
Batum, *see under* Russia.
Beachy Head, *see under* Great Britain.
Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.: 253.
Action off Dogger Bank, 115-26.
Despatch on, 121-6.
Beauchamp, Earl:
on Naval courts-martial, 451-4.
on the Naval Prize Fund, 68.
on War risks and State compensation, 49.
Behncke, Admiral: 95.
on the Naval situation, 395-7.
Beikos, *see under* Turkey in Asia.
Belgium:
Antwerp, operations round, 3rd to 9th October:
Awards of D.S.M. for, 147-8.
Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke on, 332.

INDEX

Belgium (*continued*):
Antwerp, operations round, 3rd to 9th October (*continued*):
Mr. M'Neill on promotion of Quartermaster-Sergeants acting as officers in, 371-2; reply by Dr. Macnamara on, 388.
Earl of Selborne on, 51.
Blankenberghe, air raids on, 236-7, 393-4, 394.
Bruges, British air raid, 236.
Ghistelles, French air raid, 394.
Hague Conventions ratified by, 234.
Knocke, air raids on, 237, 394.
Middelkerke, British air raid, 236, 393-4.
Naval operations off coast, 17th Oct. to 9th Nov., awards of D.S.M. for, 148.
Naval ratings serving in, method of payment, Admiralty Order, 161-2.
Ostend, air raids on, 236-7, 393-4.
Zeebrugge, air raids on, 127, 236-7, 393-4, 394.
Bell, J. W., Master of S.S. *Thordis*:
Attack on U boat, 464-7.
Awarded D.S.C., 466.
Awarded Medal for Special Merit, 467.
Granted temporary commission of lieutenant in R.N.R., 466, 467.
Belridge, Norwegian tank ship, torpedoed, 405.
Ben Cruachan, British ship, torpedoed by German submarine, 144.
Benn, S., M.P., questions in the House:
Midshipmen's pay, 403.
Pay of junior officers R.N.R., R.N.V.R., etc., 403.
Bennet:
Alan H., Stoker 1st Cl., H.M.S. *Tiger*, mentioned in despatches, 126.
Miss Mary Barbara, awarded Royal Red Cross, 469.
Beresford, Admiral Lord Charles, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., M.P.: 313, 327, 328, 330, 356, 358.
Questions in the House:
Compensation to seamen for loss of kit, 234.
Declaration of London, 208, 412.
Funeral of men washed ashore from H.M.S. *Viknor*, 128.
German blockade, 413-14.
German violation of international law, 227-8.
Beresford, Admiral Lord Charles, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., M.P. (*continued*):
Questions in the House (*continued*):
Interned alien prisoners in Portsmouth Harbour, 235.
Licensed watermen, 235.
Naval casualties, 311.
Naval defence for convoys, 11, 191.
R.F.A. *Petroleum* allotments and reparation allowances, 224.
Prize money and prize bounty, 210, 211, 315.
Retired naval officers called up for service, 208.
Royal Marine retired officers, 398.
Treatment of captured German raiders, 231.
H.M.S. *Viknor*, 128-9, 129.
Speech, in debate on Navy Estimates, on Naval courts-martial, 266-75.
Bernstorff, Count, German Ambassador in U.S.A.:
Alleged American sales of dum-dum bullets to Great Britain, 107-8.
on Sinking of the *William P. Frye*, 136.
Berwick, case of (1795), 431.
Bigland, A., M.P.:
on Conditional contraband, 340-2.
Question in the House *re* Dutch rights in Rhine waters, 190.
Birkenfels, S.S., prize of war, 400-1, 458.
Birmingham, H.M.S., action off Dogger Bank, 121.
Black Sea, operations in, 22-3, 98, 130, 207, 213-14.
Blackburn, Acting Leading Stoker John, H.M.S. *Tiger*, mentioned in despatches, 126.
Blacknose, case of (1657), 430.
Blake, Able Seaman Tom, Submarine *B 11*, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 149.
Blanche, frigate, case of (1805), 424-5.
Blankenberghe, *see under* Belgium.
Blessing, case of (1657), 430.
Blücher, German battle-cruiser: 252.
Action off Dogger Bank, and sinking of, 115-24.
Death of Captain of, and funeral at Edinburgh, 393.
Board of Trade, *see under* Great Britain.

Boland, J. P., M.P., question in the House *re* Catholics in the Fleet, 310.
Bolton, Capt., *Chester,* case of (1707), 430.
Booth, F. H., M.P., on life insurance in the Navy, 415-16.
Borkum, S.S. *Evelyn* sunk by mine off, 418.
Bosphorus, *Goeben* in, 98-9, 214.
Bossart, Rifleman, wounded at Wanga, 206.
Bougainville (Solomon Islands), Australian occupation, 21.
Boulogne, *see under* France.
Bouvet, French warship, attack on Dardanelles, 407.
Bowles, F. D., Secretary, Association of Industrial Assurance Companies and Collecting Friendly Societies, letter *re* life insurance of men in Regular Forces, 416.
Boy-Ed, Capt., German Naval Attaché, U.S.A., 136.
Bradley, Emmanuel Omega, leading carpenter's crew, H.M.S. *Lion,* mentioned in despatches, 126.
Brandt, Captain, 86.
Branksome Chine, torpedoed, 462.
Breslau, Turkish cruiser:
at Batum, 207.
Bombardment of Yalta, 213.
Encounter with Russian Black Sea Fleet, 22.
Escape from Straits of Messina:
Lord Robert Cecil on, 352.
Earl Curzon on, 67.
Earl of Selborne on, 53-4.
Pursuit by Russian Fleet, 130.
Briggs, Squadron Comdr. Edward Featherstone, Companion of the Distinguished Service Order, 147.
Brilliant, H.M.S., 148.
Bristol, H.M.S., Falkland Isles battle, 85-86, 90-93.
British Ships (Transfer Restriction) Bill, second reading, 455-8.
Brixham, *see under* Great Britain.
Brock, Captain Osmond de B., H.M.S. *Princess Royal,* action off Dogger Bank, 121-4.
Broodbank, J. G., member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Bruce, Sergeant Gideon Harry, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Bruges, *see under* Belgium.
Bryan, W. J., American Secretary of State:
Correspondence:
with Ambassador in London:
re Use of American flag by British merchant ships, 173-6.
re S.S. *Wilhelmina,* 194-202.
with British Ambassador *re* British ship *Farn,* 76-80.
with Mr. Gerard *re* sinking of the *William P. Frye,* 138-42.
Letter to Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee defending neutrality of United States, 100-14.
Buckle, Able Seaman Edward, Submarine *B 11,* awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 149.
Buenos Ayres, S.S. *Holger* at, 406-7.
Bull, Sir William, M.P.:
Question *re* midshipmen on active service, 190.
Reply to, *re* Zeppelin raid on East Coast, 96.
Bulwark, H.M.S.:
Loss of, 52, 62.
Pensions to dependants of officers and men lost on, 230-1.
Position of widows and children of officers lost on, 287-9, 460-1.
Bunbury, Lieut.-Comdr. Evan C., H.M.S. *Lion,* mentioned in despatches, 125.
Burgoyne, Captain, of *Captain,* 431.
Burton, Joseph H., Gunner (T), H.M.S. *Lion,* mentioned in despatches, 125.
Butcher, J. G., M.P.:
on Non-holding of Naval courts-martial, 347-51.
Speech in debate in Committee on Naval Estimates, 347-51, 356.
Byng, Admiral, 428.

Calder, Admiral, 442.
Callaghan:
Lieut.-Comdr. Cyril, H.M.S. *Attack,* in action off Dogger Bank, 124.
Chief Stoker Patrick, H.M.S. *Lion,* mentioned in despatches, 126.
Cambank, S.S., torpedoed, 405, 462.
Cambon, Paul, French Ambassador, 142.
Campbell, David, of the *Kildalton,* death on Easter Island, 134.
Camperdown, Earl of, on the Naval Prize Fund, 67-70.
Cannon, Mechanician Alexander James, H.M.S. *Lion,* mentioned in despatches, 126.

Canopus, H.M.S., 86, 89, 94, 281.
Cap Trafalgar, 411.
Cape Helles Fort, *see under* Turkey.
Capetown, prizes of war at, questions and answers in the House, 400-1, 458.
Captain, case of (1870), 431-2.
Carden, Vice-Admiral Sackville H., attack on the Dardanelles under, 407-11.
Carmania, H.M.S., 147, 149, 411.
Carozzi, Mr., editor of *Syren and Shipping*, 464.
Carter, Mate, smack *Provident*: 4, 6.
Presentation to, 11.
Cecil, Lord Robert, M.P.:
Correspondence with Dr. Macnamara *re* German attack on hospital ship *Asturias*, 169-71.
Questions in the House:
German attack on the *Asturias*, 165, 165-6.
Naval courts-martial, 227.
Speech in debate in Committee on Navy Estimates, on Non-holding of Naval courts-martial, 351-5.
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. A., M.P., question *re* Navy boots, 229.
Chandler, Alfred, member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Chappell, Petty Officer Robert, S.S. *Falcon*, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Char, H.M.S., loss of, 83.
Charcas, British chartered vessel, sunk by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 132.
Chatfield, Captain Alfred E. M., C.V.O., H.M.S. *Lion*, action off Dogger Bank, 121-4.
Chester, case of (1707), 430.
Chilcott, Admiral, detention in Germany, 460.
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston L. Spencer, M.P.: 11, 56, 191.
on the Allied Fleets, interview with *Matin* special correspondent, 164-5; question and answer in the House *re*, 461.
Criticism of:
by Mr. Falle, 276-7.
by Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke, 330-2.
by Earl of Selborne, 423-4.
Replies to questions in the House:
Enemy ships captured, 222.
German submarines, 223.
Imperial Ottoman Docks and Arsenals Co., 222.
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston L. Spencer, M.P. (*continued*):
Replies to questions in the House (*continued*):
Interned alien prisoners in Portsmouth Harbour, 235.
Loss of H.M.S. *Formidable*, 12-13.
Naval casualties, 311-12.
Naval courts-martial, 227.
Naval defence for convoys, 191.
Naval mission to Turkey, 221.
H.M.S. *Viknor*, 129.
Statement on Navy Estimates, 241.
Telegram from M. Augagneur, and reply, 142-3.
Telegram of congratulation from Sir John French on Dogger Bank action, 127.
Clan Macnaughton, H.M.S., presumed loss of, 420.
Clarke, John, smack *Provident*, 4, 6:
Presentation to, 11.
Cobbing, A. E., Master of ship *Mary Ada Short*, 133.
Cole, Stoker Petty Officer William Stephen, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 147.
Coles, Captain, of *Captain*, 431.
Collett, Flight-Lieut. C. H., D.S.O., mentioned in despatches, 150.
Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, owner of steamer *Floride*, 133.
Contraband:
Attitude of United States of America, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 103-6.
Conditional, Mr. Bigland on, 340-2.
England's violation of international law, German Government's declaration, 204.
Cook, Lance-Corpl. Walter John, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Cornwall, H.M.S., Falkland Isles battle, 85-6, 90-3.
Cornwallis, H.M.S., attack on Dardanelles, 407-9.
Coronel, battle off: 86-9, 94.
Mr. Falle on, 279-82.
Mr. M'Neill on, 370-1.
Courtney, Squadron-Comdr., aerial attack on Belgian ports, 100.
Cradock, Admiral Sir Christopher, 51, 52, 86, 280, 281, 369.
Craig, Herbert, M.P., question *re* trawlers hired by War Office, 224, 239.
Craven, Thomas, 1st Lieut., *Northumberland*, case of (1744), 430.

Crawford, Capt. C. W. G., mentioned in despatches, 150.
Crawford, Earl of, on alien enemies in Great Britain, 31, 34, 41, 44, 45.
Crescent, case of (1781), 429.
Cressy, H.M.S., loss of: 289, 293.
Admiralty tribute, 312-13.
Non-holding of court-martial:
Lord C. Beresford on, 268-73.
Mr. Falle on, 278.
Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke on, 329.
Dr. Macnamara on, 312-13.
Viscount St. Aldwyn on, 455.
Earl of Selborne on, 54, 452-13.
Crewe, Marquess of: 142-3.
on Alien enemies in Great Britain, 38, 39, 40, 44, 45.
on Naval position, 56-66.
Reply to questions *re* Admiralty courts-martial, 184, 185-6.
Cromer, *see under* Great Britain.
Crystal Palace, *see under* Great Britain.
Cumberland, case of (1707), 430.
Cunard Steamship Co., use of vessels of, and rates of remuneration, 411-12.
Currie, Elisha, leading carpenter's crew H.M.S. *Lion*, mentioned in despatches, 126.
Curzon, Earl, of Kedleston:
on Alien enemies in Great Britain, 33, 43, 44.
on Naval position, 66-7.
Cuxhaven, *see under* Germany.

Dacia, Hamburg-Amerika ship, case of, 26-31.
Dague, French torpedo boat, sunk by mine at Antivari, 420.
Dailey, Frederick E., Chief Carpenter, H.M.S. *Lion*, mentioned in despatches, 125.
Dampier, Capt. C. F., promoted to Rear-Admiral, 469.
Dand, William Beaty, Chief Engine-Room Artificer, 2nd Cl., H.M.S. *New Zealand*, mentioned in despatches, 125.
Dardanelles:
Naval attack on, 407-11.
Operations of Submarine *B 11* in, 13th December, awards of D.S.M. for, 148-9.
Saphir, French submarine, sunk by mine in, 82-3.
Dardanus, *see under* Turkey in Asia.
Dartmouth, *see under* Great Britain.
Davey, Petty Officer Thomas Henry, Submarine *B 11*, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Davidson, Lieut. George Lionel, late of H.M.S. *Loyal*, awarded Distinguished Service Cross, 147.
Davies:
Engineer John, awarded R.N.R. Officers' Decoration, 468.
Squadron Commander Richard B.:
Aerial attack on Zeebrugge, 127.
Mentioned in despatches, 150.
Davis, Able Seaman Henry, H.M.S. *Tiger*, mentioned in despatches, 125.
De Montmorency, Capt. J. P., mentioned in despatches, 150.
Declaration of London:
England's violation of, German Government's declaration, 204.
Mr. M'Neill on, 368.
Modifications by British Government:
Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 113-14.
Question and reply in the House, 208.
Questions and answers in the House *re*, 412.
Declaration of Paris:
Mr. M'Neill on, 368.
England's violation of, German Government's declaration, 204.
Delanoy, Mr., Federal War Risk Bureau, insurance of *Dacia's* cotton, 30.
Dencade, smack *Provident* towed in to Brixham by, 5.
Denison, Admiral John, appointed temporary Captain, R.N.R., 152.
Denmark:
Food imports, Mr. Bigland on, 342.
Ships whose cargoes, or part of them, have been detained, 153, 470.
Vessels detained or captured at sea by H.M. Forces, 469.
Denniss:
C. S., member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 203.
F. R. B., M.P.:
Questions in the House:
Declaration of London, 412.
Hague Conventions, 232-3.
on Requisitioning of ships by Admiralty, 385-6.
D'Entrecasteaux, French warship defence of Suez Canal, 189.
Deptford, S.S., probably mined, 462.
Derfflinger, German battle cruiser, action off Dogger Bank, 115-24.

Dersingham, *see under* Great Britain.
Desaix, French cruiser:
at Akaba, 419.
in the Red Sea, 419.
Desart, Earl of, on Naval courts-martial, 444-7.
Devonport, Lord, member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Dimmock, Able Seaman Ernest, S.S. *Falcon,* awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Dinorah, Austrian S.S. in French employ, torpedoed, 406.
Distinguished Service Cross, *see under* Great Britain,
Distinguished Service Medal, *see under* Great Britain.
Distinguished Service Order, *see under* Great Britain.
Dogger Bank, action off: 115-27.
Mr. Churchill on, 252-4.
Doris, British cruiser, raid on Alexandretta, 115.
Douglas, Anthony, Engine-room Artificer, 1st Cl., Submarine *B 11,* awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 149.
the **Downs,** special examination service in, 83-4.
Downshire, torpedoed, 462.
Dresden, German cruiser: 58, 164.
Battle off Coronel, 86.
Falkland Islands battle, 85-6, 90-3.
Duff, Capt. Arthur A. M., H.M.S. *Birmingham,* action off Dogger Bank, 121.
Dulwich, English collier, torpedoed, 405.
Dum-dum bullets, alleged sale by American citizens to Great Britain, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 107-8.
Dumayne, Sir Frederick G., Secretary of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Duncan, Charles, M.P., on royal dockyards, position and pay of workers, 337-40.
Dunkirk, *see under* France.
Durham, Earl of, on State compensation for damages in East Coast bombardment, 49-50.
Durward, British S.S., torpedoed, 100.

East Africa, *see* German East Africa.
Easter Island:
Crews of ships sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* left at, 132, 133-4.
Sinking of the *Jean* off, 132.
Edinburgh, *see under* Great Britain.
Edington, Francis, Master, H.M.S. *Tiger,* court-martial of (1855), 431.
Egypt:
Ismailia ferry, Turks at, 187, 188.
El Kantara:
Turkish attack on, 187.
Turks at, 188.
Serapeum, Turkish attack on, 187, 188.
Toussoum, Turkish attack on, 187, 188.
Ellis, Chief Petty Officer Bernard Henry, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 147.
Elverston, Sir Harold, M.P., question *re* payment for hire of ships on which aliens are interned, 402.
Emden, H.I.M.S., 244, 331.
Emmott, Lord, on Naval courts-martial, 436-44.
Enemy ships:
See also Interned Enemy Ships *under* Great Britain.
Captured, number and tonnage, and employment, 222.
Rewards for information, etc., Admiralty Order, 154-7.
English Channel:
Declared by Germany a military area, 203, 205-6.
German submarines in, 406.
Ephgrave, Mechanician Edward Charles, H.M.S. *Lion,* mentioned in despatches, 126.
Erdmann, Alexander Karl, Captain of *Blücher,* death and funeral at Edinburgh, 393.
Eriksson, Axmar, Master, *Isabel Browne,* 132.
Evelyn, German S.S., sunk by mine, 418.
Everett, Mr., management of requisitioned enemy ships by, 310.
Eyres, Rear-Admiral Cresswell John, placed on Retired List at own request, 151.

Falcon, H.M.S., 148.
Falkland Islands, battle off, Dec. 8th, 1914:
Mr. Churchill on, 243-4, 251-2, 253.
Marquess of Crewe on, 57-8.
Descriptions, 84-6, 89-93.
Earl of Selborne on, 51-2.
Falle, B. G., M.P.:
on Mr. Churchill, 276-7.

Falle, B. G., M.P. (*continued*):
Questions in the House:
Admiralty swimming collar, 211, 212.
H.M.S. *Fisgard II.*, compensation for loss of kits, 224.
Speeches in debates on Navy Estimates: 276-83, 381-4.
Apprentices in dockyards, 382.
Persian Gulf prize money, 384.
Protest against absence of First Lord of the Admiralty, 275-6.
Royal Marine retired and pensioned officers, position on return to service, 381-2.
Ships' stewards, 382-4.
Warrant officers' separation allowances, 384.
Fanning Island, British cable near, cutting of, referred to, 101.
Fanö Island, loss of German airship *L 3* on, 398.
Farn, British ship, capture of, correspondence with American Government *re,* 76-80.
Fay, Sir Sam, member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Fell, A., M.P., questions in the House:
Enemy ships captured, 222.
Prizes of war, 400-1, 457.
Zeppelin raid, 231, 232.
Ferens, Rt. Hon. T. R., M.P., question *re* compensation for damage by German raids, 240.
Ferris, Chief Stoker Alfred William, H.M.S. *Lion,* mentioned in despatches, 126.
Firth of Forth, *see under* Great Britain.
Fisgard II., H.M.S., compensation for loss of kits, 224.
Fisher:
Admiral of the Fleet Lord, of Kilverstone, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., First Sea Lord, 56, 252, 277, 423.
Admiral (retired) William Blake, C.B. (temp. Captain), granted temporary commission as Captain R.N.R., 151.
Flannery, Sir Fortescue, M.P., on freights, 459.
Fleet, Charles Joseph, Private, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Fletcher, E. J., Cadet, hospital ship *Asturias*: 167, 168.
Statement *re* German attack, 168-9.
Flood, Stoker Petty Officer Michael, R.F.R., H.M.S. *Meteor,* mentioned in despatches, 126.
Floride, French steamer, sunk by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich,* 133.
Folkestone, *see under* Great Britain.
Foote, Frederick George, Signalman, Submarine *B 11,* awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, 149.
Formidable, H.M.S., loss of: 1-11, 12-13, 52, 54, 62, 191, 428.
Non-holding of court-martial:
Lord Beresford on, 268-73.
Mr. Butcher on, 348-50.
Lord R. Cecil on, 353.
Mr. Falle on, 282-3.
Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke on, 330.
Viscount St. Aldwyn on, 455.
Earl of Selborne on, 432.
Sir J. Simon on, 361.
Question *re* showing of lights off Shoreham and Hove, and reply, 239.
Fountaine, Commander Charles A., H.M.S. *Lion,* mentioned in despatches, 125.
France:
Air raids on Belgian coast, 236-7, 394.
Boulogne, passenger boat from Folkestone attacked by submarine, 418.
Coast:
German attack on British hospital ship *Asturias* off, 165-71.
Navigation on, German Admiralty Staff notice concerning, 163.
Submarine off, French attack on, 418.
U 16 off, 393.
Confinement of non-combatants in detention camps, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 111.
Consul at Hodeidah, release by Turks, 419.
Dunkirk:
German air raid, 127.
Marie mined at, 420.
Fleet:
Assistance by, Marquess of Crewe on, 59.
Attack on Dardanelles, 407-11.
Attack on German submarine near Boulogne, 418.
Losses:
Dague, torpedo boat, mined at Antivari, 420.
Marie, mine-sweeper, mined at Dunkirk, 420.

France (*continued*):
Fleet (*continued*):
Losses (*continued*):
Saphir, submarine, sunk by mine in Dardanelles, 82-3.
Hague Conventions ratified by, 234.
Havre, torpedoing of British merchant ships near, 144, 145-6.
Matin, interview with Mr. Churchill, 164-5; question and answer in the House *re*, 461.
Merchant ships, losses:
Floride, sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 133.
Jacobsen, sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 132.
Jean, collier, sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 132, 133.
Pierre Loti, sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 132.
Ville de Lille, S.S., destroyed by submarine, 406.
Minister of Marine, *see* Augagneur, Victor.
Naval ratings serving in, method of payment, Admiralty Order, 161-2.
Treaties *re* navigation of the Rhine, 190.
Franks, Lance-Corpl. Thomas Charles, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Fraser, J. W., 3rd Officer, hospital ship *Asturias*, statement *re* German attack, 168.
French:
Major Arthur Harwood, Companion, Distinguished Service Order, 147.
Field-Marshal Sir John D. P.:
Despatch submitting list of names, 150.
Telegram of congratulation on Dogger Bank action, 127.

Gallieford, Sergt.-Major (acting) James Thomas, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Gallier, S.S., 459.
Galveston, *see under* United States of America.
Galway, Viscount, on alien enemies in Great Britain, 37.
Gaulois, French warship, attack on Dardanelles, 407-10.
Gazelle, German cruiser, attacked by submarine in the Baltic, 129-30.
Geddes, E. C., member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Geier, German S.S., at Honolulu, 112.
General Steam Navigation Co., owners of ship *Oriole*, 146.
Genoa, British ships waiting to discharge at, 399.
George V., H.M. King:
Congratulations on Falkland Islands battle, 86.
Presentation of silver medal, for gallantry, to skipper and crew of the *Provident*, 11.
George, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd, M.P., replies to questions in the House:
Compensation for damage in East Coast raid, 400.
Separation allowances and pensions, 308.
Gerard, James W., American Ambassador in Germany: 136
Correspondence with Secretary of State *re* sinking of the *William P. Frye*, 138-42.
German East Africa:
Blockade of, 419-20.
Kisiwani, bombarded by English cruiser, 206.
Kiwindje, fired at, by English cruiser, 206.
Kwale Island, customs-house fired on by British cruiser, 206.
Operations in, 206.
Wanga, affair of outposts at, 206.
German Raiders, treatment of, question and answer in the House, 231.
German South-West Africa, Swakopmund, occupation by Union forces, 81-2.
German-American Alliance, 135.
Germans:
See also Alien enemies *under* Great Britain.
British pilotage certificates held by, 421.
in U.S.A., fraudulent use of passports, 109.
Germany:
Admiralty notice concerning navigation on the French coast, 163.
Air raids:
on Dunkirk, 127.
on English East Coast towns, 94-7.
Immunity from attack, questions and answers in the House, 231-2.
Libau bombed, and Zeppelin destroyed, 130.
Airships, *L 3* and *L 4*, loss of, 398.

Germany (*continued*):
Ambassador in Holland, communication concerning navigation in the North Sea, 23-4.
Ambassador in U.S.A., *see* Bernstorff, Count.
American Ambassador, *see* Gerard, James W.
American Government's attitude towards, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 114.
American Naval Attaché, *see* Gherardi, Lieut.-Commander Walter R.
American note to, *re* sinking of the *William P. Frye*, and reply, 136-42.
Arrangement with, *re* repatriation of British and German subjects, and position *re*, 42-3.
British Blockade:
Mr. Churchill on, 257-8.
Proposal by Lord C. Beresford, 266-7.
Question by Lord C. Beresford, and reply by Mr. Asquith, 413-14.
Commerce destroying raiders, difficulties of, 58.
Cuxhaven, British air raid on, Earl of Selborne on, 52.
Fleet:
Capture of British ship *Fain*, correspondence between Sir C. Spring-Rice and Mr. Bryan, 76-80.
Losses:
Baden, 85.
Blücher, 115, 166, 117, 118.
Gneisenau, 85, 92.
Leipzig, 85, 93.
Nürnberg, 85, 89, 90, 93.
Santa Isabel, 85.
Scharnhorst, 85, 91-2.
Torpedo boat sunk by Russian submarine off Cape Moen, Denmark, 143.
Submarines:
Attack on British hospital ship *Asturias*, 165-71.
Attack on, by S.S. *Thordis*, 464-7.
Attack on, in Irish Sea, by H.M.S. *Vanduara*, 163-4.
Attack on passenger boat from Folkestone to Boulogne, 418.
British transport sunk, 418.
S.S. *Cambank* torpedoed, 465.
S.S. *Durward* torpedoed, 100.
in English Channel, 406.
French attack on, near Boulogne, 418.
Germany (*continued*):
Fleet (*continued*):
Submarines (*continued*):
in Irish Sea, 144, 406.
S.S. *Laertes* chased by, in North Sea, 220-1.
Norwegian tank ship *Belridge* attacked, 405.
Numbers, 223.
War against merchant ships: 143-6:
Admiral Behncke on, 395-6.
Mr. Churchill on, 257-8.
German warning to neutral ships, 207.
Question and answer in the House *re*, 461-2.
Statistics, 462.
Foodstuffs, Government control: 130-1.
Case of S.S. *Wilhelmina* in connection with, 194-202.
German communication to U.S.A. *re*, 195-6.
Government:
Declaration of British waters as a military area, 203, 205-6.
Admiral Behncke on, 395-7.
Declaration on England's violation of international law, 203-6.
Hague Conventions ratified by, 234.
Naval warfare, Count Ernest von Reventlow on, 74-5.
Officers, Turks fortifying the coast of Asia Minor under direction of, 214.
Ships:
American purchase, Bill for, 27-8.
Detained or captured at sea by H.M. Armed Forces, 152.
Evelyn, cotton steamer, sunk by mine, 418.
Interned in Great Britain, *see under* Great Britain.
Interned liners at Newport News, 136.
Internment at Honolulu, 112.
Treaties *re* navigation of the Rhine, 190.
Use of parcels post for sending supplies to, from America possible, 135.
Violation of international law, British measures in consequence, 227-8.
Warning to neutral ships, 207.
Gerty, Fleet Paymaster F. H., mentioned in despatches, 150.
Gherardi, Lieut.-Commander Walter R., American Naval Attaché at Berlin, interview with Admiral Behncke, 395-7.
Ghistelles. *see under* Belgium.

Gibraltar, Wireless telegraphy officer, travelling allowance, 182.
Gibson, G., and Co., Leith, owners of S.S. *Dūrward*, 100.
Gillespie, W., Chief Engine-Room Artificer, H.M.S. *Meteor*, mentioned in despatches, 125.
Glasgow, H.M.S.:
Battle off Coronel, 86-89.
Battle off Falkland Islands, 85-6, 90-3.
Glossop, Capt. John Collings Taswell, H.M.S. *Sydney*, Companion, Order of the Bath, 149.
Gneisenau, German cruiser:
Battle off Coronel, 86.
Battle off Falkland Islands, 85-6, 90-3.
Gnyevnyi, Russian destroyer, attack on Turkish cruiser *Medjidieh*, 22.
Goeben, Turkish cruiser: 98-9.
in the Bosphorus, 214.
Escape from Straits of Messina:
Lord R. Cecil on, 352.
Marquess of Crewe on, 64.
Earl Curzon on, 67.
Mr. Falle on, 278-9.
Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke on, 329.
Earl of Selborne on, 53-4.
Good Hope, H.M.S.:
Battle off Coronel and loss of, 86-9, 94.
Mr. Falle on, 279-82.
Earl of Selborne on, 54.
Men saved from, appeal for publication of names, Mr. Falle, 282.
Pensions to dependants of officers, and men lost on, 230.
Goodenough, Commodore William E., M.V.O., H.M.S. *Southampton*, action off Dogger Bank, 121.
Goodrich, Admiral Sir James Edward Clifford, K.C.V.O. (retired), granted temporary commission in R.N.R., 151.
Gould, Charles E., wireless operator on H.M.S. *Good Hope*, description of sinking of *Good Hope*, 94.
Gowney, Lieut. David James, awarded Distinguished Service Cross, 147.
Grace, William R., and Co., of New York, sinking of ship owned by, by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 132.
Grahame-White, Flight Comdr. Claude, aerial attack on Belgian ports, 236.
Grant:
Lieutenant Gerald Gordon, awarded Distinguished Service Cross, 147.
Grant (*continued*):
J. A., M.P., question *re* coal transport, 399.
Captain Noel, H.M.S. *Carmania*, Companion, Order of the Bath, 149.
Great Britain:
Admiralty:
Announcement *re* supposed foreign spies, 397-8.
Contracts:
Badges or tokens to men employed on, Dr. Macnamara and Mr. D. Miller on, 373.
in Districts where fishermen thrown out of employment owing to the war, proposal by Mr. D. Miller, 373-4; reply by Dr. Macnamara, 392.
First Lord, *see* Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston L. Spencer, M.P.
First Sea Lord, *see* Fisher, Lord, of Kilverstone.
Monthly Orders, 154-62, 470-8.
Notices to mariners:
Caution when approaching British ports, 13-21, 214-18.
England, East Coast:
River Humber pilotage, 189-90, 237-8.
Irish Channel, North Channel, 463-4.
Yarmouth Roads, restriction of navigation, 84.
England, South Coast:
Portland Harbour approach, 81.
Portland Harbour entrances, anchorage prohibited, 99.
Pilotage stations established at certain ports on account of defensive minefields, 24-6.
Order *re* restriction of navigation, 419.
non-Representation in the House of Lords:
Marquess of Crewe on, 57.
Earl Curzon on, 66.
Earl of Selborne on, 50.
alleged Secret order *re* hoisting of neutral colours, 171.
Transport Department, work of, Mr. Churchill on, 246-8.
Transports, rates of payment, question and answer in the House 401-2.

Great Britain (*continued*):
Alien enemies in:
Debate in House of Lords, 31-45.
Pilotage certificates held by, 420-1.
Repatriation, question by Lord St. Davids, 31-2; reply by Marquess of Crewe, 42-3; Earl of Crawford on, 44-5.
Spies, Admiralty announcement, 397-8.
Statistics, 33, 35.
Ambassador in U.S.A., *see* Spring-Rice, Sir Cecil.
American Ambassador, *see* Page, W. H.
Army:
Insurance policies, 226.
Separation allowances and pensions, new scale, date of coming into operation, 308.
Arrivals and sailings of the overseas steamers (over 300 tons) of all nationalities, 462.
Bath, Most Honourable Order of the, appointments and promotions, 149.
Beachy Head, transport sunk by submarine off, 418.
Board of Trade:
Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Silver Medal for gallantry, presentation, 11.
British waters declared by Germany a military area, 203, 205-6.; Admiral Behncke on, 395-7.
Brixham, survivors from H.M.S. *Formidable* at, 2, 4.
Coal coasting trade:
Questions and answers in the House, 459.
Use of interned ships, 22, 226, 399.
Coast patrol and protection of commerce, questions and answers in the House, 191.
Confinement of non-combatants in detention camp, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 111.
Convoys, naval defence for, question and answer in the House, 191.
Cromer, Zeppelin raid, 95-6.
Crystal Palace, R.N.D. at:
Deaths from cerebro-spinal meningitis, 403.
Health of, 307, 402-3.
Number, 403.

Great Britain (*continued*):
Dartmouth:
Cadets from:
Active service, 414.
Casualties among, 12.
Cadets' training fees, reduction advocated by Mr. Barnes, 284-5, 286.
Dersingham, Zeppelin raid, 94-6.
Desertions from hired ships, etc., Admiralty Order, 478.
Distinguished Service Cross, awards, 147, 221, 466, 468.
Distinguished Service Medal, awards, 147-9.
Distinguished Service Order, Companions, 147.
Dockyard apprentices: Mr. Falle on, 382; reply by Dr. Macnamara, 391.
East Coast:
Aliens on:
Marquess of Crewe on, 40-1.
Viscount Galway on, 37-8.
Coal trade, use of interned and captured German ships, 82, 226, 399.
German bombardment: 35, 37.
Casualties, 413.
State compensation, 46, 49-50, 400.
Earl of Selborne on, 52-3.
Zeppelin raid, 94-7.
Marquess of Crewe on, 59-61.
Immunity from attack, questions and answers in the House, 232.
Edinburgh:
Military funeral of Captain Erdmann, 393.
Naval Recruiting Station, position, Mr. Hogge on, 412, 415; replies by Dr. Macnamara, 412-13, 416-17.
Enemy vessels detained in, question and answer *re*, in House of Lords, 421-2.
Firth of Forth, pilotage notice, 24-5, 26.
Firth of Forth and Clyde Ship Canal, question by Col. Yate, 366.
Fishermen out of employment, Mr. Millar on, 373-4; reply by Dr. Macnamara, 392.
Fishing Vessels:
Compensation for persons injured owing to war, 404.
Insurance, Government scheme, 404-5.
Folkestone-Boulogne passenger boat, attacked by submarine, 448.

Great Britain (*continued*):
German prisoners, chartering of ships for internment of, 298, 309.
German raids, compensation for damage, 240.
Government, attitude *re* S.S. *Wilhelmina*, 197-202.
Greenock Torpedo Factory, wages, 317.
Hague Conventions ratified by, 233-4.
Hartlepool, bombardment, State compensation, 46, 49-50.
Heacham, Zeppelin raid, 94-6.
House of Commons, debates:
British Ships (Transfer Restriction) Bill, 455-8.
Navy estimates, 1915-16, 415-17.
Navy estimates considered in Committee, 312-93.
Supply—Navy Estimates for 1915-16, 241.
House of Lords:
Debates, etc.:
Alien enemies, 31-45.
Naval position, 50-67.
Naval Prize Fund, 67-70.
War risks and State compensation, 46-50.
Non-representation of Admiralty in:
Marquess of Crewe on, 57.
Earl Curzon on, 66.
Earl of Selborne on, 50.
Hove, question *re* signalling from, 239.
Humber River, pilotage notices, 25, 26, 189-90, 237-8.
Hunstanton, Zeppelin raid, 94-6.
Insurance companies, additional premiums for war risks, 226.
Interned enemy ships, requisitioning by Admiralty, 82, 209, 226, 310-11, 399.
King's Lynn, Zeppelin raid, 94-7.
Licensed watermen enlisted for examination duties, non-eligibility for separation allowances, 235.
Life insurance:
Mr. Booth on, 415-16.
Dr. Macnamara on, 417.
Lights on motor cars, etc., Admiralty order, 471-2.
Lyme Regis, survivors from H.M.S. *Formidable* landed at, 2, 3-4.
Medal for Special Merit, awarded, 467.
Merchant Service, tribute to:
Mr. Houston, 346-7.
Mr. Peto, 374-5.

Great Britain (*continued*):
Merchant Ships:
Board of Trade announcement as to compensation for injuries owing to war, 404.
Compensation in case of persons employed on, 212-13.
Compensation for loss of kit, question and answer in the House, 234-5, 400.
German submarine war against: 143-6.
Admiral Behncke on, 395-6.
Mr. Churchill on, 257-8.
German warning to neutral ships, 207.
Question and answer in the House *re*, 461-2.
Statistics, 462.
Life insurance, Dr. Macnamara on, 417.
Losses:
Ben Cruachan, torpedoed in Irish Sea, 144.
Branksome Chine, torpedoed, 462.
Cambank, S.S., torpedoed, 405, 462.
Charcas, sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 132.
Collier torpedoed in Irish Sea, 406.
Deptford, probably mined, 462.
Downshire, torpedoed, 462.
Dulwich, collier, torpedoed, 405.
Durward, S.S., torpedoed, 100.
Harpalion, torpedoed, 462.
Hemisphere, S.S., sunk by *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, 406-7.
Highlandbrae, S.S., sunk by *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, 406-7.
Invercoe, sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 132.
Kildalton, sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 132, 133.
Linda Blanche, torpedoed in Irish Sea, 144.
Mary Ada Short, sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 133.
Oakby, torpedoed, 462.
Oriole, probably torpedoed, 146.
Potaro, S.S., sunk by *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, 406-7.
Rio Parana, torpedoed, 462.
Semantha, S.S., sunk by *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, 406-7.
Statistics, 99-100.

Great Britain (*continued*):
Merchant Ships (*continued*):
Losses (*continued*):
Tokomaru, torpedoed off French coast, 144, 145-6.
Western Coast, torpedoed, 462.
Wilfrid, sailing ship sunk by *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, 406-7.
Willerby, sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 133, 135.
Naval benefits for crews in case of injury or death, 405.
Officers, employment in transport, coaling, and mine-sweeping operations, 400.
Requisitioning of, by Admiralty:
Arbitration Board, 302-3.
Mr. Churchill on, 247-51.
Mr. Denniss on, 385-6.
Mr. Houston on, 342-7.
Mr. Lough on, 299-300.
Dr. Macnamara on, 301-3.
Sir Robert Price on, 296-9.
Sir Joseph Walton on, 303-6.
Use of neutral flags:
Attitude of British Government, 172, 175-6.
Admiral Behncke on, 395-6.
Correspondence between Mr. Secretary Bryan and American Ambassador in London, 173-6.
alleged Secret Admiralty Order, 171.
Wages, questions and answers in the House, 238.
Mine-sweepers, pensions and allowances, 232.
Moray Firth:
Fishing in, relaxation in Orders prohibiting, 472-3.
Pilotage notices, 25, 26.
Naval mission to Turkey, date of withdrawal, 221.
Naval Prize Fund, establishment, 67-70.
Naval transport service, position of captains and officers of merchantmen employed on, 211.
Naval warfare, Count Ernest von Reventlow on, 74-5.
Navy estimates, 404, 415-17.
Osborne, cadets' training fees, reduction advocated by Mr. Barnes, 284-5, 286.
Portland Harbour, Admiralty notices to mariners, 81, 99.

Great Britain (*continued*):
Ports, Advisory Committee on Congestion in, 202.
Portsmouth:
Dockyard:
Discharge of joiners from, Mr. T. Wilson on, 379-81; reply by Dr. Macnamara, 389-90.
Management, Mr. T. Wilson on, 380-1.
Harbour, interned alien enemies on ships in, 235.
Visit of M. Augagneur, 142, 143.
Post Office Savings Bank accounts, Admiralty Order, 478.
Rewards to coast watchers and civilians, Admiralty Order, 470-1.
Rosyth, 325-6.
Royal dockyards:
Increase in wages, Dr. Macnamara on, 315-17, 318.
Increased proportion of men on the established and pensionable list, 318.
Letting out of work to contract, Mr. T. Wilson on, 379-80; reply by Dr. Macnamara, 390-1.
Position of workers, Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke on, 335-7.
Tribute to workers in:
Dr. Macnamara, 315.
Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke, 326.
Wages, Mr. Duncan on, 337-40.
Royal Marines:
Appointment, 151.
Officers:
Pensions to widows, 289.
Periods of half pay and scale of full pay, Admiralty Order, 474-6.
Quartermaster-Sergeants called up from R.F.R.:
Mr. Hohler on, 295-6.
Mr. R. M'Neill on, 372-3.
Dr. Macnamara on, 388-9.
Quartermaster-Sergeants' promotion:
Mr. R. M'Neill on, 371-2.
Dr. Macnamara on, 388.
Retired and pensioned officers' position on return to service, Mr. Falle on, 381-2; and reply by Dr. Macnamara, 391.
Royal Naval Air Service:
Pay, Order in Council, 72-3.
Raids on Belgian ports, 236-7, 393-4.
Reorganisation of, Admiralty Order, 473-4.

Great Britain (*continued*):
Royal Naval Division:
Casualties, summary, 312.
at Crystal Palace:
Deaths from cerebro-spinal meningitis, 403.
Health of, 307, 402-3.
Number, 403.
Officers, allowances, 307-8.
Promotions: 152, 468.
Quartermaster-Sergeants', Mr. R. M'Neill on, 371-2; reply by Dr. Macnamara, 388.
Superannuation allowances, Mr. G. Barnes on, 285-6.
Royal Naval Reserve:
Appointments, 151, 152, 221, 466, 468.
Insurance policies, 226.
Lieutenants, special examination service in the Downs under, 83-4.
Officers:
on Active service, position after the war, 222-3.
in Auxiliary Patrol, allowances, Admiralty Order, 476-7.
Badge or uniform or commission, Mr. Peto on, 377-8; reply by Dr. Macnamara, 389.
Junior officers' pay, 403.
Pay, Mr. Peto on, 375, 378; reply by Dr. Macnamara on, 389.
Warrant engineers, position of, 209-10.
R.N.R. Officers' Decoration, 467, 468.
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve:
Insurance policies, 226.
Junior officers' pay, 403.
Officers, badge or uniform or commission, Mr. Peto on, 377-8; reply by Dr. Macnamara, 389.
Royal Navy:
Admiralty Order against attempted rescues in certain cases, Lord C. Beresford on, 268.
Acting Mate (E), promotion to, Admiralty Order, 476.
Admiralty swimming collar, 211-12.
Allotments and remittances, details, 319-20.
Boots, British and foreign leather, 228-30, 334-5.
Cadets:
Active service, 414.
Casualties among, 12.

Great Britain (*continued*):
Royal Navy (*continued*):
Cadets (*continued*):
at Osborne and Dartmouth, fees, reduction advocated by Mr. Barnes, 284-5.
Casualties:
Mr. Churchill on, 254.
Summary, 311-12.
Catholics in, arrangements for spiritual welfare of, 310.
Chaplains' pay, Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke on, 333-4.
Coaling of, Mr. Churchill on, 247-8.
Courts-martial:
Lord C. Beresford on, 268-75.
Earl Beauchamp on, 451-4.
Mr. Butcher on, 347-51, 356.
Lord R. Cecil on, 351-5.
Mr. Churchill on, 254-6; criticism by Earl of Selborne, 426, 432.
Marquess of Crewe on, 62-4, 184, 185-6.
Earl Curzon on, 66.
Earl of Desart on, 444-7.
Lord Emmott on, 436-44.
Mr. Falle on, 277-83.
Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke on, 327-30.
Marquess of Lansdowne on, 447-51.
Mr. Bonar Law on, 263-4, 362-6.
Questions and answers in the House, 227.
Viscount St. Aldwyn on, 454-5.
Earl of Selborne on, 54-5, 64, 422-35.
Sir J. Simon on, 355-62.
Cruiser attack near Mersina, 24.
Disablement pensions, Dr. Macnamara on, 323-4.
Growth in naval preponderance, Marquess of Crewe on, 61-2.
Guns of, Mr. Churchill on, 252-3.
Increase in *personnel*, 213.
Lieutenants with temporary commissions and on mine-sweepers, question by Mr. Peto, 392.
Losses:
Bulwark, 52, 62.
Char, sunk after collision in the Downs, 85.
Clan Macnaughton, presumed, 420.
Formidable, 1-11, 12, 13, 52, 62.
Good Hope, 87-8, 89, 94.
Monmouth, 87-8, 89.

Great Britain (*continued*):
Royal Navy (*continued*):
Losses (*continued*):
Transport sunk by submarine, 418.
Viknor, H.M.S., 128.
Manning of, Mr. Churchill on, 242.
Maritime control over whole world, Marquess of Crewe on, 58-9.
Midshipmen on active service, pay and private allowance, questions and answers in the House, 190-1, 240, 403, 414-15.
National Reserve, non-payment of bounty, Mr. Hohler on, 294.
Officers:
Appointed for wireless telegraphy duties at Gibraltar, travelling allowance, 182.
Classification and pay, 70-2.
of Engine-room artificers, promotion, Mr. Hohler on, 293-4.
Lieutenant-Commanders' pay, 181-2.
Periods of half pay and scale of full pay, Admiralty Order, 474-5.
on Reserved or Retired Lists called into active service, pay and allowances, 177-8, 208-9.
Revised rates of pay, 178-80.
Training scheme, Mr. Barnes on, 283-5, 286.
Oil for, Mr. Churchill on, 241-2.
Pensions:
Comparison with the Army, Mr. Hohler on, 292-3.
Dr. Macnamara on, 319-25.
Marine officers' widows, 289.
Men entitled to, before outbreak of war, Mr. Hohler on position of, 294-5.
New scale, date of coming into operation, 308.
to Stepchildren, Mr. Hohler on, 289-90, 384-5.
Prize money and bounty:
Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke on, 331-2.
Dr. Macnamara on, 313-15, 387-8.
Mr. R. M'Neill on, 367-8.
Position *re*, 210-11.
Earl of Selborne on, 422.
Promotions, appointments, honours, rewards, 146-52, 467-9.
Raid on Alexandretta, 115.
Ratings serving abroad, method of payment, Admiralty Order, 161-2.

Great Britain (*continued*):
Royal Navy (*continued*):
Separation allowances:
Dr. Macnamara on, 319-25.
New scale, date of coming into operation, 308.
Stokers training as mechanicians, Mr. Hohler on, 293.
Storehouse clerks in ordnance depots and victualling yards, increased wages, Dr. Macnamara on, 317-18.
Training service, rank and emoluments of officer at head of, Order in Council, 219.
Travelling allowances to men on leave, suggestion by Mr. Hohler, 385; reply by Dr. Macnamara, 392.
Uniform allowance to acting mates and acting mates (E), 183-4.
Warrant officers:
Pay of, Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke on, 332.
Separation allowances:
Mr. Falle on, 384.
Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke on, 334.
Dr. Macnamara on, 391-2.
Widows:
Pensions, *see that title above*.
Twenty-six weeks' separation allowance, plus allotment:
Mr. Hohler on non-payment of allotment in certain cases, 290.
Dr. Macnamara on, 321-3.
Work of:
Lord C. Beresford on, 267.
Mr. Churchill on, 164-5, 244-5.
Marquess of Crewe on, 59.
Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke on, 326.
Mr. Bonar Law on, 260-3.
Earl of Selborne on, 55-6.
Royal Red Cross, award, 469.
Royal Victorian Order, promotions and appointments, 149-50.
Scapa Flow, pilotage notice, 25, 26.
Scarborough bombardment, State compensation, 46, 49-50.
Service motor cars, offences by drivers, Admiralty Order, 477-8.
Sheringham, Zeppelin raid, 94-6.
Ships on which aliens interned, chartering, 309, 402.
Ships' stewards, position of, Mr. Falle on, 382-4; reply by Dr. Macnamara, 391.

Great Britain (*continued*):
Ships whose cargoes or part of them have been detained, 153, 154, 469-70.
Shoreham, question *re* signalling from yachts or motor-boats owned by Germans, 239.
Territorial Force, insurance policies, 226.
Tramp steamers used for military transport, life-saving appliances, 223.
Transports:
Discipline on, Mr. Peto on, 377-8, 389; reply by Dr. Macnamara on, 389.
Officers:
Insurance of lives and kits, Mr. Peto on, 375-7; reply by Dr. Macnamara on, 389.
War bonus, Mr. Peto on, 378.
Trawlers, hiring by War Office for examination vessels, 224, 239-40.
Tyne River, pilotage notice, 26.
Vessels detained or captured at sea by H.M. armed forces, 152, 153, 469.
Violation of international law, declaration by German Government, 203-6.
War risks from aircraft or bombardment, State compensation, debate in House of Lords, 46-50.
Warships off American ports, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 108-9.
Whitby, bombardment of, State compensation, 46, 49-50.
Whitehaven area, coal transport from, 399.
Wire, prohibition of export, Sir J. Harmood-Banner on, 386-7; reply by Dr. Macnamara, 392.
Yarmouth, Zeppelin raid, 94-7.
Yarmouth Roads, Admiralty notice to mariners, 84.
Greathed, Lieutenant Bernard W., survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable*.
Green:
Donald P., Engineer-commander, H.M.S. *Lion*, mentioned in despatches, 125.
Herbert C., Third Writer, H.M.S. *Tiger*, mentioned in despatches, 126.
Greene, Francis, Master of British S.S. *Tokomaru*, 145.
Greenock, *see under* Great Britain.
Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward, M.P.: 142-3.
Memorandum *re* case of S.S. *Wilhelmina*, 197-200.
Memorandum *re* use of American flag by S.S. *Lusitania* and merchant ships, 175-6.
Replies to questions in the House:
Dutch rights in Rhine waters, 190.
Hague Conventions, 233-4.
certain Invalid military prisoners in Germany, 460.
Griffin, Able Seaman Herbert F., H.M.S. *Princess Royal*, mentioned in despatches, 125.
Guinness, Eustace J., Midshipman, survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable*.
Hague, the, *see under* Holland.
Hague Conference, 1907:
Conventions ratified and adhered to, 233-4.
German attack on the hospital ship *Asturias*, in breach of, 165-7.
Mr. R. M'Neill on, 368.
Haldane, Viscount, Lord Chancellor, 142-143.
Hall, Pte. George Henry, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Halsey, Capt. Lionel, C.M.G., H.M.S. *New Zealand*, action off Dogger Bank, 121.
Hamilton, Sir Ian, 142.
Hamm, S.S., prize of war, 400-1.
Harding, John, Chief Engine-Room Artificer, 2nd Cl., Submarine *B 11*, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Hardinge, H.M.S., Turkish attack on, in Suez Canal, 187, 188.
Hardy, Stoker Petty Officer Thomas William, H.M.S. *Indomitable*, mentioned in despatches, 126.
Harmood-Banner, Sir J., M.P., on Prohibition of export of wire, 386-7.
Harpalion, torpedoed, 462.
Harrier, 83.
Hartlepool, *see under* Great Britain.
Havre, *see under* France.
Hawke, H.M.S., loss of:
Lord C. Beresford on, 54, 64, 268-73.
Mr. Falle on, 278.
Heacham, *see under* Great Britain.
Helvetia (1878), case of, 439.
Hemisphere, S.S., sunk by *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, 406-7.
Hermes, H.M.S., loss of, Lord C. Beresford on, 268-73.

Highlandbrae, S.S., sunk by *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, 406-7.
Hill, Sir Norman, 386.
Hipper, Rear-Admiral, action off Dogger Bank, 115-24.
Hobhouse, Rt. Hon. C. E. H., M.P., reply to question *re* secret wireless stations, 223.
Hodeidah, *see under* Arabia.
Hogge, J. M., M.P., on Edinburgh Naval Recruiting Station, 412, 415.
Hogue, H.M.S., loss of:
Admiralty tribute, 312-13.
Lord C. Beresford on, 268-73.
Mr. Falle on, 278.
Dr. Macnamara on, 312-13.
Viscount St. Aldwyn on, 455.
Earl of Selborne on, 54, 432-3.
Hohler, G. F., M.P., speeches in debates on Navy Estimates, 286-96, 384-5.
Men entitled to pensions before outbreak of war, 294-5.
Navy pensions, comparison with Army, 292-3.
Non-payment of bounty to National Reserve, 294.
Non-payment of separation allowance and allotment to widows of men lost on the *Pathfinder*, 290.
Non-payment of 26 weeks' allotment to widows in certain cases, 290-2.
Pensions to stepchildren, 289-90, 384-5.
Pensions to widows of Marine officers, 289.
Position of widows and children of officers lost on H.M.S. *Bulwark*, 287-9.
Promotion of officers of engine-room artificers, 293-4.
Quartermaster-Sergeants in Royal Marines, 295-6.
Stokers training as mechanicians, 293.
Travelling allowances to men on leave, 385.
Holland:
Diplomatic reports concerning navigation in the North Sea and English Channel, 23-4.
German Ambassador, communication concerning navigation in the North Sea, 23-4.
The Hague, German Legation, warning to neutral ships, 207.
Hook of, crew of S.S. *Durward* landed at, 100.
Holland (*continued*):
Merchant ship *Maria*, sunk by the *Karlsruhe*, 198.
Passenger traffic to, Home Office restrictions, 462-3.
Ships whose cargoes or part of them have been detained, 154.
Ship detained or captured at sea by H.M. armed forces, 152.
Treaties *re* navigation of the Rhine, 190.
Holger, German S.S. at Buenos Ayres, 406-7.
Holt, Messrs. A., and Co., 220.
Honolulu, German ships at, and internment, 112.
Hood, Rear-Admiral the Hon. H. L. A., C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., mentioned in despatches, 150.
Hook of Holland, *see under* Holland.
Horrigan, Daniel, Gunner, survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable*, 2, 5.
House of Commons, *see under* Great Britain.
House of Lords, *see under* Great Britain.
Houser, M. H., Portland, Oregon, 138.
Houston, R. P., M.P., speech in debate in Committee on the Navy Estimates: 342-7.
Requisitioning of ships by Admiralty, 342-7.
Tribute to Merchant Service, 346-7.
Hove, *see under* Great Britain.
Howe, William, *Virgin*, case of (1657), 430.
Hughes, Evan Richard, Chief Engine-Room Artificer, 1st Cl., H.M.S. *Indomitable*, mentioned in despatches, 125.
Humber River, *see under* Great Britain.
Hume-Williams, W. E., M.P., question *re* tramp steamers used for military transport, life-saving appliances on, 223.
Hunstanton, *see under* Great Britain.
Hurd-Wood, Norman F., Midshipman, survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable*, 1.
Hurst, Lance-Corporal, R.M.L.I., survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable*, 8.
Hutchison, Charles S., Sick Berth Attendant, H.M.S. *Tiger*, mentioned in despatches, 126.
Hyacinth, H.M.S., operations in East Africa, 206.

Icaria, British S.S., torpedoed by German submarine, 144, 145.

Imperial Ottoman Docks and Arsenals Co., contracts with Turkish Government, 222.
Inchcape, Lord, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.: 303.
Chairman of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Report *re* rates of payment for Admiralty transports referred to, 401-2.
Indomitable, H.M.S., action off Dogger Bank, 115-26.
Inflexible, H.M.S.:
Attack on Dardanelles, 407-9.
Falkland Islands battle, 86, 90-93.
Ingleby, H., M.P., question *re* Zeppelin raid on East Coast, 96.
Inver Line, Aberdeen, owner of sailing ship *Invercoe*, 132.
Invercoe, British sailing ship, sunk by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 132.
Irish Channel, Admiralty notice, 463-4.
Irish Sea, German submarines in, 144, 163-4, 406.
Irresistible, H.M.S., attack on Dardanelles, 409.
Isabel Browne, Russian sailing ship, sunk by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 132.
Islington, Lord, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, replies to questions:
Detained enemy vessels, 421-2.
Germans or Austrians holding pilotage certificates, 421.
Ismailia Ferry, *see under* Egypt.

Jack, case of (1781), 424.
Jackson, Mr., 111.
Jacobsen, French sailing ship, sunk by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 132.
Jaffa, *see under* Palestine.
James, Chief Stoker William, H.M.S. *Indomitable*, mentioned in despatches, 126.
Japan:
Cruiser withdrawn from vicinity of Honolulu on complaint by U.S.A., 108.
Hague Conventions ratified by, 234.
Navy, assistance by, Marquess of Crewe on, 59.
Jasper, H.M.S., case of (Crimean War), 439-40.
Jean, French collier vessel, sunk by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 132, 133.
Jeffreys, Commander Robert, H.M.S. *Clan Macnaughton*, 420.
Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John R., K.C.B., K.C.V.O.: 53, 56, 245, 265.
Knight Grand Cross, Order of the Bath, 468.
John Elizabeth, case of (1657), 430.
Johnson, D. Ross, member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Jowett, F. W., M.P., question *re* Mr. Churchill's interview in the *Matin*, 461.
Joyce, Lieut. Harold Owen, late of H.M.S. *Vestal*, awarded Distinguished Service Cross, 147.
Joynson-Hicks, W., M.P., questions in the House:
Casualties among Dartmouth cadets, 12.
Coal coasting trade, 459.
Freights between Tyne and London, 459.
Loss of the *Formidable*, 11.
Naval operations (fleet of which *Formidable* was one), 191.
R.N.D. at Crystal Palace, health of, 402.
Use of interned steamers, 209.

K. D. 3 (formerly British ship *Farn*), correspondence with the American Government *re*, 76-80.
Kantara, *see under* Egypt.
Karlsruhe, German cruiser: 58, 164, 331.
Capture of British ship *Farn*, correspondence with American Government, 76-80.
Dutch ship *Maria* sunk by, 198.
Merchant ships sunk by, 127.
Kearley, Fred W., Officers' Steward, 3rd Cl., H.M.S. *Tiger*, mentioned in despatches, 126.
Keating, Chief Stoker James, R.F.R., H.M.S. *Meteor*, mentioned in despatches, 126.
Kellaway, F. G., M.P., questions in the House:
East Coast bombardment, casualties, 413.
Naval casualties, 311.
Kemp, Lieut.-Comdr. Edmund, awarded R.N.R. Officers' Decoration, 468.
Kennedy, Captain Francis W., H.M.S. *Indomitable*, action off Dogger Bank, 121.
Kennett, Petty Officer John William, H.M.S. *Lion*, mentioned in despatches, 125.

Kenny, Qrmr.-Sergeant George James, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Kent, H.M.S., Falkland Islands battle, 85-86, 89, 90-3, 253.
Keppel, Admiral, case of (1779), 443.
Khopa, *see under* Turkey in Asia.
Kiehne, Capt. H. H., *William P. Frye*: 138.
Account of destruction of ship, 131-2.
Kildalton, British barque sunk by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich,* 132, 133.
King:
J. M., questions in the House:
Imperial Ottoman Docks and Arsenals Company, 222.
Naval mission to Turkey, 221.
W. J., master of sailing-ship *Invercoe,* 132.
King's Lynn, *see under* Great Britain.
Kinloch-Cooke, Sir C., M.P.: 274.
Questions in the House:
Loss of H.M.S. *Formidable,* 12-13.
Naval courts-martial, 227.
Navy boots, 228, 229, 230.
Pensions, Scale B, 231.
Prize money, 210.
Speech in debate in Committee on Navy Estimates: 325-37.
Antwerp expedition, 332.
S.S. *Aquitania,* 331.
Criticism of Mr. Churchill, 330-2.
Naval chaplains' pay, 333-4.
Naval courts-martial, 327-30.
Navy boots, 334-5.
Prize money and bounty, 331-2.
Royal Dockyards, workers in, 335-7.
Separation allowances to wives and children of warrant officers, 334.
Warrant officers' pay, 332-3.
Kinnier, Lieutenant Douglas Reid, S.S. *Ortega,* awarded Distinguished Service Cross, 147.
Kisiwani, *see under* German East Africa.
Kitchener, Field-Marshal Earl, 142-143.
Kiwindje, *see under* German East Africa.
Knocke, *see under* Belgium.
Knothe, Engineer-Lieut. Albert, H.M.S. *Indomitable,* mentioned in despatches, 125.
Knott, Leading Seaman John Thomas, S.S. *Brilliant,* awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Königsberg, 244.
Kronprinz Wilhelm, German auxiliary cruiser: 164
English ships sunk by, 406-7.
Kum Kale Fort, *see under* Turkey in Asia.
Kurna, *see under* Mesopotamia.
Kwale Island, *see under* German East Africa.
Kym, S.S., case of, 342.

L 3, German airship, loss of, 398.
L 4, German airship, loss of, 398.
Laertes, S.S.: 468.
Chased by German submarine in North Sea, 220-1.
Officers presented by Admiralty with gold watches and grant of £3 to each member of crew, 221.
Tribute by Mr. Churchill to captain of, 257.
Laird Clowes, Sir W., quoted and referred to on question of Naval courts-martial, 424-5, 429.
Lambert, G., M.P., 274, 275.
Lang, Private Stuart, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Lansdowne, Marquess of, on Naval courts-martial, 447-51.
Latimer, Ernest, member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Lauderdale, Lord, on case of the *Captain,* (1871), 431.
Laurel, H.M.S., 147.
Law:
Rt. Hon. Bonar, M.P.:
on Employment of shipping by the Admiralty, 245-6, 258-60.
on Management of merchant shipping by Government, 302.
on Naval courts-martial, 263-4, 362-6.
Speech in Navy Estimates Debate, 258-66.
Question *re* management of requisitioned enemy ships, 310-11.
Speech in debate, in Committee on Navy Estimates, on non-holding of naval courts-martial, 362-6.
on Work of the Navy, 260-3.
Charles, Master, statement *re* German attack on the *Asturias,* 167-8.
Lawrence, I.R.M. ship, 366.
Le Seilleur, Able Seaman George Henry, H.M.S. *Lion,* mentioned in despatches, 125.

Leipzig, German cruiser:
Battle off Coronel, 86.
Battle off the Falkland Islands, 85-8, 90-3.
Leonard, Paymaster Jeremiah, awarded R.N.R. Officers' Decoration, 468.
Lerou, V., Master of sailing ship *Jacobsen*, 132.
Lestock, Admiral, case of (1744), 443.
Libau, *see under* Russia.
Liberty, H.M.S., 121.
Linda Blanche, British ship, torpedoed by German submarine, 144.
Lion, H.M.S., action off Dogger Bank, 115-26.
Littlejohns, Acting Comdr. A.S., mentioned in despatches, 150.
Livingstone, Able Seaman Peter Stanley, H.M.S. *Lion*, mentioned in despatches, 125.
Lloyd's Register, 309.
Locksun, German collier at Honolulu, 112.
Lockyer, Lieut.-Comdr. Edmund Laurence Braithwaite, H.M.S. *Carmania*, Companion, Distinguished Service Order, 147.
Lodge, Mr., 28.
Longmore, Wing Comdr., aerial attack on Belgian ports, 100.
Lonsdale, Sir John, M.P., questions in the House:
Loss of the *Formidable*, and showing of lights off Shoreham and Hove, 239.
Wilhelmina, S.S., 193.
Lough, Rt. Hon. T., M.P.:
Question *re* Cunard Steamship Co., 411.
on Use of merchant shipping by the Admiralty, 299-300.
Lovelady, Stoker 1st Cl. Stephen James, Submarine *B 11*, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 149.
Lowe, Leading Seaman (acting) Henry, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Loxley, Captain, H.M.S. *Formidable*, 3, 7.
Loyal, H.M.S., 147.
Lusitania, S.S.: 411.
Sailing to Liverpool under American flag, 173-6.
Lyme Regis, *see under* Great Britain.

Maas, Lightship, 100.
McAdoo, Mr., American Secretary of the Treasury, 30.
McClounan, Sidney, carpenter, survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable*, 1.
MacGregor, Capt. Sir M., Bart., mentioned in despatches, 150.
Machen, Ord. Seaman T., awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
M'Kenna:
Stoker Petty Officer Patrick, Submarine *B 11*, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 149.
Rt. Hon. Reginald, M.P., reply to question in the House *re* Zeppelin raid on East coast, 96-7.
Macnamara, Rt. Hon. T. J., LL.D., M.P., Secretary to the Admiralty: 290, 292, 294, 295, 300-1, 306, 385.
Correspondence with Lord Robert Cecil *re* German attack on hospital ship *Asturias*, 169-71.
Debate on Navy Estimates, 312-25.
Naval supplementary estimate, 1914-15, 404.
Speech in debate in Committee on Navy Estimates, 387-93.
Statements and replies to questions:
Admiralty transports, rates of payment, 401-2.
Admiralty swimming collar, 212.
Allotments and remittances, 319-20.
Cargo ships, 399.
Casualties among Dartmouth cadets, 12.
Catholics in the Fleet, 310.
Coast patrol and protection of commerce, 191.
Cunard Steamship Co., 411.
Disablement pensions, 323-4.
Dockyard apprentices, 391.
Edinburgh Naval Recruiting Station, 412-13, 416-17.
Fisgard II., H.M.S., compensation for loss of kit, 224.
Fishermen out of employment as result of the war, 392.
Funeral of men washed ashore from H.M.S. *Viknor*, 128.
German attack on the *Asturias*, 166-7.
Inspection of vessels, 309.
Insurance policies (war risks), 226.
Licensed watermen, 235.
Life insurance in Navy and Merchant Service, 417.
Loss of the *Formidable*, and showing of lights off Shoreham and Hove, 239.

Macnamara, Rt. Hon. T. J., LL.D., M.P., Secretary to Admiralty (*continued*):
Statements and replies to questions (*continued*):
Merchant Service officers' employment in transport, coaling, and mine-sweeping operations, 400.
Midshipmen, pay and private allowance, 191, 240, 403, 414-15.
Mine-sweepers, pensions and allowances, 232.
Naval Transport Service, 211.
Navy boots, 228-30.
Officers of Merchant Service now in active service in R.N.R., position after the war, 222-3.
Pay of junior officers of R.N.R. and R.N.V.R., 403.
Pensions to dependants of officers and men lost in *Bulwark*, *Good Hope*, and *Monmouth*, 230-1.
R.F.A. *Petroleum* allotments, 225.
Portsmouth Harbour, discharge of joiners, 389-90.
Position of widows and children of officers lost on H.M.S. *Bulwark*, 287, 460-1.
Prize bounty and prize money distribution, 210-11, 313-15, 387-8.
Prizes of war, 400-1, 458.
Retired naval officers called up for service, pay and allowances, 208-9.
Royal Dockyards:
Increased proportion of men on establishment and pensionable list, 318.
Wages in, 315-17, 318.
Work in, 390-1.
Royal Marine officers retired, 398-9.
Royal Marine pensioned officers called up for service, 391.
R.N.D. at Crystal Palace, health of, 403.
R.N.R. officers' pay, etc., 389.
Separation allowances and pensions, 319-25.
Ships' stewards, 391.
Solon, mine-sweeper, 459.
Storehouse clerks in Naval Ordnance depots and victualling yards, 317-18.
Tramp steamers used for military transport, life-saving appliances on, 223.
Transports, discipline, 389.
Travelling allowances, 392.

Macnamara, Rt. Hon. T. J., LL.D., M.P., Secretary to Admiralty (*continued*):
Twenty-six weeks' separation allowances and allotments, 321-3.
Use of merchant shipping by the Admiralty, 301-3.
Use of interned steamers, 209.
Viknor, H.M.S., 129.
Warrant engineers, R.N.R., promotion, 210.
Warrant officers, separation allowance, 391-2.
Wire export prohibition, 392.
M'Neill, R., M.P.:
Questions in the House:
Prize money, 314.
R.N.D. at Crystal Palace, 402-3.
Speech in debate in Committee on Navy Estimates: 367-73.
Action off Coronel, 370-1.
Loss of H.M.S. *Niger*, 368-9.
Prize money distribution, 367-8.
Quartermaster-Sergeants of Marines called up from R.F.R., 372-3.
Quartermaster-Sergeants of R.N.D., promotion, 371-2.
Majestic, H.M.S., attack on Dardanelles, 409.
Makriali, *see under* Russia.
Marchant, Col. 2nd Comdt. Alfred Edmund, C.B., A.D.C., granted temporary rank of Brigadier-General, 152.
Maria, Dutch ship, sunk by the *Karlsruhe*, 198.
Marie, mine-sweeper, sunk by mine at Dunkirk, 420.
Martin, Rear-Admiral W. F., 431.
Mary Ada Short, British S.S., sunk by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 133.
Matthews, Admiral, case of (1744), 443.
Mauretania, S.S., 411.
Maxwell, Capt. W. L., appointed Brigade-Major, 468.
Meade, Capt. the Hon. H., D.S.O., action off Dogger Bank, 123.
Meath, Earl of, on alien enemies of Great Britain, 34-5.
Medjidieh, Turkish cruiser, 22; pursuit by Russian Fleet, 130.
Meeson, Engineer Lieut.-Comdr. Edward Hickman Tucker, H.M.S. *Laurel*, Companion, Distinguished Service Order, 147.
Melsome, Lieut. James, R.N.R., commander of the *Char*, 83.

Mersey, H.M.S., 148.
Mersey, Lord, 302, 303, 401-2.
Mersina, *see under* Turkey in Asia.
Mesopotamia:
Kurna, engagement near, 97-8, 171.
Shatt-el-Arab, engagement at, 97-8.
Messina, Straits of, escape of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*:
Lord R. Cecil on, 352.
Marquess of Crewe on, 64.
Earl Curzon on, 67.
Mr. Falle on, 278-9.
Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke on, 329.
Earl of Selborne on, 53-4.
Meteor, H.M.S., in action off Dogger Bank, 119, 121, 125, 126.
Middelkerke, *see under* Belgium.
Miller:
Captain Charles B., H.M.S. *Nottingham*, action off Dogger Bank, 121.
Duncan, M.P., speech in debate in Committee on Navy Estimates, 373-4.
Badges or tokens to men engaged on Admiralty work, 373.
Fishermen thrown out of employment owing to the war, and proposal *re* Admiralty contracts, 373-4.
Milne, Rear-Admiral Sir Berkeley, Bart., K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, Court of Inquiry into conduct of:
Marquess of Crewe on, 64.
Earl Curzon on, 67.
Earl of Selborne on, 53-4.
Milsom, Petty Officer William Charles, Submarine *B 11*, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Mines:
Admiralty notices to mariners, new pilotage stations on account of defensive minefields, 24-6.
Rewards for information, etc., Admiralty Order, 154-87.
Modin, Sub-Lieut. Charles Oscar Frittriof, awarded Distinguished Service Cross, 147.
Moen Cape, Denmark, German torpedo-boat sunk by Russian submarine off, 143.
Moltke, action off Dogger Bank, 115-24.
Moncreiff, Lord, on alien enemies of Great Britain, 35.
Monmouth, H.M.S.:
Battle of Coronel, and loss of, 54, 86-89, 280.
Monmouth, H.M.S. (*continued*):
Pensions to dependants of officers and men lost on, 230.
Monssion, Master of French steamer *Floride*, 133.
Moore, H. T., member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Moray Firth, *see under* Great Britain.
Mortimer, Leading Seaman Wilfrid Charles, Submarine *B 11*, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 149.
Motteram, Petty Officer Frederick William Georgeson, S.S. *Falcon*, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Mudge, Capt., frigate *Blanche*, case of (1805), 425.
Munitions, American sale to Great Britain and Allies, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 106-8.
Murray, Flight-Lieutenant D., air raid on Belgium, 394.

Netherlands, *see* Holland.
New Zealand, H.M.S., action off Dogger Bank, 115-26.
Newbigin, Mr., management of requisitioned enemy ships by, 310.
Newport News, *see under* United States of America.
Nicholson, Captain Wilmot S., H.M.S. *Aurora*, action off Dogger Bank, 122.
Niger, H.M.S., loss of, Mr. R. M'Neill on, 369-70.
Noble, W. J., member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Nordic, Norwegian ship, landed crews of *Kildalton* and *Jean* at Panama, 133.
North Sea:
British fishing vessels, alleged flying of neutral colours, 23.
S.S. *Laertes* chased by German submarine, 220-1.
Navigation in, German communication to Holland, 23-4.
Northumberland, case of (1744), 430.
Norway:
Ships whose cargoes or part of them have been detained, 153, 154, 470.
Steamer pursued by the *U 16*, 406.
Tank ship *Belridge* torpedoed, 405.
Vessels detained or captured at sea by H.M. armed forces, 469.

Nottingham, H.M.S., action off Dogger Bank, 121.
Nunburnholme, Lord, on alien enemies in Great Britain, 35.
Nürnberg, German cruiser:
Battle off Coronel, 86.
Falkland Islands battle, 85-86, 89.

Oakby, torpedoed, 462.
O'Brien, Flight-Lieut. the Hon. D., missing after raid on Belgium, 394.
Oceanic, H.M.S., 185, 445.
Oceanic, case of, 439.
Oriole, probable loss of, 146.
Orkhanieh Tabia Fort, *see under* Turkey in Asia.
Ortega, S.S., 147.
Osborne, *see under* Great Britain.
Ostend, *see under* Belgium.
Otranto, armed liner, battle off Coronel, 86-89.

Page, W. H., American Ambassador in England, correspondence with Mr. Secretary Bryan:
Use of American flag by British merchant ships, 173-6.
S.S. *Wilhelmina*, 194-202.
Paget, A. H., M.P., question *re* midshipmen's private allowance, 240.
Pakenham, Captain, of *Crescent*, case of (1781), 429.
Palestine, Jaffa, Russian cruiser *Askold* at, 21.
Palliser, Admiral, case of (1779), 443.
Pamyat Markuria, Russian cruiser, attack on Turkish cruiser *Medjidieh*, 22.
Panama, landing of crews of *Kildalton* and *Jean* at, 133.
Panama Canal:
Coaling of warships in zone of, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 113.
Rules for use by belligerent vessels, 157-60.
Pathfinder, H.M.S.:
Non-payment of separation allowance and allotment to widows of men lost on, 290.
Payments to widows of men lost on, 322.
Payne, Chief Petty Officer, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 147.
Pegasus, H.M.S.:
Loss of, Mr. Falle on, 277-8.
Payments to widows of men lost on, 322.
Pegg, John, Mate of S.S. *Thordis*, 465.
Peirse, Flight-Lieut. Richard:
Aerial attack on Zeebrugge, 127.
Mentioned in despatches, 150.
Pelly:
Denis E., Midshipman, survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable*, 1.
Captain Henry B., M.V.O., H.M.S. *Tiger*, action off Dogger Bank, 121.
Pembroke, H.M.S., 474.
Perkins, W. F., M.P., questions *re* pensions to widows and children of officers of H.M.S. *Bulwark*, 460.
Perry, Leading Seaman Alfred Edmund, Submarine *B 11*, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 149.
Persian Gulf:
Arming of Royal Indian Marine vessels in, Colonel Yate on, 366-7.
Prize money, questions and answers in the House, 315, 384.
Peters, Lieut. Frederick T., H.M.S. *Meteor*, mentioned in despatches, 125.
Peto, B., M.P.:
Questions in the House:
Cargo ships, 399.
Compensation for loss of kit, 213, 400.
Compensation for damage in East Coast bombardment, 400.
Insurance policies (war risks), 225-6.
Merchant Service officers, employment in transport, coaling, and mine-sweeping operations, 400.
Merchant ships, wages, 238.
Navy boots, 230.
Officers of Merchant Service now in active service in R.N.R., position after the war, 222-3.
Pay of lieutenants with temporary commissions and serving on mine-sweepers, 392.
Ships waiting to discharge at Genoa, 399.
Speech in debate in Committee on Navy Estimates: 374-8.
Discipline on transports, 377-8.
Officers commanding transports, etc., insurance of lives and kits, 375-7.
R.N.R. officers' pay, 375.
Tribute to the Merchant Service, 374-5.
War bonus for officers on transports, etc., 378.
Petroleum, R.F.A., allotments and separation allowances, 224-5.

Pierre Loti, French sailing-ship, sunk by the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 132.
Pike, Vice-Admiral Frederick Owen, appointed temporary captain, R.N.R., 152.
Pillar, William, skipper of trawler *Provident*: 4, 6.
Presentation to, 11.
Platana, *see under* Turkey in Asia.
v. Pohl, Chief of the German Admiral Staff, 163, 203.
Porte, Squadron-Comdr., aerial attack on Belgian ports, 200.
Portland Harbour, *see under* Great Britain.
Portsmouth, Earl of, on alien enemies in Great Britain, 33, 34.
Portsmouth, Chief Stoker John Ernest James, H.M.S. *New Zealand*, mentioned in despatches, 126.
Portsmouth, *see under* Great Britain.
Portugal, prohibition of export of wire to, criticised by Sir J. Harmood-Banner, 386-7.
Potaro, S.S., sunk by *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, 406-7.
Preece, Engineer-Lieut.-Commdr. George, H.M.S. *Lion*, mentioned in despatches, 125.
President, H.M.S., 474.
Pretyman, E. G., M.P., question *re* pensions to dependants of officers and men lost on the *Bulwark*, *Good Hope*, and *Monmouth*, 230, 231.
Price, Sir Robert, on use of merchant shipping by the Admiralty, 296-9.
Primrose, Hon. N., M.P., replies to questions in the House:
Declaration of London, 208, 412.
Wilhelmina, S.S., 193.
Princess Royal, H.M.S., action off Dogger Bank, 115-25.
Pringle, P. J., member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Prinz Eitel Friedrich, German auxiliary cruiser: 164
at Newport News, 131, 135.
Sinking of the *William P. Frye* and other vessels by, 131-42.
Propert, Capt. William Henry, of S.S. *Laertes*:
Chased by German submarine in North Sea, 220-1.
Granted temporary commission as lieutenant, in R.N.R., and awarded D.S.C., 221, 468.
Tribute to, by Mr. Churchill, 257.
Provident, trawler, rescue of survivors from H.M.S. *Formidable*: 2, 4-6.
Medals presented to skipper and crew of, 11.

Queen Elizabeth, H.M.S.:
Attack on Dardanelles, 408-9.
use of Liquid fuel, 242.
Queen Elizabeth class, guns of, 253.

Rae, Able Seaman Norman Lester, Submarine *B 11*, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 149.
Raffan, P. W., M.P., question *re* soldiers' and sailors' pensions and allowances, 308.
Rathbone, Squadron-Comdr., aerial attack on Belgian ports, 100.
Rawlinson, J. F. P., M.P., protest against procedure in debate on Navy Estimates being made a precedent, 306.
Rea, Walter R., M.P., letter from Prime Minister *re* State compensation for damages on East Coast, 46.
Read, Able Seaman George, Submarine *B 11*, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 149.
Red Sea, cruiser *Desaix* in, 419.
Requin, French warship, defence of Suez Canal, 189.
von Reventlow, Count Ernest, on the naval situation, 74-5.
Reynolds, Engineer W. H., awarded R.N.R. Officers' Decoration, 467.
Rhine River, navigation rights, Sir E. Grey on, 190.
Rigall, Flight-Lieut. E. G., missing after raid on Belgium, 394.
Rio Parana, torpedoed, 462.
Ripley, Ord. Seaman George, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Rize, *see under* Turkey in Asia.
Robertson:
Sir Helenus R., member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
J. M., M.P.:
on British Ships (Transfer Restriction) Bill, 455-6, 457-8.
Replies to questions:
Coal-coasting trade, 459.
Freights between Tyne and London, 459.
Matthew, master of S.S. *Ikaria*, 145.
Robison, Able Seaman Herbert, H.M.S. *Tiger*, mentioned in despatches, 125.

Rogers, Julius F., Boy 1st Cl., H.M.S. *Tiger*, mentioned in despatches, 125.
Root, Mr., 28.
Ropner and Co., owners of S.S. *Willerby*, 133.
Rosyth, *see under* Great Britain.
Rotter, Fleet-Paymaster Charles John Ehrhardt, Companion, Order of the Bath, 149.
Royal Indian Marine:
Arming of vessels of, Colonel Yate on, 366-7; reply by Dr. Macnamara, 387.
Pay of retired officers, Order in Council, 73-4.
Royal Marines, *see under* Great Britain.
Royal Naval Air Service, *see under* Great Britain.
Royal Naval Division, *see under* Great Britain.
Royal Naval Reserve, *see under* Great Britain.
Royal Navy, *see under* Great Britain.
Royal Oak, case of (1707), 430.
Royal Red Cross, *see under* Great Britain.
Royal Sovereign, H.M.S., use of liquid fuel, 242.
Royal Sovereign class, guns of, 253.
Royal Victorian Order, *see under* Great Britain.
Royer, Lieutenant Alfred, H.M.S. *Tiger*, court-martial of (1855), 431.
Runciman, Rt. Hon. Walter, M.P., President of the Board of Trade:
Deputation to, *re* State compensation for losses through aircraft or bombardment, 46.
Replies to questions in the House:
Coal cargoes, 226-7.
Coal transport, 399.
Compensation in case of casualties on merchant ships, 212-13.
Compensation to seamen for loss of kit, 234-5.
Management of requisitioned enemy ships, 310-11.
Merchant ships, wages, 238.
Russia:
Batum, *Breslau* at, 207.
Fleet:
Assistance by, Marquess of Crewe on, 59.
Bombardment of Khopa, 207.
Bombardment of Trebizond, 213, 214.
Russia (*continued*):
Fleet (*continued*):
Operations in the Black Sea, 22-3, 98, 130.
Hague Conventions ratified by, 234.
Libau, Zeppelin raid and destruction of Zeppelin, 130.
Makriali, alleged Turkish bombardment, 22.
Merchant ship, *Isabel Browne*, sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 132.
Ship, alleged sinking of, 189.
Submarine, German torpedo boat sunk off Cape Moen, Denmark, 143.
Yalta:
Alleged Turkish bombardment, 189.
Bombardment by *Breslau*, 213.
Rutherford, W. W., M.P., on British Ships (Transfer Restriction) Bill, 456-7.
Ruttlidge, Mrs., left at Easter Island, 133.

Sacramento, German ship, purchased by America, 27.
St. Aldwyn, Viscount, on naval courts-martial, 454-5.
St. Davids, Lord, on alien enemies in Great Britain, 31, 35.
St. John, Capt. Francis G., M.V.O., H.M.S. *Undaunted*, action off Dogger Bank, 122.
Saint Pierre, French mine-sweeper, takes aboard crew of torpedoed *Tokomaru*, 146.
Salaün, Capitaine de Vaisseau, French Naval Attaché, 142.
Samson, Wing-Comdr. C. R., D.S.O.:
Aerial attack on Belgian ports, 236-7.
Mentioned in despatches, 150.
San Juan, Porto Rico, British ship *Farn* taken into, correspondence with American Government *re*, 76-80.
Sands, Engineer-Comdr. James L., H.M.S. *Southampton*, mentioned in despatches, 125.
Santa Isabel, German transport, Falkland Isles battle, 85-6, 90-3.
Saphir, French submarine sunk by mine in the Dardanelles, 82-3.
Saxton, Sidney W., Asst.-Paymaster, survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable*, 1.
Scapa Flow, *see under* Great Britain.
Scarborough, *see under* Great Britain.
Scharnhorst, German cruiser:
Battle off Coronel, 86.
Battle of Falkland Islands, 85-6, 90-3.

Schwerdt, Lieut. Charles M. R., H.M.S. *Lion,* mentioned in despatches, 125.
Searle, Francis C., surgeon on H.M.S. *Good Hope.*
Sedd-el-Bahr, *see under* Turkey.
Seely, Colonel, 142.
Selborne, Earl of:
on Admiralty courts-martial, 422-35.
on Alien enemies in Great Britain, 36, 39.
on the Naval position and request for information, 50-6.
Questions:
Admiralty courts-martial, 184, 185.
Detained enemy vessels, 421.
Germans or Austrians holding pilotage certificates, 420-1.
Prize money, 422.
Semantha, S.S., sunk by *Kronprinz Wilhelm,* 406-7.
Serapeum, *see under* Egypt.
Sewall, Arthur, and Co., agents of *William P. Frye,* 138.
Seydlitz, action off Dogger Bank, 115-24.
Shatt-el-Arab, *see under* Mesopotamia.
Sheldrake, Carpenter-Lieut. John William, Member, 5th Cl., Royal Victorian Order, 150.
Sheringham, *see under* Great Britain.
Shields, D., member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Shoppee, Lieut. D. C. G., mentioned in despatches, 150.
Shoreham, *see under* Great Britain.
Shortland, Rear-Admiral E. G., mentioned in despatches, 150.
Shuldham, Captain Molyneux, of *Warwick,* case of (1756), 430-1.
Simmonds, Lieut., *Attack,* case of (1812), 431.
Simon, Sir John, Attorney-General, speech in debate in Committee on Navy Estimates on non-holding of navy courts-martial, 355-62.
Simonds, Lieut. Henry D., H.M.S. *Formidable,* 1, 7, 8.
Sims, Stoker Petty Officer Albert John, H.M.S. *New Zealand,* mentioned in despatches, 126.
Sinope, *see under* Turkey in Asia.
Sippe, Flight-Lieut. Sidney Vincent, Companion, Distinguished Service Order, 147.
Skerries, S.S., 133.
Société des Voiliers Dunkerquois, owner of sailing-ship *Jacobsen,* 132.
Société Nouvelle d'Armement, Nantes, owner of *Pierre Loti,* 132.
Soho, 380.
Solon, mine-sweeper, assistance of S.S. *Gallier* by, 459.
Southampton, H.M.S., action off Dogger Bank, 121-2.
Southwark, Lord, on war risks and State compensation, 46-9.
Soutter, Lieutenant James C. J., survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable.*
Sowden, Acting Leading Stoker John Henry, Submarine *B 11,* awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 149.
von Spee, Admiral: 27, 51, 244.
Falkland Islands battle, 84-6, 90-3.
Spencer, Flight Sub-Lieut. T., missing after raid on Belgium, 394.
Sphinx, H.M.S., 366.
Spring-Rice, Rt. Hon. Sir Cecil, G.C.M.G., British Ambassador, Washington, correspondence with American Government *re* ship *Farn,* 76-80.
Stanley, Hon. Arthur, 170.
Stephen, A., and Sons, Glasgow, builders of S.S. *Durward,* 100.
Stephens, W. Derek, Midshipman, survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable,* 1.
Stewart, G., M.P., questions in the House:
Compensation in case of casualties on merchant ships, 212.
Persian Gulf prize money, 315.
Stirling, Surg.-Prob. James A., R.N.V.R., H.M.S. *Meteor,* mentioned in despatches, 125.
Stobart, John, artificer engineer, survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable,* 1.
Stone, Mr., Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, letter from Mr. Secretary Bryan defending neutrality of United States America, 100-14.
Stratton, Colonel, detention in Germany, 460.
Sturdee, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick C. Doveton, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.: 51, 52, 58, 142, 244.
Falkland Islands battle, 84-6, 90-3.
Sturman, Herbert Edward, Boy 1st Cl., S.S. *Mersey,* awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Stranton, North-Eastern Railway Company's S.S., *see Char.*

Suez Canal:
Closure, denial, 187.
Turkish attack on, 187-9.
Suffolk, H.M.S., 280.
Suffren, French warship, attack on Dardanelles, 407-10.
Sugden, Lieut.-Comdr. Walter Heaver Abraham, awarded R.N.R. Officers' Decoration, 468.
Swakopmund, *see under* German South-West Africa.
Sydney, H.M.A.S., 149.
'Syren and Shipping,' award to captain and crew of S.S. *Thordis* for sinking U-boat, 467.
Syria, Alexandretta, British naval raid, 115.

Taylor:
Dan, cook, smack *Provident*, 6; presentation to, 11.
George, boatswain, survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable*, 2.
Tennant, Rt. Hon. H. J., M.P.: 96.
Replies to questions in the House:
German attack on the *Asturias*, 166.
Zeppelin raid, 232.
Terrell, George, secret wireless stations, 225.
Thierichsen, Captain, of *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 135.
Thompson:
Henry, Secretary of Association of Men of Kent and Kentish Men, letter to, from captain of H.M.S. *Kent*, 89-90.
J. Hannay, member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Thomson:
A. N., second officer, hospital ship *Asturias*, statement *re* German attack, 168.
Graeme, Head of Admiralty Transport Department, 246, 304.
Thordis, S.S., attack on U-boat, 464-7.
Tickler, T. G., M. P., questions:
Mine-sweeper *Solon*, 458-9.
Mine-sweepers, pensions and allowances, 232.
Tiger, H.M.S.:
Action off Dogger Bank, 115-26.
alleged Destruction of, 120.
Tiger, H.M.S., case of (1854), 431, 439.
von Tirpitz, Admiral, 75.
Tokomaru, sunk by German submarine, 144, 145-6.
Toussoum, *see under* Egypt.
Transchant, ——, Master of sailing ship *Pierre Loti*, 132.
Trebizond, *see under* Turkey in Asia.
Trengall, T., skipper of mine-sweeper *Solon*, awarded D.S.O. for assistance to S.S. *Gallier*, 459.
Tronberg, Finland, owner of *Isabel Browne*, 132.
Triumph, H.M.S., attack on Dardanelles, 407-9.
Troubridge, Vice-Admiral Ernest C. T., C.B., court-martial on: 434.
Marquess of Crewe on, 64.
Earl Curzon on, 67.
Lord Emmott on, 441.
Earl of Selborne on, 53-4, 428.
Tryson, Sir George, 273.
Turkey:
Attack on Suez Canal, 187-9.
British Naval Mission, date of withdrawal, 221.
Cape Helles Fort, attack on, 407-11.
Cruisers, encounter with Russian ships in Black Sea, 22-3.
Government, contracts of Imperial Ottoman Docks and Arsenals Co., 222.
Sedd-el-Bahr fort, attack on, 408-11.
Ships:
Attacks by Russian Fleet in Black Sea, 130.
Crew of French submarine *Saphir* picked up by, 83.
Losses in Black Sea, 22, 98, 213-14, 214.
Vessels detained and captured at sea by H.M. armed forces, 153.
Turkey in Asia:
Beikos, *Goeben* at, 98-9.
Coast, Russian bombardments of, 23, 98, 207.
Dardanus fort, attack on, 409.
Khopa, Russian bombardment of, 23, 207.
Kum Kale Fort, attack on, 407-11.
Mersina, British attack near, 24.
Orkhanieh Tabia Fort, attack on, 408-11.
Platana, Russian squadron off, 23.
Rize, Russian torpedo-boat attack on, 130.
Sinope, Russian squadron off, 22, 23.

Turkey in Asia (*continued*):
Trebizond:
Bombardment by Russian ships, 130, 213, 214.
Russian squadron off, 23.
Turks, fortifying coast of Asia Minor, 214.
Turner:
Harold, Stoker 2nd Cl., H.M.S. *Tiger*, mentioned in despatches, 126.
Thomas H., Eng.-Comdr., H.M.S. *New Zealand*, mentioned in despatches, 125.
Tyne River, *see under* Great Britain.
Tyrwhitt, Commodore (T.) Reginald Y., C.B., action off Dogger Bank, 115-24.

U 2, S.S. *Laertes* chased probably by, 220-1.
U 16:
S.S. *Dinorah* torpedoed probably by, 406.
French S.S. *Ville de Lille* sunk and Norwegian steamer pursued by, 406.
U 19, S.S. *Durward* torpedoed by, 100.
U 21, sinking of British ships in Irish Sea, 144.
Undaunted, H.M.S., 273; action off Dogger Bank, 122.
von Uchorn, Commander-Lieutenant, *V 5*, alleged destruction of British battle cruiser by, 120.
United States of America:
Ambassador in England, *see* Page, W. H.
Ambassador in Germany, *see* Gerard, James W.
British Ambassador, *see* Spring-Rice, Sir Cecil.
Citizens on neutral vessels in British ports, alleged arrest and imprisonment, Mr. Bryan on, 111.
Citizenship papers and passports, alleged disregard by Great Britain and allies, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 109.
and Contraband, 26.
Dacia case, 26-31.
Flag, use of, by *Lusitania*, and consequent correspondence, 173-6.
Galveston, clearance of *Dacia* from, 30.
German Ambassador, *see* Bernstorff, Count.
German Embassy, admission of attack on hospital ship *Asturias*, 169.
United States of America (*continued*):
Government, correspondence with, relative to capture of British ship *Farn*, 76-80.
Hague Conventions ratified and adhered to by, 234.
Loans to belligerents, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 110.
Mails, censorship of, and alleged destruction on neutral vessels, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 102.
Naval Attaché at Berlin, *see* Gherardi, Lieut.-Comdr. Walter R.
Neutrality, letter from Mr. Secretary Bryan defending, 100-14.
Newport News:
Interned liners at, 136.
Prinz Eitel Friedrich at, 131, 135.
Note to Germany *re* sinking of the *William P. Frye*, and reply, 136-42.
Passports, fraudulent use of, by Germans, 109.
Purchase of German ships, Bill for, 27-8.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, letter to Chairman from Mr. Secretary Bryan defending neutrality of United States of America, 100-14.
Ships:
Bound through Channel or to English ports, procedure proposed by Admiral Behncke, 396-7.
Loss of *William P. Frye*, sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, 131.
Searching of, for German and Austrian subjects, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 102-3.
Submarine cables, freedom of communication by, *versus* censored communication by wireless, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 101-2.
Supplies to Germany, possible use of parcels post for, 135.
alleged Transhipment of British troops and war materials across, Mr. Secretary Bryan on, 112.
Union Metallic Carbridge Co., 107.
Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 107.

V 5, German destroyer, alleged destruction of British battle-cruiser by, 120.
Vanduara, H.M.S., attack on German submarine in Irish Sea, 163-4.
Vengeance, H.M.S., attack on Dardanelles, 407-9.

Veshupi, Island of, observation party on, 94.
Vestal, H.M.S., 147.
Victoria and Albert, H.M. yacht, 150.
Victory, H.M.S., 431.
Viknor, H.M.S.:
Funeral of men washed ashore from, 128.
Loss of, 128.
Seaworthiness of, questions and answers in the House, 128-9.
Ville de Lille, French S.S., destroyed by submarine, 406.
Viper, H.M.S., case of (Crimean War), 439-40.
Virgin, case of (1657), 430.

W. L. Green Commission Co., owners of cargo of S.S. *Wilhelmina,* 194.
Wakeford, Francis H., Asst.-Paymaster R.N.R., survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable,* 1.
Walch, Edmund, Senior Reserve Attendant, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 148.
Walker, Sir H. A., member of Advisory Committee on Congestion in British Ports, 202.
Wallace:
Charles J. M., Asst.-Paymaster, survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable,* 1.
William, Petty Officer, awarded Distinguished Service Medal, 147.
Walsh, James, British Vice-Consul, Havre, 145, 146.
Walton, Sir Joseph, on use of merchant shipping by Admiralty, 303-6.
Wanga, *see under* German East Africa.
Wardle, G. J., M.P., question *re* coal cargoes, 226.
Warwick, case of (1756), 430-1.
Wason, Cathcart, M.P., questions in the House:
Coast patrol, and protection of commerce, 191.
Naval transport service, 211.
Watson, Captain Thomas, *Northumberland* (1744), 430.
Watt, H. A., M.P., questions in the House:
Chartering of ships for internment of German prisoners, 309.
German submarines, 223.
Inspection of vessels built in Scotland, 309.
Webb, Captain Richard, Companion, Order of the Bath, 149.
Wedgwood, Captain U.: 133.
Account of sinking of S.S. *Willerby,* 135.
Weekes, Fleet-Paymaster V. H. T., mentioned in despatches, 150.
Westaway, Stoker Petty Officer Samuel, R.F.R., H.M.S. *Meteor,* mentioned in despatches, 126.
Western Coast, torpedoed, 462.
Westoll, James, owner of ship *Mary Ada Short,* 133.
Whitby, *see under* Great Britain.
White, Samuel G., Chief Writer, H.M.S. *Tiger,* mentioned in despatches, 126.
Whitehaven, *see under* Great Britain.
Wilfrid, sailing ship sunk by *Kronprinz Wilhelm,* 406-7.
Wilhelmina, S.S., case of, 134, 192-202.
Willerby, British S.S., sunk by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich,* 133, 135.
William P. Frye, American sailing vessel:
Sinking of, by *Prinz Eitel Friedrich,* 131-42.
American claim for compensation and reply, 136-42.
Wilson:
Captain Leslie Orme, D.S.O., M.P., appointed to command Hawke Batt. R.N.D., and to be temporary Lieut.-Colonel, 152.
Tyson, M.P., speech in debate in Committee on Navy Estimates: 379-81.
Discharge of joiners from Portsmouth Dockyard, 379-81.
Dockyards, work in, 379-81.
Portsmouth Dockyard, management, 380-1.
Wimborne, Lord, on Naval Prize Fund, 68-70.
Wire, prohibition of export from Great Britain, Sir J. Harmood-Banner on, 386-7; reply by Dr. Macnamara, 392.
Wireless Telegraphy secret stations detection of, 225.
Wise, Lieutenant E. S., mentioned in despatches, 150.
Wood, Captain, S.S. *Durward,* 100.
Wyld, Captain, *Royal Oak,* case of (1707), 430.
Wynne, Trethowan T., Midshipman, survivor from H.M.S. *Formidable,* 1.

Yalta, *see under* Russia.
Yarmouth, *see under* Great Britain.
Yate, Colonel, M.P., questions:
Construction of Firth of Forth and Clyde Ship Canal, 366.
Royal Indian Marine vessels, arming of, 366-7.
Yerburgh, R. A., M.P., questions:
certain Invalid military prisoners in Germany, 460.
Yerburgh, R.A., M.P., questions (*continued*):
Torpedoing of British merchant ships without warning, 461.
Youlten, Basil A. H., Cadet, hospital ship *Asturias*, statement *re* German attack 169.

Zanzibar waters, loss of H.M.S. *Pegasus* in, Mr. Falle on, 277-8.
Zeebrugge, *see under* Belgium.

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